REV. A. A. LAMBING.

No. 936.

Books should be read and studied, but not abused.

Hic sunt nectarei fontes et flumina viva,
Ambrosiæ hic Diæ dona beata fluunt.

HOLY GHOST FATHERS
SCHOLASTICATE
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T.E 25

THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON,

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED

BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

A. A. Lambing
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PREFACE

TO

AN ESSAY IN REFUTATION OF ATHEISM.

It is not without some misgiving that I present the following essay to the public; not, indeed, because I have any lack of confidence in the soundness of its principles, or the combined analytical and synthetic processes by which I attempt to demonstrate the existence of God, the fact of creation, providence, the moral law, and the ground of man's moral obligation to worship God; but from a consciousness of my inability to do justice to the great thesis I have undertaken to defend, and my distrust of the disposition of the public to receive and read with patience what is most likely to be treated as a metaphysical disquisition, and therefore as worthless. Nobody now reads metaphysical works, or any works that pertain to the higher philosophy, and especially such as attempt to vindicate theology as the science of sciences.

All I can say is, that my essay is not metaphysical in the ordinary acceptation of the term, does not attempt to construct a science of abstractions, which are null, and deals only with concretes, with realities. Some of the problems, and the analyses by which I attempt to solve them, may be regarded as abstruse, difficult, and foreign from the ordinary current of thought, as all such discussions must necessarily be; but I have done my best to make my statements and reasonings clear and distinct, plain and intelligible to men of ordinary understanding and intellectual culture.

The greatest difficulty the reader will find arises from the fact that I have not followed the more common methods of proving the existence of God, and that while I have broached no new system of philosophy, I have adopted an unfamiliar method of demonstration, though in my judgment rendered necessary by the logic of the case. I follow neither the ontological method, nor the psychological method, and adopt neither the argument *a priori*, nor the *argument a posteriori*, and while I maintain that the principles of all the real and the knowable are intuitively given I deny that we know that being or God is by intuition.

I have borrowed from Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, from Cousin and Gioberti, heathen and Christian, orthodox and heterodox what I found to my purpose, but I follow no one any further than he follows what I hold to be demonstrable or undeniable truth. I have freely criticized and rejected the teachings of eminent authors, for some of whom I have a profound reverence, but I think my criticisms carry their own justification with them. I have adopted the Ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, asserted by Gioberti; but not till I have by my own analysis of thought, the objective element of thought, and the ideal element of the object, been forced to accept it; and whether I explain and apply it or not in his sense, I certainly take it in none of the senses that, to my knowledge, have been objected to by his critics. I am not a follower of Gioberti; he is not my master; but I cannot reject a truth because he has defended it; and to refuse to name him, and give him credit where credit is honestly his due, because he is in bad odor with a portion of the public, would be an act of meanness and cowardice of which I trust I am incapable.

My essay ought to be acceptable to all who profess to be Christians. What my religion is all the world knows that knows me at all. I am an uncompromising Catholic, and on all proper occasions I glory in avowing my adherence to the See of Rome, and in defending the Catholic faith, and the Roman Pontiff now gloriously reigning, the Vicar of Christ, and Supreme Head and infallible teacher of the Universal Church. Such being the fact, there would be a want of good taste as well as

manliness in seeking to disguise or to conceal it. But in this work I have had no occasion to discuss any question on which there are any differences among those who profess to be Christians, and I have only defended, not the faith, but the preamble to faith, as St. Thomas calls it, against the common enemy of God and man.

I have embodied in this comparatively brief essay the results of my reading and reflections during a long life on the grounds of science, religion, and ethics: they may not be worth much, but I give them to the public for what they are worth They do not solve all the questions that the ingenious and the subtile critic may raise, and fairly respond to all the objections that sophists and cavillers may adduce; but I think the work indicates a method which will be useful to many minds, and, if it converts no atheist, will at least tend to confirm Christians in the fundamental article of their faith, and to put them on their guard against the seductions of a satanic philosophy and a false, but arrogant science to which they are everywhere exposed. I have written to save the cause of truth and sound philosophy, and, in all humility, I submit what I have written to the protection of Him whose honor and glory I have wished to serve, and to the infallible judgment of his Vicar on earth.

O. A. BROWNSON.

Elizabeth, N. J., March, 1873.

ESSAY IN REFUTATION OF ATHEISM.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1873-4.]

I.—INTRODUCTION.

The age of heresy is virtually past. Heresy, in its progressive developments, has successively arraigned and rejected every article in the creed, from "Patrem omnipotentem" down to "Vitam æternam." Following its essential nature, that of arbitrary choice among revealed mysteries and dogmas, of what it will reject or retain, it has eliminated one after another, till it has nothing distinctively Christian remaining, or to distinguish it from pure, unmitigated rationalism and downright naturalism. It retains with the men and women of the advanced, or movement party, hardly a dim and fading reminiscence of the supernatural, and may be said to have exhausted itself, and gone so far that it can go no further.

No new heresy is possible. The pressing, the living controversy of the day is not between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, which virtually ended with Bossuet's *Histoire des Variations du Protestantisme*, and the issue is now between Christianity and infidelity, faith and unbelief, religion and no religion, the worship of God the Creator, or the idolatry of man and nature—in a word between theism and atheism; for pantheism, so fearfully prevalent in modern philosophy, is only a form of atheism, and in substance differs not from what the fool says in his heart, *Non est Deus*. Not all on either side, however, have as yet become aware that this is the real issue, or that the old controversy between the orthodox and the heterodox, or the church and the sects, is not still a living controversy; but all on either side who have looked beneath the surface, and marked the tendencies of modern thought and of modern theories widely received, in their principles if not in their developments, are well aware that the exact question at issue is no longer the church, but back of it in the domain of science and philosophy, and is simply, God or no God?

The scientific theories in vogue are all atheistic, or have at least an atheistic tendency; for they all seek to explain

man and the universe, or the cosmos, without the recognition of God as its first or its final cause. Even the philosophical systems that professedly combat atheism and materialism, fail to recognize the fact of creation from nothing, assume the production of the cosmos by way of emanation, formation, or evolution, which is only a form of atheism. Even philosophical theories which profess to demonstrate the existence of God, bind him fast or completely hedge him in by what they call "the laws of nature," deny him personality or the last complement of rational nature, and take from him his liberty or freedom of action, which is really to deny him, or, what is the same thing, to absorb him in the cosmos.

The ethical theories of our moral philosophers have equally an atheistical tendency. They all seek a basis for virtue without the recognition of God, the creative act, or the divine will. Some place the ethical principle in self-interest, some in utility, some in instinct, some in what they call a moral sense, a moral sentiment, or in a subjective idea; others, in acting according to truth; others, in acting according to the fitness of things, or in reference to universal order. Popular literature, written or inspired in no small part by women, places it in what it calls love, and in doing what love dictates. The love, however, is instinctive, carries its own reason and justification in itself, refuses to be morally bound, and shrinks from the very thought of duty or obligation—a love that moves and operates as one of the great elemental forces of nature, as attraction, gravitation, the wind, the storm, or the lightning. The Christian doctrine that makes virtue consist in voluntary obedience to the law of God as our sovereign, our final cause, and finds the basis of moral obligation in our relation to God as his creatures, created for him as their last end, is hardly entertained by any class of modern ethical philosophers, even when they profess to be Christians.

In politics, the same tendency to eliminate God from society and the state is unmistakable. The statesmen and political philosophers who base their politics on principles derived from theology are exceptions to the rule, and are regarded as "behind the age." Political atheism, or the assumption that the secular order is independent of the spiritual, and can and should exist and act without regard to it, is the popular doctrine throughout Europe and America, alike with monarchists and republicans, and is at the bot-

tom of all the revolutionary movements of the last century and the present. Nothing can be said that will be received with more general repugnance by the men of the age than the assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual order, or the denial that the secular is independent,—supreme.

If we glance at the various projects of reform, moral, political, or social, which are put forth from day to day in such numbers and with so much confidence, we shall see that they are all pervaded by one and the same atheistic thought. We see it in the late Robert Owen's scheme of parallelograms, which avowedly assumed that the race had hitherto been afflicted by a trinity of evils of which it is necessary to get rid, namely, property, marriage, and religion; we see it it in the phalanstery of Charles Fourier, based on passional harmony, or rather on passional indulgence; we see it also in the International Association of working men, who would seem to be moved by a personal hatred of God; finally, we see it in the mystic republic of the late Mazzini, who though he accepts, in name, God and religion, yet makes the people God, and popular instincts religion. The Saint-Simonians, with their *Nouveau Christianisme*, are decidedly pantheists, and the Comtists recognize and worship no God but the grand collective being, humanity; Proudhon declared that we must deny God, or not be able to assert liberty.

This rapid sketch is sufficient to bear out the statement that the living controversy of the day is not between orthodox and heterodox Christians, but between Christianity and atheism, or, what is the same thing, Christianity and pantheism. The battle is not even for supernatural revelation, but for God, the Creator and End of man and the universe, for natural reason and natural society, for the very principle of intellectual, moral, and social life. It is all very well for those excellent people who never look beyond their own convictions or prejudices to tell us that atheism is absurd, and that we need not trouble ourselves about it, for no man in his senses is, or can be, an atheist. But let no one lay this "flattering unction to his soul." Facts, too painfully certain to be disputed, and too numerous to be unheeded by any one who attends at all to what is going on under his very eyes, prove the contrary. The fools are not all dead, and a new crop is born every year.

The Internationals are avowed atheists, and they boast that their association, which is but of yesterday, has already

(1871) two millions of men in France enrolled in its ranks, and four millions in the rest of Europe. Is this nothing? What their principles are, and what their conduct may be expected to be, the murders and incendiarisms of the Paris Commune, which their chiefs approved, have sufficiently taught us. But, under the guise of science and free thought, men of the highest intellectual, literary, and social standing, like Ralph Waldo Emerson and his disciples, like Charles Darwin, Sir John Lubbock, Professors Huxley and Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, Emile Littré, and the Positivists or worshippers of humanity, to say nothing of the Hegelians of Germany and the majority of the medical profession, are daily and hourly propagating atheism, open or disguised, in our higher literary and cultivated classes. The ablest and most approved organs of public opinion in Great Britain and the United States, France and Germany, either defend atheistic science, or treat its advocates with great respect and tenderness, as if the questions they raise were purely speculative, and without any practical bearing on the great and vital interests of man and society. There may be, and we trust there is, much faith, much true piety left in Christendom; but public opinion, we may say the official opinion, —the opinion that finds expression in nearly all modern governments and legislation,—is antichristian, and between Christianity and atheism there is no middle ground, no legitimate halting place.

It certainly, then, is not a work uncalled for, to subject the atheistic and false theistic theories of the day to a brief but rigid examination. The problem we have to solve is the gravest problem that can occupy the human intellect or the human heart, the individual or society. It is, whether there is a God who has created the world from nothing, who is our first cause and our last cause, who has made us for himself as our supreme good, who sustains and governs us by his providence, and has the right to our obedience and worship; or whether we are in the world, coming we know not whence, and going we know not whither, without any rule of life or purpose in our existence.

II.—THEISM IN POSSESSION.

An atheist is one who is not a theist. Atheists may be divided into two classes, positive and negative. Positive atheists are those who deny positively the existence of God,

and profess to be able to prove that God is not; negative atheists are those, who, if they do not deny positively that God is, maintain that he is unknowable, that we have, and can have no proof of his existence, no reason for asserting it, for the hypothesis of a God explains and accounts for nothing. Of this latter class of atheists are the Comtists and the Cosmists, or those who take Auguste Comte for their master and those who swear by Herbert Spencer.

False theists or pantheists reject the name of atheists, and yet are not essentially distinguishable from them. They are divided into several classes: 1, the emanationists, or those who hold that all things emanate, as the stream from the fountain, from the one only being or substance which they call God, and return at length to him and are reabsorbed in him; 2, the generationists, or those who hold that the one only being or substance is in itself both male and female, and generates the world from itself; 3, the formationists, or those who, like Plato and Aristotle, hold that God produces all things by giving form to a preëxisting and eternal matter, as an artificer constructs a house or a temple with materials furnished to his hand; 4, the ontologists, or Spinozists, who assert that nothing is or exists, but being or substance, with its attributes or modes; 5, the psychologists or egoists, or those who assert that nothing exists but the soul, the Ego, and its productions, modes, or affections, as maintained by Fichte.

There are various other shades of pantheism; but all pantheists coalesce and agree in denying the creative act of being producing all things from nothing, and all, except the formationists, represented by Plato and Aristotle, agree in maintaining that there is only one substance, and that the cosmos emanates from it, is generated by it, or is its attribute, mode, affection, or phenomenon. The characteristic of pantheism is the denial of creation from nothing and the creation of substantial existences or second causes, that is, existences capable, when sustained by the first cause, of acting from their own centre and producing effects of their own. Plato and Aristotle approach nearer to theism than any other class of pantheists, and if they had admitted creation they would not be pantheists at all, but theists.

Omitting the philosophers of the Academy and the Lyceum, all pantheists admit only one substance, which is the substance or reality of the cosmos, on which all the cosmic phenomena depend for their reality, and of which they are

simply appearances or manifestations. Here pantheism and atheism coincide, and are one and the same; for whether you call this one substance God, soul, or nature, makes not the least difference in the world, since you assert nothing above or distinguishable from the cosmos. Pantheism may be the more subtle form, but is none the less a form of atheism, and pantheists are really only atheists; for they assert no God distinct from nature, above it, and its creator.

Pantheism is the earliest form of atheism, the first departure from theology, and is not regarded by those who accept it as atheism at all. It undoubtedly retains many theistical conceptions around which the religious sentiments may linger for a time; yet it is no-theism and no-theism is atheism. Pantheism, if one pleases, is inchoate atheism, the first step in the descent from theism, as complete atheism is the last. It is the germ of which atheism is the blossom or the ripe fruit. Pantheism is a misconception of the relation of cause and effect, and the beginning of the corruption of the ideal; atheism is its total corruption and loss. It is implicit not explicit atheism, as every heresy is implicitly though not explicitly the total denial of Christianity, since Christianity is an indivisible whole. In this sense, and in this sense only, are pantheism and atheism distinguishable.

Pantheism in some of its forms underlies all the ancient and modern heathen mythologies; and nothing is more absurd than to suppose that these mythologies were primitive, and that Christianity has been gradually developed from them. Men could not deny God before his existence had been asserted, nor could they identify him with the substance or reality manifested in the cosmic phenomena if they had no notion of his existence. Pantheism and atheism presuppose theism; for the denial cannot precede the affirmation, and either is unintelligible without it, as Protestantism presupposes and is unintelligible without the church in communion with the See of Rome against which it protests. The assertion of the papal supremacy necessarily preceded its denial. Dr. Draper, Sir John Lubbock, as well as a host of others, maintain that the more perfect forms of religion have been developed from the less perfect, as Professor Huxley maintains that life is developed from protoplasm, and protoplasm from proteine, and Charles Darwin that the higher species of animals have been developed from the lower, man from the ape or some one of the monkey tribe, by the gradual operation for ages of what he calls "natural selection."

It has almost passed into an axiom that the human race began, as to religion, in fetichism, and passed progressively through the various forms and stages of polytheism up to the sublime monotheism of the Jews and Christians; yet the only authority for it is that it chimes in with the general theory of progress held by a class of antichristian theorists and socialists, but which has itself no basis in science, history, or philosophy. So far as history goes, the monotheism of the Jews and Christians is older than polytheism, older than fetichism, and in fact, as held by the patriarchs, was the primitive religion of mankind. There is no earlier historical record extant than *Genesis*, and in that we find the recognition and worship of one only God, Creator of the heavens and the earth, as well established as subsequently with the Jews and Christians. The oldest of the Vedas are the least corrupt and superstitious of the sacred books of the Hindoos, but the theology even of the oldest and purest is decidedly pantheistic, which as we have said, presupposes theism, and never could have preceded the theistical theology. Pantheism may be developed by way of corruption from theism, but theism can never be developed in any sense from pantheism.

All the Gentile religions or superstitions, if carefully examined and scientifically analyzed, are seen to have their type in the patriarchal religion,—the type, be it understood, from which they have receded, but not the ideal which they are approaching and struggling to realize. They all have their ideal in the past, and each points to a perfection once possessed, but now lost. Over them all hovers the memory of a departed glory. The genii, devs, or divi, the good and the bad demons of the heathen mythologies, are evidently travesties of the Biblical doctrine of good and bad angels. The doctrine of the fall, of expiation and reparation by the suffering and death of a God or Divine Person, which meets us under various forms in all the Indo-Germanic or Aryan mythologies, and indeed in all the known mythologies of the world, are evidently derived from the teachings of the patriarchal or primitive religion of the race,—not the Christian doctrine of original sin, redemption, and reparation by the passion and death of Our Lord, from them. The heathen doctrines on all these points are mingled with too many silly fables, too many superstitious details and revolting and indecent incidents, to have been primitive, and clearly prove that they are a primitive doc-

trine corrupted. The purest and simplest forms are always the earliest.

We see, also, in all these heathen mythologies, traces or reminiscences of an original belief in the unity of God. Above all the Dii Majores and the Dii Minores there hovers, so to speak, dimly and indistinctly it may be, one supreme and ever-living God, to whom Saturn, Jupiter, Juno, Venus, Vulcan, Mars, Dis, and all the other gods and goddesses to whom temples were erected and sacrifices were offered, were inferior and subject. It is true the heathen regarded him as inaccessible and inexorable; paid him no distinctive worship, and denominated him Fate or Destiny; yet it is clear that in the τὸ ἕν of the Alexandrians, the Eternity of the Persians, above both Ormuzd and Ahriman, the heathen retained at least an obscure and fading reminiscence of the unity and supremacy of the one God of tradition. They knew him, but they did not, when they knew him, worship him as God, but gave his glory unto creatures or empty idols.

We deny, then, that fetichism or any other form of heathenism is or can be the primitive or earliest religion of mankind. The primitive or earliest known religion of mankind was a purely theistical religion. Monotheism is, historically as well as logically, older than polytheism; the worship of God preceded the worship of nature, the elements, the sun, moon, and stars of heaven, or the demons swarming in the air. Christian faith is in substance older than pantheism, as pantheism is older than undisguised atheism. Christian theism is the oldest creed, as well as the oldest philosophy of mankind, and has been from the first and still is the creed of the living and progressive portion of the human race.

Christianity claims, as every body knows, to be the primitive and universal religion, and to be based on absolutely catholic principles. Always and everywhere held, though not held by all individuals, or even nations, free from all admixture of error and superstition. Yet analyze all the heathen religions, eliminate all their differences, as Mr. Herbert Spencer proposes, take what is positive or affirmative, permanent, universal, in them, as distinguished from what in them is negative, limited, local, variable, or transitory, and you will have remaining the principles of Christianity as found in the patriarchal religion, as held in the Synagogue, and taught by the Church of Christ. These

principles are all absolutely catholic or universal, and hence Christianity, in its essential principles at least, is really the universal religion, and in possession as such. The presumption, as say the lawyers, is then decidedly in favor of the Christian and against the atheist.

Christianity, again, not only asserts God and his providence as its fundamental principle, but claims to be the law of God, supernaturally revealed to man, or the revelation which he has made of himself, of his providence, of his will, and of what he exacts of his rational creatures. Then, again, Christianity asserts, in principle, only the catholic or universal belief of the race. The belief in God, in providence, natural power, and in supernatural intervention in human affairs in some form, is universal. Even the atheist shudders at a ghost story, and is surprised by sudden danger into a prayer. Men and nations may in their ignorance or superstition misconceive and misrepresent the Divinity, but they could not do so, if they had no belief that God is. Prayer to God or the gods, which is universal, is full proof of the universality of the belief in Divine Providence and in supernatural intervention. Hence, again, the presumption is in favor of Christian theism and against the atheist.

Of course, this universal belief, or this *consensus hominum*, is not adduced here as full proof of the truth of Christianity, or of the catholic principles on which it rests; but it is adduced as a presumptive proof of Christianity and against atheism, while it undeniably throws the burden of proof on the atheist, or whoever questions it. It is not enough for the atheist to deny God, providence, and the supernatural; he must sustain his denial by proofs strong enough, at least, to turn the presumption against Christianity, before he can oblige or compel the Christian to plead. Till then, "So I and my fathers have always held," is all the reply he is required to make to any one that would oust him.

III.—THE ATHEIST CANNOT TURN THE PRESUMPTION

But can the atheist turn the presumption, and turn it against the theist? It perhaps will be more difficult to do it than he imagines. It is very easy to say that the universal fact which the Christian adduces originated in ignorance, which the progress of science has dissipated; but this is not enough: the atheist must prove that it has actually originated in men's ignorance, and not in their knowledge, and

that the alleged progress of science, so far as it bears on this question, is not itself an illusion; for he must bear in mind that the burden of proof rests on him, since theism is in possession and the presumption is against him. Is it certain that Christians have less science than atheists? As far as our observation goes, the atheist may have more of theory and be richer in bold denials and in unsupported assertions, but he has somewhat less of science than the Christian theologian. The alleged progress of science, be it greater or less, throws no light one way or another on the question; for it is confessedly confined to a region below that of religion, and does not rise above or extend beyond the cosmos.

The latest and ablest representatives of the atheistical science of the age are the Positivists, or followers of Auguste Comte, and the Cosmists, or admirers of Herbert Spencer, and neither of these pretend that their science has demonstrated or can demonstrate that God is not. Mr. John Fiske, who last year (1870) was a Comtist, and who is this year (1871) a Cosmist says, in one of his lectures before Harvard College, very distinctly, that they have not. He says, speaking of God and religion: "We are now in a region where absolute demonstration, in the *scientific* sense, is impossible. It is beyond the power of science to prove that a personal God either exists or does *not exist*." This is express, and is not affected by the interjection of the word *personal*, for an impersonal God is no God at all, but is simply nature or the cosmos, and indistinguishable from it. The lecturer, after admitting the inability of science to prove there is no God, proceeds to criticise the arguments usually adduced to prove that God is, and to show that they are all inconclusive. Suppose him successful in this, which, by the way, he is not, he proves nothing to the purpose. The insufficiency of the arguments alleged to prove that God is, does not entitle him to conclude that God is not, and creates no presumption that he is not. He cannot conclude from their insufficiency that science is capable of overcoming the great fact the Christian adduces, and which creates presumption against atheism.

It is, no doubt, true, that both the Comtists and Cosmists deny that they are atheists; but they are evidently what we have called negative atheists; for they do not assert that God is, and maintain that there is no evidence or proof of his existence. If they do not positively deny it, they certainly do not affirm it. They admit, indeed, an infinite power, Force, or Reality, underlying the cosmic phenomena,

and of which the phenomena are manifestations; but this does not relieve them of atheism, for it is not independent of the cosmos or distinguishable from it. It is simply the cosmos itself—the substance or reality—that appears in the cosmic phenomena. It, then, is not God, and they do not call it God, and avowedly reject what they call the "theistical hypothesis."

Yet both sects agree in this, that they have no science that disproves the "theistical hypothesis," or that does or can prove the falsity of the great catholic principles asserted in the universal beliefs of the race. Mr. Fiske, in his lecture, says: "We cannot therefore expect to obtain a result which, like a mathematical theorem, shall stand firm through mere weight of logic, or which, like a theorem in physics, can be subjected to a crucial test. We can only examine the arguments on which the theistic hypothesis is founded, and inquire whether they are of such a character as to be convincing and satisfactory ..... If it turns out that these arguments are not.... satisfactory, it will follow that, as the cosmic philosophy becomes more and more widely understood and accepted, the theistical hypothesis will generally fall into discredit, not because it will have been disproved but because there will be no sufficient warrant for maintaining it." This is a full and frank confession that science does not and cannot disprove Christian theism, and that the hope of the Cosmists to get it superseded by the cosmic philosophy, does not rest on disproving it, but in persuading men that there "is no sufficient warrant for maintaining it." But, if science cannot disprove theism, the presumption remains good against atheism, and the Christian theist is not required to produce his title deeds or proofs. Till then, the argument from prescription or possession is all the warrant he needs.

But the confession that science cannot prove that God is not, is the confession that the atheist has no scientific truth to oppose Christian theism, but only a theory, an opinion, a "mental habit," without any scientific support. In the passage last quoted from Mr. Fiske we have marked an omission. The part of the sentence omitted is, "none who rigidly adhere to the doctrine of evolution, who assert the relativity of all knowledge, and who refuse to reason on the subjective method." There can be no doubt that the doctrine of evolution and the relativity of all knowledge is incompatible, as Mr. Fiske and his master, Herbert Spencer,

maintain, with Christian theism, or the assertion that God is. But as science cannot prove that God is not, it follows that the doctrine of evolution and the relativity of all knowledge, which the Cosmists oppose to the existence of God, is not and cannot be scientifically proved, and is simply a theory or hypothesis, not science, and counts for nothing in the argument. In confessing their inability to demonstrate what the fool says in his heart, NON EST DEUS, God is not, they confess their inability to demonstrate their doctrine of evolution, and the relativity of all knowledge. They also thus confess that they have no science to oppose theism, and they expect it to perish, in the words of Mr. Fiske, "as other doctrines have perished, through lack of the mental predisposition to accept it." This should dispose of the objection to Christian theism drawn from pretended science, and it leaves the presumption still against atheism, as we have found it.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the presumption in favor of theism cannot be overcome, and the burden of proof thrown on the theist by any alleged theory or hypothesis which is not itself demonstrated or proved. The atheist must prove that his theory or hypothesis is scientifically true, which of course the cosmic philosophers, who assert the theory of evolution and of the relativity of all knowledge, cannot do. If all knowledge is relative, there is then no absolute knowledge; if no absolute knowledge, the Cosmists can neither absolutely know nor prove that all knowledge is relative. The proof of the theory of the relativity of all knowledge would consequently be its refutation; for then all knowledge would not be relative, to wit, the knowledge that all knowledge is relative. The theory is then self-contradictory, or an unprovable and an uncertain opinion; and an uncertain opinion is insufficient to oust theism from its immemorial possession. The atheist must allege against it positive truth, or facts susceptible of being positively proved, or gain no standing in court.

According to the Cosmists, there is no absolute science, and science itself is a variable and uncertain thing. Mr. Fiske tells us that in 1870 he was a Comtist or Positivist, and defended, in his course of lectures of that year, the "Philosophie Positive;" but in this year (1871) he holds and defends the cosmic philosophy, which he says "diff rs from it almost fundamentally." The Comtean philosophy absorbs the cosmos in man and society; the cosmic philosophy

includes man and society in the cosmos, as it does minerals, vegetables, animals, apes and tadpoles, and subjects them all alike to one and the same universal law of evolution. This, our cosmic or Spencerian philosopher assures us, is science to-day. But who can say "what it will be fifty years hence, or what modifications of it the unremitted investigations of scientific men into the cosmic phenomena and their laws will necessitate." There is and can be no real, invariable, and permanent science, yet the cosmic philosophers see no absurdity in asking the race to give up its universal beliefs on the authority of their present theory, and nothing wrong in trying to spread their ever-shifting, ever-varying science and make it supersede in men's minds the Christian principles of God, creation, and providence, although they confess that it may turn out on inquiry to be false.

There is no doubt that, if the cosmic philosophers could get their pretended science generally accepted, they would do much to generate a habit or disposition of mind very unfavorable to the recognition of Christian theism; but that would be no argument for the truth of their science or philosophy. The Cosmists—a polite name for atheists—fail to recognize theism, not because they have or pretend to have any scientific evidence of its falsity, but really because it does not lie in the sphere of their investigations. "I have never seen God at the end of my telescope," said the astronomer, Lalande; yet perhaps it never occurred to him that if there were no God, there could be no astronomy. The Cosmists confine their investigations to the cosmic phenomena and their laws, and God is neither a cosmic phenomenon nor a cosmic law; how then should they recognize him? They do not find God, because he is not in the order of facts with which they are engrossed, though not one of those facts does or could exist without him.

IV. NO PURELY COSMIC SCIENCE.

Theism being in possession, and holding from prescription, can be ousted only by establishing the title of an adverse claimant. This, we have seen, the atheist cannot do. The cosmic philosophers confess that science is unable to prove that God is not. They confess, then, that they have no scientific truth to oppose to his being, or that contradicts it. It is true, they add, that science is equally unable to prove that God is; but that is our affair, and per-

haps we shall, before we close, prove the contrary. But it is enough for us at present to know that the Cosmists or atheists confess that they have no scientific truth that proves that God is not.

Indeed they do not propose to get rid of Christian theism by disproving it, or by proving their atheism, but by turning away the mind from its contemplation, and generating in the community habits of mind adverse to its reception. Take the following extract from one of Mr. Fiske's lectures in proof:

"It is, indeed, generally true that theories concerning the supernatural perish, not from extraneous violence, but from inanition. The belief in witchcraft, or the physical intervention of the devil in human affairs, is now laughed at; yet two centuries have hardly elapsed since it was held by learned and sensible men, as an essential part of Christianity. It was supported by an immense amount of testimony which no one has ever refuted in detail. No one has ever disproved witchcraft, as Young disproved the corpuscular theory of light. But the belief has died out because scientific cultivation has rendered *the mental soil unfit for it.* The contemporaries of Bodin were so thoroughly predisposed by their general theory of things to believe in the continual intervention of the devil, that it needed but the slightest evidence to make them credit any particular act of intervention. But to the educated men of to-day such intervention seems too improbable to be admitted on any amount of testimony. The hypothesis of diabolic interference is simply ruled out, and will remain ruled out.

"So with Spiritualism (spiritism), the modern form of totemism, or the belief in the physical intervention of the souls of the dead in human affairs. Men of science decline to waste their time in arguing against it, because they know that the only way in which to destroy it is to educate people in science. Spiritualism (spiritism) is simply one of the weeds which spring up in minds uncultivated by science. There is no use in pulling up one form of the superstition by the roots, for another form, equally noxious, is sure to take root; the only way of insuring the destruction of the pests is to sow the seeds of scientific truth. When, therefore, we are gravely told what persons of undoubted veracity have seen, we are affected about as if a friend should come in and assure us upon his honor as a gentleman that heat is not a mode of motion.

"The case is the same with the belief in miracles, or the physical intervention of the Deity in human affairs. To the theologian such intervention is *a priori* so probable that he needs but slight historic testimony to make him believe in it. To the scientific thinker it is *a priori* so improbable, that no amount of historic testimony, such as can be produced, suffices to make him entertain the hypothesis for an instant. Hence it is that such critics as Strauss and Renan, to the great disgust of theolo-

gians, always assume, prior to argument, that miraculous narratives are legendary. Hence it is that when the slowly dying belief in miracles finally perishes, it will not be because any one will ever have refuted it by an array of syllogisms—the syllogisms of the theologian and those of the scientist have no convincing power as against each other, because neither accepts the major premise of the other—but it will be because the belief is discordant with the *mental habits induced* by the general study of science.

"Hence it is that the cosmic philosopher is averse to proselytism, and has no sympathy with radicalism or infidelity. For he knows that the theological habits of thought are relatively useful, while scepticism, if permanent, is intellectually and morally pernicious; witness the curious fact that radicals are prone to adopt retrograde social theories. Knowing this, he knows that the only way to destroy theological habits of thought without detriment is to nurture scientific habits—which stifle the former as surely as clover stifles weeds."

A more apt illustration would have been, "as sure as the weeds stifle the corn." But it is evident from this extract that the cosmic philosophers are aware of their inability to overthrow Christian theism by any direct proof, or by any truth, scientifically verifiable, opposed to it. They trust to what in military parlance might be called "a flank movement." They aim to turn the impregnable position of the theist, and defeat him by taking possession of the back country from which he draws his supplies. They would get rid of theism by generating mental habits that exclude it, as the spirit of the age excludes belief in miracles, in spiritism, and the supernatural in any and every form. This is an old device. It was attempted in the system of education devised for France by the Convention of 1793–'94; that devised the new antichristian calendar; but it did not prove effectual. The Prince and Princess Gallitzin brought up their only son Dmitri after the approved philosophy of the day, in profound ignorance of the doctrines and principles of religion; but he became a Christian notwithstanding, a priest even, and died a devoted and self-sacrificing missionary in what were then the wilds of Western Pennsylvania. And after a brief saturnalia of atheism and blood, France herself returned to her Christian calendar, reopened the churches she had closed, and reconsecrated the altars she had profaned.

The belief in miracles may have perished among the Cosmists, but it is still living and vigorous in the minds of men who yield nothing, to say the least, in scientific culture and

attainments, to the cosmic philosophers themselves. The belief in a personal devil, who tempts men through their lusts, and works in the children of disobedience, has not perished, and is still firmly held by the better educated and the more enlightened portion of mankind; and scientific men in no sense inferior to Mr. Fiske, Herbert Spencer, or Auguste Comte, have investigated the facts alleged by the spiritists—not *spiritualists*, for spiritualists they are not—and found no difficulty in recognizing among them facts of a superhuman and diabolical origin. The first believers in spiritism we ever encountered were persons we had previously known as avowed atheists or cosmic philosophers. The men who can accept the Cosmic philosophy may deny God, may deny or accept any thing, but they should never speak of science.

That miracles are improbable *a priori* to the Cosmists may be true enough; that they are so to men of genuine science is not yet proven. Before they can be pronounced improbable or incapable of being proved, it must be proved that the supernatural or supercosmic does not exist; but this the Cosmists admit cannot be proved. They own they cannot prove that God does not exist, and if he does exist, he is necessarily supercosmic or supernatural; and the cosmos itself is a miracle, and a standing miracle, before the eyes of all men from the beginning. A miracle is what God does by himself immediately, as the natural is what he does mediately, through the agency of second or created causes, or does as *causa causarum*, that is, as *causa eminens*. A miracle, then, is no more improbable than the fact of creation, and no more incapable of proof than the existence of the cosmos itself. Hume's assertion that no amount of testimony is sufficient to prove a miracle, for it is always more in accordance with experience to believe the witnesses lie, than it is to believe that nature goes out of her way to work a miracle, is founded on a total misapprehension of what is meant by a miracle. Nature does not work the miracle; but God, the author of nature, works it; nor does nature in the miracle go out of her way, or deviate from her course. Her course and her laws remain unchanged. The miracle is the introduction or creation of a new fact by the power that creates nature herself, and is as provable by adequate testimony as is any natural fact whatever.

The Cosmists should bear in mind that when they relegate principles and causes, all except the cosmic phenomena and the law of their evolution, to the unknowable, the

unknowable is not necessarily non-existent, and should remember also that what is unknowable to them may be not only knowable but actually known to others. Our own ignorance is not a safe rule by which to determine the knowledge of others, or the line between the knowable and the unknowable.

> "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

For aught the Cosmist can say, there may be in the unknowable, principles and causes which render miracles not only possible but probable, and the supernatural as reasonable, to say the least, as the natural.

Indeed, the cosmic philosophers themselves, when it suits their purpose, distinguish between the unknowable and the non-existent, and contend that they are not atheists, because, though they exile God to the dark region of the unknowable, they do not deny that he exists. They deny what they call the "Christian theory of a personal or anthropomorphous God," but not the existence of an infinite Being, Power, Force, or Reality, that underlies the cosmic phenomena, and which appears or is manifested in them. They actually assert the existence of such Being, and concede that the cosmic phenomena are "unthinkable" without it, though it is itself absolutely unknowable. Here is the admission at least that the unknowable exists, and that without it there would and could be no knowable.

But the theory they deny is not Christian theism. The Christian theist undoubtedly asserts the personality of God, but not that God is anthropomorphous. God is not made in the image of man, but man is made in the image and likeness of God. Man is not the type of God, but in God is the prototype of man; that is to say, man has his type in God, in the *idea exemplaris* in the divine mind, and as the idea in the divine mind is nothing else than the essence of God, the schoolmen say *Deus similitudo est rerum omnium*. Personality is the last complement of rational nature, of *suppositum intelligens*. An impersonal God is no God at all, for he lacks the complement of his nature, is incomplete, and falls into the category of nature. So in denying the personality of God, the Cosmists do really deny God, and are literally atheists.

The unknowable Infinite Being, Power, Force, or Reality, the Spencerian philosophers assert, is not God, and they

neither call nor regard it as God. In the first place, if absolutely unknowable, it is not, in any sense, thinkable, or assertable, but must be to our intelligence precisely as if it were not. In the next place, if these philosophers mean by the unknowable the incomprehensible, not simply the inapprehensible, which we charitably suppose is the fact, they still do not escape atheism; for the power or force they assert is not distinct from the cosmos, but is the reality, being, or substance of the cosmos, or the real cosmos of which the knowable or phenomenal cosmos is the appearance or manifestation. It is the assertion of nothing supercosmic or independent of the cosmos. Nothing is asserted but the real in addition to the phenomenal cosmos. Certainly the cosmic philosophers are themselves deplorably ignorant of Christian theology, or else they count largely on the ignorance of the public they address. Perhaps both suppositions are admissible.

The Cosmists, who present us the latest form of atheism, divide all things into knowable and unknowable. The unknowable they must concede is at least unknown, and consequently all their knowledge or science is confined to the knowable; and according to them the knowable is restricted to the phenomenal. Hence their science is simply the science of the phenomenal, and this is wherefore they assert the relativity of all knowledge. But there is no science of phenomena alone. Science, strictly taken, is the reduction of facts or phenomena to the principle or cause on which they depend, and which explains them. Science, properly speaking, is the science of principles or causes, as defined by Aristotle, and where there are no known causes or principles there is no science. The Cosmists, and even the Positivists, place all principles and causes in the unknowable, and consequently neither have nor can have any science. They therefore have not, and cannot have any scientific truth or principle, as we have already shown, to oppose to Christian theism.

The Cosmists restrict all knowledge to the knowledge of the cosmic phenomena, and their laws, which are themselves phenomenal; but phenomena are not knowable in themselves, for they do not exist in themselves. Regarded as pure phenomena, detached from the being or substance which appears in them, they are simply nothing. They are cognizable only in the cognition of that which they manifest, or of which they are appearances. But Herbert

Spencer places that, whatever it is, in the category of the unknowable, and consequently denies not only all science, but all knowledge of any sort or degree whatever.

It is a cardinal principle with the Spencerian school that all knowledge is relative, that is, knowledge of the relative only. But the assumption of the relativity of all knowledge is incompatible with the assertion of any knowledge at all. Sir William Hamilton indeed maintains the relativity of all knowledge, but he had the grace to admit that all philosophy ends in nescience. The relativity of knowledge means either that we know things not as they really are, *a parte rei*, but only as they exist to us, as affections of our own consciousness; or that we know not the reality, but only phenomena or appearances.* The Cosmists take it in both senses; but chiefly in the latter sense, as they profess to follow the objective method as opposed to the subjective. In either sense they deny all knowledge. Consciousness is the recognition of ourselves as cognitive subject, in the act of knowing what is not ourselves, or what is objective. If no object is cognized, there is no recognition of ourselves or fact of consciousness, and consequently no affection of consciousness. The soul does not know itself in itself, for it is not intelligible in itself: since, as St. Thomas says, it is not intelligence in itself, therefore it can know itself only in acting; and having only a dependent, not an independent, existence, it has need, in order to act, of the counter activity of that which is not itself. Hence every thought is a complex act, including, as will be more fully explained further on, simultaneously and inseparably, subject, object, and their relation. If no object, then no thought; and if no thought then, of course, no knowledge.

In the second sense, they equally deny all knowledge. Phenomena are relative to their being or substance, and are knowable only in the intuition of substance or being, and relations are cognizable only in the *relata*, for apart from the *relata* they do not exist, and are nothing. The relative is therefore incognizable without the intuition of the absolute, for without the absolute it is nothing, and nothing is not cognizable or cogitable. By placing the absolute, that

* The relativity of knowledge may also mean, and perhaps is sometimes taken to mean, that we know things not absolutely in themselves, but in their relations. This is true, but it does not make the knowledge relative, or knowledge of relations only, for relations are apprehensible only in the apprehension of the *relata*.

is, real being or substance, in the unknowable, the Cosmists really place the relative or the phenomenal also in the unknowable. If, then, we assert the relativity of all knowledge, and restrict the knowable to the relative and phenomenal, as did Protagoras and other Greek sophists castigated by Socrates or Plato, we necessarily deny all knowledge and even the possibility of knowledge.

Plato maintained that the science is not in knowing the phenomenal, but in knowing by means of the phenomenal the idea, substance, or reality it manifests, or of which it is the appearance, or image. He held that the idea is impressed on matter as the seal on wax, but that the science consists in knowing, by means of the impression, the idea or reality impressed, not in simply knowing the impression or phenomenal. Hence he held that all science is *per ideam*, or *per imaginem*, using the word idea to express alike the reality impressed, and the impression or image. He teaches that there is science only in rising, by means of the image impressed on matter—the *mimesis* in his language, the phenomenal in the language of our scientists—to the *methexis*, or participation of the divine idea, or the essence of the thing itself, which the phenomenal or the sensible copies, mimics, or imitates. Aristotle denies that all knowledge is relative, and teaches that all knowledge is *per speciem* or *per formam*, substantially Plato's doctrine, that all knowledge is *per ideam;* but he never held that science consisted in knowing the *species*, whether intelligible or sensible. The science consisted in knowing by it the substantial form represented, presented, as we should say, by the species to the mind.

Certain it is that there is no knowledge where there is nothing known, or where there is nothing to be known. The phenomenon is not the thing any more than the image is the thing imaged, and apprehension of the image is science only in so far as it serves as a medium of knowing the thing it represents. We know nothing in knowing the sign, if we know not that which it signifies. A sign signifying nothing to the mind is nothing, not even a sign. So of phenomena. They are nothing save in the reality they manifest, or of which they are the appearances, and if they manifest or signify nothing to the understanding, they are not even appearances. If, then, the reality, the *noumenon*, as Kant calls it, is relegated to the unknowable, there is no phenomenon, manifestation, or appearance in the region of

the knowable, and consequently nothing knowable, and therefore no actual or possible knowledge.

Either the phenomenal is the appearance or manifestation of some real existence, or it is not. If it is, then it is a grave mistake to relegate the real being or substance to the category of the unknowable; for what appears, or is manifest, is neither unknowable nor unknown. If it is not, if the cosmic phenomena are the appearance or manifestation of no reality, then in knowing them, nothing is known, and there is no knowledge at all.

The Positivists differ from the Cosmists, unless their name is ill chosen, in asserting that, as far as it goes, knowledge is positive, and not simply relative; but then they have no ground for the unity of science, which they assert, or for the coördination of all the sciences under one superior science which embraces and unifies them all, and which they profess to have discovered, and on which they insist as their peculiar merit. They reject all metaphysical principles, and among them the relation of cause and effect, and then must, if consistent, reject genera and species, and regard each object apprehended as an independent and self-existent being, or as an absolute existence; that is to say, they must assert as many gods as there are distinct objects or unit individualities intellectually apprehensible, for no existence dependent on another is apprehensible except under the relation of dependence. The contingent is apprehensible only under the relation of contingency, and that relation is apprehensible only in the apprehension of its correlative; therefore the contingent is not apprehensible without intuition of the necessary and independent. Things can be positively known by themselves alone, only on condition that they exist by themselves alone. This, applied to the cosmos, would deny in it, or any of its parts, all change, all movement, all progress of man and society, which the Positivists so strenuously assert. The Positivists, by rejecting the relation of cause and effect, and all metaphysical relations which are real not abstract relations, really deny, as do the Cosmists, all real knowledge, for all knowledge, every affirmation, every empirical judgment, presupposes the relation of cause and effect.

The Cosmists are so well aware that there is no science of the phenomenal alone, that they abandon their own principles, admit that the relative is unthinkable without the absolute, and concede that we are compelled, in order to think

the phenomenal, to think an infinite reality on which the phenomenal depends. What is thinkable is knowable, and therefore they assume that their unknowable is knowable, and deny their cardinal principle that all knowledge is relative. An extract from another lecture by Mr. Fiske bears out this assertion.

"Upon what grounds did we assert of the Deity that it is unknowable? We were driven to the conclusion that the Deity is unknowable because that which exists independently of intelligence and out of relation to it, which presents neither *likeness, difference,* nor *relation,* cannot be cognized. Now, by precisely the same process, we were driven to the conclusion that the cosmos is unknowable only in so far as it is absolute. It is only as existing independently of our intelligence and out of relation to it, that we predicate unknowableness of the cosmos. As manifested to our intelligence, the cosmos is the universe of phenomena—the realm of the knowable. We know stars and planets, we know the surface of our earth, we know life and mind in their various manifestations, individual and social; and while we apply to this vast aggregate of phenomena the name *universe,* we can by no means predicate identity of the universe and the Deity. To do so would be to confound phenomena with noumena, the relative with the absolute, the knowable with the unknowable. It would be, in short, to commit the error of pantheism.

"But underlying this aggregate of phenomena, to whose extension we know no limit in space or time, we *are compelled* to postulate an absolute Reality, a Something whose existence does not depend on the presence of a percipient mind—which existed before the genesis of intelligence and will continue to exist even though intelligence vanish from the scene. In other words, there is a synthesis of phenomena which we know as affections of our consciousness. Instead of regarding these phenomena as generated within our consciousness, and referable solely to it for their existence, we are *compelled to regard* them as the manifestations of some absolute reality, which, as knowable only through its phenomenal manifestations, is in itself unknowable. This is the whole story; and whether we call this absolute reality the Deity or the objective world of noumena, seems to me to depend solely upon the attitude, religious or scientific, which we assume in dealing with the subject."

The cosmic philosopher in order to know phenomena, is compelled to postulate an absolute reality as the ground or substance of the phenomena, and which is knowable through their manifestation; consequently, to restrict the knowable to the phenomenal and relative is only declaring that all knowledge is impossible. The Cosmists concede it, and therefore make what they declare to be absolutely unknowable, in a certain degree at least, knowable, concede that we

may and do know that it is, and what it is in relation to the cosmic phenomena, though not what it is in itself. But why are we compelled to postulate the absolute reality, but because the phenomena are not knowable without intuition of the reality which they manifest? or because in apprehending the phenomenal we really have intuition of the absolute or the reality manifested?

Mr. Fiske, however, even after abandoning the doctrine that the absolute or real is unknowable, by no means escapes atheism. The absolute reality, Force, or Something which he asserts as underlying the aggregate of the cosmic phenomena, which aggregate of phenomena he calls *universe*, is not God, as he would have us admit, but is merely the cosmic reality of which the cosmic phenomena are the appearance, and distinguishable from it only as the appearance is distinguishable from that which appears. It is, as we have already shown, only the real cosmos, the being or substance of which the cosmic phenomena are the manifestation. It makes the "Deity" it asserts identically the substance of the cosmic phenomena, which is either pure pantheism or pure atheism, as you call it either God or cosmos, that is, nature, since it is indistinguishable from the real cosmos, and distinguishable only from the cosmic phenomena. The cosmic philosophy does not, then, as it pretends, solve the religious problem and reconcile atheism and theism in a higher generalization than either, as Herbert Spencer maintains.

Herbert Spencer, in his *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy*,* says, "that with regard to the origin of the universe or cosmos, three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made: 1, the universe is self-existent; 2, the universe is self-created; and 3, the universe is created by an external"—or, as we should express it, a supercosmic—"agency." He rejects all three as absolutely inconceivable. If the cosmos is neither self-existent nor self-created, nor yet created by an external agency, that is, by a power above it and independent of it, it cannot exist at all, and Mr. Spencer simply asserts universal nihilism and of course universal nescience; for where nothing is or exists, there can be no knowledge or science. Negation is intelligible only by virtue of the affirmation it denies.

The author refutes the first two of the three suppositions con-

* Part I, No. 11, 2d edition.

clusively enough, and we grant him that the cosmos is neither self-existent nor self-created. Then either it does not exist, and then no cosmic science; or it is created by an independent, supercosmic agency or power, and then it is contingent, and dependent on its cause, or the power that creates it. If so, there can be no purely cosmic science; for the dependent is not cognizable without intuition of the independent, nor the contingent without intuition of the necessary, as we shall prove at length, when we come to the positive proofs of Christian theism.

This is sufficient to prove that there is and can be no purely cosmic science, even by the confession of the latest atheistic school we are acquainted with. It is idle then to pretend to controvert Christian theism in the name of science; for if it be denied, all science, all knowledge is denied. The Spencerian philosophy is therefore simply elaborated ignorance, and pure emptiness.

V.—THEOLOGIANS AND THE SCIENTISTS.

It is not pretended that atheists, Cosmists, or Comtists, have, as a matter of fact, no science; that they have made no successful cosmic investigations, or hit upon no important discoveries and inventions in the material or sensible order. It is readily admitted that the patient labors and unwearied researches and explorations of the scientists, both theists and non-theists, in the fields of physical science, have enlarged the boundaries of our knowledge, and given to man a mastery over the forces of nature on which no little of what is called modern civilization depends. What is denied is, that the scientists, Comtists, or Cosmists, have discovered or attained to any scientific truth that conflicts with Christian theology, and that on their own principles they have or can have any science at all.

The Cosmists and Comtists have senses and intellect as well as others; and there is no reason in the world, while they confine themselves to the observation and classification of physical facts, and so long as they allow free scope to their intellectual faculties and do not attempt to force their action to conform to their preconceived theories, why they should not arrive at sound inductions. The human mind is truer than their theories, and broader than their so-called science; and when suffered to act according to its own laws proves its natural object is truth. So long as they confine

their investigations within the respective fields of the special sciences, and use the natural faculties with which they are endowed, they can and often do labor successfully. Lalande was a respectable astronomer; the *Mécanique Céleste* of the atheist, La Place is more than respectable for the mathematical genius and knowledge it displays; Alexander von Humboldt's *Cosmos* is an encyclopædia of physical sciences, as they stood in his day; but in all these and other instances the human mind holds intuitively principles which transcend the finite and the phenomenal, and without which there could have been no science; but principles which both the cosmic and Comtean theories exclude from the realm of the knowable. It is not the facts alleged that are objected to, but the false theories advanced in explanation of them, the conclusions drawn from them, and the application of these conclusions to an order that transcends the order to which the facts belong, and which, if valid, would exclude the facts themselves.

The atheistic scientists exclude theology and metaphysics from the knowable simply because they are too ignorant of those sciences to be aware that without the principles which they supply there could be no physical science; or to know that in asserting physical science they really assert the very principles they theoretically deny. Professor Huxley asserts protoplasm as the physical basis of life; yet he denies that there is any cognition or even intuition of the relation of cause and effect. How then can he assert any nexus or causative relation between protoplasm and life? He does not pretend that protoplasm is life; he only pretends that it is its physical basis. But how can it be its physical basis if there is between it and life no necessary relation of cause and effect? Or if protoplasm is not known to be the principle or basis of life, how can it be known to produce or support it? But principles and relations, we are told, are metaphysical, and therefore excluded from the knowable. Protoplasm, the professor owns, is dead matter; how, then without a cause of some sort vivifying it, can it become *living* matter? What is protested against is not the assertion of protoplasm as the physical or material basis of life, —though we believe nothing of the sort, for proteine is as imaginary as the plastic soul dreamed of by Plato and adopted by Cudworth and Gioberti,—but the denial of the principle of cause and effect, and then assuming it as the

principle of our conclusions, or asserting as scientific, conclusions which can have no validity without it.

Professor Huxley follows Hume, who denies that we have any knowledge, by experience, of causative force, or that the antecedent produces the consequence. Dr. Thomas Brown, who succeeded Dugald Stewart in the chair of philosophy in the Edinburgh University, maintains the same, and resolves the relation of cause and effect into the relation of invariable antecedence and consequence, or simply a relation of time. Yet if the antecedent only goes before the consequent, without producing or placing it, no conclusion is possible. Induction is reasoning as much as deduction, and all reasoning is syllogistic in principle, if not in form; and there is no syllogism without a middle term, and there is no middle term without the principle of cause and effect, which connects necessarily the conclusion with the premises, the antecedent with the consequent, as cause and effect. Deny causality and you deny all reasoning, all logical relations, and can assert no real relation between protoplasm, or any thing else, and life.

The atheist and Sir William Hamilton exclude the infinite from the cognizable and declare it incogitable; and yet either in his geometry will talk of lines that may be infinitely extended, which cannot be done without thinking the infinite. If there is no infinitely real, how can there be the infinitely possible? If there is no infinite being, there can be no infinite ability; if no infinite ability, there is no infinitely possible, and then no infinitely possible geometrical lines. Truly, then, has it been said, "an atheist may be a geometrician, but if there were no God, there could be no geometry." In mathematics, which is a mixed science, there is an ideal and apodictic element on which the empirical element depends, and the apodictic is not cogitable without intuition of infinite being and its creative act, any more than is the empirical itself; yet both Cosmists and Comtists hold mathematics to be a positive science.

Herbert Spencer asserts the relativity of all knowledge, and he, Sir William Hamilton, and Dr. Mansel deny that the absolute can be known. But both relative and absolute are metaphysical conceptions, and connote one another, and neither can be known by itself alone, or without cognition or intuition of the other. Other instances might be adduced, and will be soon, in which the Cosmists use, so to speak, principles which they either deny or declare to be unknow-

able, and which are really theological or metaphysical principles, and it is by those principles that they are able to know any thing at all beyond the intelligence they have in common with the beasts that perish. Not heeding these, they fall, in the construction of their theories, systematically into errors, which when they trust their own minds and follow their common sense, they avoid as do other men.

As Cousin somewhere remarks, there may be less in philosophy than in common sense, in reflection than in intuition, but there can never be more. The intuitions, or what Cousin calls the primitive or spontaneous beliefs of mankind, are the same in all men; and the differences among men begin the moment they begin to reflect on the data furnished by intuition, and attempt to explain them, to render an account of them to themselves, or, in other words, to philosophize. The scientists have the same intuitions, though atheists, that other men have, and in the field of the special sciences they are equally trustworthy; it is only when they leave the field of the sciences and enter that of philosophy, which with us is the name for what is commonly called natural theology, and which is the science of principles, that they err. Habituated to the study of physical facts alone, they overlook or deny an order of facts as real, as evident, as certain, as any of the physical facts they have observed and classified according to their real or supposed physical laws, and even ulterior, and without which the physical facts and laws would not and could not exist. It is not as scientists they specially err, but as philosophers and theologians, that is, in the account they render of the origin, principles, and meaning of the cosmic facts they observe and classify.

It is not with science or the cultivation of the sciences that philosophers and theologians quarrel, and it is very possible that philosophers and theologians have at times been too indifferent to the study of physical facts or the cultivation of the so-called natural sciences, and have, in consequence, lost with the physicists much of the influence they might otherwise have retained. Yet it is a great mistake, not to say a calumny, to accuse them of holding that the facts of the physical order can be determined, *a priori*, by a knowledge of metaphysical or theological principles. The scholastics of the middle ages held this no more than did my Lord Bacon himself. Observation and induction were as much their method as they were his. Bacon invented or discovered no new method, as is conceded by Lord Macaulay him-

self; all he did was to give an additional impulse to the study of material nature, towards which the age in which he lived was already turning its attention, as a necessary consequence of Luther's movement in an untheological direction. Yet Bacon maintained strenuously that the method which he recommended to be followed in the study of the physical sciences is wholly inapplicable to the study of metaphysical science or philosophy. His pretended followers have overlooked what he had the good sense to say on this point; have assumed that his method is as applicable in the study of principles as in the study of facts, and, consequently, have made shipwreck of both philosophy and science. The result of their error may be seen in Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution, which is only the revival of the doctrine of the Greek sophists, refuted by Plato and Aristotle, especially by Plato in his Theætetus.

The quarrel with the scientists is with them, not as scientists or physicists, but with them as philosophers and theologians; and as philosophers and theologians, because they give us philosophy or theology only as an induction from physicial facts. If their induction were strictly logical it could not be accepted, because the physical facts do not include all the elements of thought, and, in fact, constitute only a part, and that the lowest part, either of the real or the knowable. Their theories are too low and too narrow for the real, and exclude the more elevated and universal intuitions of the race. Induction is drawing a general conclusion from particular facts. To its validity the enumeration of particulars must be complete, and it is only by virtue of a principal that is universal and necessary that the conclusion can be drawn, otherwise it is a mere abstraction. The induction from physical facts may be perfectly valid in the order of physical facts, as applied to the special class of physical facts generalized, and yet be of no validity when applied beyond that class and to a different order of facts. The inductions of the chemist, the mechanic, the electrician, may be perfectly just when applied to dead matter, and yet be wholly inadmissible when applied to the living subject. This is the mistake into which Professor Huxley falls in regard to his physical basis of life. His analysis of protoplasm may be very just, but it is operated on a dead subject, and no conclusion from it, applied to the living subject, is valid; for in the living subject it is an element or a fact that no chemical analysis can detect, and hence no chemical

synthesis can recombine the several components the analysis detects so as to reproduce living protoplasm. The induction is not valid, for it does not enumerate all the facts, and also because it exceeds the order of facts analyzed. So when Herbert Spencer tells us in his *Biology* that "life is the result of the mechanical, chemical, and electrical arrangement of the particles of matter," he draws a conclusion which goes beyond the facts he has analyzed, and assumes it to be valid even when applied to a different order of facts. The physiologist commits the same error when he infers the qualities of the living blood from the analysis of dead blood,—the only blood which, from the nature of the case, he can analyze. Hence, chemical physiology is far from being scientific, and the pathology founded on morbid anatomy, or the dissection of the dead subject, is far from being uniformly trustworthy.

Many theologians fall into an analogous error, and seek to infer God by way of induction from the physical facts observed in nature,—the very facts from which the atheist concludes there is no God. The late Père Gratry, in his *Connaissance de Dieu*, contends with rare earnestness and eloquence that the existence of God is proved by induction. Dr. McCosh, resting the whole argument against the atheist on marks of design, which is an induction from particular facts, does the same. Induction is really only an abstraction or generalization, and at best the God obtainable by induction can be only a generalization, and God as a generalization or an abstraction is simply no God at all; for he would be nothing distinct from or independent of the facts generalized. Père Gratry was a mathematician, and arrived at God in the same way that the mathematician in the calculus arrives at infinitesimals, that is, by eliminating the finite. But supposing there is intuition of the finite only, the elimination of the finite would give us simply zero, not the infinite.

Then there is another difficulty; the finite and infinite are correlatives, and correlatives connote each other, the one cannot be known without the other, nor can either be logically inferred from the other. The principle of induction, when it means any thing more than classification or abstraction, is the relation of cause and effect. But cause and effect, again, are correlatives,—though not, as Sir William Hamilton asserts, reciprocal,—and therefore connote each other, and cannot be known separately. The argument from design, otherwise called the teleological argument or

argument from the end or final cause, is open to a similar objection. The final cause presupposes a first cause, and if we know not that there is a first cause, we cannot assert a final cause, and therefore are unable to infer design. The argument from design has its value when once it is determined that the universe has a first cause, or has been created, and the question is not as to the existence, but as to the attributes of that cause. Till then it simply begs the question.

The inductions of the physicists within the order of facts observed, and when strictly logical, are valid enough, as every day proves, by bringing them to the test of experiment; but in making them the physicist actually avails himself of the principle or the relation of cause and effect, which he is able to do, because, as a matter of fact, he holds it from intuition represented by language, though it is only the metaphysician or philosopher that takes note of it, or is able to verify it. The inductions of the Cosmists drawn professedly from physical facts alone, are invalid on their own principles, because the Cosmists reject, at least as cognizable, the relation of cause and effect, the principle of all induction or synthetic reasoning; and are invalid also on any principle when opposed to the metaphysician or theologian, because they are drawn from physical facts alone, and do not include the facts of the intelligible and moral order, in which are the principle and cause of the physical facts themselves.

This is still more the case, when we add to philosophy or natural theology, the supernatural order, made known to us by supernatural revelation. The Cosmists recognize and study only the facts, or phenomena as they improperly call them, of the physical universe, and from these only physical inductions are possible. They have only a physical world, and their reasonings and conclusions, even when true within that world, are inapplicable to any thing beyond and above it, and therefore can never prove any thing against theology, natural or supernatural, and on their own principles, as we have seen, their inductions are of no value beyond the limits of the physical world itself. They err in taking a part of the real or a part of the knowable for the whole. They may say that they do not deny the reality of what they call the unknowable, that is, being, principles, causes, &c.; but they have no right to say that all that transcends the order of physical facts and their laws, the special subject of their

study, is unknowable. It may be unknown to them, but it may be both knowable and known to others. Also, by not knowing what lies beyond the range of their own studies, they may and do give a false account of their own science. This is, in fact, really the case with them. Many of their inductions are valid in the physical order, as experiment proves; but without the intuition of the metaphysical relation of cause and effect the mind could make no induction, consequently they are wrong, and the very truth of their inductions proves that they are wrong, in declaring that the relation pertains to the unknowable.

The Cosmists do not err chiefly as physicists, but as philosophers and theologians, and as long as they are contented to be scientists and report simply the result of their scientific researches and explorations there can be no quarrel with them on the part either of theologians or philosophers; but the quarrel, as has been shown, begins when they attempt to theorize, or to construct with their physical facts alone a cosmic philosophy, and to say it cannot embrace, because no philosophy based on physical facts alone can embrace, the principle of all the real and all the knowable, since the physical is neither the whole nor the principle of the whole; nor is it commensurate with the reality presented intuitively to every mind.

Undoubtedly, neither the philosophy nor the theology can be true that contradicts any physical fact, if fact it be, but no explanation or theory of physical facts is admissible that contradicts or denies any metaphysical or theological principle.

There are no physical facts that contradict or in the slightest degree impugn Christian theism, as we hope to show in this or a future essay. In point of fact, atheists, pantheists, Cosmists, or Positivists, do not oppose or pretend to oppose any facts to what they call "the theistical hypothesis," they only oppose to it their inductions, their theories and hypotheses, or their explanation of the class of facts that have come under their observation. These, we have seen, are untenable, for without the principles they are intended to deny they cannot even be constructed. Now, theories that contradict their own principle can make nothing against Christian theism, cannot disprove it, or cause in any mind that understands the question, the slightest doubt of it, and the theist has a perfect right to treat them with sovereign contempt. At least, they assign no reason why Christian

theism should be ousted from its possession. They cannot overcome the argument from prescription, and place Christian theism on its defence, or compel it to produce its title-deeds.

Here our refutation of atheism properly ends, and no more need be said; but while we deny that we are bound to do any thing more, we are disposed to produce our title-deeds and prove positively, by unanswerable arguments, the falsity of atheism, or to demonstrate, as fully as logic can demonstrate, Christian theism.

VI.—INCONCLUSIVE PROOFS.

Philosophers and theologians do not necessarily adduce the best possible arguments to prove their theses, and may sometimes use very weak and even inconclusive arguments. An argument for the existence of God may also seem to one mind conclusive, and the reverse to another. Men usually argue from their own point of view, and take as ultimate the principles which they have never doubted, or heard questioned, although far from being in reality ultimate, and thus take for granted what for others needs to be proved. Men also may hold the truth, be as well assured of it as they are of their own existence, even possess great good sense and sound judgment, and yet be very unskilful in defending it, —utterly unable to assign good and valid reasons for it. They know they are right, but know not how to prove it.

St. Thomas, the Doctor Angelicus, maintains* that the existence of God is demonstrable, not from principles really *a priori* or universal,—for nothing can be more universal or more ultimate than God from which his existence can be concluded, since he is the first principle alike in being and in knowing, —but as the cause from the effect; and this he proves by five different arguments: The first is drawn from the empirical fact of motion and the necessity of a first mover, not itself movable; the second is drawn from the empirical fact of particular efficient causes and the necessity of a first efficient cause, itself uncaused; the third is taken from the fact that some things are possible and some are not, and as all things cannot be merely possible, therefore there must be something which is *per se*, necessary, and *in actu*. The

* Sum. theol., part I, quæst. 1, art. 2 et 3.

fourth proof is drawn from the fact that there are different degrees in things, some being more and others less good, true, noble, perfect, and therefore demand the perfect alike in the order of the true and the good,—a being in whom all diversities are identified and all degrees are included, and which is their source and complement. The fifth is drawn from the fact of order and government, and the necessity of a supreme governor. These all conclude God, if we may so speak, from a fact of sensible experience, and are empirical proofs.

Dr. McCosh, president of Princeton College, New Jersey, a man of no mean philosophical repute, relies wholly on the principle of cause and effect, as does St. Thomas, and dismisses all arguments but Paley's argument, or the argument from design. Père Gratry (now dead), of the New Oratory, relies, in his *Connaissance de Dieu*, on induction from intellectual and ethical facts; the late Dr. Potter, Episcopalian bishop of Pennsylvania, in his *Philosophy of Religion*, does virtually the same. A writer in the *British Quarterly Review* for July, 1871, in a very able article on *Theism*, examines and rejects all the arguments usually adduced to prove that God is, except that drawn from intuition, or, as we understand him, that which asserts the direct and immediate empirical intuition of God, or the Divine Being. Dr. Hodge, an eminent Presbyterian divine, in his *Systematic Theology*, accepts all the arguments usually adduced, some as proving one thing, and others as proving another pertaining to theism, and holds that no one argument alone suffices to prove the whole. Dr. John Henry Newman, in his *Apologia pro Vita sua*, says he has never been able to prove to his own satisfaction the existence of God by reason; he can only prove it is probable that there is a God, and appears to have written his *Grammar of Assent* to prove that probability is enough for all practical purposes, since we are obliged in nearly all the ordinary affairs of life to act on probabilities alone. His belief in God he seems to derive from conscience. The Holy See has decided against the Traditionalists that the existence of God *can* be proved with *certainty* by reasoning prior to faith, and the Holy See has also improbated the doctrine of the Louvain professors, that we have immediate cognition of God,—a doctrine improbated by reason itself; for if man had immediate cognition of God, no proofs of his existence would be necessary, since no man

could doubt his existence any more than his own, or than that the sun shines at noonday in the heavens when his eyes behold it.

The general tendency in our day is to conclude the cause from the effect, and to conclude God as designer, from the marks of design, or the adaptation of means to ends discoverable, or assumed to be discoverable, in ourselves and the external world. The objection to all arguments of this sort, that is to say, to all psychological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, which depend on the principle of cause and effect, is, that they all beg the question, or take for granted what requires to be proved. They all assume that the soul and cosmos are effects. Grant them to be effects, it follows necessarily that they have had a cause, and a cause adequate to the effect. As to that there can be no doubt. Cause and effect are correlatives, and correlatives connote one another, and neither is knowable alone. When we know any thing is an effect, we know it has a cause, whether we know what that cause is or not. But how prove that the soul or the cosmos is an *effect?* This the atheist denies, and this is the point to be proved against him, and how is it to be proved from the facts of experience?

St. Thomas assumes, in his second proof, that we have experience of particular efficient causes. This is denied by Hume, Kant, Dr. Thomas Brown, Sir William Hamilton, Dr. Mansel, and by all the Comtists, Cosmists, and atheists of every species. Even Dr. Reid, the founder of the Scottish school, denies that we know by experience any power in the so-called cause that produces the effect, but contends that we are obliged, by the very constitution of our nature or of the human mind, to believe it. Kant agrees with Reid, and makes the irresistible belief a form of the understanding. Huxley avowedly follows Hume, as do the great body of non-Christian scientists. Dr. Brown says that all we know of cause and effect is invariable antecedence and consequence, and maintains that, so far as experience goes, the relation of cause and effect is a relation of invariable sequence,—simply a relation in the order of time. The question does not stand where it did when St. Thomas wrote, and to meet the speculations of the day we are obliged to go behind him, and establish principles which he could take for granted, or dismiss as inserted in human nature itself, that is, as we say, intuitively given.

Even if experience could prove particular effects, and

therefore particular and contingent efficient causes, we could not conclude from them universal and necessary causes, or the one universal cause, for the universal cannot be logically concluded from the particular, and the God that could be concluded would be only a generalization or abstraction, and no real God at all. Or if this is denied, which it cannot well be, God could be concluded only under the relation of cause, as *causa causarum*, if you please, but still only as efficient cause, and therefore only as essentially cause, and substance or being only in that he is cause. This supposes him necessarily a cause, and obliged to cause in order to be or exist. This would make creation necessary, and God obliged from the intrinsic necessity of his own nature to create,—the error of Cousin, our old master, to whom we owe the best part of our philosophical discipline. But this is only one of the many forms of pantheism, itself only a form of atheism.

Dr. McCosh rests the whole question on the marks of design in man and the cosmos. Design and designer are correlatives, and connote each other; and consequently the one cannot be proved as the condition of proving the other: for the proof of the one is *ipso facto* the proof of both. Prove design and you prove, of course, a designer. But how prove design, if you know not as yet that the world has been made or created? The most you can do is to prove that there are in nature things analogous to what in the works of man are the product of art or design; but analogy is not identity, and how do you prove that what you call design is not nature, or *natura naturans?* Does the bee construct its cell, the beaver its dam, or the swallow her nest by intelligent design, as man builds his house? or by instinct, the simple force of nature? Paley's illustration of the watch found by the traveller in a desert place is illusory: for the Indian who saw a watch for the first time took it to be a living thing, not a piece of mechanism or art.

But even granting the marks of design are proved, all that can be concluded, is not a supercosmic God or Creator, but simply that the world is ordered and governed by an intelligent mind; it does not necessarily carry us beyond the *Anima mundi* of Aristotle, or the Supreme Artificer of Plato, operating with preëxisting materials and doing the best he can with them. They do not authorize us to conclude the really supramundane God, by the sole energy of his word creating the heavens and the earth and all things therein from nothing, as asserted by Christian theism. They

can be explained as well by supposing the *causa immanens* with Spinoza, as by supposing a *causa efficiens*.

The cosmologists undertake to conclude the existence of God from the facts or phenomena of the universe. The universe is contingent, dependent, insufficient for itself, and therefore it must have had a creator and upholder, who is himself necessary, not contingent, and is independent, self-subsisting, self-sufficing. Nothing more true. But whence learn we that the universe is contingent, dependent, and insufficient for itself? We know not this fact by experience or empirical intuition. Besides, necessary and contingent are correlatives, and there is no intuition of the one without intuition of the other.

The psychologists profess to conclude God by way of induction from the facts of the soul. Thus Descartes says, *Cogito, ergo sum*, and professes to deduce, after the manner of the geometricians, God and the universe from his own undeniable personal existence. Certainly, if God were not, Descartes could not exist, but from the soul alone, only the soul can be deduced, and from purely psychological facts induction can give us only psychological generalizations or laws. Take the several facts, attributes, or perfections of the soul, and suppose them carried up to infinity, it would still be only a generalization, for their substance would still be the soul, distinct and different by nature from the divine substance or being. God is not man completed; nor is man, as Gioberti says, "an incipient God, or God who begins." Man is indeed made in the image and likeness of God, not God in the image and likeness of man. He is not anthropomorphous; though his likeness in which we are created enables us to understand, by way of analogy, something of his infinite attributes, and to hold, when not prevented by sin and when elevated by grace, a more or less intimate communion with him. Christianity, indeed, teaches that man is destined to union with God as his beatitude, but the human personality remains ever distinct from the divine.

We are not certain in what sense Père Gratry understands induction. Probably our inability arises from our comparative ignorance of mathematics. He says the soul by induction darts at once to God and seizes him, so to speak, by intelligence and love, whatever all that may mean. We can understand the *élan* of the soul to God whom it knows and loves, but we cannot understand how a soul ignorant of God can, by an interior and sudden spring, jump to a knowledge

of him. Père Gratry says the soul arrives at the knowledge of God as the mathematician in the calculus arrives at infinitesimals, namely, by eliminating the finite. Eliminate the finite, he says, and you have the infinite. Not at all, mon Père. Eliminate the finite, and you have, as we have already said, simply zero. The infinite is not the negation of the finite. Infinitesimals again, are nothing, for there is and can be no infinitely little. The error comes right in the end, so far as mathematics is concerned, for it is equal on both sides, and the error on one side neutralizes the error on the other side.

The late Dr. Potter, Protestant bishop of Pennsylvania, relies on induction, and chiefly on induction from the ethical facts of the soul. But the ethical argument to prove the existence of God does not avail, for, till his existence is proved, there is no basis for ethics. The soul has a capacity to receive and obey a moral law, but that law is not founded in its nature or imposed by it. The moral law proceeds from God as final cause of creation, as the physical laws proceed from him as first cause, and is the law of our perfection, necessary to be obeyed in order to fulfil our destiny, or to obtain our supreme good or beatitude. If there is no God, there is and can be no moral law, and then no morality. Till you know God is, and is the final cause of the universe, you cannot call any facts of the soul ethical.

The argument of St. Anselm in his *Monologium* is the fourth of St. Thomas, and concludes God as the perfect from the imperfect, of which we are conscious, or which we know by experience in ourselves, or as the complement of man, an argument which contains a germ of truth, but errs by overlooking the fact that the perfect and imperfect are correlatives, and that the one cannot be inferred from the other because the one is not cognizable or cogitable without the other. St. Anselm himself seems not to have been satisfied with the argument of his *Monologium*, and gave subsequently in his *Proslogium*, what he regarded as a briefer and more conclusive argument. We have in our minds the idea of the most perfect being, a greater than which cannot be thought. But greater is a being *in re*, than a being *in intellectu*. If then there is not *in re* a most perfect being, than which a greater cannot be thought or conceived, then we can think a greater and more perfect being than we can, which is a contradiction. Therefore the most perfect being, a greater than which cannot be thought, does

and must exist *in re*, as well as *in intellectu*, since we certainly have the idea in our minds.

This argument would be conclusive if it were shown that the idea is objective and an intuition, as we shall endeavor, further on, to prove that it is. Leibnitz somewhere remarks that it would be conclusive, if it were first proved that God is possible, which shows that Leibnitz, with his universal genius and erudition, could be as weak as ordinary mortals. It was his weakness, in which he anticipated Hegel, to place the possible prior to and independent of the real. If we could suppose God not to exist *in actu*, we could not suppose him to be possible; for possibility cannot actualize itself and there would be no real to reduce it to act. The error of Hegel is in supposing the possible, for his *reine Seyn* is merely possible being, precedes *das Wesen*, or the real, and has in itself the tendency or aptness to become real—*das Wesen*—the old Gnostic doctrine that makes all things originate in the Byssus or Void.

There is no possible without the real, for possibility is the ability of the real. The possible in relation to God is what God is able to do, and in relation to man is what man is able to do with the faculties God has given him. There is nothing, we may add on which philosophers have, it seems to us, been more puzzled, or more bewildered others, than on this very question of possibility. If there were no actual, there would and could be no possible, for possibility, prescinded from the reality of the actual, is simply nothing. The excellent Father Tongiorgi imagines that possibility is not nothing, but even something prescinded from the ability of the actual, and indeed something which, like the *fatum* of the Stoics, limits or binds the power of God himself. Some things he holds are possible, and others are impossible, even to God. He forgets that nothing is impossible to God but to contradict, that is, annihilate his own eternal and necessary being. He is his own possibility, and the measure of the possible. It is his being that founds the nature of things, about which philosophers talk so much.

As to the argument of the *Proslogium*, its validity depends on the sense in which the word *idea* is taken. If we take it in a psychological sense, as a mere mental conception, the argument may be a logical puzzle, but concludes nothing.

If we suppose idea can exist *in intellectu* without existing *in re*, the argument concludes at best only a psychological

abstraction; but if we suppose the mental idea to be the intuition of the real and objective, as we have just said, it is valid and conclusive. St. Anselm seems to us to take *idea* in a subjective sense and to conclude the objective from the subjective; if so, his argument is pyschological, and, like all psychological arguments, inconclusive. Yet he seems to maintain that it is also objective, and that it could not exist *in mente*, if it did not exist *in re*, and therefore conclusive.

Descartes deduces the existence of God from the soul, in which the idea of God he holds, is innate. But what is innate, that is, born in the soul and with it, is the soul, or at least psychical; consequently, the argument is psychological, and proves nothing. Besides, Descartes, as is not seldom the case with him, falls into a paralogism, and reasons in a vicious circle; he takes the idea *in intellectu* to prove that God is, and the veracity of God to prove the objective truth of the idea. He also tells us, elsewhere, when hard pressed by his opponents, that he means by the innate idea of God only that the soul has the innate faculty of thinking God, and therefore concludes God is because man thinks him; but this is only asserting, in other words, that the soul has the faculty of knowing God by immediate cognition—recently improbated by the Holy See—and rests on the principle that thought can never be erroneous, which is not true, otherwise every man would be infallible, incapable of error.

The ontological arguments, so-called, founded on the alleged immediate cognition of being, are in nearly all cases, not ontological, but really psychological, as *das reine Seyn* of Hegel, which is simply an abstraction, therefore worthless; for the soul has no power in itself alone of immediately apprehending being. The psychological arguments are all inconclusive because they all assume the point to be proved. Yet it is not denied that the argument from design, and others that rest on the principle of cause and effect, as well as those drawn from the ethical wants and aspirations of the soul, are all valuable, not indeed in proving that God is, but in proving what he is. St. Paul tells us that "the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the beginning of the world, being understood by the things that are made," Rom. i. 20, but the Apostle does not tell us that the existence of God is a logical conclusion from cosmological or psychological facts or from "the things that are made." Indeed, St. Thomas cites

this text to prove what God is, rather than to prove that he is, for he throughout is replying to the question *Quid est Deus*, rather than to the question, *An sit Deus*, as may be seen by referring to the first article of the question cited above, in which he answers the question, *Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.*

The great question the Apostles and the Fathers had to argue against the Gentiles was not precisely the existence of God, but that of the Divine Unity and the fact of creation and providence. In fact, the distinguishing and essential feature of the Mosaic doctrine was less that God is one than that God is the one Almighty Creator of all things. The existence of one God, as has been seen, was not denied by the Gentiles, except by a few philosophers. The mother error of Gentilism was the loss of the tradition of creation, which paved the way for divinizing the forces of nature, and at length for the worship of demons, always held inferior to a Supreme Divinity, of which some dim reminiscence was always retained.

VII.—ANALYSIS OF THOUGHT.

Atheism is not natural to mankind, and is always, wherever found, the fruit of a false or defective philosophy and erroneous theories mistaken for science. The philosophy which has been generally cultivated since Descartes made his attempt to divorce philosophy from theology, of which it is simply the rational element, and to erect it into a separate and independent science, complete in itself, and embracing the entire natural order, has hardly recognized and set forth with much clearness or distinctness the principles of a conclusive demonstration of theism, or a scientific refutation of atheism. If there is atheism pretending to found itself on science, we may charge it to the false philosophy which has generally obtained, except when connected with Catholic theology, and kept from going astray by tradition and common sense. From the philosophers and false scientists atheism has descended to the people through popular literature, and diffused itself among the half-learned, chiefly by modern lectures and journalism, till literature, art, science, ethics, and especially politics, have become infected, and the very air we breathe saturated with it.

In order to refute atheism and to check the atheistic tendency of modern society, it is necessary to revise the generally

received philosophy, to correct its faulty principles and method, to supply its defects, to harmonize it with common sense and the traditions of the race, and to establish, what it is far from doing, the identity of the principles of science and the principles of things, or the identity of the knowable and the real, that is, to show that the order of science follows the order of being, and in their principles they are identical. To do this in a manner as intelligible as possible to the general reader, it is necessary to set forth the real principles on which philosophy is founded. Philosophy itself is the science of principles, and the principles must be real, that is, the principles of things, not simply mental conceptions or concepts, or the science will want reality and be no science at all. Real principles are the principles, not of science alone, without which nothing can be known, but principles of things, on which all things depend, and without which nothing is or exists.

Obviously then the principles of philosophy and of reality are *a priori*, and precede both the science and the reality that depends on them, or of which they are the principles. They must, then, be given, and neither created nor obtained by the mind's own activity, for without them the mind can neither operate nor even exist. The great error of the dominant philosophy of our times is in the assumption that the mind starts without principles, and finds them or obtains them by its own activity or its own painful exertions. Hence it places method before principles, which is no less absurd than to suppose that the mind, the soul, generates or creates itself. Principles are given, not found by the mind operating without principles. They are given in the fact which we call thought, and we ascertain what they are only by a diligent and careful analysis of thought.

In order to correct the errors of the prevailing philosophy, to ascertain the principles of a true philosophy, and of real science that refutes the atheist by demonstrating that God is, and is the creator of the heavens and the earth and all things visible and invisible, we must begin, as Descartes did, with thought (*cogito*), who was so far right, and ascertain what are the real and necessary elements of thought. This is no light labor, and it is a labor rendered necessary only by prevailing errors in order to refute them, otherwise there would be no necessity for it, and little utility in it; for the human mind remains and operates the same with or without the knowledge the analysis affords.

We therefore adopt the method of the psychologists so far as to begin with the analysis of thought. This is imposed on us by the necessity of the case, as it is only in thought that we find ourselves or are placed in intellectual relation with any thing not ourselves. It is only in thought that the principles either of science or reality can be ascertained. The atheist must assert thought as well as the theist, and so also must the sceptic; for he who denies or he who doubts, thinks, and can neither doubt nor deny without thinking. Hence universal denial or universal doubt, or scepticism, is simply impossible; for he who denies, or he who doubts, knows that he denies or doubts, as he who thinks knows that he thinks. The error of Descartes, or the Psychologues, is not in beginning with thought, but in their assumption that all thought is the act of the soul or subject alone, or that thought is a purely psychological fact.

Cousin, though erring on many capital points, gives somewhere a very clear and just analysis of thought, which he defines to be a complex fact, composed of three inseparable elements, subject, object, and form. He asserts that the subject is always the soul, or ourselves thinking; the object is always distinct from the soul, and standing over against it; and the form is always the relation of the subject and object. Every thought, therefore, is the synthesis of three elements: subject, object, and their relation, as we maintained and proved in some chapters of an unfinished work on Synthetic Philosophy published in the years 1842–'43.

Thought is either intuitive or reflective. The careful analysis of intuitive thought, intuition, what Cousin calls spontaneity or spontaneous thought, though erroneously, and which he very properly distinguishes from reflection or thought returning on itself, and so to speak, actively rethinking itself, discloses these three elements: subject, object, and their relation, always distinct, always inseparable, given simultaneously in one and the same complex fact. Deny one or another of these elements and there is and can be no thought. Remove the subject, and there is no thought, for there evidently can be no thought where there is no thinker; remove the object, and there is equally no thought, for to think nothing is simply not to think; and finally, deny the relation of subject and object, and you also deny all thought, for certainly the soul cannot apprehend an object or an object be presented to the soul with no relation between them; hence the assertion by the peripatetics of the necessity to

the fact of intuition as well as of cognition of what they call *phantasmata* and *species intelligibiles*, which is simply their way of expressing the relation in thought of subject and object.

The three elements of thought being given simultaneously and synthetically in one and the same fact, they all three rest on the same authority and are equally certain both subjectively and objectively. Here we escape the interminable debates of philosophers as to the passage from the subjective to the objective, and, in military phrase, flank the question of the certainty of human knowledge, and thus render all arguments against either subjectivism or scepticism superfluous. There is no passage from the subjective to the objective, if the activity of the subject alone suffices for the production of thought, and no possible means of a logical refutation of scepticism. If the soul alone could suffice for thought, nothing else would be necessary to its production, and thought would and could affirm no reality beyond the soul itself; no objective reality could ever be proved, and no real science would be possible. All objective certainty would vanish, for we have and can have only thought with which to prove the objective validity of thought. Hence it is that those philosophers who regard thought as the product of the soul's activity alone, have never been able to refute the sceptic or to get beyond the sphere of the subject.

The soul's activity alone does not, and, unless it were God, who is the adequate object of his own intellect, could not, suffice for thought. The object is as necessary to the production of thought as is the subject. The soul cannot act without it, and therefore cannot seek and find its object. The presence and activity of the object is necessary to the activity of the subject. The object must then present itself or be presented to the soul, or there is no thought actual or possible. This is the fact which Cousin undertakes to explain by what he calls spontaneity, and which he distinguishes from reflection. Intuition, he says, is spontaneous, impersonal; but reflection is personal, in which the soul acts voluntarily. But unhappily he loses all the advantage of this distinction, for he makes the intuition the product of the spontaneous activity of the soul, or, as he says, the spontaneous or impersonal reason, therefore as much a psychical product as reflection itself; and therefore again, gets, even in intuition, no object, no reality, *extra animam*, and with all his endeavors he never really gets out of the subjectivism

of Kant, or even the egoism of Fichte. The distinction he makes between the personal reason and the impersonal is by no means a distinction between subject and object, but simply a distinction in the soul itself, or a distinction between its spontaneous and reflective modes of acting, and is, as Pierre Leroux has well said, a contradiction of his own assertion that the subject is always the soul, and the object is always distinguishable from it, standing over against it, and acting from the opposite direction; for the impersonal and personal reason are in his view psychical, simply a faculty of the soul.

If the object were purely passive, or did not actively concur in the production of thought, it would be as if it were not, and the soul could no more think with it than without it. It is the fact that the object actively concurs in the production of thought that establishes its reality, since what is not, or has no real existence, cannot act, cannot present or affirm itself. So far Pierre Leroux, to whom we are much indebted for this analysis of thought, is right, and proves himself, let Gioberti speak as contemptuously of him as he will, a true philosophical observer; but he vitiates all that follows in his philosophy by maintaining that the soul creates or supplies the form of the thought, or the relation between subject and object, as we have shown in *The Convert.* The soul cannot act without the object, nor unless the object is placed in relation with it; consequently the soul can no more create the relation than it can create the object or itself. The object with the relation, or the correlation of subject and object, then, is presented to the soul or given it, not created or furnished by it.

The soul, unable to think by itself alone, or in and of itself, can think even itself, find itself, or become aware of its own existence only in conjunction with the object intuitively presented; each of the three elements of thought therefore not only rests on the same authority, but each is as certain as is the fact of consciousness or the fact that we think. The object is affirmed or affirms itself objectively, and is real with all the certainty we have or can have of our own existence. Further than this, thought itself cannot go. we cannot from principles more ultimate than thought, demonstrate thought; but it is not necessary, for he who thinks knows that he thinks, and cannot deny that he thinks without thinking, and therefore not without affirming what he

denies. This is all that can be asked, for a denial that denies itself is equivalent to an affirmation.

This analysis of thought not only refutes scepticism and subjectivism, or what is called in English philosophy, idealism, and shows the objective validity of intuition to be as indisputable as our consciousness of our own existence, but it refutes at the same time and by the same blow both the ontologists and psychologists; not indeed by denying either the ontological or the psychological principle, but by showing that both are given in one and the same thought, and therefore that neither is obtained by any process of reasoning from the other. The psychologist assumes that the soul is given, and that it by its own psychical action obtains the non-psychical or ontological; the ontologist assumes that being is given, and from the notion of being alone the soul deduces both the psychical and the cosmic. Neither is the fact. Being must be intuitively presented or we cannot have the notion of being, and the intuitive presentation of being to the subject gives the subject simultaneously the consciousness of itself as the subject of the intuition. Being can be presented in thought, only under the relation of object, and in every thought is given simultaneously with the other two inseparable elements, subject and relation. The psychologist fails in his analysis of thought to detect as an original and indestructible element of thought a non-psychical element, the object which stands over against it, distinct from it, and except in conjunction with which there is and can be no psychical activity or action. What the psychologist overlooks is the fact that the psychical and the non-psychical, as the condition of the soul's activity and consciousness of itself, are both given together in one and the same intuitive fact, and therefore that neither is obtained as an element of thought or science from the other. The objective validity of our knowledge rests on the non-psychical element of thought, not on the psychical. The ontologist fails to detect the psychical element as a primitive element of thought; the psychologist fails to detect the ontological element as equally primitive and underived; and neither notes the fact that both are given in one and the same original intuition. Cousin asserts it indeed, but as we have seen, forgets it or destroys its value, by resolving the distinction of subject and object into a distinction between the personal and impersonal reason, or between the spontaneous and reflective modes of the soul's activity, which

makes both really psychical, and allows nothing *extra animam* to be affirmed in thought or presented in intuition.

VIII.—ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECT.

The analysis of thought, as we have just seen, discloses a non-psychical or an ontological element, and shows that in every thought there is an object distinct from and independent of the subject, and that in every intuitive thought the object affirms or presents itself by its own activity. This at one stroke establishes the reality of the object and the validity of our science or knowledge. Having done this, we may proceed to analyze, not the subject, as do the psychologists, but the object, in order to determine, not how we know, but what we know.

Modern philosophers, for the most part, especially since Descartes, proceed to analyze the subject before having either ascertained or analyzed the object, and are engrossed with the method and instrument of philosophy before having determined its principles. All philosophers do and must begin with a more or less perfect analysis of thought. Even Gioberti, who insists on the ontological method, concedes that in learning or teaching philosophy, we must begin with psychology, the analysis of thought, or as Cousin says, with the analysis of "the fact of consciousness." But the psychologists proceed immediately from the analysis of thought to the analysis of the subject, that is, of the soul, and give us simply the philosophy, as it may be called, of the Human Understanding, as do Locke and Hume; of the Active powers of the soul as do Reid and Stewart; or of the Human Intellect as does Dr. Porter, president of Yale College. This at best can give us, except by an inconsequence, only a science of abstractions, or the subjective forms of thought without any objective reality, or barely the *Wissenschaftslehre*, or the science of knowing, of Fichte, the science of the instrument and method of science, not science itself, the science of empty forms, not the science of things.

It is no wonder, therefore, that philosophy is very generally regarded as dealing only with abstractions and empty formulas, or that it is very generally despised and rejected by men of clear insight and strong practical sense, as an abstract science, and therefore worthless. Mere psychology,

which can be only the science of abstractions or empty forms, is even worse than worthless, and the popular estimate of it is only too favorable. There is no class of men more contemptible or mischievous than psychologers endeavoring to pass themselves off for philosophers, and very few others are to be met with in the heterodox world, or even in the orthodox world, when not guided and restrained by the principles and dogmas of Christian theology.

This comes from proceeding to the analysis of the subject before having analyzed the object. The object, if given simultaneously with the subject in the fact of thought, precedes it in the order of being or real order; for it presents or affirms itself as the necessary condition of the soul's activity, and of her apprehension of her own existence even. It is first in order, and its analysis should precede that of the soul; for as the subject is given only in conjunction with the object, or as reflected or mirrored in it, it is only as reflected or mirrored in the object that it can know or recognize its own powers or faculties. The object determines the faculty, not the faculty the object. Man, St. Thomas says, somewhere, as cited by Balmes, "is not intelligible in himself, because he is not intelligence in himself." If he could know himself in himself, or be the direct object of his own intellect, he would be God, at least independent of God. The soul knows itself only under the relation of subject, as it knows what is not itself only under the relation of object, and is conscious of its own existence only in the intuition of the object. We ascertain the powers of the soul from the object she apprehends, not the reality of the object from the powers or faculties of the soul. The analysis of the object is, then, the necessary condition of the analysis of the subject.

The analysis of the object, like that of thought, if we mistake not, gives us, or discloses as essential in it, three elements, the ideal, the empirical, and the relation between them. The ideal is the *a priori* and apodictic element, without which there is and can be no intelligible object, and consequently no thought; the empirical is the fact of experience, or the object, whether appertaining to the sensible order or to the intelligible, as intellectually apprehended by the soul; the relation is the *nexus* of the ideal and the empirical, and is given by the ideal itself.

Kant has proved in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, or Analysis of Pure Reason, that the empirical is not possible without the ideal, or as he says, without cognitions *a priori*,

which are necessary to every synthetic judgment, or cognition *a posteriori*. The cognitions *a priori* Kant calls categories after the peripatetics, or certain forms under which we necessarily apprehend all things. He makes these forms or categories forms of the human understanding, and therefore makes them subjective, not objective, or places them on the side of the subject, not on the side of the object. Aristotle makes them, apparently, forms neither of the subject nor of the object, but of the *mundus logicus*, or a world intermediary between the subject and the object, or the soul and the *mundus physicus*, or real world. Kant's doctrine, that the categories are forms of the subject, is refuted in our analysis of thought. It implies that the subject can exist and operate without the object, and that we see the object as we do, not because it is such as we see it, but because such is the constitution or law of the human mind,—which denies the objective validity of our knowledge already established.

The peripatetic categories are admissible or not, as the intermediary world is or is not taken as the representation of the real world. If we take the phantasms and intelligible species as the representations of the object to the mind, not by the mind, and thus make the categories real, not simply formal, the peripatetic doctrine, as will be seen further on, is not inadmissible. But if we distinguish the categories from the *mundus physicus* or real world, and make them forms of an intermediary world, or something which is neither subject nor object, we deny them all reality, for no such world does or can exist. What is neither subject nor object is nothing. St. Thomas, as we understand him, makes, as we shall by and by show, the phantasms and species proceed from the object, and holds them to be in the reflective order, in which the soul is active, representative of the object; which permits us to hold that in the intuitive order they are simply presentative or the object presenting or affirming itself to the passive intellect. He holds them to be, in scholastic language, *objectum quo* not *objectum quod* or that in which the intellect terminates, but that by which it attains to the idea, or the intelligible, as will be more fully explained further on. The modern peripatetics, for the most part, make the categories purely formal, and gravely tell us that a proposition may be logically true and yet really false!

Cousin identifies the categories of Aristotle and Kant, with what he calls necessary and absolute ideas, and reduces their number to being and phenomenon, or substance

and cause, but loses their objective reality by making them constituent elements of the impersonal reason, which is subjective, as purely so as is the reflective reason itself. The impersonal reason differs, in his philosophy, from the personal reason only as to the mode of its activity, and is, as the personal, a faculty of the soul, by which the soul knows all that it does or can know, whatever the degree or region of its knowledge.

Dr. Ward, of the *Dublin Review*, places or intends to place the categories or, as he says, necessary and and eternal ideas, on the side of the object, and holds that they are intuitive or self-evident; yet he makes intuition the act of the soul, therefore, empirical, and really places the ideal on the side of the subject. He fails to integrate them in real and necessary being, and says, after Father Kleutgen, that though founded *on* God, they are not God. But what is founded on God, and yet is not God, is creature, and creatures Dr. Ward cannot hold them to be, for he holds them to be necessary and eternal, and necessary and eternal creature is a contradiction in terms. What is neither God nor creature is nothing, and Dr. Ward cannot say ideas are nothing, for he holds them to be intuitive or self-evident, and nothing cannot evidence itself, or be an object of intuition. There is, also, a further difficulty. Dr. Ward, as do Drs. McCosh Porter, Hopkins, and others of the same school, by making intuition an act of the soul makes it a fact of experience, and the point to be met is, that without intuition of the ideal, there is and can be no fact of experience, or empirical intuition. It must be borne in mind that Kant has proved that without the *cognitions a priori*, or what we call the ideal, no cognition *a posteriori* is possible.

Dr. Newman, of whom we would always speak with profound reverence, in his *Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent*, apparently at least, not only denies ideal intuition, but the objective reality of the ideal itself, and resolves the categories or ideas into pure mental abstractions created by the mind itself. "All things of the exterior [objective?] world," he says, section second of his opening chapter, "are unit and individual, and nothing else; but the mind not only contemplates these unit realities as they exist, but has the gift, by an *act of creation*, to bring before it abstractions and generalizations which have no existence, no counterpart out of it." It would be difficult to express more distinctly the Nominalism of Rosceline, or at least the Con-

ceptualism of Abelard, censured by the theologians of the twelfth century as incompatible with the assertion of the ineffable mystery of the Ever-Blessed Trinity. It need not surprise us, therefore, that Dr. Newman confesses in his *Apologia pro Vita sua*, that he has never been able by reasoning to prove satisfactorily to his own mind the existence of God, for on his philosophy, if we do not misapprehend it, he can adduce no argument against the atheist. If we are to take the passage cited as a key to his philosophy, there can be for him no object in thought but these unit realities, for the abstractions and generalizations, being mental creations, are all on the side of the subject, and no place is left for God in the knowable.

But, unhappily, these "unit realities" are not cognizable by themselves alone. To suffice of themselves as objects of thought they must suffice for their own existence. What cannot exist alone, cannot be known alone. Then every one of these unit realities, to be cognizable alone, must be an independent, self-existent, and self-sufficing being, that is to say, God, and there must be as many Gods as there are unit realities or distinct objects of thought or intuition, which we need not say is inadmissible. These unit realities can be objects of thought or intuition only on condition of presenting or affirming themselves to the mind, and they can present or affirm themselves in intuition only as they are *in re*, not as they are not, as is sufficiently proved in our analysis of thought. If they are not real and necessary being they cannot affirm themselves as such; if they are not such they can affirm themselves only as contingent and dependent existences that have their being in another, not in themselves, and then only under the relation of contingency or dependence, or in relation to that on which they depend; consequently they are not cognizable without intuition of real and necessary or independent being which creates them. Contingency or dependence expresses a relation, but relations are cogitable only in the related, and only when both terms of the relation are given. Neither term can be inferred from the other, for neither can be thought without the other. Hence there is no intuition of the contingent without intuition of the necessary, or empirical intuition without ideal intuition.

The categories are all correlatives, and are presented in two lines, as one and many, the same and the diverse, the universal and the particular, the infinite and the finite, the

immutable and the mutable, the permanent and the transitory, the perfect and the imperfect, the necessary and the contingent, substance and phenomena, being and existences, cause and effect, &c. These severally connote each other, and we cannot think the one line without thinking or having intuition of the other. When we think a thing as particular, we distingnish it from the universal, or think it as *not* universal; but evidently we cannot do this unless the universal is intuitively present to the mind. The same is equally true of every one of the other categories. The contingent is not cogitable without intuition of the necessary; nor is it possible to think the contingent without intuition of its contingency, for, as we have shown in the foregoing analysis. the object presents itself by its own activity, and therefore must present itself as it is, not as it is not. Nothing is more certain than that the relation of the categories is no fact of experience, nor than that neither correlative is inferred from the other. Yet it is no less certain that men, all men, even very young children, regard Dr. Newman's "Unit realities" as contingent, as dependent, or as not having the cause of their existence in themselves. Hence the questions of the child to its mother: "Who made the flowers? who made the trees? who made the birds? who made the stars? who made father? who made God?" Hence, too, those anxious questionings of the soul that we mark in the ancient heathen and in the modern Protestant world: Whence came we? why are we here? whither do we go? It is only scientists, Comtists or Cosmists, who are satisfied with Topsy's theory, "I didn't come, I grow'd." But if the soul had no intuition of the relation of contingent and necessary, or of cause and effect, it would and could ask no such questions.

It is certain, as a matter of fact, that the soul has present to it both the contingent and necessary, as the condition *a priori* of all experience or empirical intuition. So much Kant has proved. The object of thought always presents itself either as contingent or as necessary. The categories of necessity and contingency, not being empirical, since they are the forms under which we necessarily apprehend every object we do apprehend, we call them ideas, or the ideal. The question to be settled is, Is the ideal, without which no fact of experience is possible, on the side of the object, or on the side of the subject? Kant places it on the side of the subject, and subjects the object to the laws of the soul;

we place it on the side of the object, and hold that it is that without which the object is not intelligible, and therefore no object at all. Hence we maintain that the object of thought is not a simple unit, but consists of three inseparable elements, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation. The proof that we are right is furnished in our analysis of thought, and rests on the principle that what is not is not intelligible, and that no object is intelligible save as it really exists. This follows necessarily from the fact we have established that the object presents or affirms itself by its own activity. Contingent existences are active only in their relation to the necessary; consequently are intelligible or cognizable only in their relation of contingency. Then, as certain as it is that we think, so certain is it that the ideal is on the side of the object, not on the side of the subject. This will appear still more evident when we recollect that the contingent is not apprehensible without the intuition of the necessary on which it depends, and the necessary is and can be no predicate of the subject, which is contingent existence, not necessary being, since it depends on the object for its power to act.

It follows from this that the ideal is given intuitively in every thought, as an essential element of the object, and therefore that it is objective and real. But while this agrees with Plato in asserting the objective reality of the ideal, in opposition to Kant, it agrees also with Aristotle and St. Thomas in denying that it is given separately. We assert the ideal as a necessary element of the object, but we deny that, separated from the empirical element, it is or can be an object of thought; for man in this life is not pure spirit or soul, but spirit or soul united to body, and cannot directly perceive, as maintained by Plato, the old Gnostics or *Pneumatici*, the modern Transcendentalists, Pierre Leroux, and the disciples of the English School founded by the opium-eater Coleridge, such as Drs. McCosh and Ward, Presidents Marsh, Porter, and Hopkins, to mention no others. Hence we deny the proposition of the Louvain professors, improbated by the Holy See, that the mind "has immediate cognition, at least habitual, of God." Cognition or perception is an act of the soul in concurrence with the object, and the soul, though the *forma corporis*, or informing principle of the body, never in this life acts without the body, and consequently can perceive the ideal only as sensibly represented. The ideal is really given in intuition,

but not by itself alone; it is given in the empirical fact as its *a priori* condition, and is distinctly held only as separated from it, by reflection, the *intellectus agens*, or active intellect, as maintained by St. Thomas and the whole peripatetic school, as well as by the official teaching in our Catholic schools and colleges generally.

Ideal intuition is not perception or cognition. Perception is empirical, whether mediate or immediate, and whatever its object or its sphere, and in it the soul is always the percipient agent. Intuition of the ideal is solely the act of the object, and in relation to it the intellect is passive. It corresponds to the intelligible species of the peripatetics, or rather to what they call *species impressa*. Dr. Reid, founder of the Scottish school, finished by Sir William Hamilton, thought he did a great thing when he vehemently attacked, and as he flattered himself made away with, the phantasms and intelligible species of the peripatetics, which he supposed were held to be certain ideas or immaterial images interposed between the mind and the real object, and when he asserted that we perceive things themselves, not their ideas or images. But Dr. Reid mistook a windmill for a giant. The peripatetics never held, as he supposed, the *phantasmata* and the *species intelligibiles* to be either ideas or images, nor denied the doctrine of the Scottish school, that we perceive things themselves; and one is a little surprised to find so able and so learned a philosopher as Gioberti virtually conceding that they did, and giving Reid and Sir William Hamilton credit for establishing the fact that we perceive directly and immediately external things themselves. We ourselves have studied the peripatetic school chiefly in the writings of St. Thomas, the greatest of the Schoolmen, and we accept the doctrine of sensible and intelligible species as he represents them, that is, supposing we ourselves understand him. Both the sensible and the intelligible species proceed from the object, and in relation to them the intellect is passive, that is, simply *in potentia ad actum*. Now, as we have shown that the intellect cannot act prior to the presentation of the object or till the object is placed in relation with it, it cannot then, either in the sensible or the intelligible order, place itself in relation with the object, but the object, by an objective act independent of the intellect, must place itself in relation with the subject. This is the fact that underlies the doctrine of the peripatetic phantasms and intelligible species, and trans-

lated into modern thought means all simply what we call ideal intuition, or the presentation or affirmation of the object by itself or its placing itself by its own act in relation to the intellect as the *a priori* condition of perception.

But as the soul cannot act without the body, the intelligible cannot be presented save as sensibly represented, and therefore only in the phantasmata or sensible species, from which the active intellect abstracts, divides, disengages, or separates—not infers—them. Yet the intelligible, the ideal, as we say, is really presented, and is the object in which the intellect terminates or which it attains, the very doctrine we are endeavoring by our analysis of the object to bring out. Reid never understood it, and psychologists either do not distinguish the ideal from the empirical, or profess to infer it by way of deduction or induction from the sensible. St. Thomas does neither, for he holds that the intelligible enters the mind with or in the sensible, and is simply disengaged, not concluded, from it.

It is necessary to be on our guard against confounding the question of the reality of the ideal or universal and necessary ideas, which correspond to the cognitions *a priori* of Kant, with the scholastic question as to the reality of universals, as do the Louvain professors, in the proposition improbated by the Holy See, that universals, *a parte rei considerata*, are indistinguishable from God, which confounds universals with *idea exemplaris*, or the type in the divine mind after which God creates, and which St. Thomas says is nothing else than the essence of God. *Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.* The universals of the Schoolmen are divisible into classes: 1, Whiteness, roundness, and the like, to which some think Plato gave reality, as he did to justice, the beautiful, &c., and which are manifestly abstractions, with no reality save in their concretes from which the mind abstracts them; 2, Genera and species, as *humanitas*. The Scholastics, as far as our study of them goes, do not sharply distinguish between these two classes, but treat them both under the general head of universals.

Rosceline and the Nominalists, who fell under ecclesiastical censure, held universals to be simply general terms, or empty words; Abelard and the Conceptualists held them to be not empty words, but mental conceptions existing in the mind but with no existence *a parte rei;* Guillaume de Champeaux of St. Victor, and afterwards bishop of Paris, and the mediæval Realists, are said to have held them to be real or

to exist *a parte rei*, or as they said then, as separate entities; St. Thomas and the Thomists, as is well known, held them to exist *in mente* or *in conceptu cum fundamento in re*. But Cousin, in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, originally published as a Report to the French Academy on the unpublished works of Abelard, thinks, not without reason, that he finds in a passage cited by Abelard from William de Champeaux, that the mediæval realists did not assert the separate entity of all universals, but only the reality of genera and species, though of course, not either as ideas in the divine mind, or as existing apart from their individualization.

The reality of genera and species is very plainly taught in Genesis, for it is there asserted that God created all living creatures each after its kind; and if we were to deny it, generation as the production of like by like could not be asserted; the dogma of Original Sin, or that all men or the race sinned in Adam, would be something more than an inexplicable mystery, and we have observed that those theologians who deny the reality of the species, have a strong tendency to deny original sin, or to explain it away so as to make it not sin, but the punishment of sin. Certainly, if the race were not one and real in Adam, it would be somewhat difficult to explain how original sin could be propagated by natural generation. It would be equally difficult to explain the mystery of Redemption through the assumption of human nature by the Word, unless we suppose, what is not admissible, that the Word assumed each individual man, for to suppose a real human nature common to all men, is to assert the reality of the genus or species. The denial of the reality of genera and species not only denies the unity of the race and thus denies Original Sin, the Incarnation, Redemption, and Regeneration, but also impugns, it seems to us, the Mystery of the Blessed Trinity, by denying the unity of the nature or essence of the three persons of the Godhead, and certain it is that both Rosceline and Abelard were accused of denying or misrepresenting that ineffable Mystery.

We are not aware of the views of St. Thomas on this precise question, or that he has treated specially of the question of genera and species. As to the other class of universals, he is unquestionably right. They are conceptions, existing *in mente cum fundamento in re*, that is, mental abstractions, formed by the mind operating on the concretes given in intuition. They have their foundation in reality. There

is a basis of reality in all our mental conceptions, even in our wildest imaginations and our most whimsical fancies, for we neither think nor imagine what is absolutely unreal.

But however this may be, St. Thomas* does not class what we call the ideal intuitively given, with the universals or conceptions, with simply a basis in reality. He asserts self-evident principles, the first principles of science or of demonstration, which are neither formed by the mind, nor obtained from experience, but precede experience and all reasoning, and which must be given by ideal intuition. In its substance, its principles and method, the real philosopher will find that the philosophy of St. Thomas cannot be safely rejected, although, as we have already intimated, he may find it necessary, in order to meet errors which have arisen since his time, to explain some questions more fully than St. Thomas has done and to prove some points which he could take for granted.

IX. ANALYSIS OF THE IDEAL.

The analysis of Thought gives us three inseparable elements, all equally real: subject, object, and their relation; the analysis of the Object gives us also three inseparable elements, all objectively real, namely, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation. The analysis of the Ideal, we shall see, gives us again three inseparable elements, all also objectively real, namely, the necessary, the contingent, and their relation, or being, existences, and the relation between them.

We have found what logicians call the categories and what we call the ideal or objective ideas, and without which no thought or fact of experience, as Kant has proved, is possible, are identical. Aristotle makes the categories ten and two predicaments; Kant makes them fifteen, two of the sensibility, twelve of the understanding (*Verstand*), and one of the reason, (*Vernunft*); but whatever their number, they are, contrary to Kant, intuitive, and therefore objectively real. They are intuitive because they are the necessary conditions *a priori* of experience or the soul's intellectual action; and they are objective, since otherwise they could not be intuitive, for intuition is the act of the object, not of the subject.

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* See *Summa*, p. 1, Q. 2, a. 1.

All philosophers agree that whatever exists is arranged under some one or all of these categories, and is either necessary or contingent, independent or dependent, one or many, the same or the diverse, universal or particular, invariable or variable, immutable or mutable, permanent or transitory, infinite or finite, eternal or temporary, being or existences, cause or effect, creator or creature. They are, as we have seen, in two lines, and go, so to speak, in pairs, and are correlatives, and each connotes the other.

But these categories may be reduced to a smaller number. Cousin contends that all the categories of the upper line may be reduced to the single category of being, and those of the lower line to the single category of phenomenon, or the two lines to substance and cause. Rosmini reduces the categories of the upper line to being in general; Father Rothenflue reduces them all to the single category of *ens reale*, or real being, in contradistinction from the *ens in genere* of Rosmini; the Louvain professors, as all exclusive ontologists, do the same. The exclusive psychologists reduce them all to the category of the soul or our personal existence; Gioberti reduces the categories of the upper line to that of real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, and all the categories of the lower line to that of contingent existences, or briefly, both lines to Being and Existences.

Cousin's reduction is inadmissible, for it omits the second line, or denies its reality. Phenomenon, in so far as real or any thing, is identical with being, and does not constitute a distinct category. Cousin makes being and substance identical, a pantheistic error; for though all being is substance, all substances are not real and necessary being. He also places cause in the lower line, which is a mistake. The effect is in the second line, but not the cause. It is true, cause is not in the upper line, for it is not eternal and necessary. The causative power is in being, and therefore in the upper line, but actual cause is the nexus between the two lines, and is included in the relation between them, or between the necessary and the contingent. This shows that the ideal or the categories cannot be reduced to two, for that would deny all relation between them, and make them subject and predicate without the copula. Gioberti is more philosophical in reducing them to three, in his terminology, Being, existences, and their relation.

Cousin, Father Rothenflue, Professor Ubaghs, and all the

ontologists, as we shall soon show, are right in their reduction of the categories of the upper line to the single category of real and necessary being, though Cousin and Spinoza, as do all pantheists, err in making being and substance identical, and in asserting one only substance, as do the Cosmists, for this restricts the ideal to the upper line, and excludes entirely the lower line. Hence they resolve all reality into being, or substance and phenomenon, the last real only in being or substance.

Real and necessary being is independent, and can stand alone, but we found in our analysis of the object, another line of categories, the contingent, the particular, the dependent, &c., equally necessary as the *a priori* condition of experience or empirical intuition, and therefore included in the ideal element of the object, and therefore given or presented in ideal intuition. The relation between the two lines of categories, and which is really the relation, not yet considered, between the ideal and the empirical, and also given by ideal intuition, will be treated further on. Here we are considering only the two lines of categories, given together in ideal intuition. For the present we shall consider them simply as reduced to two categories, namely, the necessary and the contingent, which will soon appear to be necessary being and contingent existences. These categories are, as included either in the ideal or in the object of thought, correlatives, and neither can be inferred or concluded from the other. They do not imply one the other, but each connotes [*connotat*] the other, that is to say, neither is cognizable without the other. They who take the necessary as their principium can conclude from it only the necessary, not the contingent, and hence the pure ontologists, who attempt by logical deduction from real and necessary being alone to obtain the contingent, inevitably fall into pantheism. It is equally impossible to conclude, by logical induction, real and necessary being from the contingent. Deduction from the contingent can give only the contingent, and induction can give only a generalization, which remains always in the order of the particulars generalized. Hence those who make the contingent their principium, if consequent, inevitably fall into atheism. The error of each class arises from their incomplete analysis of the object and of its ideal element. The complete analysis of the object shows, as we have seen, that the ideal element is given intuitively, as the *a priori* condition of the empirical. The analysis of the ideal shows

that the necessary and the contingent are both given in the ideal intuition and there is no need of attempting to conclude either from the other. They are both primitive, and being intuitively given, both are and must be objectively real.

But the necessary and the contingent are abstract terms, and are real only in their concretes. There is and can be no intuition of necessary and contingent as abstractions; for as abstractions they have no objective existence, and therefore are incapable of presenting or affirming themselves in intuition, which, as we have shown, is the act of the object, not of the subject. The necessary must therefore, since we have proved it real, be real and necessary being, and intuition of it is intuition of real and necessary being. In like manner, intuition of the contingent is not intuition of contingent nothing, but of contingent being, that is, existences, the *ens secundum quid* of the Schoolmen. This is what we have proved in proving the reality of the ideal. Ideas without which no fact of knowledge is possible, and which through objective intuition enter into all our mental operations, are not, as they are too often called, abstract ideas, but real.

We have reduced, provisorily, the ideas or categories to two, necessary and contingent, which we find, in the fact that they are intuitively given, are real, and if real, then the necessary is real and necessary being, and the contingent is contingent, though real, existence. Then the analysis of the ideal or *a priori* element of human knowledge gives us being, existences, and their relation. These three terms are really given intuitively, but, as we have seen, in the fact of thought or experience, they are given as an inseparable element of the object, not as distinct or separate objects of thought, or of empirical apprehension, noetic or sensible. They are given in the empirical fact, though its *a priori* element, and the mind by its own intuitive action does not distinguish them from the empirical element of the object, or perceive them as distinct and separate objects of thought. We distinguish them only by reflection, or by the analysis of the object, which is complex, distinguishing what in the object is ideal and *a priori* from what is empirical and *a posteriori*. When we assert the necessary and contingent as ideas, the mind, again, does not perceive that the one is being and the other existence or dependent on being; the mind perceives this only in reflecting that if given they must

be objective and real, and if real, being and existence, for what is not being, or by or from being, is not real. The identity of the ideal and the real, and of the real with being and what is from being, is arrived at by reflection, and is, if you insist on it, a conclusion, but, as the logicians say, an explicative, not an illative conclusion.

But we have reduced the categories to the necessary and contingent, and found the necessary identical with real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, and the contingent identical with contingent existence, *ens secundum quid*. Being is independent, and can stand alone, and can be asserted without asserting any thing beside itself; for who says *being* says being *is*—a fact misconceived by Sir William Hamilton, when he denies that the unconditioned can be thought, because thought itself conditions it. But a contingent existence cannot be thought by itself alone, for contingency asserts a relation, and can be thought or asserted only under that relation. It would be a contradiction in terms to assert ideal intuition of the contingent as independent, self-existent, for it would not then be contingent. The contingent, as the term itself implies, has not the cause or source of its existence in itself, but is dependent on being. The relation between the two categories is the relation of dependence of the contingent on the necessary, or of contingent existences on real and necessary being. This relation we express by the word existences. The *ex* in the word *existence* implies relation, and that the existence is derived *from* being, and, though distinguished from it, depends on it, or has its being in it, and not in itself.

The Scholastics apply the word *ens*, being, alike to real and necessary being and to contingent existences, to whatever is real, and also to whatever is unreal, or a mere figment of the imagination, as when they say *ens rationis*. This comes partly from the fact that the Latin language, as we find it in the Latin classics, is not rich in philosophic terms, but still more from the fact that they treat philosophy chiefly from the point of view of reflection, which is secondary, and is the action of the mind on its intuitions. Whatever can be the object of reflective thought, though the merest abstraction or the purest fiction, they call by the common name of *ens:* it may be *ens reale* or *ens possibile*, *ens necessarium* or *ens contingens*, *ens simpliciter* or *ens secundum quid*. From the Schoolmen the practice has passed into all modern languages. We think it would be more simple and convenient, and tend

to avoid confusion, to restrict as Gioberti does, being to the *ens simpliciter* of the Schoolmen, and to use the word existence, or rather existences, to avoid all ambiguity, to express whatever is from being and depends on it, and yet is distinguishable from it.

Making this change in the received terminology of philosophy, the analysis of the ideal gives us being, Existences, and the relation between them. The second term, as the lower line in the categories, must be given in the ideal intuition, for we cannot perceive existences, or empirically apprehend contingents, unless we have present to our mind the idea of contingency as the correlative of the necessary, as shown in our analysis of the object.

There remains now to be considered the third term, or the relation of the contingent to the necessary, or of existences to Being. Being and existences comprise all that is or exists. What is not real and necessary, self-existent and independent being, is either nothing or it is from being and dependent on being. Existences are, as we have seen, distinguished from being, and yet are real, for the idea of contingency is given in the objective intuition, or in the ideal element of the object. Existences are then real, not nothing, and yet are not being. Nevertheless they are, as we have seen, related to being and dependent on it. But they cannot be distinct from being, and yet dependent on being, unless produced from nothing by the creative act of being. Being alone is eternal, self-existent, and beside being there is and can be only existences created by being. Being must either create them from nothing by the sole energy of its will, or it must evolve them from itself. Not the last, for that would deny that they are distinct from being; then the first must be accepted as the only alternative. Hence the analysis of the ideal gives us being, existences, and the creative act of being as the nexus or copula that unites existences to being, or the predicate to the subject.

The ideal then has, as Gioberti truly remarks, the three terms of a complete judgment, subject, predicate, and copula, and as it is formed by the ideal, it is real, objective, formed and presented to us by being itself, presented not separately, but as the ideal element of the object. It contains a formula that excludes alike ontologism and psychologism, and gives the principium of each in its real synthesis. The intelligent reader will see, also, we trust, that it excludes alike the exaggerations of both spiritualists and sensists, and

that nothing is more ridiculous than to charge it, as we have set it forth, with atheism or pantheism, as many excellent persons have done, as they find it stated in the pages of Gioberti. It refutes, as we trust we shall soon see, both atheism and pantheism, and establishes Christian theism. Truth, if truth, is truth, let who will tell it, and it is as lawful to accept it when told by Gioberti as when told by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Cousin, Pierre Leroux, or Sir William Hamilton.

X.—ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION.

In the analysis of thought, the analysis of the object, and the analysis of the ideal we have found in each, three elements given simultaneously and inseparably. In thought: subject, object, and their relation; in the object: the ideal, the empirical, and their relation; in the ideal: the necessary or being, the contingent or existences, and their relation. But though in the last analysis we have stated the relation is the creative act, the reader will not fail to perceive that we have given only a meagre account of the relation in the analysis of thought, and still less in the analysis of the object. This has been partly because we are not setting forth a complete system of philosophy embracing all the questions of rational science, and partly because till we had reached the analysis of the ideal, the analysis, or a proper account of the relation in the other two cases, could not be given, since the relation, as we hope to show, is substantially one and the same in each of the three cases.

The analysis of the relation is not practicable in the sense of the other analyses we have made; for, as relation, it has only a single term, and prescinded from the related is simply nullity. We can analyze it only in the related, in which alone it is real. In the fact of thought we have found that the object is active, not passive as most philosophies teach; and therefore that it is the object that renders the subject active, reduces it to act, and therefore creates it. St. Thomas and, we believe, all the Scholastics, teach that in the reception of the phantasms and the intelligible species the mind is passive. That which is purely passive is as if it were not, for whatever really is or exists, is or exists *in actu*, and therefore is necessarily active. Since, then, the phan-

tasms and species proceed from the object,* it follows that the object actualizes the subject, and renders it active or *intellectus agens*. Hence the relation of object and subject in the fact of thought is the relation of cause and effect. The object actualizes or creates the subject, not the subject the object.

The relation we have found of the ideal and empirical is also the relation of cause and effect. The empirical we have found is impossible without the ideal, for it depends on it, and does not and cannot exist without it. That without which a thing does not and cannot exist, and on which it depends, is its cause. The ideal then causes, produces, or creates the empirical, and therefore the relation between them is the relation of cause and effect. Ideal space produces empirical space, and ideal time produces empirical time. As the ideal is real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, as we have seen, ideal space is and can be only the power of being to externize its own acts, in the order of coëxistences, and ideal time can only be the power of being to externize its own acts successively, or progressively. Empirical space is the effect of the exercise of this power producing the relation of coëxistence; empirical time is its effect in producing the relation of succession, or progressive actualization. The relations of space and time are therefore resolvable into the relation of cause and effect, the reverse of what is maintained by Hume and our modern scientists.

As all the categories of the upper line are integrated in real and necessary being, and as all the categories of the lower line are integrated in existences, so all relations must be integrated in the relation of being and existences, which is the act of being, producing, or actualizing existences, and therefore the relation of cause and effect. Hence there are

* We think it a capital mistake of some moderns to suppose, as does the very able and learned Father Dalgairns in his admirable treatise on Holy Communion, that the Scholastics held that the phantasms and species by which the mind seizes the object are furnished by the mind itself. This would make the Scholastic philosophy a pure psychologism, which it certainly is not, though it becomes so in the hands of many who profess to follow it. St. Thomas expressly makes the mind passive in their reception, and therefore must hold that they are furnished by the object, and consequently that in them or by means of them the object presents itself to the mind and actualizes it, or constitutes it *intellectus agens*. There are more who swear by St. Thomas than understand him, and not a few call themselves Thomists who are really Cartesians.

and can be no passive relations, or relations of passivity. Whatever is or exists is active, and God, who is being in its plenitude and infinity, is, as say the theologians, *actus purissimus*, most pure act. Only the active is or exists; the passive is non-existent, is nothing, and can be the subject of no predicate or relation. So virtually reasons St. Thomas in refuting the Gentile doctrine of a *materia prima* or first matter. Aristotle held that matter eternally exists, and that all things consist of this eternally existing matter and form given it by the equally eternally existing Mind or Intelligence. St. Thomas modifies this doctrine, and teaches that the reality of things, or the real thing itself, is in the form, or idea as Plato says, and consequently is not a form impressed on a prëexisting matter, but a creation from nothing; for matter without form, he maintains, is merely *in potentia ad formam*, therefore passive, therefore mere possibility, and therefore, prescinded from the creative act, simply non-existent, a pure nullity, or nothing. Even Hegel asserts as much when he makes *das reine Seyn* the equivalent of *das Nicht-Seyn*. To give activity to the passive, to give form to the possible, or to create from nothing, says one and the same thing.

St. Thomas teaches, as we have seen, that the mind in the reception of the phantasms and species is passive, and therefore must hold, if consistent with himself, that prior to the affirmation of the object through them the mind does not actually exist; consequently that the affirmation or presentation of the object creates the mind, or the intellectual or intelligent subject, which, again, proves that the relation of subject and object is the relation of cause and effect. If then we accept the doctrine of St. Thomas, otherwise undeniable, that the passive and the possible are identical, we must deny—since the possible is non-existent, a pure abstraction, and therefore, simply nothing—that there are or can be any passive relations, and hold that in all relations, ideal or empirical, the one term of the relation is the cause of the other. This is why one term of the relation cannot be known without intuition of the other, or why, as we say, correlatives connote one another.

Here, too, we may see yet more clearly than we have already seen, the error of Sir William Hamilton in asserting that correlatives are reciprocal, and the still more glaring error of Cousin in asserting the same thing of cause and effect. Correlatives connote each other, it is true; but not

as reciprocal, for in the intuition they are affirmed, and in cognition connoted, the one as creating or producing the other, and it would be absurd to assert that the effect creates the cause, or that cause and effect produce reciprocally each the other. Sir William Hamilton is misled by his failure to comprehend that all relations are integrated in the relation of being and existences, and are therefore relations of cause and effect, or of the productive or creative power of being producing existences. He, as does Hume, excludes the notion or conception of power, and therefore not only the creative act of being, but of all activity, and conceives all relations as passive. They are all resolvable into relations of coëxistence and succession, or relations of space and time, and therefore relations of the passive; for excluding ontology from the region of science, or the cogitable, Sir W. Hamilton can assert no creative or productive power, and recognize no relation of real cause and effect.

Neither Cousin nor Sir William Hamilton ever understood that the object affirmed in thought, and without which there is and can be no thought, actualizes, that is, places or creates the subject, and renders it thinking or cognitive subject. The object does not simply furnish the occasion or necessary condition to the subject for the exercise of a power or faculty it already possesses, but creates the mind itself, and gives it its faculty, as we have already proved in proving that in ideal intuition the soul is passive, that is—as St. Thomas implies in resolving the passive into the possible—non-existent, and therefore the subject of no relation or predicate. The ideal or intuitive object must then be real and necessary being, for the contingent is not creative, and hence the intuition of being, which Sir William Hamilton denies, is not only necessary to the eliciting of this or that particular thought, but to the very existence of the soul as intelligent subject, and therefore must be a persistent fact, as will be more fully explained in the section on Existences.

It follows from this that the relation of subject and object, or rather of object and subject, in every thought is the relation, as we have said, of cause and effect. It is the third term or copula in the ideal judgment, and is in every judgment, whether ideal or empirical, that which makes it a judgment or affirmation. Being, Gioberti says, contains a complete judgment in itself, for it is equivalent to *being is;* but this is nothing to our present purpose. Being and exist-

ences as subject and predicate constitute no judgment without the copula that joins the predicate to the subject. As the copula can proceed only from being, or the subject of the predicate, as its act, the ideal judgment is necessarily *Ens creat existentias ;* and, as the object creates or produces the predicate, the judgment in its three terms is Divine and apodictic, the necessary and apodictic ground of every human or empirical judgment, without intuition of which the human mind can neither judge nor exist.

It is not pretended of course that all judgments are ideal, any more than it is that every cause is first cause. There are second causes, and consequently second or secondary, that is, empirical judgments. The second cause depends on the first cause which is the cause of all causes ; so the empirical judgment depends on the ideal or Divine judgment which it copies or imitates, as the second cause always copies or imitates in its own manner and degree the first cause. There is no judgment—and every thought is a judgment—without the creative act of being creating the mind and furnishing it the light by which it sees and knows ; yet, the immediate relation in empirical judgments, that is, judgments which the soul herself forms, though a relation of cause and effect, is not the relation between being and existences, as we once thought, though perhaps erroneously, that Gioberti maintained, and which were sheer pantheism, inasmuch as it would deny the existence of second causes, and make God the sole and universal actor. The relation in the ideal judgment is only *eminently* the cause in the empirical judgment, in the sense in which being is the eminent cause of all actions, in that it is the cause of all causes.

The copula or relation in the ideal judgment is the creative act of being, or subject creating the predicate, as we shall soon prove, and uniting it to itself. This is true of all relations. The first term of the relation of subject and predicate, is the cause of the second term, and by its own causative act unites the predicate to itself as its subject. Second causes have, in relation to the first cause, the relation of dependence, are produced by it, are its effects or predicates ; but in relation to their own effects, they are efficient causes, and represent creative being. We are existences and wholly dependent on real and necessary being, for our existence and our powers are simply the effect of the divine creative act or activity; but in relation to our own acts we are cause ; we are the subject, they are the predicate, and our act producing them

is the copula. In this sense the second cause copies the first cause, and the empirical judgment copies the ideal or, as we have called it, the Divine judgment.

We say this not by way of proof that the relation between being and existence is the creative act of being, which follows necessarily from the reduction of the categories to being, existences, and their relation, or subject, predicate, and copula, for the copula can be nothing else than the creative act of being; but to prevent the mistake of supposing that being is the agent that acts in our acts, and that our acts are predicates of the Divine activity; which is the mistake into which the Duke of Argyll falls in his "Reign of Law," and of all who impugn Free Will, and deny the reality of second causes. Having done this, and having resolved the relation of being and existences, and all relations into the relation of cause and effect, we may now proceed to consider the Fact of Creation.

XI.—THE FACT OF CREATION.

The great Gentile apostasy from the Patriarchial religion originated in the loss of the primitive tradition of the fact of creation: that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, and all things visible and invisible. No Gentile philosophy, known to us, recognizes the fact of creation; and the mother-error of all Gentilism is pantheism, and pantheism is no vulgar error, originating with the ignorant and unlettered many, but the error of the cultivated few, philosophers and scientists, who, by their refinements and subtile speculations on the relation of cause and effect, first obscure in their own minds and then wholly obliterate from them the fact of creation.

Dr. Döllinger, in his *Heathenism before Christianity*, assumes that heathenism originated with the ignorant and vulgar, not with the learned and scientific. But this view cannot be accepted by any one who has watched the course of philosophy and the sciences for the last three centuries. Three centuries ago Christian theism was held universally by all ranks and conditions of civilized society, and atheism was regarded with horror, and hardly dared show its head; now, the most esteemed, the most distinguished philosophers and scientists, like Emerson, Herbert Spencer, Professor Huxley, Emile Littré, Claude Bernard, Voigt, Bachmann,

Sir John Lubbock, and Professor Tyndall, to mention no others, are decided pantheists, and undisguised atheists. They are not merely tolerated, but are held to be the great men and shining lights of the age. Pantheism—atheism—in our times originates with philosophers and scientists and descends to the people, and, in the absence of all proof to the contrary, it is fair to presume that it was the same in ancient times. The corruption, alike of language and of doctrine, is always the work of philosophers and of the learned or the half-learned, never of the people.

The various heathen mythologies never originated, and never could have originated, with the ignorant multitude, or with savage and barbarous tribes. These mythologies are in great part taken up with the generation or genealogy of the gods, and bear internal evidence that they had for their starting point the ineffable mystery of the Blessed Trinity, and have grown out of efforts by philosophers and theologians to symbolize the eternal generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, which they obscured and lost by their inappropriate symbols, figures, and allegories. They all treat the universe as generated by the gods, and for cosmogony give us theogony.

Generation is simply explication or development, and the generated is of the same nature with the generator, as the Church maintains in defining the Son to be consubstantial with the Father. Hence the visible universe, as well as the invisible forces of nature, as generated by the gods, was held to be divine, both as a whole and in all its parts. Rivers and brooks, hills and valleys, groves and fountains, the ocean and the earth, mountains and plains, the winds and the waves, storms and tempests, thunder and lightning, the sun, moon, and stars; the elements, fire, air, water, and earth; the generative forces of nature, vegetable, animal, and human, were all counted divine, and held to be proper objects of worship. Hence the fearful and abominable superstitions that oppressed and still oppress heathen nations and tribes, the horrid, cruel, filthy, and obscene rites which it were a shame even to name. These rites and superstitions follow too logically from the assumed origin of all things visible and invisible in generation or emanation, to have originated with the unlearned and vulgar, or not to have been the work of philosophers and theologers.

Dr. Döllinger holds that polytheism in polytheistic nations and tribes precedes monotheism, or the worship of one God,

and denies that pantheism is the primal error of Gentilism. He appears to hold that the nations that apostatized, after the confusion of tongues at Babel, fell at once into the lowest forms of African fetichism, and from that worked their way up, step by step, to polished Greek and Roman polytheism, and thence to Jewish and Christian monotheism. But this is contrary to the natural law of deterioration. Men by supernatural grace may be elevated from the lowest grade to the highest at a single bound, but no man falls at once from the highest virtue to the lowest depth of vice or crime, or from the sublimest truth to the lowest and most degrading form of error. African fetichism is the last stage, not the first, of polytheism. The first error is always that which lies nearest to the truth, and that demands the least apparent departure from orthodoxy, or men's previous beliefs. We know, historically, that the race began in the patriarchal religion, in what we call Christian theism, and pantheism is the error that lies nearest, and that which most easily seduces the mind trained in Christian theism.

What deceives Dr. Döllinger and others is that they attribute the manifest superiority of Greek and Roman polytheism over African fetichism to a gradual amelioration of the nations that embraced it; but history presents us no such amelioration. The Homeric religion departs less from the patriarchal religion than the polytheism of any later period in the history of either pagan Greece or Rome. The superiority of Greek and Roman polytheism is due primarily to the fact that it retained more of the primitive tradition, and the apparent amelioration was due to the more general initiation, as time went on, into the Eleusinian and other mysteries, in which the earlier traditions were preserved, and, after Alexander the Great, to more familiar acquaintance with the tradition of the East, especially the Jews. The mysteries were instituted after the great Gentile Apostasy, but from all that is possible now to ascertain of them, they preserved, not indeed the primitive traditions of the race, but the earliest traditions of the nations that apostatized. Certain it is, if the Unity of God was taught in them, as seems not improbable, we have no reason to suppose that they preserved the tradition of the one God the creator of the heavens and the earth. Neither in the mysteries nor in the popular mythologies, neither with the Greeks nor the Romans, the Syrians nor Assyrians, neither with the Egyptians nor the Indians, neither with the Persians nor the Chinese, neither with the

Kelts nor the Teutons do we find any reminiscences of the creative act, or fact of creation from nothing.

The oldest of the Vedas speak of God as spirit, recognize most of his essential attributes, and ascribe to him apparently moral qualities, but we find no recognition of him as Creator. Socrates, as does Plato, dwells on the justice of the Divinity, but neither recognizes God the Creator. Père Gratry contends indeed, in his *Connaissance de Dieu*, that Moses, Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Bossuet, Fénelon, in fact all philosophers of the first rank of all ages and nations, agree in asserting substantially one and the same theodicæa. Yet Plato asserts no God the Creator, at best, only an intelligent artificer or architect, doing the best he can with preëxisting material. His theology is well summed up by Virgil in his Æneid:

> Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus,
> Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

Artistotle asserts God as the *anima mundi*, or soul of the world, followed by Spinoza in his *Natura Naturans*, and which Pope versifies in his shallow *Essay on Man*.

> All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
> Whose body nature is, and God the soul;
> That, changed through all, and yet in all the same,
> Great in the earth as in the ethereal frame;
> Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
> Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees;
> Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
> Spreads undivided, operates unspent, &c.

Here is no creative God; there is only the *anima mundi* of the Brahmins, and of the best of the pagan philosophers.

Even some Christian philosophers, while they hold the fact of creation certain from revelation, deny its probability by reason. St. Paul says "*by faith* we understand the world was framed by word of God," but St. Thomas, if we are not mistaken, teaches that the same truth may be at once a matter of revelation or faith and a truth cognizable by natural reason and matter of science, and certain it is that our greatest theologians undertake to prove the fact of creation from reason or reasoning, or from data supplied by the natural light of the soul, for they all attempt a rational refutation of pantheism.

The analysis of the ideal element of the object in thought, we have seen, shows that it is resolvable into being, existences, and their relation, and the analysis of the relation, real only in the related, brings us, so to speak, face to face with the Divine creative act. Real and necessary being can exist without creating, for it is, as say the theologians, *actus purissimus*, therefore in itself *ens perfectissimum*, and is not obliged to go out of itself, in order either to be or to perfect or complete itself, in which respect it is the contrary of the *reine Seyn* of Hegel. It is in itself infinite Fulness, *Pleroma*, *Plenum*, while the *reine Seyn* is the Byssos of the old Gnostics, or the Void of the Buddhists, and even Hegel makes it not being, but a Becoming—*das Werden*. The being given in ideal intuition is real and necessary being, self-existent, self-sufficing, complete in itself, wanting nothing, and incapable of receiving any thing in addition to what it is, and is eternally.

Hence the ontologist, starting with being as his *principium*, can never arrive at existences, for being can be under no extrinsic or intrinsic necessity of creating. But, may not the psychologist conclude being from the intuition of existences? Not at all, because existences, not existing in and of themselves, are neither cognizable nor conceivable without the intuition of being. Yet, though being is sufficient in all respects for itself, it is cognizable by us only *mediante* its own act creating us and affirming itself as the first term or being in the ideal element of the object in thought; and therefore only in its relation to the second term, or existences. This relation under which both being and existences, the necessary and the contingent, are given, is the creative act of being, as we have seen, and therefore, as that *mediante* which both being and existences are given, is necessarily itself given in ideal intuition. It is as necessarily given in the object in every thought as either being or existences, the necessary or the contingent, and therefore is objectively as certain as either of the other two terms without which no thought is possible, and is in fact more immediately given, since it is only *mediante* the relation or creative act of being that either being or existences themselves are given, or are objectively intuitive.

But not therefore, because being is cognizable only in its relation to existences, does it follow that being itself is relation, or that all our cognitions are relative, or, as Gioberti maintains, that all truth is relative; nay, that the essence

of God, as implied in the mystery of the Holy Trinity, is in relation, in the relation of the three Persons of the Godhead. The relation is given in ideal intuition as the act of real and necessary being. The relation then is extrinsic, not intrinsic, and since being is real, necessary, independent, self-existing, and self-sufficing, the creative act must be not a necessary, but a free, voluntary act on the part of being. The relation, then, is not intrinsic, but freely and voluntarily assumed.

Being is given in ideal intuition *mediante* its creative act, then as creator or *ens creans*. But as nothing extrinsic or intrinsic can oblige being, which is independent and self-sufficing, to create or to act *ad extra*, it must be a free creator, free to create or not create, as it chooses. Then being must possess free-will and intelligence, for without intelligence there can be no will, and without will no choice, no free action. Being then must be in its nature rational, and then it must be personal, for personality is the last complement of rational nature, that is, it must be a suppositum that possesses, by its nature, intelligence and free-will. Then being, real and necessary, being in its plenitude, being in itself, is—God, and creator of the heavens and the earth, and all things visible and invisible.

But, it is objected, this assumes that we have immediate intuition of being, and therefore of God, which is a proposition improbated by the Holy See. Not to our knowledge. The Holy See has improbated, if you will, the proposition that the intellect has immediate cognition, that is, perception or empirical intuition of God; but not, so far as we are informed, the proposition that we have, *mediante* its creative act, intuition of real and necessary being in the ideal element of the object in thought. The Holy See has defined against the Traditionalists, that "the existence of God can be proved with certainty by reasoning." But will the objector tell us how we can prove the existence of God by any argument from premises that contain no intuition of the necessary, and therefore, since the necessary, save as concreted in being, is a nullity, of real and necessary being? We may have been mistaught, but our logic-master taught us that nothing can be in the conclusion, not contained, in principle at least, in the premises. If we had not ideal intuition of real and necessary being, there is no possible demonstration of the existence of God. St. Thomas finds the principle of his demonstration of the existence of God, precisely

as we have done, in the relation of cause and effect, or as we say, in the relation of being and existences; but whence does the mind come into possession of that relation, or of the ideas expressed by the terms *cause* and *effect?* St. Thomas does not tell us; he simply takes it for granted that we have them. What have we done but prove, which he does not do, by analyzing, first, thought, then the object, then the ideal, and finally the relation, that we have them, and at the same time prove that being is a free, not a necessary cause, and thus escape pantheism, which we should not do, if we made cause as ultimate as being, *Ens creans*, not simply *ens in se*, that is: *Ens* acting is the cause, and existences or creatures are the effect.

The ideal, as we have found it, does not differ, we concede, from the ideal formula of Gioberti, *Ens creat existentias*, or Being creates existences. This has been objected to as pantheistic. Nay, an eminent Jesuit Father charged us with atheism because we defended it and we answered him that to deny it would be atheism. Even distinguished professors of philosophy and learned and excellent men not unfrequently fall into a sort of routine, let their minds be cast in certain moulds, and fail to recognize their own thoughts when expressed in unfamiliar terms. We have no call to defend Gioberti, who, for aught we know, may have understood the ideal formula in a pantheistic sense, but we do not believe he did, and we know that we do not. Gioberti asserts the formula, but declares it incapable of demonstration; we think we have clearly shown, by the several analyses into which we have entered, that each term of the formula is given intuitively in the ideal element of the object, and is as certain and as undeniable as the fact of thought or our own existence, and no demonstration in any case whatever can go further. As we have found and presented the formula it is only the first verse of Genesis, or the first article of the Creed. We see not, then, how it can be charged either with atheism or pantheism.

Perhaps the suspicion arises from the use of the present tense, *creat*, or "is creating," as if it was intended to assert being as the immanent cause—the *causa essentialis*, not as the *causa efficiens*, of existences; but this is not the case with us, nor do we believe it was with Gioberti, for he seems to us to take unwearied pains to prove the contrary. We use the present tense of the verb to indicate that the creative act that calls existences from nothing is a permanent

or continuous act, that it is identically one and the same act that creates and that sustains existences, or that the act of creation and of conservation are identical, as we shall explain in the next section.

The formula is infinitely removed from pantheism, because, though given in intuition *mediante* the creative act of being, being itself is given as real and necessary, independent and self-sufficing, and therefore under no extrinsic or intrinsic necessity of creating. The creative act is, as we have seen, a free act, and it is distinguished, on the one hand, from being as the act from the actor, and on the other, from existences as the effect from the cause. There is here no place for pantheism, less indeed than in the principle of cause and effect which St. Thomas adopts as the principle of his demonstration of the existence of God. The relation of cause and effect is necessary, and if cause is placed in the category of being, creation is necessary, which is pantheism. Yet St. Thomas, the greatest of the Schoolmen, was no pantheist. We have avoided the possibility of mistake by placing the causative power in the category of being, but the exercise of the power in the category of relation, at once distinguishing and connecting being and existences.

The objector forgets, moreover, that while we have by our analysis of thought established the reality of the object, or its existence *a parte rei*, and asserted the objectivity and therefore the reality of the ideal, we have nowhere found or asserted the ideal alone as the object in thought. We have found and asserted it only as the ideal element of the object, which must in principle precede the empirical element, but it is never given separately from it, and it takes both the ideal and the empirical in their relation to constitute the object in any actual thought. The ideal and the empirical elements of the complex object are distinguished by the *intellectus agens*, or reflection, in which the soul acts, never by intuition, ideal or empirical, in either of which the action originates with the object. Most men never do distinguish them during their whole lives; even the mass of philosophers do not distinguish them, or distinguish between intuition and reflection. The peripatetics, in fact, begin with the reflective activity, and hardly touch upon the question of intuition, save in what they have to say of phantasms and species. Their principles they take from reflection, not from the analysis of thought or its object. We do not dissent from their principles or their

method, but we do not regard their principles as ultimate, and we think the field of intuition, back of reflection, needs a culture which it does not receive from them, not even from St. Thomas, still less from those routinists who profess to follow him. We do not dissent from the Thomist philosophy; we accept it fully and frankly, but not as in all respects complete. There are, in our judgment, questions that lie back of the starting-point of that philosophy, which, in order to meet the subtilties and refinements of modern pantheists or atheists, the philosopher of to-day must raise and discuss.

These questions relate to what in principle precedes the reflective action of the soul, and are solved by the distinction between intuition and reflection, and between ideal intuition and empirical intuition or perception, that is, cognition. What we explain by ideal intuition, the ancients called the dictates of reason, the dictates of nature, and assumed them to be principles inserted in the very constitution of the human mind; Descartes called them innate ideas; Reid regarded them as constituent principles of man's intellectual and moral nature; Kant, as the laws or forms of the human understanding. All these make them more or less subjective, and overlook their objectivity, and consequently, cast doubts on the reality of our knowledge. "It may be real to us, but how prove that it is not very unreal to other minds constituted differently from ours?" We have endeavored to show that these are the ideal elements of the fact of experience, and are given in objective or ideal intuition, which is the assertion to the mind by its own action of real and necessary being itself, and therefore our knowledge, as far as it goes, is universally true and apodictic, not true to our minds only.

The objection commonly raised to the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, is, not that it is not true, but that it is not the principle from which philosophy starts, but the end at which philosophy arrives. This, in one sense, if we speak of the reflective order, is true, and the philosophy most in vogue does not reach it even as its end at all. Yet by using reflection we shall find that it is given in the object of every thought, as we have shown, the first as well as the last. Ideal intuition is a real affirmation to the mind by the act of the ideal itself, but it is not perception or distinct cognition, because, as we have said, it is not given separately, but only as the ideal or *a priori* element of the object, and is never

intuitively distinguished or distinguishable from it. This is, we think, a sufficient answer to the objection, which is founded on a misapprehension of what is really meant by the assertion that the ideal formula is the principle of science and intuitively given. It is so given, but it is only by reflection that the mind distinguishes it, and is aware of possessing it.

XII.—EXISTENCES.

Having found the first term of the ideal formula to be real and necessary being, and that real and necessary being is God the creator of all things distinguishable from himself, we may henceforth drop the term being or ENS and use that of Deus or God, and proceed to consider the second term, EXISTENCES or creatures. God and creatures include all that is or exists. What is not creature and yet is, is God; what is not God and yet exists, is creature, the product of the act of God. What is neither God nor creature is nothing. There is nothing and can be nothing that is not either the one or the other. Abstractions, prescinded from their concretes, and possibilities prescinded from the power or ability of the real, we cannot too often repeat, are nullities, and no object of intuition, either ideal or empirical. This excludes the *ens in gènere*, or being in general, of Rosmini, and the *reine Seyn* of Hegel, which is also an abstraction, or merely possible being. An abstract or possible being has no power or tendency, as Hegel pretends, to become by self-evolution either a concrete or actual being. Evolution of nothing gives nothing. Hence whatever truth there may be in the details of the respective philosophies of Rosmini and Hegel, they are in their principles unreal and worthless, proceeding on the assumption that nothing can make itself something. Existences are distinguishable from being and are nothing without the creative act of God. Only that act stands between them and absolute nullity. God then does not form them from a preëxisting matter, but creates them from nothing. He does not evolve them from himself, for then they would be the Divine Being itself, and indistinguishable from it, contrary to what has already been established, namely, that they are distinguished from God as well as joined to him *mediante* his creative act. God is not a necessary but a free creator; creatures are not then evolved

from his own being, but himself, a free creator, is necessarily distinct from and independent of them; and as without creation there is nothing but himself, it follows necessarily that he must, if he creates existences at all, create them from nothing, by the word of his power, as Christian theology teaches.

But the fact that they are creatures and distinct from the Creator proves, also, that they are substances, or substantial existences, and therefore, as philosophers say, second causes. If creatures had no substantial existence, they would be mere phenomena or appearances of the divine being or substance, and therefore could not be really distinguishable from God himself; which would be a virtual denial of the creative act and the reality of existences, and therefore of God himself; for it has been shown that there is no intuition of being save *mediante* the creative act of being, or without the intuition of existences, that is, of both terms of the relation. It would deny, what has been amply proved, that the object of intuition, whether ideal or empirical, is and must be real, because it does and must present or affirm itself, which, if unreal or mere appearance, it could not do, since the unreal has no activity and can be no object of thought, as the Cosmists themselves concede, for they hold the phenomena without the substance that appears in them are unthinkable. Moreover, the object in intuition presents or affirms itself as it is, and existences all present or affirm themselves as real, as things, as substances, as second causes, and really distinguishable from Dr. Newman's "Notional" propositions, which propose nothing, and in which nothing real is noted.

It is here where Cousin and the pantheists, who do not expressly deny creation, commit their fatal mistake. Spinoza, Cousin, and others assert one only substance, which they call God, and which the Cosmists call Nature. Hence the creative act, if recognized at all, produces only phenomena, not substantial existences, and what they call creation is only the manifestation or apparition of the one only substance. It is possible that this error comes from the definition of substance adopted by Descartes, and by Spinoza after him, namely, that which exists or can be conceived in itself, without another. This definition was intended by the Schoolmen, and possibly by Descartes also, as simply to mark the distinction between substance and mode, attribute, or accident; but, taken rigidly as it is by Spinoza, it war-

rants his doctrine, that God is the one only substance, as he is the one only being, for he alone exists *in se*. The universe and all it contains are therefore only modes or attributes of God, the only substance. The error, also, may have arisen in part from using *being* and *substance* as perfectly synonymous terms. *Ens* is *substantia*, but every *substantia* is not *ens*. Substance is any thing that can support accidents or produce effects; *Ens* is that which is, and in strictness is applicable to God alone, who gives his name to Moses as I AM; I AM THAT AM,—SUM QUI SUM. There may be, *mediante* the creative act of God, many substances or existences, but there is and can be only one being, God. All existences have their being, not in themselves, but in God *mediante* the creative act, according to what St. Paul says, "in him we live, and move, and are," *in ipso vivimus, et movemur, et sumus*. Acts xvii, 28.

Existences are substantial, that is, active or causative in their own sphere or degree. The definition of substance by Leibnitz—though we think we have found it in some of the mediæval Doctors, as *vis activa*, corresponding to the German *kraft* and the English and French *force*, is a proper definition so far, whatever may be thought of what he adds, that it always involves effort or endeavor. In this sense existences must be substances or else they could not be given intuitively, as in our analysis of the object we have seen they are, for in intuition the object is active and presents or affirms itself. Strictly speaking, as we have seen in the analysis of relation, nothing that exists is or can be passive, for passivity is simply *in potentia ad actum;* whatever exists at all exists *in actu* and so far is necessarily *vis activa*. Existences in their principle are given intuitively, and their principle cannot be substantial and they unsubstantial. But it is necessary here to distinguish between the *substans* and the *substantia*, between that which stands under and upholds or supports existences or created substances, and the existences themselves. The *substans* is the creative act of God, and the *substantia* or existence is that which it stands under and upholds. This enables us to correct the error of the deists, who regard the cosmos, though created in the first instance and set a-going, now that it is created and constituted with its laws and forces as able to go of itself without any supercosmic support, propulsion, or direction, as a clock or watch, when once wound up and set a-going, goes of itself —till it runs down. It has now no need of God, it is suffi-

cient for itself, and God has nothing to do with it, but, if he chooses, to contemplate its operation from his supramundane height. But this old deistical race, now nearly extinct, except with our scientists, forgot that the watch or clock does not run by its own inherent force, and that it is propelled by a force in accordance with which it is constructed indeed, but which is exterior to it and independent of it. The cosmos, not having its being in itself and existing only *mediante* the creative act of being, can subsist and operate only by virtue of that act. It is only that act that draws it from nothing and that stands between all existences or creatures and nothing. Let that act cease and we should instantly sink into the nothingness we were before we were created. This proves that the act of creation and that of conservation are one and the same act, and hence it is that intuition of existences is, *ipso facto*, intuition of the creative act, without which they are nothing, and of which they are only the external terminus or product. This explains the distinction between *substans* and *substantia*, and shows why the *substans* is and must be the creative act of God. Substances rest or depend on the creative act for their very existence; it is their foundation, and they must fall through without it, though they stand under and support their own effects or productions as second causes.

The creative act, it follows, is a permanent not a transient act, and God is, so to speak, a continuous creator, and creation is a fact not merely in the past but in the present, constantly going on before our eyes. We would call God the immanent, not the transitory cause of creation, as the deist supposes, were it not that theologians have appropriated the term immanent cause in their explanation of the relation of the Father to the Son and of both Father and Son to the Holy Ghost in the ever-blessed Trinity, and if it had not been abused by Spinoza and others. Spinoza says God is the immanent not the transitory cause of the universe; but he meant by this that God is immanent in the universe as the essence or substance is the cause of the mode or attribute, that is, the *causa essentialis*, not *causa efficiens*, which is really to deny that God creates substantial existences, and to imply that he is the subject acting or causing in phenomena. God is immanent cause only in the sense that he is manent *mediante* his creative act in the effect or existences produced from nothing by the omnipotent energy of his word, creating and sustaining them as second causes or the subject of

their own acts, not as the subject acting in them. It is what theologians call the "efficacious presence" of God in all his works. He is the *eminent* cause of the acts of all his creatures, inasmuch as he is the cause of their causality, *causa causarum;* as we explained in our analysis of Relation, but he is not the subject that acts in their acts. This shows the nearness of God to all the works of his hands, and their absolute dependence on him for all they are, all they can be, all they can do, all they have or can have. It shows simply that they are nothing, and therefore can know nothing, but by his creative act. The grossest and most palpable of all sophisms is that which makes man and nature God, or God identically man and nature. Either error originates in the failure to recognize the act of creation and the relation of existences to being as given in the ideal intuition.

The cosmists make God the substance or reality of the Cosmos, and deny that he is supercosmic; but their error is manifest now that we have shown that God is the Creator of the cosmos, and all things visible and invisible. The cosmic phenomena are not phenomena of the Divine Being, but are phenomena or manifestations of created nature, and of God only *mediante* his creative act. The cosmos, with its constitution and laws or nature, is his creature; produced from nothing and sustained by his creative act, without which it is still nothing. God then, as the creator of nature, is independent of nature, and necessarily supernatural, supercosmic, or supramundane, as the theologians teach, and as all the world, save a few philosophers, scientists, and their dupes, believe and always have believed.

God being supernatural, and the creative act by which he creates and sustains nature being a free act on his part, the theory of the rationalists and naturalists that holds him bound, hedged in, by what they call the laws of nature, is manifestly false and absurd. These laws do not bind the Creator, because he is their author. The age talks much of freedom, and is universally agitating for liberty of all sorts, but there is one liberty, without which no liberty is possible, it forgets—the liberty of God. To deny it, is to deny his existence. God is not the Fate, or inexorable Destiny, of the pagan classics, especially of the Greek dramatists. Above nature, independent of it, subject to no extrinsic or intrinsic necessity, except that of being, and of being what he is, God is free to do any thing but contradict, that is,

annihilate himself, which is the real significance of the Scholastic "principle of contradiction." He cannot be and not be; he cannot choose to be or not to be what he is, for he is real and necessary being, and being in its plenitude. He can do nothing that contradicts his own being or attributes, for they are all necessary and eternal, and hence St. Paul says, "it is impossible for God to lie." That would be to act contrary to his nature, and the Divine nature and the Divine Being are identical, and indistinguishable *in re*. It would be to contradict his very being, his own eternal, immutable, and indestructible essence, and what is called the nature of things.

Saving this, God is free to do whatever he will, for extrinsic to him and his act nothing is possible or impossible; since extrinsic to him there is simply nothing. His liberty is as universal and as indestructible as his own necessary and eternal being. He is free to create or not as he chooses, and as in his own wisdom he chooses. The creative act is therefore a free act, and as nature itself, with all its laws, is only that act considered in its effects, it is absurd to suppose that nature or its laws, which it founds and upholds, can bind him, restrict him, or in any way interfere with his absolute freedom. God cannot act contrary to his own most perfect nature or being, but nothing except his own perfection can determine his actions or his providence. Following out the ideal judgment, or considering the principles intuitively given, they are alike the principles of the natural and of the supernatural. They assert the supernatural in asserting God as creator; they assert his providence by asserting that creation and conservation are only one and the same act, and the free act, or the act of the free, uncontrolled, and unnecessitated will of God. Hence also it follows that God is free, if he chooses, to makes us a supernatural revelation of his will, and to intervene supernaturally or by miracles in human or cosmic affairs. Miracles are in the same order with the fact of creation itself, and if facts, are as provable as any other facts.

XIII.—GOD AS FINAL CAUSE.

We have in the foregoing sections proved with all the certainty we have that we think or exist, the existence of God as real and necessary being, and as the free, intelligent,

voluntary, and therefore personal Creator and Upholder of the universe and all things therein visible and invisible, in accordance with the teachings of Christian theism, and the primitive and universal tradition of the race, especially of the more enlightened and progressive portion of the race. This would seem to suffice to complete our task, and to redeem our promise to refute Atheism and to prove Theism.

But we have only proved the existence of God as First Cause, and that all existences proceed from him by way of creation, in opposition to generation, emanation, evolution, or formation. We have established indeed, that the physical laws of the universe, the natural laws treated by our scientists, are from God, created by him, and subject to his will, or existing and operative only through his free creative act. But this, if we go no further, is only a speculative truth, and has no bearing on practical life. Stopping there, we might well say, with Jefferson, "What does it matter to me, whether my neighbor believes in one God, or twenty? It neither breaks my leg, nor picks my pocket." God as first cause is the physical Governor, not the moral Governor of the universe, a physical, not a moral Providence, and his laws execute themselves without the concurrence of the will of his creatures, as the lightning that rends the oak, the winds and waves that scatter and sink our richly freighted argosies, the fire that devastates our cities, respiration by the lungs, the circulation of the blood by the heart, the secretion of bile by the liver or of the gastric juice by the stomach, the growth of plants and animals, indeed all the facts or groups of facts called natural laws, studied, described, and classified by our scientists, and knowledge of which passes in our day for science, and even for philosophy. The knowledge of these facts, or groups of facts, may throw light on the laws and conditions of physical life, but it introduces us to no moral order, and throws no light on the laws and conditions of spiritual life, or the end for which we are created and exist.

The man who believes only in God as first cause differs not, practically, from the man who believes in no God at all: and it is, no doubt, owing to the fact that the age stops with God as first cause, that it is so tolerant of atheism, and that we find people who profess to believe in Christianity who yet maintain that atheism is not at all incompatible with morality—people who hold in high moral esteem men who, like Ralph Waldo Emerson, Herbert Spencer, Professors

Huxley and Tyndall, recognize no distinction between physical laws and the moral law, and assert the identity of the law of gravitation and of purity of heart. Hence the Transcendentalist rule of life: "Obey thyself," "Act out thyself," "Follow thy instincts;" and hence also the confusion of physical or sentimental love with supernatural charity, the worship of the beautiful with the worship of God, and of art with religion, so characteristic of modern literature and speculative thought. Indeed, the first step in the downward progress towards atheism, is the denial or non-recognition of the theological order.

We have proved that God is being, being in its plenitude, being itself, and being in itself; therefore that he necessarily includes in himself, in their unity and actuality, all perfection, truth, power, intelligence, wisdom, goodness, freedom, will, &c. We do not hold, with Cousin and Plato, that the beautiful is an absolute and universal idea, since the beautiful exists only for creatures endowed with sensibility and imagination, and therefore is not and cannot be absolute being or a necessary perfection of being; yet we do hold, with the Schoolmen, that *ens*, *verum*, and *bonum* are absolute and identical. Hence St. Augustine teaches that existence itself, since it participates of being, is a good, and consequently even the eternally lost are gainers by their existence, though by their own fault they have made it a source of everlasting pain. To be is always better than not to be.

That God is the final cause of creation follows necessarily from the fact that he is its free, voluntary first cause. If God were, as Cousin maintains, a necessary creator, he could act only *ad finem*, not *propter finem*, and therefore could not be asserted as the final cause of creation; but being a free creator not compelled by any extrinsic or intrinsic necessity, as he cannot be, since he is being in its plenitude, *ens perfectissimum*, he can create only for some end, and consequently only for himself, for besides himself there is and can be no end for which he can create. He is therefore the final cause of creation, as well as its first cause. Hence St. Paul tells us that "for him, and in him, and to him are all things." The conclusion is strengthened by considering that God, being all-powerful and essentially wise and good, it would contradict his own being and attributes to create without any end, or for any but a good purpose or end, and he alone

is good, for the very reason that he alone is being, and his creatures are being and good only by participation.

No doubt it may be said that God creates for the good of creatures, but he is the good as he is the being of creatures, and he can give them good only by giving them himself, for besides himself there is no good for them, since beside him there is no good at all. The end or final cause of a creature is its good, and when we say God is the final cause or end of a particular existence, we say he is that which it must seek and possess in order to attain to and possess its supreme good or beatitude. When we say God creates all things for himself, we simply mean that he creates all things for the manifestation of his own glory in the life and beatitude of his creatures. The end or final cause of an existence is in obtaining the complement or perfection of its being. It is not simply beatitude, but beatitude in God that is the end. Creation flows out from the infinite fulness of the Divine Love, which would diffuse itself in the creation and beatitude of existences, and God cannot beatify them otherwise than through their participation of his own beatitude. God, then, is the ultimate and the final cause of creation.

But why could not God create existences for progress, or for progress through infinity? That would be a contradiction in terms. Progress is motion towards an end, and where there is no end there is and can be no progress. Progress is advancing from the imperfect to the perfect, and if there is no perfect, there can be no advance towards it; if there is progress, it must finally come to an end. The doctrine of infinite or indefinite progressiveness of man, so popular in this nineteenth century, is based on the denial alike of creation and the final cause of man and the cosmos. It supposes development instead of creation, and admits only the physical laws of nature, which operate as blind and fatal forces, like what is called instinct in man and animals. Hence we have a class of scientists who seek to elevate man by improving, through wise and skilful culture, the breed. How do these men who deny God as final cause, and hold the theory of development or evolution, account for the existence of moral ideas or the universal belief in a moral law? This belief and these ideas cannot be obtained either by observation or by induction from the study of the physical laws of nature; and if we hold them to be given intuitively, we assert their reality, affirm that there is a moral order, and then, a final cause of creation.

We maintain that the soul really has intuition of God as final cause in a sense analogous to that in which we have seen it has intuition of being as first cause. St. Thomas, while he denies that God is *per se notus*, concedes* that we have intuition of him, as we have explained intuition, or a confused cognition of him as the beatitude of man. The soul, he says, naturally desires beatitude, and what it naturally desires, it naturally apprehends, though it be confusedly. In our language, the soul desires beatitude; but it cannot desire what it has no intuition of, or what is in no sense presented or affirmed to it, and since God is himself this beatitude, the soul must have some intuition of God as its good or final cause. It is true, St. Thomas says, the soul does not know explicitly that it is God that presents or affirms himself as the beatitude it desires. It does not know that it is God any more than it does when it sees a man coming without being able to distinguish whether it is Peter or some other man that is coming; yet it is as really intuition of God as final cause, as the intuition of the idea is intuition of God as real and necessary being, or as first cause. In neither case is there a distinct or explicit cognition that what is presented is God, and it comes to know that it is so only by reflection.

Certainly every soul desires happiness, supreme beatitude; and desire is more than a simple want. Desire is an affection of the will, a reaching forth of the soul towards the object desired. What a man desires he, in some degree at least, wills; but will is not a faculty that can in any degree act without light or intelligence. The soul can will only what is presented to it as good; it cannot will evil for the reason that it is evil, though it may will the lesser good instead of the greater, and a present good instead of a distant or future good; for it has the freedom of choice. Yet it is certain that the soul finds its complete satisfaction in no natural or created good. It craves an unbounded good, and will be satisfied with nothing finite. Why, but because it has an ever-present intuition that it was made for an infinite good? Why, but because God the infinite everywhere and at every instant presents or affirms himself to the soul as that alone which can fill it, or constitute its beatitude? The fact that every limited or created good is insufficient to satisfy the soul has been noted and dwelt on by philosophers,

* Sum. Theol. P. I. quæst. 2, a. 1, ad 1um.

sages, prophets, and preachers in all ages of the world, and it is the theme of the poet's wail, and the source of nearly all of life's tragedies. Yet it is inexplicable on any possible hypothesis except that of supposing the soul was made for God, and has an intuitive intimation of the secret of its destiny.

Assuming, then, the intuition of God as final cause in the desire of beatitude, the assertion of it rests on the same authority that does the assertion of the ideal as being, or being as God, and therefore, as our several analyses have proved, it is as certain as either the subject or object in the fact of thought, or as the fact that we think or exist. In fact, as we have already seen, it is included in the creative act of being as a free, voluntary act. Being cannot act freely without will, and no one can will without willing an end; and no good being without willing a good end. No really good end is possible but God himself; we may, therefore, safely and certainly conclude God is our last cause as well as our first cause, at once the beginning and end, the Alpha and the Omega of all existences, the original and end of all things.

We are now able to assert for man a moral law and to give its reason in distinction from the natural or physical laws of the scientists. The physical laws are established by God as first cause, and are the laws or created forces operative in existences in their procession, by way of creation, from God, as first cause; the moral law is established by God as final cause, and prescribes the conditions on which rational existences can return to God, without being absorbed in him, and fulfil their destiny, or attain to perfect beatitude. This completes the demonstration of Christian Theism.

If God be the first and last cause of existences, they must have, so to speak, two movements, the one by way of creation from God as their first cause, the other under the moral law, of return to him as their end, beatitude, or the perfection of their nature, and the perfect satisfaction of its wants. These two movements found two orders, which we may designate the initial and the teleological. The error of the rationalists, whether in morals or religion, is not wholly in the denial of supernatural revelation and grace, but in denying or disregarding the teleological order, and in endeavoring to find a basis for religion and morality in the initial or physical order, or, as Gioberti calls it, the order of genesis. Thus Dr. Potter, Anglican Bishop of Pennsylvania

lately deceased, in his work on the philosophy of religion, asserts that religion is a law of human nature, that is, if it means any thing, the law of his physical nature and secreted as the liver secretes bile. In like manner the ancient and modern Transcendentalists, Gnostics, or Pneumatici, who make religion and morality consist in acting out one's self, or one's instincts, place religion and morality in the initial order, and in the same category with any of the physical laws or forces of the cosmos. The modern doctrine of the correlation of forces, which denies all distinction of physical force and moral power—a fatal error—originated in the assumption of the initial order as the only real order. The creative act is not completed in the initial order, or order of natural generation, and does not end with it. Man is not completed by being born, and existences, to be fulfilled or perfected, must return to God as their final cause, in whom alone they can find their perfection as they find their origin in him as their first cause. The irrational existences, since they exist for the rational, and are not subject to a moral law, can return only in the rational. As the teleological order, as well as the initial, is founded by the creative act of God, it is equally real, and the science that denies or overlooks it, is only inchoate or initial, as in fact is all that passes under the name of science in this age of boasted scientific light and progress.

We may remark here that though we can prove, by reason that God is our final cause, our beatitude, because the Supreme Beatitude, it by no means follows that the soul can attain to him and accomplish its destiny by its natural powers, without being born again, or without the assistance of supernatural revelation and grace. Our reason, properly exercised, suffices, as we have just seen, to prove the reality of the two orders, the initial and the teleological, but as God, either as First cause or as Final cause, is supercosmic or supernatural, it would seem that nature must be as unable to attain of itself to God as its end, or to perfect itself, as it is to originate or sustain itself, without the creative act. They who, while professing to believe in God as creator, yet deny the supernatural order, forget that God is supernatural, and that the creative act that founds nature with all its laws and forces, is purely supernatural. The supernatural then exists, founds nature herself, sustains it, and is absolutely independent of it, is at once its origin and end.

The supernatural is God and what he does directly and

immediately by himself; the natural is what he does mediately through created agencies, or the operation of natural laws or second causes created by him. The creation of man and the universe is supernatural, and so, as we have seen, is their conservation, which is their continuous creation; the growth of plants and animals, all the facts in the order of genesis, are natural, for though the order itself originates in the supernatural, the facts of the order itself are effected by virtue of natural laws, or as is said, by natural causes. Yet as God is not bound or hedged in by his laws, and as he is absolutely free and independent, there is no reason *a priori*, why he may not, if he chooses, intervene supernaturally as well as naturally in the affairs of his creatures, and if necessary to their perfection there is even a strong presumption that he will so intervene. If revelation and supernatural grace are necessary to enable us to enter the teleological order, to persevere in it, and attain to the full complement or perfection of our existence, we may reasonably conclude that the infinite love or unbounded and overflowing goodness which prompted him, so to speak, to create us, will provide them. Hence revelation, miracles, the whole order of grace, are as provable, if facts, as any other class of facts, and are in their principle, included in the ideal judgment.

XIV.—OBLIGATION OF WORSHIP.

How or in what manner God is to be worshipped, whether we are able by the light of nature to say what is the worship he demands of us, and by our natural strength to render it, or whether we need supernatural revelation and supernatural grace to enable us to worship him acceptably, are questions foreign from the purpose of the present inquiry. All that is designed here is to show that to worship God is a moral duty, enjoined by the natural law, or that the moral law obliges us to worship God in the way and manner he prescribes, whether the prescribed worship be made known to us by natural reason or only by supernatural revelation. In other words, our design is to show that morals are not separable from religion, nor religion from morals.

The question is not an idle one, and has a practical bearing, especially in our age and country, in which the tendency is to a total separation of church and state, religion and morals. The state with us disclaims all right to estab-

lish a state religion, and all obligation to recognize and support religion, or to punish offences against it, at least for the reason that they are offences against religion; and yet it claims the right to establish a state morality, to enforce it by its legislation, and to punish through its courts all offences against it. Thus the government seeks to suppress Mormonism, not as a religion indeed, but as a morality. As a religion, Mormonism is free, and in no respect repugnant to the constitution and laws of the country; but as a morality it is contrary to the state morality and is forbidden: and consequently, under the guise of suppressing it as morality, the law suppresses it, in fact, as religion. Is this distinction between religion and morality real, and does not the establishment of a state morality necessarily imply the establishment of a state religion? Are religion and morals separable, and independent of each other? A question of great moment in its bearing on political rights.

Among the Gentiles, religion and morality had no necessary connection with each other. Ethics were not religious, nor religion ethical. The Gentiles sought a basis for morality independent of the gods. Some placed its principle in pleasure. Others, and these the better sort, in justice or right, anterior and superior to the gods, and binding both gods and men. This was necessary with the Gentiles, who had forgotten the creative act, and held to a plurality of gods and goddesses whose conduct was far from being uniformly edifying, nay, was sometimes, and not unfrequently, scandalous, as we see from Plato's *Euthyphro* and the *Meditations of the Emperor*. But it does not seem to have occurred to these Gentiles that abstractions are nothing, and that justice or right, unless integrated in a real and concrete power, is a mere abstraction, and can bind neither gods nor men; and if so integrated, it is God, and is really the assertion of one God above their gods, the "God of gods," as he was called by the Hebrews.

The tendency in our age is to seek a basis outside of God for an independent morality, and we were not permitted by its editors to assert, in the *New American Cyclopedia*, that "Atheism is incompatible with morality," and were obliged to insert "as theists say." But not only do men seek to construct a morality without God, but even a religion and a worship based on atheism, as we see in the so-called Free Religionists, and the Positivists, which goes further than the request for "the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out."

Even among Christian writers on ethics we find some who, in a more or less modified form, continue the Gentile tradition, and would have us regard the moral law as independent of the will of God, and hold that things are right and obligatory not because God commands them, but that he commands them because they are right and obligatory. They distinguish between the Divine Will and the Divine Essence, and make the moral law emanate from the essence, not from the will of God. If we make the law the expression of the will of God, we deny that the distinctions of right and wrong are eternal, make them dependent on mere will and arbitrariness, and assume that God might, if he had willed, have made what is now right wrong, and what is now wrong right, which is impossible; for he can by his will no more found or alter the relations between moral good and moral evil than he can make or unmake the mathematical truths and axioms. Very true; but solely because he cannot make, unmake, or alter his own eternal and necessary being.

The moral law is the application of the eternal law in the moral government of rational existences, and the eternal law, according to St. Augustine, is the eternal will or reason of God. The moral law necessarily expresses both the reason and the will of God. There are here two questions which must not be confounded, namely, 1, What is the reason of the law? 2, Wherefore is the law obligatory on us as rational existences? The first question asks what is the reason or motive on the part of God in enacting the law, and, though that concerns him and not us, we may answer: Doubtless, it is the same reason he had for creating us, and is to be found in his infinite love and goodness. The second question asks, Why does the law oblige us? that is, why is it law for us; since a law that does not oblige is no law at all.

This last is the real ethical question. The answer is not, It is obligatory because what it enjoins is good, holy, and necessary to our perfection or beatitude. That would be a most excellent reason why we should do the things enjoined, but is no answer to the question, why are we bound to do them, and are guilty if we do not? Why is obedience to the law a duty, and disobedience a sin? It is necessary to distinguish with the theologians between the *finis operantis* and the *finis operis*, between the work one does, and the motive for which one does it. Every work that tends to realize the theological order is good, but if we do it not

from the proper motive, we are not moral or virtuous in doing it. We must have the intention of doing it in obedience to the law or will of the sovereign, who has the right to command us.

What, then, is the ground of the right of God to command us, and of our duty to obey him? The ground of both is in the creative act. God has a complete and absolute right to us, because, having made us from nothing, we are his, wholly his, and not our own. He created us from nothing, and only his creative act stands between us and nothing; he therefore owns us, and therefore we are his, body and soul, and all that we have, can do, or acquire. He is therefore our Sovereign Lord and Proprietor, with supreme and absolute dominion over us, and the absolute right, as absolute owner, to do what he will with us. His right to command is founded on his dominion, and his dominion is founded on his creative act, and we are bound to obey him, whatever he commands, because we are his creature, absolutely his, and in no sense our own.

Dr. Ward of the *Dublin Review*, in his very able work on *Nature and Grace*, objects to this doctrine, which we published in the *Review* some years ago, that it makes the obligation depend on the command, not on the intrinsic excellence, goodness, or sanctity of the thing commanded, and consequently if, *per impossibile*, we could suppose the devil created us, we might be under two contradictory obligations, one to obey the devil our creator, commanding us to do evil, and our own reason which commands us to do that which is intrinsically good. What we answered Dr. Ward at the time we have forgotten, and we are in some doubt if we seized the precise point of the objection. The objection, however, is not valid, for it assumes that if the devil were our creator, God would still exist as the intrinsically good, and as our final cause. On the absurd hypothesis that the devil creates us, this would not follow; for then the devil would be God, real and necessary being, and therefore good, consequently, there could not be the contradictory obligations supposed. The hypothesis was introduced by one of the interlocutors in the discussion, as a strong way of asserting that obedience is due to the command of our Creator because he is our creator, without reference to the intrinsic character of the command. The intrinsic nature of the command approves or commends it to our reason and judgment, but does not formally oblige. This is

the doctrine we maintained then, and which we maintain now, while Dr. Ward maintained that the command binds only by reason of its intrinsic excellence or sanctity.

We asserted that there is no distinction between the idea of God and the idea of Good. Dr. Ward justly objects to this, and we were wrong in our expression, though not in our thought. What we meant to say, and should have said to be consistent with our own doctrine is, that there is no distinction *in re* between Good and God, and therefore to ask Is God good? is absurd. Dr. Ward, we find in this work, *Nature and Grace*, asserts very properly the identity of necessary truths with being; in his recent criticism on J. Stuart Mill he denies it, and says he agrees with Fr. Kleutgen, that they are founded on being, or God, but as we have remarked in a foregoing section, what is founded on God must be God or his creature, and if his creatures, how can these truths be eternal?

Dr. Ward's objection has led us to reëxamine the doctrine that moral obligation is founded on the creative act of God, but we have seen no reason for not continuing to hold it, though we might modify some of the expressions we formerly used; and though we differ from Dr. Ward on a very essential point, we have a far greater respect for his learning and ability, as a moral philosopher, than we had before re-reading his work. He seeks to found an independent morality, not independent of the Divine Being indeed, but independent of the Divine will. In this we do not wholly differ from him, and we willingly admit that the Divine will, distinctively taken, does not make or found the right. The law expresses, as he contends, the reason of God, his intrinsic love and goodness, as is asserted in the fact that he is the final cause of creation, the supreme good, the beatitude of all rational or moral existences, and the law is imposed by him as final cause, not as first cause. But this is not the question now under discussion. Judgments of moral good may be formed, as Dr. Ward maintains, by intuition of necessary truths founded on God, or identical with his necessary and eternal being; but we are not asking how moral judgments are formed, nor what in point of fact our moral judgments are; we are simply discussing the question why the commands of God are obligatory, and we maintain that they oblige us, because they are *his* commands, and he is our absolute sovereign Lord and Proprietor, for he has made us from nothing, and we are his and not our own. Hence it follows

that we have duties but no rights before God, as asserted by that noble Christian orator and philosopher, the lamented Donoso Cortés, and that what are called the rights of man are the rights of God, and therefore sacred and inviolable, which all men, kings and kaisers, peoples and states, aristocracies and democracies, are bound to respect, protect, and defend, against whoever would invade them.

The objection to the doctrine of Dr. Ward's independent morality is that it is not true, and exacts no surrender of our wills to the Divine will. It is not true, for Dr. Ward himself cannot say that the invasion of the land of Canaan, the extermination of the people, and taking possession of it as their own by the children of Israel, can be defended on any ground except that of the express command of God, who had the sovereign right to dispose of them as he saw proper. Abraham offering or his readiness to offer up his son Isaac was justified because he trusted God, and acted in obedience to the Divine command. Yet to offer a human sacrifice without such a command, or for any other reason, would contradict all our moral judgments. If one seeks to do what the law enjoins, not because God commands it, but for the sake of popularity, success in the world, or simply to benefit himself, here or hereafter, he yields no obedience to God. He acknowledges not the Divine sovereignty. He does not say to his Maker, "Thy will, not mine be done;" he does not pray, "Thy will be done on earth as in heaven;" and, what is more to the purpose, he recognizes no personal God, follows God only as impersonal or abstract being, and fails to own or confess the truth or fact that he is God's creature, belongs to God as his Lord and Master, who has the absolute right to command him, as we have shown in showing that God is man's sole creator.

The essential principle of religion is perfect trust in God, and obedience to his sovereign will, the unconditional surrender of our wills to the will of our Creator. This is only what the moral law enjoins, for the first law of justice is to give to every one his due or his own, and we owe to God, as has been seen, all that we are, have, or can do. This shows that religion and morality in their principle are one and the same, and therefore inseparable. There is then no morality without religion, and no religion without morality. He who refuses to keep the commandments of God and to render him his due, violates the moral law no less than he does the religious law. Let us hear no more then of independent

morality, which is only an invention to save the absolute surrender of our wills to the will of God, and is inspired by a reluctance to acknowledge a master.

But this is not all. If the moral law requires our unreserved obedience to the commands of God, it requires us to honor, love, trust, and obey him in all things, and therefore to worship him in the way and manner he prescribes. If then he is pleased to make us a supernatural revelation of his will and to promulgate supernaturally a supernatural law, we are bound by the moral or natural law to obey it, when promulgated and brought to our knowledge, as unreservedly as we are to obey the natural law itself. If Christianity be, as it professes to be, the revelation of the supernatural order, a supernatural law, no man who knowingly and voluntarily rejects or refuses to accept it, fulfils the natural law, or can be accounted a moral man.

We have now, we think completed our task, and redeemed our promise to refute atheism and to demonstrate theism by reason. We have proved that being affirms itself to the soul in ideal intuition, and that being is God, free to act from intelligence and will, and therefore not an impersonal, but a personal God, Creator of heaven and earth and all things visible and invisible—the free upholder of all existences, and therefore Providence, the final cause of creation, therefore the perfection, the good, the beatitude of all rational existences. We have proved his Divine sovereignty as resting on his creative act, and the obligation of all moral existences to obey his law, and to honor and worship his Divine Majesty as he himself prescribes. We can go no further, by the light of reason, but this is far enough for our argument.

XV.—TRADITION.

We have now proved, or at least indicated the process of proving, with all the certainty we have that we think or exist, the existence of God, that he is real and necessary being, being in its plenitude, or as say the theologians, *ens perfectissimum*, self-existent and self-sufficing, independent, universal, immutable, eternal, without beginning or end, supracosmic, supernatural, free, voluntary creator of heaven and earth and all things visible and invisible: creating them from nothing, without any extrinsic or intrinsic necessity, by the free act of his will and the sole word of his power;

the principle, medium, and end of all existences, the absolute Sovereign Proprietor, and Lord of all creatures, the Upholder and moral Governor of the universe, in whom and for whom are all things, and whom all rational existences are bound to worship as their sovereign Lord, and in returning to whom by the teleological law, they attain to their perfection, fulfil the purpose for which they exist, enter into possession of their supreme good, their supreme beatitude in God, who is the good, or beatitude itself. We have in this ascertained the ground of moral obligation, and the principle of all religion, morality, and politics. We have then proved our thesis, refuted atheism under all its forms and disguises, and positively demonstrated Christian theism.

But, though we hold the existence of God may be proved with certainty by the process we have followed or indicated, we are far from pretending or believing that it is by that process that mankind, as a matter of fact, have attained to their belief in God or knowledge of the Divine Being. We do not say that man could not, but we hold that he did not, attain to this science and belief without the direct and immediate supernatural instructions of his Maker. The race in all ages has held the belief from tradition, and philosophy has been called in only to verify or prove the traditionary teaching. Men believe before they doubt or think of proving. We doubt if, as a fact, any one ever was led to the truth by reasoning. The truth is grasped intuitively or immediately by the mind, and the reasoning comes afterwards to verify it, or to prove that it is truth. The reasoning does not originate the belief, but comes to defend or to justify it. Hence it is that no man is ever converted to a doctrine he absolutely rejects, by simple logic, however unanswerable and conclusive it may be.

Supposing the process we have indicated is a complete demonstration of the existence of God as creator and moral Governor of the universe, few men are capable of following and understanding it, even among those who have made the study of philosophy and theology the business of their lives. The greatest philosophers among the Gentiles missed it, and the scientists of our own day also miss it, and fail to recognize the fact of creation and admit no supramundane God. Even eminent theologians, as we have seen, who no more doubt the existence of God than they do their own, prove themselves utterly unable to demonstrate or prove that God

is. Dr. Newman, for instance, whose Christian faith is not to be doubted, confesses his inability to prove the existence of God from reason, and in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, if he does not sap the foundation of belief in revelation, he destroys its value, by subjecting it to the variations and imperfections of the human understanding. His *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* is an attempt to prove the relativity of all science or knowledge, that in practice we assent to the probable without ever demanding or attaining to the certain, the apodictic, and is hardly less incompatible with the existence of God than the cosmic philosophy of the school of Herbert Spencer, from which it in principle does not, as far as we can see, essentially differ.

If such men as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte, Emil Littré, and John Henry Newman are unequal to the process, how can we suppose that the doctrine that God is, originated in that or any process of reasoning? Reason in the *élite* of the race may prove that God is, but how can reason, wanting the word, originate and establish it in the minds of the ignorant, uncultivated, rude, and rustic multitude? And yet it is precisely this multitude, ignorant and incapable of philosophy, who hold it with the greatest firmness and tenacity, and only philosophers, and such as are formed by them, ever doubt it. There is, no doubt, a true and useful philosophy, if one could only find it, but philosophers in all ages have been far more successful in obscuring the truth and causing doubt, than in enlightening the mind and correcting errors. Plato was little else than a sophist ridiculing and refuting sophists; and in all ages we find so-called philosophers originating and defending the grossest and absurdest errors that have ever obtained, and we find them true and just only when they accord with tradition.

Intuition, as we have shown, furnishes the principle of the demonstration or proof of the existence of God, with absolute certainty; but ideal intuition, which gives the principle of cognition, is not itself cognition, and though implicitly contained in every thought as its condition, it becomes explicit or express only as sensibly re-presented in language, and the long and tedious analytical process performed by the reflective reason. To get at the ideal formula, which expresses the matter of intuition, we have had to use reflection, and both analytical and synthetic reason-

ing. The formula is obtained explicitly only by analyzing thought, the object in thought, and the ideal element of the object, and synthetizing the results of the several analyses. It is only by this long and difficult process that one is able to assert as the intuitive synthesis, *Ens creat existentias*, or the essential principles of theistic philosophy. It is so because ideal intuition, as distinguished from empirical intuition, is not open vision of the object presented, is not the soul's cognition or judgment, but the objective or divine judgment affirmed to the soul implicitly, that is, indistinctly in every thought or empirical judgment, and must be distinguished from the empirical by the reflective or analytical activity of the soul, or, in the language of St. Thomas, abstracted or disengaged by the active intellect, *intellectus agens*, from the phantasmata and intelligible species in which it is given, before it can be explicitly apprehended by the soul, and be distinct cognition, or a human judgment, the complete *verbum mentis*.

When a false philosophy has led to the doubt or denial of God, this recurrence to ideal intuition is necessary to remove the doubt, and to make our philosophical doctrines accord with the principles of the real and the knowable; but it is evident to the veriest tyro that not even the philosopher, however he may confirm his judgment by the intuition, takes his idea that God is, immediately and directly from it; for this would imply that we have direct and immediate empirical intuition of God, which not even Plato pretended, for he held the Divine Idea is cognizable only by the *mimesis*, the image, or copy of itself, impressed on matter, as the seal on wax, whence his doctrine and that of the Scholastics, of knowledge *per ideam*, *per similitudinem*, *per formam*, or *per speciem*.

We cannot take the ideal directly from the intuition, because we are not pure spirit, but in this life spirit united to body; yet we have the idea in our minds before we can deny it, or think of seeking to demonstrate it. Hence it must be acknowledged, that though reason is competent to prove the existence of God with certainty when denied or doubted, as we think we have shown, it did not, and perhaps could not, have originated the Idea, but has taken it from tradition, and it must have been actually taught the first man by his Maker himself.

The historical fact is that man has never been abandoned by his Maker to the light and force of nature alone, or left

without any supernatural instruction, or assistance, any more than he has been left without language. The doctrine of St. Thomas is historically true, that there never has been but one revelation from God to man, and that one revelation was made in substance to our first parents, before their expulsion from the garden of Eden. This revelation is what we call tradition, and has been handed down from father to son to us. It has come down to us in two lines: in its purity and integrity from Adam through the Patriarchs to the Synagogue, and through the Synagogue to the Christian Church whence we hold it; in a corrupt, broken, and often a travestied form through Gentilism, or Heathenism. The great mistake of our times is in neglecting to study it in the orthodox line, and in studying it only in the heterodox or Gentile line of transmission, all of which we hope to prove in a succeeding work, if our life and health are spared to complete it, on revelation in opposition to prevailing rationalism.

The reader will bear in mind that we have not appealed to tradition as authority or to supply the defect of demonstration; but only to explain the origin and universality of theism, especially with the great bulk of mankind, who could never prove it by a logical process for themselves, nor understand such process when made by others. Hence we escape the error of the Traditionalists censured by the Holy See.

The error of the Traditionalists is not in asserting that men learn the existence of God from tradition or from the teaching of others, which is a fact verifiable from what we see taking place every day before our eyes; but in denying that the existence of God and the first principles of morals or necessary truth, what we call the ideal judgment, are cognizable or provable by natural reason, and in making them matters of faith, not of science, as do Dr. Thomas Reid, Sir William Hamilton, Dean Mansel, Viscount de Bonald, Bonnetty, Immanuel Kant, and others. This is inadmissible, because it builds science on faith, deprives us of all rational motives for faith, and leaves faith itself nothing to stand on. Faith, in the last analysis, rests on the veracity of God, and its formula is, *Deus est Verax*, but if we know not, as the preamble to faith, that God is, and that it is impossible for him to deceive or to be deceived, how can we assert his veracity or confide in his word? Knowing already that God is and is infinitely true, we cannot doubt his word, when we

are certain that we have it. This connects faith with reason, and makes faith, objectively at least, as certain as science, as St. Thomas asserts.

God must have infused the knowledge of himself into the soul of the first man, when he made him; for all the knowledge or science of the first man must have been infused knowledge or science, since the fact of creation upsets the Darwinian theory of development, as well as the Spencerian theory of evolution, and Adam must have been created a man in the prime of his manhood, and not, as it were, a new-born infant. What was infused science in him, becomes tradition in his posterity, but a tradition of science, not of faith or belief only. The tradition, if preserved in its purity and integrity, embodies the ideal intuition, or ideal judgment common to all men, and implicit in every thought, in language, the sensible sign of the ideal or intelligible, and which represents it to the active intellect that expresses it, renders it explicit, and therefore actual cognition.

It follows from this that the ideal judgment when re-presented by tradition through the medium of language, its sensible representative, is even in the simple, the rustic, the untutored in logic and philosophy, who are incapable of proving it by a logical process or even of understanding such a process, really matter of science, not of simple belief or confidence in tradition. The tradition enables them to convert, so to speak, the intuition into cognition, so that they know as really and truly that God is, and is the creator, upholder, and moral Governor of man and the universe, as does the profoundest theologian or philosopher. Hence wherever the primitive tradition is preserved in any degree, there is, if not complete knowledge of God, at least an imperfect knowledge that God is, and this knowledge, however feeble and indistinct, faint or evanescent, serves as the *point d'appui* or basis of the operations of the Christian missionary among savage and barbarous tribes for their conversion.

The tradition is not the basis of science, but is in the supersensible a necessary condition of science, and hence the value and necessity of instruction or education. The ideal judgment is, as ideal, not our judgment, but objective, Divine, intuitively presented to the soul as the condition and model of our own. We can form no judgment without it, and every judgment formed must copy or be modelled

after it. But, as we have shown, we cannot take the ideal directly from the intuition, but must take it primarily from tradition or as re-presented through the senses in language, which is really what is meant by education, or instruction. But all instruction, all education, reproduces, as far as it goes, tradition, or depends on it.

As language is the sensible representation of the idea, and the medium of tradition, the importance of St. Paul's injunction to St. Timothy, to "hold fast the form of sound words," and of maintaining tradition in its purity and integrity is apparent to the dullest mind. The corruption of either involves the corruption, mutilation, or travesty of the idea, and leads to heathenism, false theism, pantheism, atheism, demonism, as the history of the great Gentile apostasy from the patriarchal or primitive religion of mankind amply proves. As tradition of the truths or first principles of science, which are ideal not empirical, had its origin in revelation or the immediate instruction of Adam by his Maker, we cannot fail to perceive the fatal error of those who seek to divorce philosophy from revelation, and, like Descartes, to erect it into an independent science. Revelation is not the basis of philosophy, but no philosophy of any value can be constructed without it.

VINCENZO GIOBERTI.

ARTICLE I.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1850.]

We have, on several occasions within the last two or three years, introduced the name of Gioberti, sometimes with praise, sometimes with blame, and some attempt to appreciate his influence as an author, or to determine the practical tendency of his writings, can be neither misplaced nor mistimed; for he is, unquestionably, a man of rare genius, of acute and profound thought, a highly polished intellect, and various and extensive erudition. He appears to have mastered the whole circle of the sciences, and to have made himself thoroughly acquainted with the past and the present. He has studied profoundly the spirit of our age, and we have met with no one who better understands its dangerous tendencies. He possesses a genuine philosophical aptitude, and is unrivalled in his exposition and criticism of modern philosophy, especially as represented by the later German, French, and Italian schools; and as far as concerns the refutation of false systems, and the statement of the first principles and the method of philosophical science, he is eminently successful. The best refutation of sensism, pantheism, radicalism, and socialism, and the clearest and most satisfactory statement and vindication of the several truths opposed to them, with which we are acquainted, are to be found in his writings. He never fears to make a bold and manly profession of the Catholic faith, and it is from the point of view of Catholicity, and by the aid of Catholic doctrine, that he refutes the modern errors and heresies he attacks. He seems, also, save in the ascetic region, whenever he has occasion to present Catholic theology, to present it in its highest and most rigidly orthodox forms. According to him, the true human race does not and cannot subsist out of the Catholic, or elect society; and he energetically maintains, that out of the Catholic Church man is in an abnormal condition, and incapable, under any aspect of his nature, of attaining to his normal development. He attacks Gallicanism, and asserts in their plenitude the spiritual and civil prerogatives of the Papacy, which French, German, and Eng-

lish theologians, especially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have so generally denied, or but ambiguously admitted. He maintains that civil society is of sacerdotal origin, derives all power, civil as well as ecclesiastical, from God through the sacerdotal order, and makes the Pope, who embodies in himself the whole priesthood, the representative on earth of the full and universal sovereignty of God.

But we cannot read Gioberti's works without feeling that, along with this, and by ordinary readers not easily separable from it, the author introduces remarks and opinions, and exhibits practical aims and tendencies, which, in our times at least, go far to neutralize his orthodox influence, nay, to throw his influence into the scale of modern liberalism and socialism. We do not judge a book by the personal conduct of the author; but as far as Gioberti's conduct, whether in power or out of power, is known to us, it does not appear to have harmonized with the high-toned Catholic principles he has, at least, the air of professing. His present position with regard to the Holy See, unless we are wholly misinformed, is not that of a dutiful and affectionate son, and contrasts unfavorably with that of Rosmini, or even with that of Padre Ventura. Professedly opposed to all violent revolutions, claiming to be a man of great moderation, and occasionally using language which would lead one to suspect him of being a delegate to the Peace Congress, he nevertheless undeniably had a large share in preparing and precipitating the recent shameful Italian revolutions, and plunging his own sovereign, the late Charles Albert, into his disastrous and unprovoked campaigns against Austria. Professing to disdain modern liberals, to hold democratic politicians in contempt, and to address himself only to the wisdom and solid judgment of the enlightened and virtuous few, he aided, indirectly, to say the least, in stirring up that infuriated mob which drove the Jesuits out of Italy, assassinated Count Rossi, exiled the Holy Father from Rome, persecuted the religious, massacred the clergy, and enabled Mazzini and his fellow-miscreants to establish the infamous Roman Republic. Asserting in the most unqualified terms the infallibility of the Holy See in the definition of doctrines and the condemnation of books, he has, we believe, never submitted a single one of his own publications to its judgment, and up to the present time has refused to submit to its condemnation of his *Gesuita Moderno.* It is true,

and we take pleasure in saying so, that, when at the head of the Sardinian government, he refused to acknowledge the infidel and sacrilegious Roman Republic; but he also refused to co-operate with the Catholic powers of Europe in restoring the Holy Father to his temporal sovereignty, and sanctioned encroachments of the civil on the spiritual power, which but too clearly preluded the sacrilegious Siccardi laws, the imprisonment of the illustrious Franzoni, and the persecution of the clergy in the Subalpine kingdom, which so deeply wound the heart, not only of our Holy Father, but of every sincere Catholic. These things, which we are unable to deny, or satisfactorily to explain away, coupled with the fact that he is usually surrounded, not by men venerable for their doctrine and their piety, but by a knot of young Italian atheists and misbelievers, compel us to pause in our admiration, and ask if there be not, after all, some grave fault in the author as well as in the man. With our high estimation of his genius, his talent, his clear and profound thought, his erudition, and his polish and eloquence as a writer, as well as of the soundness of his doctrines on many of the most vital points of philosophy and theology, we must naturally be disposed to place the most favorable construction possible on both his speculations and his acts; but, considering what has undeniably been the practical influence of his views and tendencies, as a political writer and statesman, on the disastrous and shameful revolutionary movements of his countrymen, we cannot but believe that there is something rotten in his writings, and that, with all his high-toned orthodoxy on so many important points, there is yet something in his thought, as well as in his heart, not compatible with Catholic doctrine and Catholic piety, and which we are bound to reprobate.

We took up and read Gioberti's works at first from curiosity, and to find out the truth they might contain, and we were charmed and carried away by his learning and eloquence, to an extent we are ashamed to acknowledge, although we had all the time a secret feeling that he was not altogether healthy in his practical influence; we have since re-read his writings, to discover, if possible, the error concealed in them, or the source of that unhealthy influence. We think we have discovered it, and our chief purpose in noticing the volumes we have introduced is to point it out to our readers, and, if our views should chance to fall under his eyes, to the distinguished author himself. Several books

of greater or less magnitude have been written against the author, but we are unacquainted with their contents. We have read nothing against him, except some high commendations of him in *The North British Review*, a Scotch Presbyterian journal, intended to perpetuate the spirit of John Knox, and some two or three articles, feebly and unsuccessfully attacking his philosophy, in a respectable French periodical, conducted by a layman whose learning and good intentions we hold in high esteem. Our judgment, whether sound or unsound, has been formed by the simple study of the volumes before us, and the school to which their author obviously belongs, and of which he is the most distinguished member.

Our purpose in our present article is not to review Gioberti so much under a philosophical as an ascetic, a speculative as a practical, point of view; and perhaps we cannot better introduce the criticisms we propose to offer, than by reverting to a fact which we have often insisted on, namely, that there is in modern society a fatal schism between the ecclesiastical order and the temporal, and between spiritual culture and secular. There is not, under Christianity, that harmony between the two orders that there appears to have been under gentilism in Greek and Roman antiquity. In classic antiquity there seems to have been, for the most part, a perfect harmony between religious and secular life, spiritual and secular culture; and in the great men of Livy and Plutarch, regarding them simply as men, we find a balance, a proportion, a completeness, and, so to speak, roundness of character, in its order, that we do not find in the men of modern times. In modern society the two orders are not only distinct, but mutually repugnant, and we are able to devote ourselves to the one only by rejecting or opposing the other. Civil government opposes, and, as far as possible, subjects the Church; philosophy rejects theology; the sciences are irreligious in their tendency; and secular literature and art foster unbelief and impiety. The individual and society are alike torn by two internal hostile and irreconcilable forces, and we have no peace,—hardly, at rare intervals, a brief truce. This schism, taken in its principle, may be regarded as the source of all the evils which afflict modern society, whether temporal or spiritual.

It is from the fact we here state, more especially as it exists in Italy, the author's own country, that Gioberti appears to start. He assumes that this schism is practically

remediable, that it ought to be healed; and hence his chief inquiry is as to its causes and the means of healing it. The principal cause, if we understand him aright, is, that the sacerdotal society has lost its control of the lay society, by having lost its former moral and and intellectual superiority over it, and yet insists on retaining the dominion it rightfully exercised when it possessed that superiority; and the remedy is to be sought in the voluntary cession, as far as civilized Europe is concerned, on the part of the sacerdotal society, of that former dominion, become incompatible with modern civilization, the new conditions and relations of peoples and nations, the emancipation of the civil order from the sacerdotal tutelage, and a union, alliance, or interfusion of sacerdotal and lay culture, of the sacerdotal and lay genius, of the Christian spirit and the spirit of ancient Italo-Greek gentilism. He denies, indeed, the right of the lay society to assert its emancipation by violence, and thus far condemns modern liberalists, but contends that the clerical order should voluntarily concede the emancipation, and invest the lay order with an independence that was denied it, and very properly denied it, in the earlier mediæval times. We shall amply prove, before we close, that this is the author's view of the matter; and, indeed, it is evident from almost every page of his writings, and especially from his long discussion in the *Del Primato* on the difference between the civil dictatorship exercised by the Popes immediately after the dissolution of the Western Empire by the Northern barbarians, and the arbitratorship which he contends is now for civilized Europe all that can or should be exercised by the sovereign pontiffs, except in the Ecclesiastical States.

That, in pointing out the causes of this schism, and proposing the remedy, Gioberti refutes much false philosophy, demolishes many false systems of politics, ethics, and society, and brings to his aid truths in philosophy, theology, morals, and politics of the highest order and of the last importance, there is no question; but he has nowhere the appearance of doing this for the sake of a genuinely Catholic end. The end for which he brings forward Catholicity, he says expressly,* is not the salvation of the soul, or the advancement of faith and piety for the sake of heaven, eternal beatitude, but the advancement of civilization for the sake of

**Del Primato morale e civile degli Italiani*, Tom. I. p. 95.

the "earthly felicity of men," and "the temporal well-being of nations." And hence he presents himself as a political and social reformer, in reality as a socialist in relation to his ends, differing from the vulgar herd of socialists only in the respect, that his instruments of reform, of reconstructing society, and of advancing civilization and social well-being, include, instead of rejecting, the ideal philosophy and the Church. In doctrine, in formal teaching, he is the antipodes of our modern socialists and liberalists, but in heart and soul, in spirit, in aim, and practical tendency, he is, after all, with them, and hardly distinguishable from them. Speaking in general terms, his error lies here, and is practical rather than theoretical,—in what he is laboring to effect rather than in the doctrines he formally and expressly teaches or attempts to apply to his socialistic purposes; and hence you feel, in reading him, that he is carrying you away in an anti-Catholic direction, although you cannot easily lay your finger on a direct and positive statement that you can assert to be in itself absolutely heterodox, or that directly and unequivocally expresses the error you are sure he is insinuating into your mind and heart.

Nevertheless, in his practical doctrine, as we have just stated it, there are clearly errors both of fact and of principle. He says expressly,—"La declinazione delle influenze civili del clero in alcuni paesi cattolici nasce appunto dall' aver lasciato che i laici di sperienza, di senno, di dottrina, e di gentilezza lo avanzassero."† And it is clear that he means to lay this down as a general principle, and to maintain that the decline of the influence of the clergy in the civil order is owing to their having suffered "the laity to surpass them in experience, wisdom, knowledge, and cultivation," or, in other words, to the fact, that the sacerdotal society has lost its moral and intellectual superiority over the lay society. But he knows little of human affairs, and of the world at large, who can seriously hold that the influence of a class, clerical or laical, is always in proportion to its moral and intellectual worth, or to its knowledge and cultivation. Wisdom and virtue do not, naturally, attain to dominion in the affairs of the world, and ignorance and vice always govern, except when God, supernaturally, intervenes to secure the victory to the good over the bad. Every man knows that this is true in the sphere of his own experience;

†*Del Primato*, Tom. II. p. 255.

for every man knows that, if he follows nature, he goes to destruction, and that it is only by grace that he is able to conquer evil, and secure the dominion to wisdom and virtue. What is true thus of men individually is true of them collectively; and this, being true of the individual, must be equally true of society, which can, therefore, be saved from destruction only by supernatural protection, only by grace, of which the sacerdotal order is the minister. If influence was always exerted in proportion to moral and intellectual worth, the wisest and best, the *optimates*, would always be at the head of affairs, and have the management of the republic, which, we need not say, is by no means the fact. Moreover, if it were so, Gioberti would have nothing to complain of; for to place the *optimates* at the head of affairs is precisely what he contends for as that which will perfect the political and social constitution.

There is, again, in the principle here assumed, a suspicious approximation to the pretensions and aims of Saint-Simonism. It is lawful, no doubt, to learn from an enemy, but we are not prepared to admit that Catholicity is insufficient for itself, or that it is under the necessity of making any important loans from those who are studying to supplant it. The essential principle of the Saint-Simonian constitution is the organization of society, hierarchically, under its natural chiefs, the natural aristocracy, that is to say, the *optimates*. These, from the fall of the Roman Empire to the age of Leo the Tenth, the Saint-Simonians assert, were the Catholic clergy, under their supreme chief, the Pope; but at the latter period they ceased to be the natural chiefs of society, because they ceased to advance in the same proportion that the lay society advanced, and suffered themselves to be surpassed in civil wisdom, knowledge, and cultivation by the laity. No one familiar with the writings of the Saint-Simonian school can read Gioberti without being pained to find him too often speaking as one of its honored disciples.

Finally, we deny the fact assumed. The clergy have never, in relation to the lay society, lost their former moral and intellectual, or scientific and civil superiority; and if they sometimes seem to have done so, it is only because the lay society has opposed to them false morality, false society, and false science, in place of the genuine. The clergy have never ceased, even in the most polished nations of Europe, to surpass the laity; never have the laity been able to be their teachers; and in every instance where they have

claimed to be, they have been able to do so only on the ground of their having departed in religion, morals, politics, or philosophy from sound doctrine. Abelard was a layman, —reputed a learned man, a great philosopher, an able dialectician; but his influence served only to promote nominalism, poorly disguised under the name of conceptualism, and to ruin philosophical science. Bacon and Descartes were laymen, and Gioberti holds them in no higher estimation than we do. Except, perhaps, in mathematics and some of the physical sciences, which are only secondary matters, and whose predominance marks an infidel age, the superiority of science and doctrine has always been on the side of the clergy, and we are aware of no contributions of any real value ever made by the laity. The fact is not as Gioberti assumes. The laity, having acquired a smattering of science and learning, have become filled with pride and conceit, and refused for that reason to recognize the just influence of the clergy. The decline of the influence of the clergy in some Catholic countries is not owing to their having suffered the laity, in wisdom, doctrine, and cultivation, to surpass them, but to the overweening pride and conceit of the laity, which have taken the place of humility and docility. The most truly learned, scientific, and cultivated among the laity are, even in our own age, the most docile to the clergy, and the most ready to assert and vindicate their general moral and intellectual superiority; for we do not reckon your Mazzinis, Caninos, Mamianis, and Leopardis among the distinguished laymen of our times. They and their associates are not to be named in the same day with an O'Connell, a Montalembert, a De Falloux, a Donoso Cortés. Moreover, where are the laymen who in our days rank above Balmes in Spain, Wiseman or Newman in England, Moehler in Germany, and Vincenzo Gioberti in Italy, not to mention hundreds of others of the clerical order in no sense their inferiors, but who happen to be less known to our American public?

The author assumes, virtually, that, when the clergy find their influence decline, it is owing to their own fault and the growing virtue of the laity. It is only on this assumption that he can justify his demand of concessions to the revolting laity, and the union or fusion of sacerdotal with lay culture. The contrary of this is the truth. The clergy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when their influence had much declined, were, in relation to contem-

porary society, not one whit below what they were in the previous ages, when their influence was the greatest; and in no age have the laity shown themselves more superficial, more ignorant, more indisposed to severe thought and solid studies, or less virtuous, or more immmoral, than in the eighteenth century, and in France, where the influence of the clergy was nearly null, but where their faith and virtue were by no means null, as was amply proved in the hour of trial. The clergy never obtain, and never maintain, in any country, their influence by mere personal qualifications, or personal superiority to the rest of the community, although this superiority may be a fact; but by the superiority of their doctrine and the sacredness of their office,—by the fact of their being priests and doctors,—the depositaries of the Christian mysteries, and the dispensers to the people of the bread of life; and their influence declines just in proportion as the people lose their faith in these mysteries, and their relish for this bread, or become wedded to the flesh and the world.

With all deference, then, to the distinguished author, we must dissent from his representation of the first element of the cause of the evil which we, as well as he, deplore. We cannot revive our youth, and join again with those who ascribe, in whole or in part, the acknowledged evils of society to the clergy, or the decline of their influence, in most countries, to the loss of their former moral and intellectual superiority; and just as little can we ascribe their loss of influence to the growing intelligence and virtue of the lay society, for this growing intelligence and virtue is not a fact, and if it were a fact, it would only render the lay society so much the more docile and submissive to the sacerdotal society. Individual clergymen, no doubt, there are, who do not by any means adorn their profession, or walk worthily in their high vocation, of which our author is, perhaps, a notable example; but, taken as a body, throughout the world, it is not the clergy that need reforming, but the laity,—not those of the laity, again, who are docile and submissive to their pastors, but those who are indocile, rebellious, and require the clergy to come to them, instead of recognizing the fact that it is for them to go to the clergy.

We find it equally difficult to agree with Gioberti, that the fatal schism is continued by any censurable disposition of the sacerdotal society to hold on to the shadow of a dominion which, as to its substance, has long since escaped them.

He contends that the civil dictatorship belongs, *in radice*, to the priesthood in all times and in all countries, but that its exercise is practicable or desirable only during the infancy or minority of nations, and that when a nation attains its majority, as we say of children, it is entitled to its freedom, and should and must be emancipated. The priesthood should then resign its dictatorship, and be contented to fill, in regard to civil society, the simple office of arbitrator, or referee. He says,—"When the priesthood delay beyond the proper time the civil emancipation of the people, as well as when these presume to hasten it. and attempt its possession prematurely, grave dissensions spring up and disturb both the Church and the state, until sound reason triumphs, and the true order of things is restored; for the sacerdotal tutelage of *infant* nations and the civil independence of *adult* nations are equally two laws of nature, which may be resisted for a time, but which no human power can wholly annul, or permanently suspend."*

In accordance with this view, the author appears to charge the clergy with having failed to recognize the fact that modern nations have attained their majority, and of being in some measure the cause of the present schism between the two orders, by attempting to retain them under their tutelage beyond the proper time. They are behind their age; they have not taken sufficient account of the changes which have been going on, and the progress of civilization, or civil and social culture, which has been effected. They are not aware that the Middle Ages have passed away, and that a new order has sprung up, and is henceforth, for civilized Europe, the only legitimate order. Hence, they are found in opposition to the secular movements of the day, which is disastrous for them, and still more disastrous for society. They cannot hinder these movements, and by opposing them they lose all control over them, and all influence for good on their age. In consequence of their opposition,—in plain language, of their opposition to the demands of the age for liberal governments, free institutions, and a generous and partially independent secular culture,—they lose the lay society, and the lay society loses the guidance and salutary control of the sacerdotal society. This thought runs through all of Gioberti's writings that we have read. It is clear to the intelligent reader that he is dissatisfied with the political

* *Del Primato*, Tom. II. p. 253.

order he finds existing, especially in Austria and Italy, and that he finds the clergy in the way of such changes as he wishes to introduce. Perhaps the Pope, certainly the College of Cardinals, the regular clergy, especially the Jesuits, and no small portion even of the secular clergy of Italy and Austria, are opposed to all organic changes in the existing constitutions. He is not, or was not when he wrote, prepared to attempt the changes in spite of them, and therefore he writes to win them over to his side, and attempts to set forth a theory which shall make it appear to them that they not only can favor the revolution he demands, consistently with the highest-toned Catholicity, but that they are required to do so by the most rigid forms of orthodoxy, and the soundest philosophy, as well as by the interests of secular society and civilization.

But after all, he only sings us the song sung by La Mennais, and the whole swarm of the so-called Neo-catholics, and simply proves that he is a slave of the age against which he is everywhere so sarcastic, not, as he no doubt honestly believes, one of its masters. It is remarkable, too, that with him, as with La Mennais, Ultramontanism and high-toned orthodoxy are far more apparent than real. Even we ourselves are, in reading his *Del Primato*, occasionally startled by some of his strong assertions of the civil power of the Pope; but as we read on, we find that we had no reason to be startled, and that the power of the Pope dwindles down into a very commonplace affair, as he somewhere says, only the power infidels readily accord to a respectable parish priest,—and is, after all, merely a power that grows out of the accidental condition of nations in space and time, rather than a power held and exercised by virtue of the positive and express institution of Almighty God. So La Mennais made a furious onslaught upon Gallicanism, and yet ended by making the authority of the Church herself depend on the *consensus hominum*, and resolving the Christian religion into pure socialism. Gioberti attacks Gallicanism with great strength of language, and great force of argument, and yet winds up the controversy by telling us,—"The principal error of the famous Gallican Declaration of 1682 consisted in asserting as universal what is and must be only particular. It is beyond doubt that, in nations that have attained to civil maturity, the government, in temporal things, is wholly independent of the Pope and the clergy, and that the clergy, *participating in the general culture*, possesses by good

right certain canonical and disciplinary liberties which should be respected by all; for it is a general rule, applicable to all ecclesiastical as well as to all civil government, that absolute and arbitrary authority is good and legitimate only in barbarous ages, and even then only because *no other order is then possible.*"* That is to say, Gallicanism is, in the main, true, when asserted of a given time and place, or of nations that have attained a certain grade of civilization, though false when asserted as true of all times and places, and of nations through all the stages of their civil development. This implies that the *actual* powers of the Papacy derive, not from the positive and immediate grant of our Lord to Peter, but from those political and social accidents which demand them; that is, they grow out of the wants or necessities of society, and inhere in the Papacy solely because it is in the best condition to assume and exercise them for social organization and progress, which, in principle, is the assertion simply of the government of the *optimates*,—of the Pope, not because he is the Divinely appointed sovereign, but because, in reference to time, place, and circumstances, he is the wisest, and best able to govern,—the doctrine which Thomas Carlyle, the inveterate pantheist, has been for these fifteen or twenty years harping upon *ad nauseam*. The right to govern, whether in Church or state, depends on the Divine appointment, not on the personal qualifications of the governors, and the *optimates* are always those who are legitimately invested with authority, and are such solely because so invested. The right gives the capacity to govern, not the capacity the right.

It is undoubtedly true, that the Sovereign Pontiffs do not, and cannot in the existing state of the secular order in Europe, exercise all the powers they did in the earlier ages of the modern world, and therefore we readily grant that those powers are now to some extent in abeyance. But it is one thing to recognize this as a fact, and another to recognize it as a law. We are aware that Gioberti holds to what he calls "moderate optimism," as was to be expected from an ardent admirer of Leibnitz; but we are not aware that in this respect Catholic faith requires us to agree with him, and we confess that we have never been able to agree with the pupil of Lord Bolingbroke, that "Whatever is, is right."

Because such political and social changes have taken place

* *Del Primato,* Tom. I. p. 219, note.

in the world, as render the exercise of certain powers on the part of the sovereign pontiffs impracticable or inexpedient, it does not follow that the Papacy does not still actually possess them, or that the well-being of society does not as imperiously demand their exercise now, as before the changes occurred. The fact that they cannot be exercised may be a social calamity, instead of a social progress; and it is very conceivable, that, if society had continued to follow the Christian law, their exercise would not have become impracticable. We agree that regard must be had to time and place, and that certain powers must be exercised by the clergy in certain circumstances which in other circumstances they are not required to exercise in the same form. We concede that to attempt the practical assertion of what Gioberti calls the dictatorship would in our times most likely be productive of evil rather than good; but we do not concede that this is so because modern nations have attained to civil majority, and therefore do not need it. The reason is, simply, that modern nations have, to a great extent, lost their faith, and will not heed the commands of their father. It is as necessary for them to receive and obey the paternal commands as ever it was, but they have grown so rebellious and stubborn that they will not.

Gioberti's theory about the minority and majority of nations is no doubt plausible; and if it were true in fact, that a nation ever does attain to civil majority, we should not seriously object to his doctrine, nay, we could not, without contradicting doctrines heretofore advanced in our own pages. But the truth is, save in regard to the department of mere industry, no nation ever attains to majority, and every one is as much a minor when in the most as when in the least advanced stage of its civilization. We hold, with Gioberti, that civil society is the creature of the priesthood, and that it is in all times and places through the priesthood, not, as modern demagogues pretend, through the people, that Almighty God invests civil society with its authority to govern; therefore we also hold with him, that the civil no less than the spiritual sovereignty under God vests immediately in the Divinely instituted priesthood, and in civil society only *mediante* the sacerdotal society. With what he says on this point we cordially agree, and we had maintained substantially the same doctrine in *The Democratic Review*, while still a Protestant. But that there ever comes a time when the priesthood is required to abandon its civil sover-

eignty and recognize the independence of the civil order, we are not prepared to concede; for, among other reasons, there never comes a time when the independence of the civil order does not conduct the nation to barbarism. All civilization is of sacerdotal origin, and must be lost just in proportion as society escapes from subjection to the priesthood. The reason of this is, that the elements of civilization are from the supernatural order, and the elements of barbarism are inherent in human nature, reproduced in every new-born individual, and retained in the bosom of every human being as long as he remains in the flesh. Barbarism has its seat in the carnal mind, the inferior soul, the natural passions, propensities, appetites, and instincts, which are always, when left to themselves, even in the saint while in this world, opposed to the law of God, and never cease to lust against the spirit, in order to bring us into captivity to the law of sin and death. The essence of barbarism is in the freedom and independence of this lower nature, in the predominance of inclination, passion, concupiscence, over reason and will. Civilization is precisely in the subjection of the inferior soul in the community to the superior, and in the assertion and maintenance of the sovereignty of right reason, that is, THE SUPREMACY OF LAW.

But this supremacy is secured by no possible secular culture; for it is the work in the individual, and therefore in society, not of natural reason and will, but of supernatural grace, of which the priesthood is the minister. It is of faith, we believe, that man, in his lapsed state, cannot without grace fulfil even the law of nature, and this grace is as necessary in the case of the learned, the cultivated, the refined, as it is in the case of the rude and simple. No natural training, no merely secular culture, is sufficient to subdue the barbarous elements in our nature, and the Christian maintains his virtue, and the constant predominance in his own bosom of the essential elements of civilization, only by constant vigilance, and continual recourse to the means of grace. If he relaxes his vigilance, if he neglects the sacraments, if he foregoes prayer and meditation, if he trusts to the training he has already received, to the habits already formed, or which have been infused into him by the Holy Ghost, he loses his spiritual freedom, fails to maintain the supremacy of reason, suffers the animal nature, the beast that is in him, to become independent, predominant, and lapses into the barbarian and the savage.

This, which is undeniably true of the individual, is equally true of communities and nations. No nation remains civilized without the constant presence and activity of the powers that originally civilized it, any more than creatures continue to exist without the immanence of the creative act which produces them from nothing. In consequence of retaining always and everywhere in its bosom the germs of barbarism, which no culture can eradicate, and which are ever ready to spring up, blossom, and bear fruit, the moment the sacerdotal vigilance and authority are withdrawn, or even relaxed, the nation in regard to civilization remains always in the state of a minor, and never does and never can attain to majority,—to a state in which it need be no longer under the parental dictation, and can safely be trusted to set up for itself. This has been amply proved by the modern revolutions in France and Italy, the two most civilized nations in the world; and both, especially France, if especially France, the moment the temporal order set up for itself, and asserted its independence, have exhibited a barbarism that it would be difficult to match in the annals of the old Vandals, Goths, and Huns. We have never seen grosser barbarism than Paris exhibited under the Convention, or Rome under the recent Triumvirate, and the nations of Europe, as did those of Asia and Africa, approach barbarism just in proportion as they break from the parental authority of the Sovereign Pontiff. This proves that these nations have not attained to civil majority, and that whatever sacerdotal authority is demanded by nations in their infancy is demanded equally by them through all the stages of their existence. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned and philosophic author, that the principal error of Gallicanism was in asserting as universal what is true only in particular cases. Gallicanism is either universally true, or it is universally false, and it was no more applicable to the France of Louis Quatorze than to the France of Pepin or Clovis.

It is not true, again, that the clergy, as Gioberti insinuates, rather than expressly asserts, show themselves reluctant to concede the civil emancipation of nations, and determined to continue their tutelage beyond its proper time. The clergy have never shown any thing of the sort, and, if any fault is to be charged against them, it is the fault of having been too yielding to the temporal power, of not having always asserted with sufficient firmness, constancy, and

energy their own rights and prerogatives against its grasping ambition and sacrilegious encroachments. If the clergy have sinned at all, it has not been against the civil order, as distinguished from the ecclesiastical, it has not been in too strenuously asserting the sacerdotal dictatorship, but in not asserting it, in siding, for the sake of peace, or now and then for the sake of their revenues, with the temporal prince, as mere laics, instead of rallying to the support of their spiritual chief; that is, in doing the very thing in principle that Gioberti counsels them to do, and in not doing the very thing he accuses them of having done. The grasping of power over the civil order, or tenacity in clinging to it, has never been a vice or failing of the Christian priesthood, and they have always shown themselves ready and willing to yield to the temporal authorities all that could be yielded without giving up the faith, or sacrificing the freedom of religion, as the early rise and wide prevalence of what is called Gallicanism abundantly prove.

The schism is not caused or exaggerated by the efforts of the clergy to retain an undue control over the secular order, and those who have followed Gioberti's advice, and yielded to the modern spirit, have effected nothing towards healing it. The countenance some of them showed, from 1845 to 1849, to the revolutionary movements in Italy, served only to weaken their legitimate influence, to diminish reverence for the Church in her spiritual character, and to please, embolden, and strengthen the enemies of religion and society,—to give up Rome to the savage Mazzinis and Garibaldis, and to subject their own order to a bitter persecution, which we fear is yet far from being ended. They were applauded for the moment by heretics and infidels, Freemasons and Carbonari, Red Republicans and Socialists, and some persons were simple enough to regard these applauses as indicating a growing respect for the Church, and a return to Catholicity, whereas they really indicated only the demoniacal joy of the enemies of truth and sanctity, that the clergy themselves were destroying the Church by bringing her to them, instead of insisting, as formerly, on their coming to her. When the modern liberalists applauded Pius the Ninth, it was not because their feelings towards the Church had changed, but because they believed, or hoped to make the Catholic population believe, that the Pope was himself a liberalist in the chair of St. Peter; and when he was obliged, in order to undeceive them, or to prevent them

from deceiving the faithful, to protest against their interpretation of his acts, they cried out, "Death to Pius the Ninth!" and compelled him to flee from Rome, and seek a refuge in exile.

This leads us to consider the remedy proposed. Gioberti would retain the supremacy of the Church,—in words, certainly,—and preserve for the Pope the civil arbitratorship. Yet his means of healing the schism are not the absolute subjection of the temporal order to the spiritual, as demanded by his own dialectics, but, as we have said, the union, alliance, or interfusion of the two orders, that is, of the sacerdotal and lay culture. As the case now stands, sacerdotal culture is mystical, excessively ascetic, and does not make sufficient account of earthly felicity and the advance of civilization, or temporal prosperity of nations; and secular culture is weak, mean, contemptible, disgraceful, because it lacks the order of truth, of which the priesthood is the sole depositary. A true culture and a true and noble civilization are possible only by the union or coalition of the two orders of culture, rendering the one less unworldly, and the other more ideal, or philosophical. To do this is the business of the priesthood, because the priesthood is the creator, in the order of second causes, of civilization.

Religion, throughout Gioberti's works, as far as we have read them, is considered only as the grand civilizing agency of mankind, and civilization is held to be in itself, not indeed the supreme good, but a real good, which we are to seek for its own sake. The advancement of civilization for its own sake, and the earthly felicity it secures, is set forth as a noble and laudable aim, and as an end to which the Church should exert, directly and intentionally, her various powers and influences. After having established his first principles, and attempted to show that, according to them, all life and all dialectics are in harmonizing extremes, conciliating opposites, or contraries, he proceeds to say,—

"The application of these several principles to our subject is not difficult. The religious and universal society which is called the Church and Catholicity is a complex of forces, which, in so far as finite and having a temporal aim, are subjected to the general laws of every dynamic process. The action of this grand community is in the preservation and development of the ideal principles, in the two-fold order of things and cognitions, and therefore works and manifests itself as doctrine and as art. As doctrine, it is the guardian of the ideal principles in their primitive purity and integrity, and the deduction of all the sec-

ondary truths included in them ; as art, it is the application of the doctrine to active life in order to the production of the earthly felicity of mankind; for I am considering here religion only in so far as it is the supreme dialectics conciliating human forces on the earth, and the system of civilization directed to the temporal well-being of nations, not as the direct instrument of celestial salvation, or of eternal beatitude."—*Del Primato, Avvertenza*, Tom. I. pp. 94, 95.

That the author holds that this mode of considering religion is proper, and that religion, as a civilizer and promoter of earthly well-being, may be distinguished from religion as the medium of salvation, and considered apart, is clear, not only from the passage just cited, but from the whole tenor of his teachings. His primary charge against the Jesuits is, that they do not seek to advance civilization, do not allow free and independent thinking, and that they discourage the developments of genius and the attainment of mental excellence,—a charge itself full of meaning. He adds:

"Understanding (*l'ingegno*), informed and strengthened by virtue, produces the precious fruits of civilization and science, which are two inseparable things, since the former is only the practical use and application of the latter. To oppose civil progress, and the cognitions which effect it, is an attempt injurious to God, repugnant to the order and design of the world, fatal to mankind, and contrary to the spirit, the precepts, and the purpose of Christianity. It offends God, because civilization is divine, like religion, to which it is inferior only inasmuch as it aims directly at time instead of eternity. But as eternity, in respect to creatures, presupposes temporal duration, and is, so to speak, its consummation, he who disrelishes and discountenances worldly interests prejudices the heavenly, as every one opposes the end who weakens or obstructs the aids by which it is to be gained. Civilization and religion alike import the superiority and victory of the soul over the body, of reason over sense, of will over instinct, of law over brute force, of the spirit over nature, of man over the other terrestrial beings, and of finite intelligences over the corporeal universe. So that it may be said that religion is absolute and perfect civilization, as secular culture is an initial religion, which bears to the other the relation of a part to the whole, or of the beginning to its completion. Both are alike universal, dialectic, conciliative; both combat the same enemy, that is, blind and fatal forces, and tend to repress without destroying them, by subjecting them to the directing authority of intellect and reason: and hence, as their powers are gradually developed, they are transformed one into the other, and their effects prove them to be identical."—*Ibid.*, p. 140.

This is intelligible, and very much to the purpose. But here is something more.

"The maxims of a falsely understood mysticism, and its abusive effects, to which science and civilization give occasion, lead many per-

sons of good faith, but of narrow minds, if not wholly to repudiate, at least to distrust and discountenance, these two noblest parts of understanding. It appears to the abettors of an exaggerated asceticism as a sort of sacrilege to regard temporal things as of some account, and to occupy ourselves with them, since our ultimate end, our abiding country, is not on the earth, but in heaven. Moreover, finding that we are in a fallen state, and that our present life is intended to be an expiation, a penalty, it seems to the exaggerated mystics, that to improve our earthly condition would be to favor the corruption to which it is subjected, and to lessen or destroy the expiative penalty, which is the only possible profit to be drawn from it. But this doctrine is not Christian, since, according to the teachings of the Gospel, nature, although greatly impaired, is not substantially changed, and the germs of good nestle in its bosom by the side of the contrary powers. It is, therefore, our duty to regenerate it, and ameliorate it as much as possible, but not to neglect what it retains that is good, far less to exterminate it. Manicheism, and the pantheistic systems connected with it, admit, indeed, the essential malignity of the corporeal world; and not far removed from this heresy are they who, exaggerating the dogma of the Fall, presuppose that it has changed and perverted the essence of nature. Now, if the natural orders have not essentially changed, it follows, that, notwithstanding the introduction of evil, the primitive condition of the earth has not varied, and that it is always, as in the beginning, a place of probation, of progress, and of melioration to its inhabitants. The only difference there is between the primitive state and the present is, that in the beginning man had only to develop and cultivate the seeds of good, whereas now he is obliged, in addition, to extirpate those of evil which are sown among them. Hence life, which in no case could have been idle, is now not simply business, but also toil, or rather a fatiguing business, in which the duty of expiation does not essentially alter the reasons of earthly existence, or change in regard to it the universal properties of every dialectic work. This, consisting in evolving and harmonizing diversities and contrarieties, and not in annulling the sound and the positive that is found in them, is at all times the office of man on the earth; and in this respect our globe does not differ from other stations of the universe subjected to the course of ages, and to the great law of development. Now, what else is civilization, in so far as it depends on us, but the continuous development of terrestrial forces? The conclusions of Christianity, then, accord with those of a severe and profound philosophy, which, unable to deny the co-existence of good and its opposite, must impose upon us a double correlative duty, the fulfilment of which is civilization or religion, as referred to this life or to that which is to come."—*Ibid.*, pp. 142, 143.

It is evident, from these extracts, that the author holds civilization and religion to be alike divine, and that to live

and labor for earthly happiness and the temporal prosperity of nations is, as far as it goes, as much to serve God, and to keep his commandments, as to live and labor for eternal beatitude. No doubt the temporal end is to be held inferior and subordinate to the eternal, but it is nevertheless equally sacred, and is not to be sacrificed to it. The two ends are both substantive, so to speak, and are to be harmonized without the destruction of either. The harmonizing of these two ends authorizes the union or alliance of the two orders, the two cultures, sacerdotal and secular, or rather is itself that very union or alliance of which we have spoken. Hence the author's condemnation of the mystics, the exaggerated (?) ascetics, and especially the old Oriental monks and the modern Jesuits, whose teaching is, that man should immolate himself to God, and earth to heaven. This teaching he cannot endure.

"Another exaggeration," he says, "is the disregard, the contempt, and hatred of profane literature, and that rich, intellectual patrimony of eloquence, taste, imagination, invention, memory, institutions, which the ancients have transmitted to us, as if the Christian religion could be the enemy of that which embellishes, consoles, strengthens, and even meliorates, humanly speaking, our mortal life, and as if the spirit of the Gospel consisted, not in the subordination and wise direction, but in the immolation, of the body to the soul, time to eternity, earth to heaven,—a supposition most foreign to that faith which is invoked to justify it, injurious to Providence, and contrary to his designs in the ideal history of the world; for civilization, although of inferior excellence, is no less divine in its principle, in its essence, and in its terminus, than religion."—*Ibid.*, p. 112.

Even Bossuet, according to our Italian Abbate, runs into intemperate asceticism, especially in his indiscriminate censure of the modern theatre, and never made sufficient account of this world. He adds in a note to his *Del Primato*,—

"A worthy French writer belonging to the clerical order, and a great admirer of Bossuet, confesses that Bossuet had a very imperfect conception of Providence, and he excuses him by casting the blame on his age. 'In the age of Bossuet,' he says, 'the opinion of the Middle Ages which requires man to live exclusively for eternity (*qui jette l'homme entier dans l'éternité*), which treats things of time with a disdainful indifference, and holds them to be unworthy to draw down the judgments of heaven upon them, still survived.' He elsewhere asserts that Bossuet was ignorant of the true genius of modern civilization."—Tom. II. p. 403.

It is not difficult to understand what the learned, philo-

sophical, and we wish we could add, pious author means by "intemperate," "excessive," "exaggerated," ascetieism; and the doctrine he opposes to it seems to us to be plain enough. We certainly are not among those, if such there are in the Church, who regard religion as inimical to civilization, or to any thing which is really useful to men in this life. That religion promotes or creates civilization, that, so far as received and obeyed, it provides for and secures the temporal prosperity of nations, cultivates the human mind and heart, favors scienee and the fine arts, fosters industry, and diffuses earthly happiness, we hold to be unquestionable, and we cannot understand how any right-minded man, with ordinary information, ean pretend to the contrary. Thus far we certainly have no quarrel with our author, but agree with him most fully and most heartily. But it does not do this by teaching us to set our hearts upon these things, to value them for their own sake, or to make them direct objects of pursuit. This world is not our home, and we are never permitted by religion to regard it as such. We are, *in hac providentia*, beings with one destiny, not with a twofold destiny, the one earthly, the other heavenly; and therefore earthly felicity, the temporal prosperity of nations, and the melioration of the globe and of our condition on it, are not and never can be our lawful end, or lawfully consulted, save as a means and condition, if such they are or can be, of attaining our heavenly destiny,—eternal beatitude. We are not permitted to consult them as ultimate, even in their own order, or to regard ourselves as keeping the commandments of God, because we accept and use religious authority, dogmas, and institutions for securing them. Religion knows no earthly end; it knows no end but God himself, and no good for us but in returning to him as our final cause, and beholding him in the beatific vision. It does not and cannot, therefore, allow us to distinguish an earthly destiny from the heavenly, and to make it a direct object of our affections or of our pursuit. Here, it seems to us, is the primal error of our author. He professedly considers religion only in so far as it is an instrument of civilization, of earthly individual and social well-being, and avowedly waives its consideration as the instrument of salvation, of eternal beatitude. This, he must permit us to say, he has no right to do, *because religion thus considered is not true religion*, and because, so considered, *it is and can be no instrument of civilization, no medium even of earthly felicity.*

Religion promotes, or, if the author chooses, creates, civilization, secures the temporal prosperity of nations, and provides for earthly felicity, only inasmuch as it draws our minds and hearts off from these things, and fixes them on God and eternal beatitude. No well-instructed Christian pretends that we secure heavenly beatitude by simply laboring for earthly happiness, eternity by devoting ourselves to time; but just as little do we, or can we, secure earthly happiness by making it an object of pursuit, or time by devoting ourselves to time. The earthly, in so far as good, has its root in the heavenly, and time is simply the extrinsecation of eternity. The author's own dialectics establishes this, and all experience proves it. We lose the world by seeking it. Wealth sought for a worldly end does not enrich, pleasure does not please, knowledge does not enlighten. The fact holds true, whether you speak of the individual or of the nation. No nation, even in regard to this world, is more to be pitied, than that which places its affections on things of the earth, and its religion wholly or partially even in seeking temporal power, greatness, prosperity, and felicity. It never attains really what it seeks. Its prosperity, however dazzling it may be to the superficial beholder, is rotten within,—its apparent felicity a gilded misery; and its highest glory is that of the ghastly and grinning skeleton dressed in festive robes and crowned with flowers, for the Egyptian banquet. Hence our Lord says,—"If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it." St. Matt. xvi. 24, 25. The reason of this is obvious enough. Man can find good, temporal or eternal, only in living his normal life, and he lives his normal life only when he lives to the end for which he was intended by his Maker, that is to say, his ultimate end, which is God as the Supreme Good, the end of all things. Whenever, then, he loses sight of God as the Supreme Good, in itself, or as his supreme good, he abandons the source of all good, and falls into a condition in which there is no good for him.

The author tells us, indeed, that he is not writing a book of devotion, and we are not so unreasonable as to ask in a work on philosophy or on politics, an ascetic treatise; but we must be permitted to say, that when he leaves out the consideration of religion as the instrument of celestial salvation and eternal beatitude, or the duty of seeking these, and the means, agencies, and influences by which they are gained,

he leaves out all that renders religion efficient in the work of civilization, of securing earthly felicity, and the temporal prosperity of nations; because it is only by instructing us in the principles of eternal life, by directing our minds and hearts to the gaining of our true end as the one sole business of our lives, and infusing into us the graces, and furnishing us with the helps, necessary to gain it, that religion affords us any aid in subduing barbarism, in advancing civilization, or securing the blessings of time. Considered merely as civilization, or as an agent in promoting civilization, religion is not religion, becomes merely human, and passes wholly into the secular order, and therefore necessarily loses all power or influence over it. The author, although not writing a work expressly on devotion, was, inasmuch as he presented religion as a civilizer and promoter of well-being on earth, bound to present her under that point of view in which she is able to do, and does do, what he claims, and therefore was bound to present her as the instrument of celestial salvation and eternal beatitude, since it is only because she is that instrument that she is an instrument of civilization and earthly happiness.

The author errs, as it seems to us, not as to the fact of the civilizing influence of religion, but as to the *rationale* of that fact. Christianity secures us all the goods of this life, and enhances them a hundredfold; but she does it, not by stimulating and directing the pursuit of them, but by commanding and enabling us to immolate them, morally, to the goods of eternity. Hence our Lord says, "Be not solicitous for your life, what ye shall eat, nor for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than the food, and the body more than the raiment? Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns, yet your Heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not ye of much more value than they? And which of you by thinking can add to his stature one cubit? And for raiment, why are ye solicitous? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they labor not, neither do they spin. And yet I say unto you that not even Solomon in all his glory was arrayed as one of these. Now, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more you, O ye of little faith! Be not solicitous, therefore, saying, What shall we eat, or What shall we drink, or Wherewith shall we be clothed? *For after all these things do the heathen seek.* For your

Heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Seek ye, therefore, first the kingdom of God and his justice, *and all these things shall be added unto you.*" —St. Matt. vi. 25–33. The doctrine here is too plain to be easily misapprehended. It is not, that you must seek the kingdom of God and his justice more than you seek the world, but that you are to seek them as the principle, and the world only in them and for them, as is evident from the 24th verse of the same chapter: —"No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." If this be so, the teaching of our Lord is plainly the immolation—the moral immolation, of course, not the physical—of ourselves to God, of the body to the soul, time to eternity, earth to heaven,—the very contradictory of Gioberti's doctrine, as we understand it,—and that when we so immolate ourselves and all secular interests to God, making a complete and moral abnegation of the whole, all these things, that is, all temporal goods, in so far as goods, and of which our Heavenly Father knoweth we have need, are added to us, as our Lord here says, and as he teaches us when he tells us that "whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it." The principle we here insist upon, that earthly goods are attainable only in so far as we abnegate them, turn our backs upon them, and seek only heavenly goods, not by laboring to lay up treasures on the earth, but by laboring exclusively to lay up treasures in heaven, Gioberti seems to us to have overlooked, and hence his condemnation of the ascetics, his war against the Jesuits, his great admiration of Gentile culture, of heathen civilization, and the worldly tendency and influence of his writings.

The author does not appear to us to be just to the mystics, or ascetics, for he evidently means to include among them many whom the Church has beatified, and proposes to the veneration of the faithful,—the anchorites of the Thebais, St. Anthony, St. Pachomius, St. Simon Stylites, and the Oriental monks generally, as well as some modern religious who happened not to be Italians. That some pantheistic and dualistic systems have led in the pagan world to extraordinary austerities on the one hand, and a censurable quietism on the other, may or may not be true, for with them we have

at present no concern.; but that the asceticism found in the Church, practised by Catholics, and especially by Catholic saints, has ever been affected by any obvious or secret taint of the doctrine of the inherent malignity of matter is not true. The mortifications and self-denials practised have always had another and a truly Christian reason, —the reason, on the one hand, of discipline, and on the other, of expiation. It is a great mistake, also, to suppose that none but the active orders are useful to others than themselves. The contemplative orders are, to say the least, no less useful. Our Lord did not place Martha above Mary, and we have entirely misapprehended our holy religion, if even a St. Simon Stylites was lost to mankind by giving himself entirely to God. It will not do to forget that our temporal as well as our spiritual blessings come from God, and that he is moved to grant both by the prayers and intercessions of his saints. Moses holding up his hands in prayer contributed not less to the victory of the children of Israel over the Amalekites, than Josue, who led them forth to the battle. They who sit at Jesus's feet and listen to his words choose the good part, and he loves them, and who can tell us how much he has done and daily does for us poor worldly sinners, in answer to their prayers? Perhaps, if our deserts were filled with holy hermits and devout anchorites, whose life is one unremitting prayer, the world would not be overrun with infidelity and irreligion; and we have no doubt that the prayer and mortification of a single pious contemplative, however obscure or remote from the busy haunts of men, is worth more for the conversion of the unbeliever than all that Gioberti or any other philosopher has ever written or ever will write. Doubtless, all are not called to be contemplatives; doubtless the saints have done things which are not to be proposed for the imitation of every one; but what men like our author would term extravagance, exaggeration, or sublime folly, perhaps is no extravagance, exaggeration, or folly in them, and always in proportion as we approach that which is wise in the sight of God do we approach that which is foolish in the sight of the world.

The author in his condemnation of asceticism, and in his attempt to unite the world and God, earth and heaven, time and eternity, philosophy and theology, heathenism and Christianity, lay culture and sacerdotal, or, in a word, if he will permit us to say so, to combine the service of mammon with the service of God, seems to us to depart from his own

ideal formula, no less than from the Gospel. His formula, as we understand it, asserts not the harmony of the two orders, but the absolute supremacy of the one, and the absolute subjection of the other. This formula is, *L' Ente crea l' esistenze; Ens creat existentias;* or, Being—that is, God—creates existences; as we are taught in the first verse of Genesis, in the first question of the Catechism, and the first article of the Creed. It is intuitively evident to us, but is and can be presented to the mind as an object of reflection, or of distinct thought, only in language, which is in its origin a Divine revelation. We accept this formula as axiomatic, as the *primum philosophicum*, and regard the author, in having restored it to modern philosophy, vindicated its truth, and shown its fecundity, as deserving the gratitude of all who wish to be able to refute scientifically sensism, pantheism, and nullism.

This formula is a synthetic judgment, *a priori*, and, like every judgment, contains three terms, the subject, the predicate, and the copula. The subject is *God*, the predicate is *existences*, and the copula is *creation*, or the creative act. The predicate *existences* is affirmable only by means of creation, for it is only *mediante* the creative act of God that existences exist, or that there are existences, as distinguishable from *Ens*, or God himself. The creative act produces them from nothing, causes them to be, and therefore their relation to God cannot be the relation of co-subsistences, or independent entities, harmonized or conciliated by a middle term, but must be that of the creature to the creator, and therefore that of absolute dependence, and hence of absolute subjection.

This ideal formula, according to the author, and in this we agree with him, is the ontological basis of all dialectics,—for the order of cognition must in all respects correspond to the order of being; and since it is the basis of the whole created order, it must reappear in every fact of the universe, and therefore in every fact of human life. God as creator enters universally, and therefore must be represented universally as the subject, in the order of second causes. Consequently there must also always enter or be represented in the same order the other two terms, that is, predicate and copula, answering in their degree to creature and creation in the order of the first cause. Now, in relation to the question before us, the subject is the priesthood, the predicate is civilization, and the copula the

creative act, in the order of second causes, whence the formula becomes, *The priesthood creates civilization.* Consequently, the relation of society or civilization to the sacerdotal order is that of creature to creator, and therefore that of absolute dependence, which is the assertion of the absolute subjection of the secular order, under God, to the spiritual. The two orders are not, therefore, two independent, coexisting orders, to be reconciled or harmonized one with the other by a middle term. No union, alliance, or marriage between them is supposable; for these terms imply a certain degree of independence or autonomy on the part of the secular order in relation to the sacerdotal, which is denied by the ideal formula, and is as inadmissible as the assertion of an autonomic power on the part of existences in relation to God creating them, authorizing them to say to him, in some measure, what and with what qualities he shall or shall not make them. In demanding, therefore, as he does, the emancipation of what he calls adult nations from sacerdotal tutelage, or their civil independence, and the union of sacred and profane literature, of sacerdotal and secular culture, that is to say, in order to speak without disguise, of Christianity and gentilism, the author obviously departs from his own ideal formula, and misapplies his own dialectics.

The author very properly recognizes two cosmic cycles, the one the procession of existences, by way of creation, not emanation, from God as first cause, and the other, the return of existences, without being absorbed in him, to God as final cause. God is the final cause, as he is the first cause, of all existences, for he has created all things for himself. Now, all practical life, all manifestation of created activity, belongs to this second cycle, the return of existences to God. The end, or final cause, is the legislator,—imposes the law; and God, as our sole end, or final cause, is therefore our sole and absolute legislator. The law he imposes is absolute, universal. God alone hath true and complete autonomy, and in the order of second causes that only is in a secondary sense autonomic which represents the subject in the ideal formula. Man before God as final cause has no more autonomy than he has before God as first cause, that is to say, none at all. He has before God, then, no rights, no independence, but is bound to absolute submission to his law. The law is the copula, the ligament that binds man to his final end, or supreme good, and is

in the second cosmic cycle what the creative act is in the first; that is, the law in the order of *palingenesis* is what the creative act is in the order of *genesis*. As there is no physical cosmos save *mediante* the creative act of God, so is there no moral cosmos save *mediante* the law of God. As all physical existence is from God as first cause, *mediante* creation, so all moral existence is from God as final cause, *mediante* obedience to his law. Without seeking God as final cause, as his law commands, there is no proper morality, any more than there is or can be holy living, or supernatural sanctity.

The priesthood, as Catholicity teaches, is the sole depositary, guardian, and interpreter of the law of God, and therefore represents for us the sole and absolute legislator, not, of course, by virtue of the humanity of its members, but by divine constitution, appointment, and assistance. The authority of the priesthood, then, extends to the whole of practical life, and that practical life is moral, therefore good, only inasmuch as it is submissive or obedient to the law as they promulgate and declare it. There is, then, and can be, no order of life, individual or social, that has or can have any autonomy in the face of the Church, or that is or can be pronounced morally good, save in so far as subjected to her and informed by obedience to her as representative of the authority of God as universal, absolute legislator. This, if we understand the author, is what his own dialectics require us to assert. Secular culture, then, in order to be moral, in order to have any right to be, must be the product of sacerdotal culture, receive its law and its informing spirit from the Divinely authorized priesthood, and be in all things dependent on it, and subject to it. Hence, the schism we spoke of in the beginning is not to be healed by a union of secular culture with the sacerdotal, but by the absolute subjection of the former to the latter, because the former, in so far as it does not proceed from the latter and depend on it, proceeds from human activity, not subjected to the law of God, and therefore is not moral.

We do not suppose that Gioberti really means to deny this conclusion, although much he says is not easily reconcilable with it. He earnestly contends that all civilization is of sacerdotal origin, but he seems to us to suppose that in a truly civilized state the proper office of the priesthood is restricted to the dispensation of the mysteries of religion, or the revel-

ation of God as the superintelligible, and that the revelation of God as the intelligible is free to the lay genius, which has the right to cultivate it without any dependence on the sacerdotal order, so long as it does not run athwart any supernatural dogma. He very properly asserts two orders of ideal truth, one the natural, or revelation of God as Idea, or the Intelligible, and the other supernatural, or the revelation of God as the Superintelligible. The former revelation is philosophy, the latter faith, objectively considered. Both are given originally in language, supernaturally infused into the human mind with language, which is itself a Divine revelation. So all science is originally a Divine revelation, not a human invention, creation, or discovery. But one part, the revelation of the Intelligible, though not naturally discoverable, is yet, when presented in language, naturally evident, that is, intuitive, or evident *per se*. Thus language is the medium through which the mind apprehends it, but not the authority on which it receives it, or assents to its truth. The other part, the revelation of the Superintelligible, being mystery, is not only apprehended through the medium of language, but is received on the authority of language alone, that is, on the authority of the hieratic language, preserved from corruption, and in its purity and integrity, by the infallible hieratic society, or priesthood.

The primitive science of both orders was transmitted without division till the epoch of the dispersion of mankind, but since that epoch, or the time of Phaleg, it has been transmitted through two different channels, the one orthodox, running through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Catholic Church, down to us; the other heterodox, running through the Egyptian, Hindoo, Italian, Greek, and Roman, or, in a word, pagan priesthoods. There is a double tradition, the tradition of the supernatural revelation and of the scientific, and a double channel of tradition, the orthodox and the heterodox, or the Catholic and the pagan. In the orthodox, the Church, or the elect society, the tradition of the revelation of the *Superintelligible* has come down to us in its purity and integrity, in the infallible language or speech of the orthodox priesthood. In the pagan, it has been more or less corrupted, and wholly lost, or so travestied that it is hardly possible to detect some traces of it in the various heathen myths and fables. Yet the author seems to us to hold that the revelation of the *Intelligible*, that is, philosophy, the scientific tradition, has been transmitted in

greater purity, and with fuller and grander developments, by the old heterodox or pagan priesthoods, than by the orthodox priesthood, and that in this respect the ancient gentile world was superior, if not to the ancient, at least to the modern, orthodox world. In other words, that the gentile culture, including philosophy and all that pertains to strictly secular life,—what we call *lay* culture, for we recognize no *priestly* character in the heathen priesthoods,—was superior to that which obtains under Christianity, and that we should now, instead of denouncing it as of the Devil, accept it, and endeavor to effect a union between it and Christianity; and this he appears to think we may do without departing from the ideal formula, because the basis of this culture was the primitive revelation of the intelligible in language, and because it was the work of the pagan priesthoods, heterodox, indeed, and therefore without authority in the order of the supernatural truth, yet, as descending from the primitive priesthoods, legitimate in the secular order, since the loss of religion, as the Council of Constance has defined in the case of the Wicliffites, does not forfeit secular rights.* Pagan culture, therefore, may be regarded as in some sort a sacerdotal culture, and therefore as created by the ideal, and in its turn in a degree autonomic.

"The speculative spirit," says the author, "is feebler in the moderns than in the ancients. If we compare modern philosophy with that of Greece and India in their flourishing periods, we shall find on our side greater truth of doctrine (which, however, cannot be said of the larger number of modern thinkers), and greater rigor of analysis, but not, indeed, greater, or even equal, synthetic force and contemplative aptitude, in which philosophical genius principally consists. . . . . We certainly cannot pretend that we surpass, or equal, the cultivated nations of antiquity, even in respect to moral qualities, such as nobleness of soul, fervor of sentiment, constancy of opinion and action, magnanimity of thought and deed, in a word, the several virtures which appertain to civil life. We must distinguish here, as in ideal cognition, the works of

* The learned author misapplies the decision of the Council. The Wicliffites contended that the prince who falls into mortal sin forfeits his civil rights, because, as they pretended, these rights depend on personal sanctity. This the Council condemned. But the cases are not parallel. The secular rights of the priesthood are the consequence of their spiritual rights, and spiritual rights are of course forfeited by heresy or apostacy. The pagan sacerdocies had, as sacerdocies, no legitimate secular rights or powers, because they were no legitimate priesthoods at all. The members were really nothing but laymen, and had, as have Protestant ministers, only the rights and powers of laymen.

men from the effects of institutions, and in institutions themselves human inventions from the suggestions of religion. Under its religious aspects, our civilization is immeasurably superior to that of the most cultivated pagan nations, and surpasses it as much as the Gospel surpasses gentilism; and as religion, the supreme dominatrix, exercises her salutary influence on every department of individual and social life, there is no branch of our culture in which Christianity has not effected important meliorations. But however large the space occupied by religion, and however operative and efficacious it may be, it is not alone; by its side is found the nature of man, yielding to or resisting its action, enhancing or diminishing its beneficial effects. Civilization, being the mixt result of these principles, may give place in the same time to diverse qualities, and be at once good and bad, strong and weak, flourishing and declining, in the way of perfection and of degeneracy, as the matters on which it turns are referred to one or the other of these two causes. This distinction is of the greatest importance, and he who does not distinguish accurately between the natural elements and the Christian is in danger either of adulating the age or of calumniating religion;—and, in truth, some philosophers, like Machiavelli and Rousseau, do impute many defects of modern civilization to religion itself, mistaking excellences for defects, or confounding religion with superstition,—a monstrous paradox, which it is now no longer necessary to combat.

"The special characteristic of the modern man by the side of the ancient, if we speak merely of natural dispositions, is frivolity. This extends to manners, the sciences, literature, politics, opinions, and beliefs, and embraces and pollutes every branch of human thought and action. The ancients in their bloom, as, for instance, when the Italo-Greek civilization was at its height, have, in respect to us moderns, the same proportion that the full-grown man generally has to the boy. The men of Livy and Plutarch, in comparison with us, are more than mortal, or we are less than men; that is, in regard to force of mind, vigor, firmness, constancy, perseverance, courage, and all those qualities which are alike applicable to virtue or vice; for the ancients carried even into vice and crime a greatness unknown in modern times. Some would persuade us that this is a mere poetical illusion, and that this alleged superiority of the ancients proceeds from the *prestige* which imagination lends to distant objects, and the rhetorical art of the ancient authors. But this is not true. The facts speak for themselves, and there is here no question of style, eloquence, or rhetoric, but history; for Greek and Roman facts, narrated as rudely and as nakedly as you please, are still wonderful. Salamis, Thermopylæ, Sparta, Leuctra, Homer, Pythagoras, Socrates, Epaminondas, Timoleon, Camillus, Scipio, Fabricius, Cato, the Roman Senate, law, and jurisconsults, the games and theatres, the literature and arts, of those times,—alone perfect, because they join simplicity and polish to force,—stand as unique portents in the world; and they are so attractive, that, were it not for Christianity, and the

incomparable benefits with which it has enriched even this life, whoever has the heart of a man, and a single generous feeling in his soul, would be disposed to murmur at Providence for having given us our birth amid the meanness and filth of the modern world. Other parts of antiquity, and even mediæval facts, are also remote in place and time, and have a certain poetic charm when embellished by the art of the historian; but nevertheless they do not approach Greek and Roman excellence. The Middle Ages are, no doubt, admirable for their Christian genius, and the people then, so far as animated by the Catholic idea, certainly surpassed the most cultivated gentile world; but I know not what there is in their annals to admire, except what they directly or indirectly derived from religion; and the modern eulogists of Feudalism, Chivalry, Gothic Architecture, and the Crusades, strike me as being little reasonable and very dull. The knightly heroes, and all those fearless or lion-hearted warriors, with their mad adventures and silly love-making, appear to me very much like those one finds in Boiardo and Ariosto, and Cervantes, who hits them off in his inimitable way, I am inclined to believe, partakes often of the philosophical historian not less than of the satirical poet. There may be something laudable in their strong muscles and reckless generosity, but assuredly they lack simplicity and common sense, and therefore true greatness. Their courage is rendered ridiculous by the lack of worthy aim, and by effort, pomp, and ostentation. We do not find in them the prudence, the naturalness, the true valor, and the sane and tranquil fury of Themistocles, Epaminondas, and Scipio, and they amongst us who revive the chivalric practices, and fancy themselves advancing the civi ization of the age, only succeed in getting themselves laughed at. If you really wish to advance the age, and have really at heart to change its manners and customs,—which, by the way, is no joke,—leave the old romances and chronicles, and turn to history; add the superhuman excellences of the Gospel to the ancient spirit of of Athens, Sparta, Samnium, and Rome; assemble and melt into each other Plato and Dante, Brutus and Michel Angelo, Cato and Hildebrand, Lycurgus and Charles Borromeo; fuse together these elements, which we marvel to find separated in history, so necessary are they each to the other's perfection, and cause to come forth from their fusion a new civilization, higher and more exquisite than the world has hitherto known. This should be the great endeavour of the age, and especially of us Italians."*

We might easily extract much more to the same purport, but this is sufficient for our present purpose, and, unless we wholly mistake the author's meaning, or unless he attaches a ridiculous importance to mere external polish, fully bears us out in our assertion, that he holds that in civilization and

* *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*, Tom. I. cap. 2, pp. 164–168.

strictly secular culture the heterodox and pagan world surpassed, at least the modern orthodox world, and that what is now demanded for the advancement of mankind is the union of polished gentilism and Christianity; which, since polished gentilism, in so far as it has any thing not truly of Christian origin, or not created or inspired by the orthodox priesthood, is the product of the lay genius, is the union of the lay society and the sacerdotal, of secular culture and sacerdotal culture. We are not disposed to deny that the Græco-Roman civilization retained some valuable portions of the primitive revelation in the order of the intelligible, and that these gave it a certain worth, in some respects even a certain grandeur; but we do deny that the heathen world, even in its least corrupt nations, and in its most blooming periods, retained any portions of that revelation not retained by the chosen society, or the orthodox priesthood; and it seems to us not a little strange, that a writer who makes a boast of high-toned Catholicity, and holds the Catholic priesthood to be infallibly assisted and protected by the Holy Ghost, should send us from it to an acknowledged heretical and corrupt society to find portions of truth and manifestations of virtue not to be found in that priesthood itself, assumed to have always preserved the revelation in its purity and integrity. It is not an ordinary genius that would think of sending one in search of pure water from a pure to a corrupt fountain to obtain it. Gioberti tells us, over and over again, that philosophy cannot be preserved, or successfully cultivated, outside of orthodoxy and the Catholic society, yet he sends us to the old Pythagoreans and Platonists, and among the moderns principally to Leibnitz and Reid, that is, to heathens and heretics, to study it. The men he most praises are almost without exception heretics, infidels, or at least men of very questionable orthodoxy and piety. He praises Vico, indeed, but even Vico, as we have read him in a French translation, was hardly less pantheistic as to the foundation of his thought than M. Victor Cousin, whom the author wars against. He appears to hold Malebranche in high esteem, it is true, but whether this is well or not we are unable to say, for we know Malebranche only at second hand. But Leibnitz was an eclectic, as Cousin justly asserts, and the father of German rationalism, which Gioberti condemns and refutes. Dr. Reid was a Scotch Presbyterian minister, a mere psychologist, a sort of feeble prelude to the German Kant. The Pythagoreans, as Gioberti himself confesses, held to the heresy of

the eternity of matter, and Plato he owns was a moderate pantheist. Yet it is to these impure and corrupt sources he sends us to draw the living waters which are to refresh and revivify our drooping scientifical world!

We confess we are not edified by finding the abbate proposing, as the condition of producing a higher and more perfect civilization than the world has yet known, the tempering together, or fusing into one, of "Plato and Dante, Brutus and Michel Angelo, Cato and Hildebrand, Lycurgus and Charles Borromeo." Dante would have been improved by more frequent prayer and meditation, by a more strict conformity to the teachings, the spirit, and the requirements of his religion, which would have softened the asperities of his temper, sweetened his affections, and relieved the darkness of his passions, and made him more amiable as a man, without detracting from his strength, or his sublimity as a poet; but we know not what Plato had which would have made him a more elevated or perfect character. An infusion of St. Francis of Sales, or of Fénelon, would, no doubt, have been an improvement, but not an infusion of Plato. Michel Angelo was far enough from being perfect, but we had always supposed that his defect consisted in his being too much, not in his being not enough, of a heathen, as was the case with too many of his Italian contemporaries. What the weak-minded Brutus—if Marcus Brutus be the Brutus meant,—the ingrate, the conspirator, the assassin, the self-murderer, who conspired against his best friend, plunged his dagger into the only man worthy to govern Rome, and when defeated fell pitiably on the sword of his companion, exclaiming, "O Virtue, I have worshipped thee as a god, but I find thee an empty name!"—had which it would have been to his advantage to possess, we are quite unable to conjecture. We know nothing in Brutus to admire, unless we are prepared to instaurate the worship of the dagger, and to proclaim the right of every man to assassinate whosoever he takes it into his head does not understand liberty as he does, or who is not favorable to what he chooses to call patriotism.

Then, what had the stoical pedant, Cato Uticensis,—the Cato we presume the author means,—stuffed with a double quantity of the superlative pride of his sect, shrinking as a poltroon from defeat, reading Plato on immortality, and cutting his own throat,—to add to the elevation, or completeness, or finish of the character of the sainted Hildebrand, the illustrious Gregory the Seventh, who, not from pride, but from humility,

never bowed but to his God, and never lost an opportunity of asserting truth and sanctity, of withstanding the lordly, royal, or imperial oppressor, or of befriending the friendless, protecting the weak and innocent, and helping the helpless,—who, when sacrilegiously driven from Rome to Salerno, bore his exile with true Christian fortitude, in resignation, and without a murmur, and exclaimed, in yielding up his pure and heroic spirit, "I have loved justice, and hated iniquity, — therefore I die in exile"? Or what could the great Cardinal St. Charles Borromeo—the learned, polished, enlightened, wise, energetic, tender, vigilant, brave, faithful, and eminently meek and affectionate Archbishop of Milan, who conferred by his heroic virtues blessings on Italy and the world, not yet exhausted—borrow to perfect his character as a man, a prince, a priest, or a saint from the stern old Spartan lawgiver, who legalized theft, adultery, and murder, forbade whatever could charm or embellish life, and rejected every virtue not a virtue of the camp? Really the learned and philosophic abbate must be joking, or else he must suppose that we have forgotten to study history.

We ourselves, like most men, at some period of their lives, who have studied Greek and Roman antiquity, and read the classics, especially Livy and Plutarch, have at times been disposed to rank the Græco-Roman civilization above its merits, and, indeed, we have not long since expressed our views of it in terms not fitly chosen, and which require qualification; but we have never dreamed of commending it in the sense in which we now understand Gioberti to approve it. The heathen standard of greatness and the Christian are different, and in all important respects diametrically opposed one to the other. Tried by the heathen standard, the great men of Livy and Plutarch had qualities which the moderns have not in an equal degree; but tried by the Christian standard, in respect to either of the qualities demanded or tolerated by our religion, they shrink, even as men, into insignificance, before the great men of the Bollandists. The principle of heathen greatness is pride, and if pride is the principle of true greatness, we certainly ought, with Gioberti, to sympathize with and admire the Græco-Roman civilization, and to hold that in the human order it far surpassed the modern. That kind of culture which takes man instead of God for its principle, and substitutes the glory of man for the glory of God, pride

for humility, and earthly pleasures for heavenly, we believe was really carried, by the ancient Greek and Roman people, to a degree of perfection to which no modern Catholic nation has as yet succeeded in carrying it. Thus far Gioberti's doctrine is unquestionably sound and undeniable.

But when it is proposed to combine this gentile culture with the superhuman excellences of the Gospel, the question changes. The spirit of ancient Athens, Sparta, Samnium, and Rome was the spirit of the world, and proposed as the end the glory of man, individual or social, and the embellishment and enjoyment of this mundane life. Now is this spirit compatible with the spirit of the Gospel? Here is the question, and we know on Divine authority that it is not; for our Lord expressly opposes his maxims to the maxims of the gentiles, and tells us that the spirit of the gentile, the heathen,—and, let Gioberti say what he will, his favorite Italo-Greek or Pelasgic nations were heathen,—was what we have just described it to be. "For after all these things do the heathen seek," that is, what shall we eat, what shall we drink, and wherewith shall we be clothed, or, in other words, the goods and pleasures of this life. He bids us not be like them, but "seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto" us. There can be no union between the two, no alliance between pride and humility, Christ and the world. Our Lord says, Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, the humble; the heathen adored pride. The Lord says, Blessed are they who weep; the heathen said, Blessed are they who rejoice. The Lord says, Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake, and blessed are ye when men shall revile you and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake; the heathen thought this a calamity, and more than flesh could endure. The Lord says, Lay not up treasures on earth, but lay up treasures in heaven; the heathen said, Lay up treasures on the earth. The Lord directed us not to look for our reward here, but to wait for it in heaven; the heathen said, Seek your reward in this world, and study to enjoy yourselves here, eat, drink, and be merry, while life lasts, for we know not what comes after it. Now, though Gioberti talks much about conciliating contraries, and harmonizing opposites, we have found in his dialectics no way by which these two opposite, contradictory spirits can be reconciled, and brought to operate in unison. The one can live only by the destruction of the other.

Hence the perpetual warfare which rages in the bosom of Christian individuals and Christian nations, — a warfare unknown for the most part in heathendom, because the heathen religion chimed in with the worldly spirit of the people. As they had broken away from the orthodox instruction, rejected the worship of God, and "liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness, wickedness,—full of envy, murder, contention, deceit, malignity,—whisperers, detractors, hateful to God, contumelious, proud, haughty, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, foolish, dissolute, without affection, without fidelity, without mercy. Who, having known the justice of God, did not understand that they who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they who do them, but they also who consent to them that do them."—Rom. i. 28–32. This is the description which an inspired Apostle gives us of the heathen, and therefore of Gioberti's noble Italo-Greeks, and we can easily understand from it that there should have been in their case a completeness and roundness of character, reference had to the order of character to which it belonged, a proportion between their religion and the daily life of the people, which we cannot find or expect to find among Christians, on the one hand striving after the supernatural virtues of the Gospel, and on the other drawn away by their corrupt nature in the opposite direction, towards the vices, the crimes, and the abominations of the heathen.

The author tells us, that in civilization there is, besides the religious element, the human element, and his pretence is, no doubt, that the human element of civilization was more perfect among the cultivated Gentiles than it is among the moderns. This view we ourselves took when we wrote the essay on *The Church in the Dark Ages;* but the study of Gioberti's own dialectics which we have since made has of itself served to convince us that it is not true, and that the Christian cannot consistently entertain it. Civilization he makes the creation of the priesthood, and, as we have seen, he identifies it with religion; then in civilization proper there is and can be no human element distinguishable from the religious: for it is only as instructed and informed by the sacerdotal culture that man is, or can be, *civilized* man. The sum total of the life of a so-called civilized country is,

no doubt, a mixed result, composed of a religious and a human element, but this life, in so far as distinguishably human, is defective, and not yet civilized. Thus far religion has not been able to subdue the human element, and transform its acts into religious acts, therefore into civilized acts. If the priesthood creates civilization, then civilization cannot be a mixed result of the human and Divine, in any other sense than is religion itself as exhibited by men a mixed result, but must be a pure result of the religious element acting on and subduing the human. Then, again, if man is in his normal state only in the Catholic society, how can it be possible for the human element to attain a more perfect and exquisite development out of that society, and therefore, as Gioberti contends, as well as we, disjoined from the true human race,—the human race living in the unity of the ideal, therefore in communion with God,—than it can or does in that society itself? If this were so, we should be obliged to assume that the abnormal is more perfect and exquisite than the normal,—a monstrous paradox.

We are pained to be obliged to remark, that Gioberti nowhere, so far as we can discover, recognizes the influence in promoting civilization of the sacramental principle of our religion. As far as we have been able to ascertain, he holds that religion operates as dogma and government, as doctrine and authority, but we do not find that he recognizes in it any other mode of civilizing action. Now he places the seat of barbarism in the flesh, as well as we, and he attempts to identify civilization with religion, for the reason, among others, that it gives man a dominion over instinct, passion, the body. But religion can, in this view of the case, promote civilization only by the means she adopts to give us a victory over the flesh, in which are the seeds of barbarism. These means are not simply dogma and precept, for the devils know these, and believe and tremble, but joined to these mortification, prayer, meditation, and the sacraments. The surest way to destroy barbarism is to destroy its cause, or to dry up its fountain. This is done, as far as it can be done, by the practice of asceticism, and the purity and strength obtained from the sacraments, especially, after Baptism, from Penance and the holy Eucharist. After all, then, the devout mystics, and the pious ascetics, who, in the view of Gioberti, are rather the enemies than the friends of civilization, take necessarily as such the most, and, we may add, the only, effectual way of advancing or

securing it. No doubt there are evangelical counsels distinguishable from evangelical precepts, and we are far from pretending that, in strict law, we are all obliged to lead the life of the religious. The life of seculars is lawful, but that of the religious is higher and more perfect, and the nearer we approach its elevation and perfection, the better for us, and the better our influence on the world, both for time and eternity.

We intended to offer something more, and we may resume the discussion hereafter, but for the present we must content ourselves with what we have already said. We frankly acknowledge that on many points we have been enlightened by reading Gioberti's writings, and had we not read them, we could hardly have given the statement we have of the truth opposed to his errors; we also acknowledge, nay, contend, that his errors do not necessarily grow out of his fundamental philosophy, but are distinguishable from it, and in fact opposed to it. They have another origin, and ought not to lead us to reject the philosophy itself, because he has bound them up with it. Nevertheless, as these errors chime in with the grand heresy of our age,—that is, the secularization of Christianity, the rehabilitation of the flesh, the revival of paganism, and the conceptions of the carnal Jews, who expected a temporal prince and temporal prosperity, instead of a spiritual ruler and the salvation of the soul,—they are precisely that in his writings which will give them popularity with the mass of readers, and determine their practical influence, and therefore are exceedingly dangerous. They seem also to indicate the practical results the author has had in view in writing his philosophy. Hence, however sound may be the philosophy itself, the author's writings cannot be safe, and we have felt it our duty to admonish our readers to be on their guard against them.

As to Gioberti himself, while we have not spared him where we have thought him wrong, we have aimed to treat him with candor and respect. It is possible that he began writing with good intentions, with the sincere and earnest desire to promote the cause of truth and piety; but the tone and style of his works are not such as to win our confidence in him as a sincere, humble, and devout Catholic priest. They are laical; and his spirit is proud, his bearing haughty and disdainful. He strikes us as a politician, or as a man of the world, rather than as a spiritual father. We miss in his

writings that unction which so charms us in Fénelon, and especially in St. Francis of Sales, and we cannot help feeling that he has spent an undue proportion of his time in studying philosophy and profane literature, and has reserved himself too little to spend at the foot of the crucifix in prayer and meditation. We are sorry to think so, for we see in him a man whom God has endowed with extraordinary gifts, and who might be an honor to his country, and a useful servant of the Church; but so we must think, till he breaks his present silence, submits to the Holy Father, responds to the affectionate entreaty of Pius the Ninth, and sets himself earnestly at work to purge his writings of their mischievous errors.

ARTICLE II.

PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1861.]

THE work the title of which we cite is the Second Volume of the Posthumous Works of the late Abbate Gioberti, collected and published under the editorial care of his friend and disciple, Joseph Massari. It has been placed in our hands by a venerable Italian priest, who has been for years a professor of philosophy and theology, and who to a certain extent at least accepts Gioberti's philosophical views. He has placed it in our hands with the remark, that as we seem to have made some advances toward the philosophical and theological system of which it gives the principles and method, we probably should find pleasure in reading it. Whether he gave it to us with a wish that it should be to us a guide or a beacon we are unable to say. We have a high opinion of the genius, the learning, and philosophical ability of its author, and we have accepted and defended some parts of his philosophy; but neither in philosophy nor in theology are we disposed to take him for our master or our guide. We think he had opinions that we do not hold, and purposes with which, as we at present understand them, we do not sympathize. We set up in our youth and inexperience to be a reformer, and to recast the world in our own image; we met with no great or marked success, and we think it is well that we did not, for we have no reason to believe that the world recast in our image would be any

* *Della Filosofia della Rivelazione di* VINCENZO GIOBERTI. *Pubblicato per Cura di* GIUSEPPE MASSARI. Torino e Parigi. 1856.

better than it is now. We did not come into the Catholic Church to turn Catholic reformer, to reform Catholic faith, Catholic theology, or Catholic discipline; we try to learn and hold Catholic faith as the Church believes and teaches it, and to make the best use of reason in our power in defending it against the various classes of adversaries it at present encounters. Further than this no man and no set of men can count on us.

The work now before us is unfinished, and in fact is little more than notes jotted down to be afterwards worked up or bald statements of principles to be afterwards developed and applied. It does no credit to the author as a writer, but it does credit to him as a varied, profound, and fertile thinker. It is only the outlines of a treatise, a rude sketch, but it could have been the production only of philosophical and theological genius of the first order. Signor Massari says it is scrupulously orthodox, which no doubt is much, but would be more, if we were assured that his own orthodoxy is above suspicion. But whether really orthodox or not, the work, which the editor rightly calls *Fragments*, is one, like Dr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, the principle of which it adopts and defends, that will be variously judged according to the taste, the temper, the understanding, or the prejudices of the reader. It is not a work to be judged by sciolists, favorably or unfavorably. The work is a serious work, an earnest work, we doubt not an honest work, and on subjects of the highest and to all thinking men of the most pressing interest, and only those who are familiar with the higher branches of thought, and have done something more than hastily run through Bouvier's Philosophy and Theology, or even study St. Thomas or Duns Scotus are competent to pass judgment on its merits. It can be brought within none of the approved formulas of the schools, and tested by none of the rules ordinarily adopted by schoolmen, for it rises above all those formulas and rules, and seeks either to make way with them or to elevate and expand them by showing the higher reason in which they are founded.

There is, even in the case of those who by their natural genius and studies are not wholly incompetent to judge of works of this sort, an evident difficulty in appreciating these Fragments of an unfinished work in which the author was engaged when death overtook him, in the fact that the author cannot be looked upon as free from suspicion.

All his works, published during his lifetime, are on the *Index*, and though it may be that they were placed there for political reasons, or for various other reasons than philosophical or theological unsoundness, yet the fact itself can hardly fail to excite in loyal Catholic hearts some degree of distrust. He refused, if we have not been misinformed, to follow the example of Rosmini and Padre Ventura, and make the retraction required by the Holy See, and he died suddenly at Paris, as our Parisian friends say, without being visibly reconciled to the Church. He openly departs from the theology of the scholastics, and makes war to the knife on the Jesuits, and contends that the theology taught by them since the General Aquaviva is unchristian. Indeed, he accuses them of introducing another Gospel than that of our Lord, and he holds that the definitions of popes and councils are to be taken only as true in general, but not in particular. He shows in his writings hardly ever any sympathy with the great doctors, writers, and saints of the Church, at least since the earliest ages, and reserves his esteem and affection for the Arnoldis, Rienzis, Machiavellis, Alfieris, and Leopardis, who have done their best to repaganize Italy, and through Italy Christendom; and although some of these things may possibly admit an explanation, they have a tendency to create in honest Catholic minds a prejudice against him.

We are by no means disposed to defend the analytic method of the scholastics, nor are we disposed to maintain that our modern theologians have always been St. Augustines, St. Basils, or able to compete successfully with the great Fathers of the early ages. We do not always sympathize with the meticulous orthodoxy of our age, or hold ourselves bound as a Catholic to defend through thick and thin even the administration of ecclesiastical affairs in our own or in any other country, much less the secular polities of all Catholics, whether priests or laymen. In matters of simple human prudence we believe Catholic laymen, Catholic priests and bishops, even popes and cardinals may make mistakes, and commit great blunders from which religion and society suffer. We have shown time and again what we dare in relation to the scholastic philosophy and that generally taught in Catholic schools at the present day. We have proved that we respect liberty in all its forms, are not afraid on all proper occasions to assert the rights of the temporal, as well as of the spiritual. We are even now suffering

much opprobrium because we have fearlessly vindicated the province of reason, and in the name of religion herself protested against the doctrine that we must demolish reason to make way for faith, or surrender our manhood in order to be faithful and acceptable servants of God. But, if we were required to believe that the scholastics have essentially erred in their theology, and that the Jesuits for two hundred and fifty years have introduced a false theology, nay, another Gospel, and have been unchristian in their teaching, we should cease to profess ourselves Catholics, and should look upon the Church as having failed as the teacher of truth. The Church teaches through her doctors, and if these have failed, as failed they have, if the scholastics and Jesuits have introduced a false and corrupt theology, she has failed in her mission to teach. The Jesuits are the last men in the Church Gioberti should complain of, for from the origin of the Society it has been their study to show the harmonious relations between reason and faith, nature and grace, liberty and authority, the very thing he himself professes to be aiming to effect, and he knows perfectly well, that the great standing charge against them is that they have yielded too much to reason, nature, and human liberty; and if he had descended for a moment from his synthetic altitude and analyzed his objections, he would have found that he was really objecting to them only what he was himself professing to do. His attacks upon them strike us as at least ungrateful, and such as we should expect from no man not deeply imbued with Lutheran and Jansenistic heresy. We are not the special apologists of the Jesuits, but we have seldom, if ever, found them as a body strongly opposed to a man whose Catholic loyalty or orthodoxy there were no good reasons for suspecting.

We have not become an old gray-headed man without knowing that a man may be unjustly suspected, that no man can do boldly and energetically the precise work demanded in his day and generation in church or state without making many enemies, without offending the honest people who get great gain by making shrines for the goddess Diana, raising a clamor against him, and perhaps going to the grave with his motives misconceived, and his words and deeds misconstrued. Even great and good men may and often do misinterpret and do no little wrong to great and good men. Did not the chief priests, the scribes, and the pharisees conspire to raise up the mob against our Lord himself, and per-

suade them to cry out, *Crucifige eum, crucifige eum!* Was it not by his own people, the people he had brought up out of Egyptian bondage, led through the wilderness to a land flowing with milk and honey, and whom he had loaded with privileges, and whose national constitution and existence were founded on faith in him, who rejected him, and crucified him by the hands of an alien? If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of his household? The Christian Church is the Synagogue continued and fulfilled, but men in the one and the other have the same nature, the same appetites, passions, senses, principles, and motives of action, and to some extent at least there will always be reproduced in the Church what was produced in the Synagogue, for Christianity is not and cannot be severed from Judaism. Our Lord came not to destroy the law and the prophets, but to fulfil. Christian history is recorded in the Old Testament as well as in the New. We know also that modern orthodoxy is timid, and its defenders are more ready to denounce, to place upon the *Index*, or to pillory a man's writings than to refute them, to silence by authority than to convince by reason; we know, furthermore, that in these revolutionary times, when every thing is loosened from its old moorings, and is afloat on a tumultuous sea of wild and lawless speculations, when nothing is sacred from the hand of the profane, and the whole world seems breaking up and hastening to universal ruin, men are bewildered, and hardly know whom to distrust or in whom to confide, or to tell their friends from their enemies. But recalling all this, and making all the allowances demanded, we confess we cannot approach a work of Gioberti without feeling that the presumption, as they say in law, is against him, and that he is put upon his defence. He cannot claim the benefit of presumed innocence, and therefore that all should be interpreted in his favor, not clearly and undeniably against him. We say not that he is guilty, but that he is reasonably suspected, and that his friends are called upon to free him from suspicion before calling upon us to acquit him. We say not that he is heterodox, but we do say his orthodoxy is not to be presumed, is not to be taken for granted, and his writings in doubtful cases to receive an orthodox sense. His orthodoxy, not his heterodoxy, is to be proved, for it is a question in his case not of condemning but of acquitting and approving, whether we shall confirm the judgment rendered against him, or

reverse it, and present him as a man who has suffered wrong, been unjustly condemned.

The difficulty of settling the question whether Gioberti is to be censured as heterodox or acquitted as orthodox, is the greater from the fact that he departs from the usual method and language of the schools. The schools, since St. Anselm, if not since St. John of Damascus, have followed in the construction and exposition of theology as well as of philosophy the method of analysis. Our whole theological science is cast in analytic moulds, and expressed in analytic language. Gioberti censures and rejects this method, adopts the synthetic method, attempts to cast both philosophy and theology in a synthetic mould, and to express them in the language of synthesis, which in modern times at least is unfamiliar even to scholars and men of science. It is not easy always to say whether the doctrine he sets forth in its synthetic form is an old acquaintance or a total stranger. He has certainly made great changes in the human and variable element of theology, but has he not proposed also changes in the divine and invariable element? In varying the forms in which theologians have hitherto arranged and expressed divine revelation to the scientific understanding, does he not vary revelation itself? Does he leave revelation intact, in its unity and integrity? Human science may vary from age to age, because it is imperfect, and can never become perfect; but the revealed truth, faith never varies, never has varied from the beginning, and never can vary till swallowed up in vision.

But as faith is the word of God revealed to the human understanding through the medium of human language, the dogma, or authoritative expression of faith, necessarily contracts up to a certain point a human element. There is in the dogma of faith, as believed by the human mind, or as defined by the Church, a human element. And this human element may vary its form without losing its truth, or affecting the truth of the dogma. The Church for instance has defined that the soul is the form of the body, *forma corporis*, and that the change in the Eucharistic elements is well expressed by the word *Transubstantiation*. In both cases the dogma is true, and the Church gives an infallible definition, but only when the words *forma* and *transubstantiatio* are taken in the scholastic sense, and in giving her definition the Church had no intention of asserting the scholastic doctrine of forms and substances. Now were we

to say that in the blessed Eucharist there is no change of substance, we should appear to deny the dogma of the Real Presence, and yet we could say so and be strictly orthodox. The scholastics take the word *substance* in the sense of essence, as that which in the conception of a thing is ultimate, the intelligible as distinguished from the visible, what Gioberti calls the superintelligible. The essence of the bread and the wine is changed, but as Theodoret argues against the Eutychians, their nature and substance remain unchanged, though confessedly converted into the body and blood of our Lord. Here is a difference of philosophy, or of the human element, inducing a change in the form of the statement, but no change in the essential dogma itself. We accept, of course, the dogma as defined, but we accept the word transubstantiation only in the scholastic sense, not in the sense of our own philosophy, for were we to do so we should be obliged to deny to the species after consecration all the natural properties of bread and wine, which would be contrary to fact, and indirectly, we apprehend, favor the error of the Eutychians, if not of the Docetæ. The difficult point to determine is whether the changes introduced into the human element from time to time imply any change in the divine element or not. If they do, they cannot be entertained; if they do not, so far as the dogma is concerned, they are admissible.

We are not ourselves disposed to find fault with Gioberti for rejecting the analytic method and adopting the synthetic. The change, in our judgment, was much needed. Analysis is anatomy, and operates only on the dead subject. As our old Transcendentalist friends were accustomed to say, "In analysis we murder to dissect." The analytic method presents us truth in detail, in abstract forms, which are dead and incapable of imparting life and vigor to the mind. It treats truth as the wicked Typhon and his associates in Egyptian fable treated the good Osiris—hews it in pieces, and deprives it of life and fecundity. It gives us for the full, roundly moulded, symmetrical and living body of truth, only *disjecta membra*, which the weeping Isis seeks in vain to recover and re-endow with life and reproductive energy. It is this fact that for centuries has rendered scholastic theology so barren of grand results, and diverted from itself minds naturally the most vigorous and prolific; that has rendered it weak and inefficient in face of modern heresies, incapable of grappling successfully with the subtler errors

of the day. The public opinion of the world condemns it, and it ceases to be able to attract to itself the intelligence of the age. It wants vitality, the warmth and feeling of life, and repulses young and ardent souls as a corpse or a charnel-house. It is a valley of dry bones, and all the life we find in it is the life the student has obtained elsewhere and brings with him to its study. We accept in the main Gioberti's criticism of scholastic theology. It, he says, "is particularism, whence its defects and weakness before rationalism. 1. It defends miracles as isolated facts, and therefore they appear arbitrary, fortuitous, and sometimes mean, little worthy of God. 2. It does the same with prophecy. 3. It admits the inspiration of the Scriptures in a purely particular sense, and thus imposes on theology the obligation of defending every passage, every anomaly, &c. 4. It adopts the same method with regard to passages cited in the New Testament from the Old. 5. It does the same with regard to angelology and demonology. 6. Finally, in it the whole Catholic doctrine is taken piecemeal and broken in the definitions of the Church. In all these methods analysis predominates, and the synthesis which follows gives only a *sum* —is only a summing up of particulars."—pp. 63, 64.

No man who has studied scholastic theology, how much soever he may have admired the acuteness, the subtilty, the masterly analytic power of the schoolmen who astonish us every moment with further distinctions and abstractions—but has felt the justice of this criticism. The schoolmen give us truth in detail, not as an organic whole, and they seldom if ever show us the definitions of the Church in their synthetic relations. Yet Catholic doctrine in itself and in the mind of the Church is a synthesis, the synthesis of all the relations of Creator and creature, of the Redeemer and the redeemed, of God and the universe, of Being and existence, of men with one another and with their Maker and Saviour. All the definitions of the Church are determined by this sublime synthesis, and find in it their unity and their integrity. It is only in scholastic theology which presents truth only in detached views, or gives us a *summa* instead of an organic whole, that they appear isolated, arbitrary, and without a general reason, or reason in the general constitution of things natural or supernatural. No doubt the scholastic theologians suppose back of their analytic presentations a grand doctrine, which embraces these presentations in their synthetic unity, in

which they are all integrated and become one, but their method breaks it and prevents them from setting it forth. Nobody pretends that they deny its reality, but they do not seize it, and present their particular doctrines as integral parts of one living whole. Hence it is not the living truth but its dead carcass our theologians depict and work up into their systems, for all life, as Gioberti would say, is dialectic, is in relation, or in the union and joint action of opposing forces, the great law of all life, which we set forth in a letter to the late Dr. Channing, *On the Mediatorial Life of Jesus*, published in June, 1842. To hope to form a conception of the living body of truth, or of truth as a whole, by analysis, seems to us no wiser than to attempt to form a conception of the earth's surface, and of the relations of the several countries on its surface to one another by studying a series of detached maps, presenting in detail only one city, town, or country each. So far as the rejection of the analytic method is concerned, and the adoption of the synthetic, Gioberti in our judgment is deserving of commendation, not censure, and has given an impulse to both theological and philosophical science of great importance.

We cannot, however, say that Gioberti has been the first in modern times to adopt and apply the synthetic method. Leibnitz and Malebranche, Gerdil and Thomas Reid, the founder of the Scottish school, and even Kant, in what he calls the practical reason as distinguished from the speculative reason, make decided approaches to it, while the schools of Schelling and Hegel, in Germany, avowedly adopt it, though they are unhappy in its application. Cousin mistook it, and ran off into the eclectic method, which in practice became the syncritic; but his great opponent, Pierre Leroux, however he may have erred in his principles, adopted the method as decidedly as Gioberti, and with as full an understanding of its application and value. We are well aware of the repute in which Leroux is held; we are well aware of the charges made against him; but, though full of errors and treated always with contempt by Gioberti, we dare be known to hold him entitled to the first rank among the philosophers of France, and there is far more affinity between his philosophy and Gioberti's, as we find it in these Fragments before us, than the haughty Italian was ever willing to acknowledge. Indeed all great thinkers in our age, whether in theology or philosophy, have abandoned the analytic method, and adopted the synthetic, and com-

menced studying the objects of intelligence, whether made known to us by natural reason or by divine revelation, in their mutual relations as parts of one organic whole. The fact is worthy of consideration as a proof that we have reached our lowest point, that the mind is recovering its energy, and will attain to a more vigorous growth in the future.

We must remark, however, if Gioberti adopts the synthetic method in common with many others, he differs from the German and French synthetists in one very important respect. They in philosophizing take up the question of method before the question of principle. Method belongs to the order of reflection; principles belong to the order of intuition, and are given in the creative act. Principles are given, not found or obtained by the action of the mind itself; for the mind can neither exist nor act without principles. They must, then, not only be given, but given in the very act of God that creates the mind or human subject. They are intuitive, and intuition is an original, immanent fact, constitutive of the human intelligence and furnishing it the principles of all science as well as of all reality. The formula of intuition is, therefore, well expressed by Gioberti, *Ens creat existentias*, or, Being creates existences. This formula includes *omne reale et omne scibile;* for all the real must be being, the act of being, or the product of that act, and only that which is real can be an object of knowledge, since what is not is not intelligible or cognoscible. But principles must be received as well as given, for there is and can be no act of human knowledge without the act of the human subject. In all human science it is the human subject that knows, and hence all human science is subjective as well as objective. The fact of human knowledge is therefore a twofold fact, the resultant of two factors, subject and object. The creative act of God in presenting the principles of science creates the mind, and the mind, the instant it is created, receives or apprehends them. Hence the *primum philosophicum* must be a synthesis of the *primum ontologicum* and the *primum psychologicum*, and is at once ideal and empirical.

The principle of all science is intuitive, but the actual development of science is reflective. Method therefore pertains to the reflective order and is determined by the principles intuitively given. It must always recognize and preserve the synthesis or union of the ideal and empyrical.

Reflection uses for its instruments contemplation and reasoning. The reasoning makes use of language or sensible signs which represent more or less perfectly the reality given in intuition. The error of philosophers is in attempting to determine the method before having ascertained what are the principles of science. The defect of the modern methods of philosophy is in their starting from a mutilated formula; either in taking the *primum ontologicum* or the *primum psychologicum* alone as the *primum philosophicum*. In the first case all science is rendered ideal, which was the error of Malebranche; in the second case it is purely empyrical, the error of the sensists and the psychologists generally, both of which errors Gioberti happily avoids.

The design of Gioberti in the work which he did not live to complete is one which all must approve. It was the full and triumphant defence of the Catholic religion against all classes of adversaries, but more especially against modern rationalists. Persons not familiar with modern rationalism, especially as we find it in Germany, will find much difficulty in appreciating either this or any other of the philosophical or theological works of Gioberti. His aim in all of them is to present truth as a whole, in its unity and its integrity, and to show that the truth as known by natural reason and the truth known by immediate divine revelation are but parts of one whole, that God, in the natural order and in the supernatural, is but carrying out one and the same grand design, and acting to one and the same glorious end. The natural and supernatural, reason and revelation, nature and grace, he maintains, are not opposed one to another, are not essentially unrelated, but are parts of one and the same universal plan and harmonize in their origin, in their principle of operation, and in their final cause. He maintains that the supernatural excludes no natural truth, no natural good, and he thus recognizes or accepts all the affirmations of rationalists while laboring to show the absurdity of their denials. He holds, with Leibnitz, that all sects, parties, and schools are right in what they affirm, and wrong only in what they deny. In this he is undoubtedly right, since, as St. Thomas maintains, the intellect cannot be false, and truth alone is the object of the intellect. Error is not in apprehension but in non-apprehension. The mind errs, not in regard to what it perceives, but in regard to what it does not perceive. The intelligible is always true, and the untrue

and the unintelligible are convertible terms. All sects, schools, parties, creeds, doctrines are true in what they contain that is positive and intelligible, and are false only for the reason that they embrace not the whole truth, but take mere partial views or accept only some fragments of it; that is, for the reason that they do not hold truth in its unity and integrity. Yet it is the truth held by the sects which sanctifies to their own minds the errors they mix up with it. In order to refute them, it is not necessary simply to point out their errors, but to present them a doctrine which integrates the several fragments or portions of truth they hold in a higher and more comprehensive unity. This is what Gioberti attempts. He starts from a formula which embraces all truth in its unity and integrity, and which enables him to express all truth, whether of the natural or supernatural order, in its dialectic harmony. He finds the principle of this dialectic harmony in the creative act which serves as the middle term between the extremes. Thus by the creative act existences are united and harmonized with Being, and in the creative act the natural and supernatural are identified.

The great point to be remarked in Gioberti's method is, that while he holds the natural and the supernatural are distinguishable, he maintains that they are inseparable. According to him, whatever is done immediately by God is supernatural; the natural is that which is done mediately through second causes, or the action of natural agencies. The natural is explicable by cosmic laws; and whatever is not so explicable is supernatural. All origination is supernatural; thus the creative act is a supernatural act, and the cosmos as to its origin is supernatural. Christianity, inasmuch as it is the immediate and direct act of God, is also supernatural. Reason is natural, revelation supernatural, because in reason there is the action of a second cause, and in revelation only the immediate act of God. Reason does not include revelation analytically, but reason and revelation are never in point of fact separated. Christianity and cosmogony are synthetically one and inseparable, hence the author denies not only the fact but the possibility of what theologians call pure nature, or the *status naturæ puræ*. The following extract will show his doctrine on this point:

"The perfection of all orders of the cosmos, physical, æsthetic, moral, religious, &c., is in the fulness of the creative act, as absolute perfection is in the creative Being. The first creative cycle contains the principles

and origin of things, the second the laws of their development, and their progress and end. Genesis is the book of the first cycle; the Apocalypse of the second; Genesis is the book of the creation; the Apocalypse of the palingenesia.

"The creative act extrinsecated is the methexis.* The methexis is the methexis, that is the participation of Idea, inasmuch as it is the extrinsecation of the creative act. It is one as that act itself is one in potential unity (initial methexis) or in actual unity (final methexis.) But such unity is always actually finite, and therefore, being limited, includes virtual or actual multiplicity. In the methexis as one and the image of the creative act externated in it, all is one as in the creative act, although there is already there the germ or the act (initial or final methexis) of multiplicity and distinction. Thus grace and nature, supernatural and natural, religion and civilization, are all made one in the methexis. Their separation is only mimetic;† for separation is always sophistical, and the sophistical has no place in the methexis. In the methexis there is only dialectic distinction and harmony, potential in the initial methexis, and actual in the final. Hence to seize the excellence of the various created orders, we must not consider them as isolated from one another, for, to see the worth of a thing, we must take it in its real relations—that is, as it actually subsists. Now, created things have no isolated subsistence, unless in our abstract conceptions or imagination. No wonder, then, if taken out of their natural relations, they appear crude, defective, and unworthy of God. The defects which are attributed to Providence and to revelation proceed solely from their being so considered. Analysis leads to atheism, rationalism, pessimism, for it disfigures, despoils, and disjoins objects by abstraction. Synthesis alone conducts to ideal cognition, because it takes things as they are in their entireness. 'Creatures are stairs to the Creator,' says Petrarca, but only by him 'who rightly esteems them,' that is, who regards them directly in front, not in profile. As for example, the permission of error and evil is irreconcilable with Providence, if taken alone, but reconcilable, if regarded as a preparation for truth and goodness. *Oportet hæreses esse. O felix culpa!*

"The created, in that it is mimetic, is in time; but in that it is methexic, it is out of time. Therefore, facts and events which are mimetically successive and separated by time are simultaneous in the methexis; therefore, again, the internal life of every force is out of time. This explains the supernatural in religion. Methexically it is identical with the creative act and with the palingenesiac act; mimetically it is a reminiscence of the premundane order, and an anticipation of the ultramundane. The unity of the supernatural with nature is in the creative act

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* From *μετέχω, habeo cum alio, particeps sum,* to participate.

†From *μιμητικός, μίμησις, μιμέομαι.*

(Idea creative), and in the immanent methexis. So in this respect the transfiguration of Christ was a partial or momentary raising of the mimesis which covered the methexis. Christ, as methexic, was already glorious; only his mortal body was mimetic. The Docetæ and other heretics had a confused view of this, but they erred in denying the reality of the mimetic state. Thus methexically the particular judgment and the universal are identical.

"Earth is mimetically opposed to heaven, not as part to part, but as the part to the whole: for according to the Copernican system the earth even is in heaven. Heaven and earth may be considered both mimetically and methexically. The real contrariety is between earth as mimesis and heaven as methexis, of which it is the symbol. Therefore, the methexic heaven is the earth as mimesis. Their contrariety is mimetic. Indeed there is no contrariety in the methexis, but only harmony. As heaven is beyond earth in space, so the celestial and palingenesiac epoch is beyond the earth in time. But as methexically heaven is in the earth, so the palingenesiac future is methexically in the present, the continuous in the discrete. Therefore, methexically the kingdom of the heavens is the earth—*intra vos est*—in respect to both space and time. The future life is present in the same sense. Hence we see how a miracle, a methexic and superintelligible fact, is numerically identical with the future facts of the palingenesiac cosmos, and subjected only in the mimetic covering to the laws of time."—pp. 39-41.

And also from this further extract, which we take from the section on *The Supernatural:*

"The creative act is the dialectic union of the natural and the supernatural. But in what do the two things differ, since the nature of the creative act is the same in both cases? They differ in principle and end. 1. In principle, because in the supernatural the creative act is immediate, and in nature mediate. 2. In the end, because nature refers to time, the finite, the earth; the supernatural to heaven, the eternal, the infinite. The supernatural is nature raised to infinite power, that is, nature passed from the state of mimesis to that of methexis. Thus the Church and the human race, inspiration and cognition, grace and free will are all one in their nature; but Church, inspiration (θεόπνευστια), grace are free will, cognition, the human race raised to the infinite.

"The natural and the supernatural, as all contraries, coincide in the creative act, the dialectic conciliator, *par excellence*. Divided in their course, they are united in their destiny, and as they are united in their origin so they meet together in their end, that is, in the palingenesia. The opposition between them, therefore, has place only in the medium, that is, only in the interval which separates cosmogony from palingenesia. Rationalists and supernaturalists fight each other because they do not rise to the principle of their conceptions. There they would see that they are both right and both wrong. Rationalists abase the supernatural

to the natural; vulgar supernaturalists do not raise the natural to the supernatural. The point in which nature and the supernatural meet is the creative act. Bymeans of that the two notions stand either for the other, —*si reciprocano insieme.*

"The mimesis is either external or internal, subjective or objective, fantastic or cosmic and natural. The external is sensible, the internal is affective and imaginative. Miracle is the mimesis of the supernatural; the methexis of the supernatural is the creative act. The mimesis of the supernatural may be either external (facts) or internal, (myths), whence thaumatologies and mythologies.

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"Every force is supernatural in respect to specifically different and inferior forces. Civilization is supernatural in respect to the barbarian. If beasts could understand, man would be for them supernatural, as to man are angels. In proof of this, you see that all barbarians attribute to supernatural beings, demons, genii, giants, the Fates, Solomon, Alexander, that is, to divine men believed endowed with talismanic or magic force, the ruins of the civilization they do not possess and which they find in their countries.

"The supernatural is in the natural as the individual without the species, an act without the potential, a fact without law. It is therefore an isolated phenomenon, But an isolated phenomenon cannot be unless as a reminiscence or a presentiment; it must pertain either to the past or to the future; because there can be nothing really isolated in nature, an act without the potential, or an individual without the species. The supernatural, therefore, is a bit (*brano*) of a premundane or an ultramundane order, or rather of both, and is cosmogonic and palingenesiac. Every act, every fact, must have its law, for it expresses an idea. Therefore the supernatural also must have its law, its genus.

"The natural and the supernatural are identified in the creative act. The natural is the imperfect intervention of the creative act; the supernatural its complete intervention. Hence the supernatural is the summit, the end, the complement of nature and the creative act (hence also its principle). This is seen in Christianity, which is supernatural because it is morally, theologically, and civilly perfect religion. But it is natural because the form of the perfection being possible, it must have place. Thus Christ is God-man because he is perfect man, which supposes in him the complete insidence of the creative act. This insidence is the theandria. Vulgar theologians make of the supernatural a sophistical and not dialectic opposite (exclusive) of nature, and thus distort it and render its maintenance impossible. Thus they say Christianity being supernatural cannot be natural, and it would be contradictory to assert it as such. Wherefore? Because it is more perfect than all other religions. But see they not that the more perfect is as natural as the less perfect? that the one must be as natural as the other?

"The supernatural is not isolated in history, nor does it pertain alone

to religion; for there are in history as in nature a multitude of facts that are more or less inexplicable and therefore hold more or less from the supernatural. Chance is one of the words which, expressing the want of a known law, denote the supernatural. There are various grades of the inexplicable, and therefore of the supernatural. In respect to God there is no supernatural, for every one of his actions is law. His creative act is idea, and hence a law to itself. *The supernatural, therefore, is simply relative to our cognition,* and must change as this changes. In proportion as new laws become known, the supernatural recedes."—pp. 46–49.

There is no doubt that existences receive in the creative act two motions founding two cycles, the one their procession by way of creation,—not emanation, formation, or generation,—from God as first cause, and the other their return without absorption in him or loss of their own substantial or individual existence to God as their final cause. All things are created by him and for him,—are from him, to him, and for him. But when the author calls the second cycle the palingenesia or regeneration, that is, as we understand it, the Christian order of life, he appears to us to assume that the natural has its complement only in the supernatural. This, taken as a fact, may be accepted, but not if assumed to be necessary. That cosmogony has its completion or fulfilment only in palingenesia is in the present order of Providence perhaps true, but this is so from the divine free-will, not because necessarily implied in the creative act. We are aware of no reason *a priori* why the cosmos should not have its fulfilment in its own order. The cosmos is the world, the *mundus* of the Latins, the natural universe bound together, informed, and governed by the inherent laws of beauty and harmony. It is the created universe, and is rightly represented as having two motions, a motion from God as first cause and a motion to God as final cause. Both motions are given in the creative act, and are necessary to its completion. To call the second cycle palingenesia must imply either that the cosmos is merely potential, or initial in its own order, and is fulfilled only in another order, or that the palingenesia is itself cosmic, and therefore natural. The former cannot be said, because it denies that the cosmos has two cycles, and in fact denies the very existence of the cosmos itself; for the final cause is as essential to all created existence as the first cause. A potential cosmos is simply a divine idea, a cosmos which God may, if he chooses, create, but which he has not yet created. The latter implies a contradiction in

terms. The natural return, or return by their natural powers, in the natural order, of existences to God as their final cause, is no palingenesia, for there is no new birth, regeneration, or restoration even necessary. The return is only the fulfilment of their nature. The author gains nothing under this point of view by his distinction between the methexis, *participation*, and mimesis, *imitation*. The methexis he defines to be the creative act extrinsecated, and is, we suppose, what is usually called genera and species, imitated, mimicked or symbolized in the mimesis or action of second causes; for, though all creation is by genera and species, the determination, actualization, fulfilment, or individuation is in the order of its genus or species, and belongs to cosmogony, not to palingenesia, to the first cause, not to the final. The production of genera and species, the methexis, may be initial creation, but it is not complete cosmogony, or the whole of the first cycle, and the determination, actualization, or individuation of the genus or species is not what is meant by the return of existences to God as their final cause, and is only their completion in the first cycle. It is only actual or complete cosmogony; that is, it simply completes the procession, by way of creation of existences from God, and is not even the beginning of their return to him as final cause, or end for which they were created.

The author would have us understand cosmogony is completed in palingenesia, or that Christianity is the actualization and completion of what is potential, generic, or initial in cosmogony, and is therefore included in cosmos. Thus he says, "Grace and nature, supernatural and natural, religion and civilization are one in the methexis," or generic cosmos. Christianity completed is completed cosmogony. He allows us never to consider nature and grace, natural and supernatural, religion and civilization, as generically separated or isolated. Their separation or isolation is only mimetic, not methexic, because all separation is sophistical, and the sophistical is never in the methexis, in which there can only be dialectic distinction and harmony; that is to say, generically the two orders are identical, and are distinguishable only as the initial and final. By this he denies, first, what theologians call the state of pure nature, and second, all real distinction between the order of nature and the order of grace—between the natural and the supernatural, reducing both orders under one and the same cos-

mic law. Their separation, he says, is sophistical, which in his language implies that it is not real, but simply mimetic, or a passing of the initial to its complement. It is also sophistical, because then they are not subject and predicate of the same judgment, or are two extremes without a middle, for *argumentum a genere ad genus non valet*, and if admitted the author would lose his synthesis, or the completion and sufficiency of the ideal formula. But is he at liberty to deny the state of pure nature? It seems to us that every theologian must admit its possibility, and presuppose it possible, in all his reasoning. He cannot assume that man was created with only a palingenesiac destiny, for the Council of Trent, in its decree touching the subject, struck out the word *conditus*, and inserted the word *constitutus*, and defined not that man was *created*, but that he was *established* in grace or original justice, and theologians have maintained—and without censure—that Adam remained some time in a state of nature before he was elevated by grace to the plane of a supernatural destiny, from which in original sin he fell. Neither as he was before the fall, nor as he is now born, can man claim as due to his nature the palingenesia. The redemption by the Word made flesh, and the final Beatitude promised by the Gospel, are of grace not debt, and were in no sense initial in cosmogony, and to be completed in the palingenesia. Man is now born in a state of nature, and has no claim by nature to the palingenesia, and can merit it condignly or congruously by no natural act he can perform. No one is entitled to it, or can enter into its order till born again, till a new life is begotten in him by the grace of regeneration communicated in the sacrament of Baptism, as is certain from the decison of the Church that unbaptized infants dying in infancy go *in infernos*, and can never see God and enjoy the beatitude of heaven. It is not true then to say that the palingenesia is in the order of the cosmos, and only completes or fulfils what is initial or potential in cosmogony, for we cannot enter it by generation. Nor can we maintain on the other hand that man was created without a natural destiny. Nearly all theologians, not the Jesuits only, teach that, though infants dying in infancy unbaptized lose the beatific vision, and suffer the *pœna damni*, and will never see God as he is in himself, yet they will be gainers by their existence, and enjoy forever some sort of natural beatitude. Cardinal Sfondrati in a work published

in the seventeenth century,* maintains that even adults of the class termed by theologians negative unbelievers—that is, persons who do not reject Christ, but simply lack faith in him—dying free from actual sin and subject only to original sin, the penalty of which is the loss of the beatific vision, will receive a natural beatitude superior, perhaps, to the happiness of this life; and the Holy See, though earnestly solicited by Bossuet and other bishops, refused to condemn the doctrine. So it would seem that the author is not free to deny either natural or supernatural beatitude. Indeed the author himself appears to admit both, for in treating of the eternal punishment of the wicked he says:

"Hell is the perpetuity of the state of fallen earth, that is, to speak theologically, of man in the state of original sin. Now original sin is nothing else than the fall of man from the supernatural state (inseparable from the perfection of his nature) into a natural state. Therefore hell is the perpetual exclusion of man from the supernatural state; it is the endless degradation of man in an inferior and therefore finite state of nature, as paradise is the exaltation, the raising to a higher state. In saying state, I say genus; whence the glorified is a trans-humanized man, as the reprobate is a dis-humanized man. One touches the angel, the other the brute. Hell therefore does not consist in the eternity of evil, as the scholastics believed. The only thing eternal is the exclusion from the supernatural good."—p. 357.

Whether the doctrine of this extract is orthodox or not we shall hereafter examine. It suffices for the present to say that the author does here recognize a natural good, since he maintains that the reprobate do not suffer eternal evil, but are simply excluded from supernatural good. If the state of the reprobate is not evil, it must be good, for between evil and good there is no medium. As this good is declared to be not supernatural, it must be natural; but there can be no natural good for man unless he has a natural destiny, since all good or beatitude consists in attaining to one's destiny. The fact that this natural good is inferior to supernatural good, or that the condition of the reprobate is inferior to the glorified, makes nothing against this conclusion. The author must then admit that man has a beatitude in the order of nature, although it may be far inferior to a supernatural beatitude.

Nevertheless the author seems to us to confound the natural and the supernatural. He makes the supernatural

* *Nodus prædistinationis dissolutus:* Romæ, 1696.

supernatural only in relation to our cognition, and virtually identical with the superintelligible, since he formally identifies it with the inexplicable. In his *Introduction to the Study of Philosophy*, and especially in his Letters on the *Errors of Rosmini*, he declares positively that he does not understand by the supernatural the superintelligible, and he takes Rosmini roundly to task for accusing him of doing so. But what is the difference between the superintelligible and the inexplicable. The superintelligible is superintelligible only in relation to our cognition, and he himself maintains that it diminishes in proportion to the progress of our knowledge, "Il sovrintelligibile, scema col progresso e si accosta all'intelligibile secondo il corso metessico della scienza. Il mistero tende a diventare assioma." He says the same of the supernatural. The supernatural is supernatural only because we are unable to explain it, that is, are ignorant of its law. But in proportion as we get the better of this ignorance, and are able to reduce the supernatural under law it ceases to be supernatural. The supernatural exists only in our ignorance, and the superintelligible only in our impotence to know; but both are alike relative to us, and both disappear in proportion as our knowledge increases. This is not Catholic doctrine as we have learned it. "Christianity," the author says, "is supernatural because it is morally, theologically, and civilly perfect religion; but it is also natural." It is in the same order as imperfect religion, and he permits those who deny it to be natural, to do so only because it is more perfect than all other religions. It is evident, then, that the author holds that in the real order, the natural and the supernatural are one and the same, and that they differ only in their representation to our intelligence. Now we hold Christianity to be supernatural not solely because it contains mysteries inexplicable by natural reason, not solely because it is a revealed religion, nor solely because it is more perfect than all other religions, but because, though it presupposes nature, it is not included in nature but is an order above it. We do not know by what authority, or for what reason the author says nature has reference only "to time, to the finite, to the earth," and not "to heaven, to the eternal, the infinite." The existence of God and the immateriality and therefore indissolubility of the soul, free will, moral accountability are, if revealed truths, also truths of reason and provable by it. All creatures are made by God and for him, and therefore refer to

him for their final cause as well as for their first cause. There is a natural religion, for there is a natural bond, to wit, the creative act, between man and God, and man is bound by the natural law, as well as the revealed law, to worship God, and therefore to refer all his acts to him as his final cause, and their ultimate end; and we need not say that whatever is referred to God is referred to heaven [natural beatitude], the eternal, the infinite. Either then there is another sense in which the supernatural is referred to heaven, the eternal, the infinite, or there is no real distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and no reason why Christianity should be called supernatural rather than natural.

The author, we know, professes to distinguish between the supernatural and the natural, and would have us understand that what he denies is not that they are distinguishable, but that they are separable in point of fact, and we think with him that in treating both philosophy and theology they should be taken as forming parts of one whole. To rightly understand the works of Divine Providence, we must regard from first to last the natural and supernatural as coexisting, and co-operating to one and the same ultimate end. Man finds his ultimate destiny in the union or synthesis of the two orders. In point of fact nature is never left without grace, or reason without revelation. In creating man, in the very act by which he creates him, God gives to him the principles of all science, and he made to the first man a revelation of his will. The intuition of the principles is common to and immanent in all men, and the tradition of the primitive revelation has never been wholly interrupted, but in a more or less perfect state has been preserved by all nations down to us. Never has the human race been without the aid of the supernatural revelation or the assistance of divine grace. The reason, common sense, and conscience of mankind are formed by the joint operation of the natural and supernatural. So far as Gioberti seeks to bring out this fact and establish it as the basis of his explanation and defence of the Catholic religion, we of course agree with him and regard his labors not only as proper but as exceedingly valuable. But he seems to us not only to deny the separability of the two orders, but all real distinction between them. He says indeed, the supernatural is distinguished from the natural in the respect, that it is that which is done immediately by God, while the nat-

nral is that done mediately through the agency of second causes, and that it has reference to heaven, to eternity, to the infinite, while nature has reference only to time, to the earth, the finite.

But these distinctions amount to nothing, for nature is the immediate work of God, and therefore is itself supernatural, as the author expressly asserts, and we have shown that nature, or the cosmos, must refer to God as its final cause; therefore to heaven, to eternity, the infinite no less than the palingenesia. He tells us himself that they are both one in the methexis, and differ only in the mimesis, or the sensible representation. We see not, therefore, how he can assert any real distinction between them. Indeed, he himself says that Christianity is supernatural, but that it is also natural, and he nowhere shows wherein it is to be distinguished from nature.

Now, we have been accustomed to regard Christianity as a supernatural order or a real order of life, above even our natural, moral, and spiritual life, into which order no one can enter without being born again, regenerated, made through grace a new creature. Indeed, Gioberti himself frequently calls the palingenesia a new creation. It is not then in the cosmos, is neither in the first cycle nor the second cycle, if we take the word cosmos in its proper sense. It includes the cosmos, if you will, for all nature was redeemed by the Word made flesh, and is glorified in the glorification of Christ, but is itself super-cosmic, supramundane. Certainly the supernatural has God for its first and last cause, and therefore, like the cosmos or natural order, a motion from God as its first cause, and a motion to him as its final cause; but the creative act on which it depends is distinguishable from the creative act on which nature or the cosmos depends. We know God is one, and all his acts intrinsically considered, or considered in relation to their origin in his own unity, are one; but extrinsically considered, as acts extrinsecated, that is, in what the author calls the methexis, or as placing genera and species, they are not necessarily one, and may be distinguished with something more than dialectical distinction, or *distinctio rationis*. No doubt, when God decreed to create man, he decreed also to found the order of grace, because as regards himself there is no chronological priority or subsequence; but not therefore are we to conclude that the Incarnation of the Word was decreed in the decree to cre-

ate man, or to create the cosmos. Indeed, theologians are not agreed as to the question whether if man had not sinned —and he need not have sinned—the Word would have become Incarnate or not. The Word is eternal, begotten before all worlds; but our Lord or the Word made flesh is only "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." The Incarnation in the Divine mind would then seem to be logically subsequent to creation.

What we call the supernatural is the new order which springs from God made man, from the Incarnation, and of which our Lord is the progenitor, as Adam was the progenitor of the human race in the natural order. Our Lord is the second Adam, and stands to the palingenesiac order as the first Adam to the genesiac or cosmic. Adam is the first parent in the order of generation, and Jesus Christ in the order of regeneration, which is the order of grace. The two orders, then, differ with all the difference between the first Adam and the second. This, according to the author, is only the difference between initial and completed creation. He says, as we have seen, that "Christ is God-Man, because he is perfect man, which supposes the complete insidence of the creative act. This insidence [*insidenza*] is Theandria." He says (p. 307): "Man is made in the image of God, and is a God that begins, an inchoate God, because methexical and crescent to infinity." If this means any thing, it means that man perfected, completed, or brought to the term of his progress, is God, or that man grows into God; that is, again, creation completed, fulfilled, is God—a doctrine which the Transcendentalists had made us quite familiar with long before the name of Gioberti ever reached our ears. Yet this doctrine cannot, so far as we can see, be reconciled with the Catholic dogma, which the author professes to hold; for the god thus attained to would be after all only a created god, and instead of embracing and uniting the two extremes of the formula, *l'Ente* and *l'esistente*, would fall under the head of *l'esistente*,—the contingent, and united with *l'Ente*, or Being, only by the creative act, like every other creature. Christ, then, would be Theandric only in a secondary sense—only in the sense in which every other man is Theandric. The difference between him and other men would be a difference only in degree—a difference of more or less. Hence, in his *Gesuita Moderno*, the author places Christ in the same category with Moses, David, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Confucius, and other extraordi-

nary men; and, therefore, places him in the line of what Pierre Leroux calls "providential men." The author does well to say (p. 311), his view of the Incarnation differs from the scholastic view. It differs not only from scholasticism, but, as we understand it, from the Fathers and from the Church.

Christ, we must take the liberty to say, is not God-Man, because perfect man, that is, because he is man completed, whether completed by the mediate or immediate act of God; for he is at once both perfect God and perfect man—two natures hypostatically united in the unity of the Divine Person. The God that thus unites human nature to himself, and makes it his own human nature, is not the creative act perfected, nor God *mediante* the creative act, for the Word was begotten not made,—*genitum non factum*,—but the infinite and eternal God in the fulness of his own real and necessary being. The Apostle does not say that in him was the complete insidence of the creative act, or that in him the creative act had reached its summit, its apex, but "in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."—Col. ii. 9.

This Divine fulness is not the fulness of the creative act, or the creative act fulfilled, but the fulness of Being. Hence God with whom the human nature of Christ is hypostatically united is not creation nor the creative act, but is literally, in the fullest, and the highest sense of the term, God himself in his own divine nature. The author, we fear, in his desire to find the law of the Incarnation, and to understand it generically, has missed the dogma, the real mystery of the Word made flesh, and resolved it into the mystery of flesh made Word, man made God. Thus he writes:

"The theory of the Incarnation is the complement of the theory of Creation. In Christ are united the human and the Divine natures in the Divine Hypostasis. Now human nature is the universal methexis of the human species, joined, as the species to the genus, to the methexis of the Universe. *The Divine Hypostasis is the creative act.* Therefore the Incarnation is the union of Being and Existence, *dell' Ente e dell' esistente,* in the substance, *nella sussistenza,* of the creative act, that is, Christ. It is the ideal formula completed, individuated. Thus are explained the effects of the incarnation, as redemption, infinite merit, expiation, &c., *for these spring from the Divine creative act united to the created* (existence). Thus is explained the communication of idioms. This theory of the Incarnation is dialectically midway between pantheism and dualism, and

contains the truth of both systems free from their errors. Dialecticism is expressed by the Catholic formula: Union not separation of natures, the unity of person against Nestorius; distinction not confusion of natures against Eutyches and the Monothelites. Here we see the distinction and harmony of the two extremes proper to the Ideal formula —*l'Ente crea l'esistente.* This theory of the Incarnation is as far from scholasticism as from rationalism. The Scholastics consider in the Incarnation only the individual element and assert a supernaturalism built in the air, ultramysterious, inefficacious in practice, and inconceivable in speculation. Rationalism considers only the general without the particular, and takes from Christianity its historical efficacy and significance, and induces superficialism. Our theory, (scented by Nicholas of Cusa,) avoids both extremes, conjoins the general (potential and generic incarnation of universal existence) with the particular (actual and individual incarnation only in Christ), mystery with evidence, and makes of the Incarnation at the same time a philosophical and a theological theorem. Redemption is the exaltation of creation to infinite power. It is the complement of the second creative cycle,—the teleology and the palingenesia of the created. It consists of two parts: Incarnation and Glorification. The Incarnation is the creative act (*the Word*) individuated in Christ; Glorification is the creative act concreted in the species. Christianity, therefore, pertains to the teleology and the palingenesia of the world, of which it is the principle, the potentiality, the effort, the preparation, and the anticipation. On this rock rationalism always splits, severing from Christianity its divinity, or confounding it with other worships, taking it as a simple symbol of the general, despoiling it of all supernatural and creative individuality. It denies the teleology of the world, as through the medium of pantheism it denies its true cosmogony. Pantheism denies creation and palingenesia, and is consistent with itself. Rationalism, unless pantheistic, admits creation, and denies palingenesia, and is illogical."—pp. 310–312.

We think we understand this theory of the Incarnation, and, if we mistake not, it is substantially the theory we ourselves broached, though we did not develop it, in the Letter to the late Dr. Channing already referred to. The aim of Gioberti, as was ours, is to bring the Incarnation within the general law of cosmic life, and to make of it both a philosophical and a theological theorem, so as to reduce all orders of our knowledge to the scientific unity, or synthesis rather, of the formula. We attempted it in what we called *Life*, he attempts it in what he calls the *creative act*, the sole copula between Being and existences. With us Christ was the life, or union without confusion of the two opposites or extremes, and therefore universal mediator and conciliator. Christ was again, the union of the natural

and supernatural, because living immediately the life of God in conjunction with the life of the creature, and therefore a theandric life. But the difficulty is that the Incarnation cannot be brought under the general law of cosmic life. It is its own law, and the law, as it is the beginning, middle, and end, of the palingenesia. The humanity in Christ, distinctly taken, is under the universal law of created life, but neither the Divinity nor the hypostatic Union. The act of God assuming human nature to be his own nature is not the creative act which creates human nature itself, nor is the hypostatic union the copula of the ideal formula or ideal judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, for that would identify Incarnation and creation, and all life would be the participation of Being and existences hypostatically united, which would imply, if not pantheism, dualism, which is no better. The hypostatical Union is the union of two logically pre-existing terms, and therefore cannot be the creative act which does not presuppose two terms, but produces by the first term, the second term from nothing. We know not, of course, the precise nature of the union, but we do know that it is not the union expressed by the copula, nor the completion or fulfilment of that union, for that is fulfilled in genesis or the cosmos. The creative act is an act, actual, not power or potential only. The return of existences to God as their final cause is not the completion or fulfilment of genesis or the act of creation, but the completion or fulfilment of the Divine purpose in that act; cosmogony is the complete production of existences.

"The Hypostasis," the author says, "is the creative act," "the creative act is the Word, Verbum." The Word is the second Hypostasis or Person of the Godhead: if that be creative act, what are the Hypostasis called the Father, and the Hypostasis called the Holy Ghost? If hypostasis is creative act, it must be so in each of the Divine Persons, and then we lose the distinction of persons and therefore the Trinity. That there is a procession in the Divine Being, whence the distinction of persons, we of course hold, but we have never supposed this procession is the creative act, or that the distinction of persons is the distinction between Being and its creative act. Neoplatonism or the Alexandrian school did not fall as low as that. The distinction of Persons (the generation of the word and the procession of the Holy Ghost) is *ad intra*, eternal, and necessary; the creative act is *ad extra*, a free act, contingent on the will of

God. God is free to create or not, as Gioberti himself maintains, but he is not free to be or not to be three co-equal and eternal Persons in one Divine, eternal, and immutable being or essence; for, though there are not three Gods, but one God only, each of the three Persons or Hypostases is God in the fullest and highest sense of the term. We cannot then call the creative act the Word, or make it a Divine Person, Hypostasis, or subsistence, without falling undeniably into pantheism. The creative act regarded in God and not externated is the Divine power to create, and identical with the being or essence of God, that is, God himself. Regarded as externated, it is what the author calls initial methexis, that is, in the language of mortals, genera and species, not yet individuated, or as that which in individuals is determined, individuated, or concreted. The methexis is participated idea, the Universal of the schoolmen, which cannot be identified with the Word, because *Verbum genitum non factum*, is generated not created, and participated idea, genera, species, universals, are existences, and are God only *mediante* his creative act. Were we so to identify it, we should be obliged to regard the Word, since the Word is God, as the potential or initial creation, and creation or the cosmos as the completion, fulfilment, or actualization of God, an Hegelian error and the seminal error of Buddhism, if not indeed of Brahminism. It is the basis of the doctrine of Pierre Leroux in his *Humanité*. The Word is not the creative act, but the creator, "All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing that was made."

Moreover, if the Hypostasis be taken as the creative act, its assumption of flesh can mean only the creation of man, and the life of Christ would be theandric only in the sense in which all human life is theandric. The human nature, like all created nature, would be united to God only *mediante* the creative; that is, only as the creature of God, not immediately as in the hypostatic union. Christ then would be man, but not God. He might be the most perfect of creatures, but he would be a creature and a creature only. We can conceive, then, no sense in which the author's doctrine can be so explained as to recognize the God-Man of Christian theology. Indeed, his whole system, as far as we can collect it, seems to exclude the orthodox Christology, and to require him to deny that Christ is God-Man, or anything more than a divinely created man. We agree with

him that Christ, the Author and Finisher of our faith, is the beginning and end of the palingenesia, which includes Incarnation and Glorification; but as he makes the palingenesia the second cycle of the cosmos, he can include in it only what was potential and initial in cosmogony. The principle and type, then, of the Incarnation must be in the cosmogony, and consequently the Incarnation can only complete the first cycle of the cosmos, as Glorification completes the second. Hence he makes the Incarnation the complete actualization or perfection of the initial creative act, as Glorification is the complete, perfect actualization of the final creative act. In all creatures, then, in that they are creatures, must be the type and beginning of all that is actual and complete in Glorification; so that Glorification is the perfect actualization of the potentiality of the Divine creative act. There must be, in every man, the type and beginning of the Incarnation, and our Lord can be Theandric only in the same sense, as we have already said, that every other man is theandric, and can differ from other men only in degree, only in the fact that in him is actually completed, perfected, or fulfilled, what is potential, inchoate, or incomplete in them. This is all he can say on his system. To make Christ any thing more, would be to make the Incarnation, and therefore palingenesia, not cosmic but supernatural; to withdraw it from the universal law of cosmic life, and declare it, as we do, supernatural, and supercosmic not only in relation to our own cognition, but supernatural in the order of reality. This shows wherefore we so earnestly object to the position that palingenesia is the second cycle of the cosmos.

It is very true, that carelessly following Gioberti, we have in this Review occasionally spoken of the palingenesia as the second cosmic cycle, but it was only because the final Christian end, to which through God's grace we aspire, is supernatural and not in the plane of the natural. We have called the second cycle palingenesia, not because we have denied the possibility of a natural beatitude, but because God through the Incarnation, enables us to aspire to a supernatural destiny, in which the natural destiny is absorbed in some sense, as the personality of the human nature assumed by our Lord was absorbed by the Divine personality. In the human nature assumed, the human personality remains virtual in the Divine which takes its place; so the natural beatitude is virtual in the supernatural

which is provided in its stead. In this sense palingenesia may be termed the second cycle of the cosmos, not as something having its type and beginning in cosmogony, but as superadded, in which the cosmic may not only be completed in regard to its end, but more than completed, elevated to a higher plane, above the cosmic line. In this sense, in which we supposed Gioberti himself was to be understood till reading the volume before us, we spoke. But Gioberti does not mean that man, in fact, has his natural only in his supernatural destiny, thus simply denying the *status naturæ puræ*, which he pronounces an untenable fiction; but he means that cosmogony can be completed, fulfilled, actualized only in palingenesia, and that the palingenesia is natural or supernatural according as it is or is not explicable by our cognition. In this sense we have never used the expression, and as it may be taken in this sense, the expression is not exact and ought not to be used.

Nothing here said, it will be perceived, militates in the least against the validity or comprehensiveness of the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, as we have heretofore understood and defended it; for, as we have shown, all reality is reducible to one or another of the terms of the judgment, and is either subject, or predicate, or copula. But we deny that it follows from this that the union of God with created existence in the Incarnation is that expressed by the copula, for it is immediate union with human nature already existing; otherwise our Lord could not have been called the Son of Mary, nor Mary Deipara, or Mother of God. The existence assumed, in relation to the assumption, was already created, for human nature was created and existed before its assumption, and therefore was not created by the assumption. All existences are united to God by the creative act. All union between God and man presupposes that act; but it does not, therefore, follow that all union between God and man is expressed by that act. The formula may be true, and yet God may sustain another than a creative union with creature, and we know from revelation that he does, namely, the hypostatic union. The error of the author is not in the assertion of the formula as the *primum philosophicum*, but in assuming that all truth is philosophical, or that every one of the mysteries is reducible to a philosophical theorem; or in denying the real distinction between the natural and the supernatural. The cosmos proceeds from God as the first cause, and has a motion of return to him as final cause.

God *mediante* the creative act is the principle and end of the cosmos. So also is God *mediante* his creative act the principle and end of the palingenesia; but in the palingenesia it is the God-Man, God Incarnate, that is Creator, Author, and Finisher. As the Incarnation or hypostatic Union is not by virtue of the creative act, it is not natural but supernatural. The supernaturality is not in the fact that this union is a mystery inexplicable to our cognition, for that may be said of creation; nor in the fact that it is immediately revealed by God himself, but in the fact that it is a supercosmic union—a supercreative union of two forever distinct natures in one Divine Person, as all Catholic theology teaches. The palingenesia having its first and last cause, as palingenesia, in the Incarnation is strictly supercosmic, supernatural, though it presupposes the natural, and like the cosmos has God for its first and last cause.

The point we insist on is that cosmogony is not potential, or initial palingenesia, or that palingenesia is the completion, fulfilment, or actualization of cosmogony, for palingenesia and cosmogony are not of the same genus. The type palingenesia actualizes is a new type, a new generic principle not found initially or finally in the cosmos. This new principle—new as a generic principle—is the theandric principle originating in the Incarnation, and becoming the generic principle, so to speak, of a new mankind, the elect mankind, of a new life, into which individuals enter by the rebirth or birth of grace, as they enter into the cosmic life by genesis or natural generation, as the author himself seems to us to teach in Chapter III. of his *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia.* We admit, if you will, that cosmogony, as a fact, is completed in palingenesia, but there is more in palingenesia than the fulfilment or completion of the cosmic type. There is superadded the fulfilment, actualization, or completion of the theandric type, which has its archetype only in the Incarnation. Gioberti makes man a God that begins, *che incomincia*, an inchoate God, because capable of infinite growth—*perchè è metessico e crescente all' infinito.* Finished, fulfilled, or completed, then, man is God. This completion may be successive or simultaneous, mediate or immediate, the completion is as to itself the same; so that it is man that becomes God by the complete fulfilment of his generic principle. Therefore says the author, *l'apice dell'atto creativo è la teandria.* But this implies that in the Incarnation it is the human that assumes the Divine, man that becomes God, not the Divine that

descends to man—the precise contrary of what we have understood to be the teaching of the Church:—"The Word was made flesh." It is not man that is incarnated, but God. The Incarnation is not, strictly speaking, the deification of human nature, nor its exaltation to infinite power; but it is God who condescends to take upon himself our infirm and finite nature,—*semetipsum exinanivit.* The type, then, of the palingenesiac life—if the Incarnation means any thing, since it is conceded to be the principle and end of the palingenesiac life—is not in cosmogony, and therefore palingenesia is not the second cycle of the cosmos, completing cosmogony, but a super-cosmic order, differing generically from the natural order.

Asserting the palingenesia as the completion of cosmogony, or the fulfilment of the first cycle of the cosmos, or the actualization of the potentiality of the cosmos, the realization of what is generic in the natural order, the author is unable to retain the dogma of original sin, and seems to us to favor the error on this point of Luther, Calvin, Baius, and Jansenius, by resolving it into the simple degeneracy of the human race, or positive corruption of human nature, as we think will be evident from what he says on the subject. We translate entire his section on *Original Sin*, in which we remark, however, the reader will find much worthy of his serious consideration, and not to be hastily rejected:

"Adam innocent is the primitive type of man, as Eden is the primitive type of pure earth. Eden is the methexic earth according to the grade of inchoate perfection. Christianity, that is, redemption, is the restoration of the primitive type in the case of man, and its fulfilment in the final type. The difference between the primitive and final types is the difference between the ovary and the fruit in plants. The union of the two types in the immanence with the whole successive series of their progress, is the non-temporal type, that is, the methexis fulfilled. Botany and all natural history prove original sin. Isolation in the order of reality as in that of the cognoscible disfigures, impairs, disnatures, slays, and annuls things, for truth and life consist in relation. Physical, moral, æsthetic, and intellectual evil, nullity is the defect of relation. Would you destroy a thing, annihilate it? Take from it all relation with other things, completely isolate it. Existence in universal is relation (absolute isolation is a nullity); it combines with the identity of being and creation, since creation is relation. The isolation of the living from nature is death; communion with nature (of the individual with the species, the mimesis with the methexis) is life. This denies not that life is internal, for the internal also is in the relation which constitutes the essence and

marrow of things. It reconciles the conflicting theories of the Hippocratists and the Brunonians. Isolation is sophistical, for the sophistical is the tendency of opposites to destroy each other, and to impede the union, the concord, the relation of dialecticism. Dialectics is relation. In the ideal orders isolation is the false. Hence the great guilt of heresy and schism in religion, and the high significance of unity in the dogma and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Would you render false the truest opinion? Separate it from others. It will at first become exaggerated, for exaggeration is precisely isolation; it will then become exclusive, and lose its essence which consists in relation. For this reason analysis alone is a falsifying chemistry, a false method; because it disjoins objects without reuniting them, and does not consider their relations. Sophistry, negative criticism, all systems of misbelief consist in taking truths out of their natural relations, by isolating them from one another. And what wonder that truth consists in relation, since it is solely in virtue of this that partial truths are united together, and make one only truth, responding to the objective unity of the Logos?

"The theory of relation explains original sin; for the great difficulty which militates against original sin is, (setting aside the pre-existence of souls, which, understood as it necessarily would be as a perfect and personal existence, is too foreign from the analogy of nature to be maintained,) how can each one of us participate in a fall which occurred before we existed? But assumed that relation is not something abstract and mental, but a concrete thing, real and substantial, the difficulty vanishes, and it is impossible to deny an intimate relation between the trunk of the human race and all its branches, whatever the interval of time and space that divides them.

"Original sin is simply the degeneracy of the human stock, originating in a dialectic defect. Man may degenerate as plants, as animals, as every thing finite. Degeneracy usually originates in the refusal of matter to respond to the intention of the artist. In man, therefore, it is the effect of the finite will, The formation of degenerate stocks (stirpi), as the Yellow, the American (native Indian), the Malayan, the Finnic, and the Ethiopian, gives us five examples of a degeneracy gradually descending till reaching its lowest point in the Negro. Now original sin is for the soul what physical degeneracy is for bodies. Nay, the physiological degeneration of the body implying corresponding defects in the spiritual faculties (wherefore the more degenerate stocks are the more ferocious, voluptuous, and less apt to civilization), is only an effect of original sin. Whence in this respect original sin, essentially one in all men, varies in its accidents according to zones and countries. In this accidental respect the least infected race is the White, the most is the Negro. Now what is this degeneracy but a defect of logic ? Therefore even geographically, the further a stock is removed from the telluric medium, and extends toward the extremes, the more it departs from the temperate zones and approaches the excessive, the further does it deviate

from the original type. Thus Europe and that part of Asia corresponding to it are peopled by Whites; the Negroes have Africa, the least methexic region of the globe; the Finns and Negroes, the two most degenerate lineages, divide between them the two extremes, the Arctic and the Equator. America and Oceania, inferior to Europe and Asia, are inhabited by reddish and bronzed families, inferior to the White and the Yellow. The geography of human degeneracy, that is, of original sin, would be very curious.

"It is necessary to distinguish in the original corruption of our nature, the fault from its development. The fault (*colpa*) is a certain morbid force which is the same in all men, and in all times; the development depends on external and physical conditions, and must vary from man to man, and from age to age. There is, therefore, in the process of corruption, as in every dynamic principle, an exterior progress or regress which should engage the attention of the philosopher of history. That process regards not alone the morality of man, although it resides essentially in that, but all the parts of human nature, as those in which it is more or less reflected or reproduced. Indeed, error in science, bad taste in art and literature, diseases of the body, barbarism in society, &c., are only branches of original sin in its development. A *history, therefore, of original sin* is a most essential part of the history of human nature.

"Original sin and redemption correspond to the two dialectic moments of the battle of opposites, and of their harmony. They are, therefore, supremely rational, and express a cosmic law. Their mysterious element is founded in reason. It is born from the methexis. The transmission of sin in all men is by virtue of the methexic unity of the species. The redemption of all by way of Christ is an effect of a like unity. In both intervenes a supernatural element; in original sin satanophany, and in redemption theandria. But even here there is analogy with reason, for satanophany and theandria represent the two extreme links of creation. In satanophany the human race touches the lowest grade, moral nullity, fallen beings, degraded (Satan) from an anterior cosmos (the angelic). In theandria the human race communicates with beings of the highest grade, with God, with Being itself, with the future cosmogony, with the palingenesia, with the methexis completed, with the Idea.

"The individual participates of nature, that is, the species, but does not contain it, for it is contained in it. In the human species only two individuals have contained the species, Adam and Christ; the one as the beginning, the other as the summit; the one as protological and cosmogonic, the other as teleologic and palingenesiac. This explains original sin and redemption.

"Original sin and the Incarnation are the two extremes; the one is the greatest discord of opposites, the other their greatest concord. By the former man is sequestered from God (in which consists moral evil) and the infinite; in the latter he is personified in God and joined in the great-

est possible intimacy to the infinite. Original sin is the initial disorder of the species, of the potential which is badly actualized; the Incarnation is its most perfect and most excellent actualization. The former pertains to the mimesis, the latter to the methexis.

"The sin of the first man, as that of the angels, was pride. Pride is the effort of a finite being to become infinite. All sin is such, having its root in pride. All sin is the attempt of the finite to usurp the throne of the Infinite; *eritis sicut dii.* All sin is, therefore, pantheistic in its essence, as is all error. The effort of the finite to become the infinite is not in itself culpable, for it originates in the instinct of the creature panting to join itself with the Creator as its last end, and to fulfil the second creative cycle. Mimesis tends naturally to become methexis. The methexis is the finite reduced to pure mentality and thence conjoined to the infinite. Hence we gather that the essence of sin consists alone in the bad application of a natural principle. The union of the finite with the infinite, the transformation of mimesis into methexis is in itself naturally good. It is not by itself sinful, but is even the essence of virtue, and its fulfilment *mediante* beatitude. In what then consists the evil? Precisely in willing to obtain the end in an undue mode; in willing to attain to it before the time, without merits, and by one's own strength; in confounding the reasons of time with those of eternity, the mundane state of probation with the ultramundane state of reward. Moral evil is always the good misplaced, thrown out of order, out of place. All action is good if *à propos.* The desire of Lucifer and Adam to be like God, and to know good and evil, was excellent; the evil was in willing to satisfy it unseasonably and by inopportune means. Errors, as moral evils, are pantheistic, and pantheism is the principle of creation abused and misapplied.

"The original fall, the formation of races, the division of languages, and the dispersion of the human family, are the first four sophistical and logical facts of human history. They are sophistical in themselves and as a transient mode; logical as they open the way to ulterior harmony. In each of these facts the potential unity branches out into a multiplicity, more or less actual, of opposites, disputing among themselves.

"Such branching out is both sophistical and logical. The original fall has for its logical elements; 1, the use of reason (knowledge of good and evil), the opposites are good and evil, the true and the false, &c., which man knows only on arriving at the use of reason; 2, sexual love, generation, &c.,....the opposites are the two sexes and their offspring, Cain and Abel, families, tribes, nations, &c.; 3, the introduction of civilization, that is, the first actualization of human power, the invention of sciences, foundation of the primitive arts, and the building of cities—Enochia, Jubal, Tubal Cain; the agriculture of Cain, the pasturage of Abel. The ancients with the fable of Prometheus, and among the moderns Rousseau and Leopardi, are therefore right in attributing the origin

of culture to a primitive fault; but this fault was also a virtue (*felix culpa*); and it is as a virtue, not as a fault, that it produces civilization.

"The sophistical elements of the original fall are the excesses which occasionally perfect and accompany the logical elements. The knowledge of good and evil produces sin, of truth and falsehood sophistry and error. Civilization gives place to a thousand disorders, &c. Original actualization or puberty was therefore, in some respects a virtue, in others a fault; under one aspect a rise, under another a fall. The three divisive facts, that is, the division of races, languages, nations (all related in Genesis), were virtues or faults; a rise or a fall, amelioration or the reverse, sophistry or logic, according to the respect in which they are taken. Thus considered original sin is a profoundly philosophical truth, evident, and connected with the universal order."—pp. 278-285.

To be consistent with himself the author should not say the knowledge of good and evil produces sin, but that sin gives the knowledge of good and evil; not that the knowledge of truth and error leads to error, but that error leads to the knowledge of truth and error. That is, sin is the road to good and error to truth; or, as we used to express it in our rough way when before our conversion we held the author's doctrine, the road to heaven runs through the devil's territory, and to serve God we must begin by serving Satan. In this case sin is a necessity in God's universe, and Satan a loyal servant of God, and the true friend of man, as sings in more than tolerable verse the author of *Festus*. It is so the author understands the *O Felix Culpa* which the Church sings in her exultation on Holy Saturday. We in our stupidity had not so understood the words in which she breaks forth with almost wild joy in view of the approaching dawn when her Lord shall rise again, triumphant over sin, death, and hell. We had not understood her to exclaim, O happy fault! to call the sin of Adam a *felix culpa* because it brings man to the use of reason, by its own virtue introduces art and science, builds cities, and founds civilization, and prepares the human race to rise to the completion of its creation; but because exulting in the wondrous wisdom and mercy of God, which by providing such and so great a Redeemer, has made it the occasion of a greater and more glorious destiny. *O Felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!* It was not a happy fault in itself, it was not a happy fault in its natural consequences, but was made so by the love and mercy of God that in so great and so glorious a manner redeemed it and overcame it with good. It is not the sin, but the grace

and bounty of God, so great that it covers over the sinfulness of sin, or wrests from sin its victory, in which she exults, and goes almost wild with her gratitude and joy.

The author rightly places the root of all sin in pride, and rightly defines pride to be the effort of the finite to usurp the throne of the infinite. "Ye shall be as gods," was the temptation. But when, in order to bring out the logical side of pride and to defend it, he makes pride essentially the instinctive desire of the finite to unite itself with the infinite, or to attain to God as its complement and final cause, he is in another order of ideas, and is speaking not of pride, but of love, in fact of humility, the root of all love in the creature, for all love in the creature originates in the sense of its own insufficieney and the worth of the beloved. Pride seeks to be as God, love seeks to be united to God, and to lose itself in God. Pride would be God, love would be God's, and have God all in all. The author, when he says pride would usurp the throne of the infinite, gives its true nature; but when he says it is essentially the aspiration of the finite to the infinite as its complement, or as its final cause, he changes its nature and confounds it with love or humility, the root of all virtue. We cannot then agree that original sin originated in the desire of fulfilling our destiny, and of attaining to God as our last end, as our supreme Good, as well as the supreme Good in itself, and that its sinfulness or fault consists only in willing it unseasonably and *mal à propos*, before its time, and out of its place. We prefer rather to say, with all our theologians, that sin is an abuse of free will, and consists in turning from God to the creature, and seeking our beatitude in the created instead of the Creator. The desire of Adam could not have been the knowledge of good and evil, for he already had that knowledge or he could not have sinned, but to know good and evil independently, or from himself as God knows them, not as taught them in the law of a superior, or as learning them from a master. It was the master that he would get rid of, and it was the law imposed by a superior from which he would emancipate himself.

The author says, "Original sin is nothing else than the degeneracy of the race." We should call the degeneracy of the race the effect and penalty of original sin, rather than original sin itself. No doubt man by the fall became deteriorated in both body and mind. The author explains very well the principle on which original sin is propagated or

transmitted to all the posterity of Adam, namely, the unity of the race, the methexic or generic identity of all men, and the life of individuals by commerce with the species, a principle which is denied by the Conceptualists and Nominalists. But he does not explain to us in what original sin consisted, or what it was from which man in it fell. "Adam innocent was the type of the primitive man." This, if it means any thing, means not that Adam was the primitive man, but that he was man in the primitive state of human nature. Now it is precisely that primitive state we would have defined. The Council of Trent says, man lost by original sin the justice and sanctity in which he was constituted, and became deteriorated in both mind and body. Was that original righteousness in the order of nature, and was the fall, the deterioration, the corruption, or the loss of our natural spiritual faculties to attain to or to live it? So say Luther, Calvin, Baius, and the Jansenists, and so the author himself would seem to say, for though he admits the supernatural, it is only as to the means, not as to the principle or end. Satanic intervention is admitted as tempting man to sin, and the intervention of Christ is also admitted, but only to redeem from sin, and both satanophany and theandria are resolved into rational truths, the one into the culmination of discord, the other into the culmination of concord. Original sin, then, can be only a simple degeneracy or corruption of human nature, which, as we understand it, is by implication condemned in the condemnation of the 55th proposition of Baius: "God could not have created man from the first such as he is now born,"—the fundamental proposition of the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists. According to the doctrine of Catholic theologians, as we had supposed of the Catholic Church herself, original sin consists essentially in the loss of original righteousness, in which man before his fall was constituted, and certain gifts or endowments which, though in the natural order, and essential to what is called integral nature, are not essential or due to pure nature, and are therefore called *indebita*. The consequences of the fall consist in being despoiled of the original righteousness, and stript of these gifts or *indebita*. The original righteousness is not in the natural but in the supernatural, and man being constituted in it was raised to the plane of a destiny that could not be attained to by the full and normal development and use of his natural faculties, and hence constituted in that state his nature is called elevated

nature—*natura elevata.* Adam by his prevarication was despoiled of this original supernatural righteousness, and, as he was both the generic and federal head in the order of genesis of mankind, all men were despoiled of it in him. The deterioration of nature which followed the loss of the supernatural righteousness was the loss of integral nature, or the *indebita;* that is, of the complete subjection of the body to the mind, the inferior soul to the higher, the appetites, passions, and senses to reason, and reason to the law of God, and exemption from pain, sickness, and death of the body, whence follow all the moral and physical diseases and disorders which afflict our race, and under which the creation groaneth in pain, sighing for deliverance. This is Catholic doctrine as it has been taught to us. According to this the loss by original sin was the loss of supernatural justice and holiness, together with integral nature, and only a negative deterioration of nature regarded as pure nature. But the author makes no account of this original justice, denies by implication that man either had in innocence supernatural righteousness, or by sin lost any righteousness above nature, and defines original sin to be nothing else than a degeneracy of human nature. As he makes redemption the simple restoration of man to integral nature, theandria the simple fulfilment of his nature, it is clear that he recognizes no real distinction of orders between the natural and supernatural. The supernatural is simply in our ignorance, as the superintelligible is in our impotence to know. If this is not pure naturalism and rationalism we know not what would be.

We are by no means satisfied with the author's doctrine as to the dialectic character of original sin. Dialectics or logic, according to the author, has its type and model in the ideal judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, in which the creative act is the copula or middle term uniting the two extremes, *ens* and *existentias*. The archetype or prototype is in the Holy Trinity, whence the *Verbum* or Word is the copula or middle term uniting the two extremes, Father and Holy Ghost, asserted in the *Filioque*, or the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, or as the Greeks perhaps with more philosophical precision express it, "from the Father through the Son," meaning thereby to deny what they supposed the Latins asserted, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from two principles, and to assert that he proceeds from one principle only, which is true, if we understand by

principle as the Greeks do, principle in its strict sense, as primordial or first principle. But this placing the prototype of logic in the union of the three Persons of the Godhead through the medium of the Logos or second term is going beyond the sphere of our investigation, and plunging deeper into the superintelligible essence of God than we dare venture. Logic is undoubtedly derived from Logos (λόγος), and is in some way connected with the Logos or the second Person in the Trinity, we concede, for the Logos is the true light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world. That the archetype of all creation is in the Divine Being, which is essential unity in three Persons, we firmly hold, but that the Logos is the creative act, and the middle term uniting two extremes, whence logic or dialectics, is more than we are prepared to assert, for as we have shown the distinction between the Divine essence and the creative act is not the distinction or principle of the distinction of Persons in the Godhead. In the creation, the whole Trinity acts in the unity of essence, as is asserted in the ideal formula. That God is, as St. Thomas says, *similitudo rerum omnium*, we hold, and must hold, so long as we maintain that in him is the *idea exemplaris* of every thing he creates, but at the same time we do not feel ourselves able to trace the similitude in all things.

Leaving all speculations in this superintelligible region, we are willing to take the ideal formula as the universal dialectic type. But in this formula the copula does not simply unite the two extremes, is not the middle term bringing two opposites or contraries into harmony, and it is not just to say that God and existences are two extremes, or two opposites united, conciliated, and brought into harmony by the creative act, as we told the author some years ago, during his lifetime, for the *ens* by the creative act places *existentias*, and so far from the creative act bringing existences into harmony and union with *ens*, they are themselves that act itself in its extrinsic terminus. Gioberti himself defines in a previous work existence or creation "the extrinsecation of the creative act." The creative act does not simply unite the predicate to the subject, but by it the subject produces the predicate. The author falls, we fear, in applying his formula, into the very pantheism the formula itself refutes. Indeed in this posthumous work he half frightens us. Identifying as he does the creative act with the Word or Hypostasis, thus making it immanent in the divine Essence,

and asserting it as the middle term uniting being and existences as two extremes, as two opposites, or contraries, we see not how it is possible for him to escape the pantheism charged against him; for if the act is immanent in being so must be the effect, and then the procession of existences is in being, not from being, and the opposites reconciled are the contrarieties of being itself. So interpreted the Jesuit fathers at Rome have been right in rejecting his formula as pantheistic. The archetype of the creative act is immanent in God as are all archetypes, but not the act, for if it were the distinction between being and existences would be the immanent distinction or procession of persons in the Godhead. The author should have studied Schleiermacher and the Orientals less, and St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and the definitions of the Church more.

If we take the ideal formula as the model of the logical judgment, we must understand that the subject creates or produces the predicate either really in the order of being, or intelligibly in the order of science. We cannot say then with the author that truth and life are in relation—*la verità e la vita versano nella relazione*, that is, the reality is in the relation, not in the related,—a doctrine we thought he had forever exploded in his *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia*, especially in his *Degli Errori di Rosmini*. Indeed, if we are to take the volume before us as an authentic statement of his doctrine, we have been most egregiously deceived, and have given him credit for a philosophy which he has never defended, and which was ours rather than his. He speaks in this volume of concrete, real, substantial relations, and resolves the essence of being into relation. If the essence of things be relation, pray, tell us what is related? Being is not relation, for it is independent, self-existent, real, necessary, absolute, as Gioberti has maintained in his criticism on the *ens in genere* of Rosmini. There are real relations in the sense that real things are really related, but the relation considered in itself, as prescinded from the *related*, is a mere abstraction and therefore a nullity. Things are really related to God their Creator, and are nothing out of that relation, that is, out of or severed from the creative act that produces them, but the contrary is not true. God is not only in relation to creatures, or only in relation to his creative act. He was under no necessity, external or internal to create, and creation produces no change in him. To be is not in to do, as our old

Transcendentalist friends maintained, nor is God being only in creating, nor does he actualize his possibility in creating existences. Creation is not infinite abyss or void become *pleroma* or *plenum*, God is not possible being, but actual being, *actus purissimus*, as say the schoolmen after Aristotle.

According to the author's doctrine *ens simpliciter* would be the most sophistical of all possible conceptions, and yet he had in a former work told us *l'Ente* can stand alone, and that *l'Ente è*, Being is, is a true judgment. The sophistical is taking the extremes without their middle term, out of their relations. If all truth and life are in relation, how can being is be a true judgment, since being is, says no more nor less than *ens simpliciter*, at least expresses no relation, for *ens* and *est* are identical? Hence, God reveals his name to Moses, as I AM, SUM QUI SUM. The relation between being and existence is not reciprocal or mutual. To conceive of God as existing apart from his works, or as not creator, would be sophistical, and consequently false. Therefore we must conceive of him as necessarily creator, and therefore of creation as necessary, which conducts us to pantheism.

But in the application of dialectics, the author forgets that the type of dialectics is in the ideal formula, according to which the subject produces the predicate. The medius terminus unites the subject and predicate not as two extremes and two opposites, for the opposite of being is not existence, but nothing, which since it is nothing cannot be united, and the author is not to be followed when he defines existence the union of being and nothing, *mediante* the creative act, or the medium between being and nothing, for between being and nothing there is no medium, and existence in that it is something is not nothing. But in his application he conceives the subject not as creating the predicate, but the subject and predicate as the two opposites or extremes. Thus the Negroes and Finns or Lapps are sophistical because they dwell at the two extremes, one at the extreme north, the other at the equator. Africa is the most sophistical quarter of the globe, because it is the most exposed to the extreme heat. The white races are the most dialectic, the most logical, because they inhabit the medium, the temperate zones. Hence we suppose is to be explained the fact that in our country the extreme abolitionists are at the extreme north, and the extreme fire-eaters are at

the extreme south. As our continent is less methexic, less dialectic than Europe and Asia, though we see not why, since it lies within the same zones, the Europeans settled here will in time fall below the white races of Europe and Asia, below the yellow race, Chinese and Tartars, and become of a reddish and bronzed complexion like the aborigines.

The dialectic effects of original sin, we cannot accept. One of these the author tells us is the use of reason or knowledge of good and evil; but how can a man who has not arrived at the use of reason, and who does not inherit sin, commit sin? If Adam, before he sinned, had not the use of reason, knew not good and evil, how was it possible for him to sin? Moreover, to suppose it, would be to suppose he was created an infant, not an adult man, contrary to common sense, contrary to the teaching of the theologians, and contrary to what the author himself says, who makes Adam one of the two individuals in which the human species is completely actualized and individuated. What is his middle term uniting these two extremes or opposites? That sin, in the providence of God, is overruled and made the occasion of good, we do not deny; but we do deny that the good is ever the product of the sin, sin original or actual is always sophistical, always evil, and in no sense can error be dialectical and good. The good either exists in spite of it, or is due to the operation of another cause than the sin itself. We shall therefore never admit that original sin under any aspect, or in any respect, is logical, in accordance with the logic of things, or a profoundly philosophical truth, evident, connected with the universal order of things. It is a fact to which all nature and all history bear witness, we grant and deplore, but it is not a truth, but like all sin a falsehood in the intellectual and an evil in the moral order.

It is thus we understand Gioberti's doctrine as contained in the extracts we have made, and it seems to us to be their plain, natural, and obvious sense. It is possible, however, that his friends may insist that his language admits of a different interpretation, one, if not in consonance with scholastic theology, at least in consonance with Catholic faith. We by no means pretend that it is necessary to preserve in all things the form of scholastic theology, or that every departure from it is a departure from orthodoxy. We have given as far as we have gone Gioberti's

doctrine as we understand it, and we have offered such criticisms on the propositions cited as have seemed to us just and called for. We however have not yet done with the author; for the present we break off, but with our exposition incomplete. We have much more to say, and something to say in his favor as well as against him. We have thus far done little more than point out what we regard as his errors; we intend in one or two future articles to indicate his truth and to develop the real contributions he has made to theological and philosophical science. But the present article, though incomplete, and doing but scant justice to the work before us, is perhaps enough for our readers, and more than they will be willing to read and inwardly digest during these hot summer days, and in these times when their minds are engrossed with the deplorable condition of the country and the horrors of civil war.

ARTICLE III.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1861.]

A Western editor, who has little occasion to put up the Scotchman's prayer, "O Laird! gie us a gude conceit o' oursels," attempts to be witty and merry over our advocacy of the *synthetic* method; and others have been at some loss to understand what is the precise difference between the synthetic and analytic methods we recognize. To our merry critic we probably have no answer to give that would be intelligible; to the others who ask rather than seek to give information, and who experience a real difficulty on the subject, we may reply that analysis considers a subject in its several parts and these several parts abstractedly or as isolated, while synthesis considers the subject as a whole and the several parts in their relation to the whole or as integrated in it. In all philosophizing, as in all reasoning, there must be both analysis and synthesis; and we do not understand, and never have understood by the synthetic method the exclusion of analysis. In the synthetic method synthesis predominates and controls the analysis; in the analytic method analysis predominates and controls the synthesis. In the synthetic method we use analysis to *find* the synthesis; in the analytic method we use analysis in order to *construct* a synthesis.

We call the Scholastic method the analytic method, not because it does not aim at synthesis, but because it aims at a logical synthesis, which is a mere abstract synthesis, not at the real synthesis of things. It constructs, it does not find a synthesis; and hence its synthesis is not a real synthesis but a simple sum or summary. By it we attain to abstract conceptions, we see or study truth in detail, in its separate or detached parts, not in its real relations as a living and organic whole. There is, we should be sorry to question, back of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas a real, a living synthesis, as there is back of all the definitions of the Church the living synthesis proceeding from the creative act of God and revealed by the Gospel, in which every definition of the Church, every special doctrine of the *Summa* is integral, and may be seen to be so by an intellect capable of taking in the whole, and every part in its real relation to the whole; but this real and living synthesis is not continually kept in view, is not clearly and distinctly brought out, and by ordinary minds is neither discovered nor suspected; each proposition stands, as it were, alone, as an independent proposition, not as a part bearing a relation to the whole, and having its truth and significance only in that relation. All minds of the first order are synthetic, and comprehend the parts in their relation to the whole, while minds of the second, or an inferior order are analytic, and are capable of comprehending the whole only in its parts, and lose themselves in particulars.* Hence it is that our later philosophers and theologians who profess to follow the mediæval masters give us in either theology or philosophy at best only a summary of particulars united by no common bond, integrated in no common principle that unites and vivifies the whole; hence

* It is exceedingly interesting to follow out the thought here merely indicated. St. Thomas teaches that in proportion as the mind is of a higher order, it understands by fewer ideas, until we ascend to God who understands by one only idea. See *Sum Theol*, p. 1, Qu. 55, Art. 3 and Qu. 89, Art. 1, and Quodlib. 7, Art. 3. Balmes in his *Fundamental Philosophy* denotes the fourth chapter of his first book to this subject, and he says (vol. 1, p. 31): "Men of true genius are distinguished by the unity and extent of their conceptions. If they treat a difficult and complicated question, they simplify it, consider it from a high point of view, and determine one general idea which sheds light upon all the others. If they have a difficulty to solve, they show the root of the error, and with a word dispel all the illusion of sophistry. If they use synthesis, they first establish the principle which is to serve as its basis, and with one dash trace the road to be followed in order to reach the wished-for

modern official philosophy is a *hortus siccus*, and theology a *caput mortuum*, or rather a cabinet of specimens, where each specimen is properly labelled and numbered. To be a first-class philosopher or a first-class theologian now-a-days demands only a good memory, or readiness in reading or deciphering the labels and numbers.

Synthesis, rightly understood, is not something we attain to or construct by our logical analyses, but is the real relation in which things actually exist, and to find it, we must study things as they really are, and see them in their real relation to their first cause and to their final cause. In following the synthetic method we start from the original synthesis of things, intuitively given, which is the basis of all the real as of all the knowable, and study to bring back to this synthesis and integrate in it the several particular things we observe and analyze, for these things have no meaning, no reality even, out of this synthesis, or, if you prefer it, their synthetic relation. Thus, if you dissolve the synthesis and take either of its terms as isolated, you attain not to truth, but either to pantheism or to nullism. The creative act is a nullity if isolated from *Ens* or Being whose act it is, as creatures or existences are nullities if isolated from the creative act on which they are absolutely dependent. Dissolve the synthesis and take the first term, Being, and proceed analytically from the idea of Being to the idea of creation, and the only idea of creation you can attain to is that of a necessary creation, or the pantheism of Cousin, because analytic judgments merely bring out the contents of the subject analyzed, and in them subject and predicate are identical, and the predicate adds nothing to the subject. If the subject is real, necessary, and eternal Being, creation, as analytically deducible therefrom, must be itself real, eternal, and necessary Being, and therefore no creation at all; God and the universe would be identical.

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result. If they make use of analysis they strike in its secret resort the point where decomposition is to commence, they at once open the object and reveal to us its most obscure mysteries. If there is question of a discovery, while others are seeking here and there, they strike the ground with their foot and exclaim, "the treasure is here."

"No doubt there is in the intellectual order a simple truth from which all other truths emanate, one idea which includes all other ideas. This philosophy teaches, and the efforts, the natural and instinctive tendencies of every intelligence toiling after simplicity and unity show it; such also is the dictate of common sense, which considers that thought the highest and noblest which is the most comprehensive and the most simple." ED.

Exclude the subject and proceed to deduce the idea of Creator from the simple analysis of existence, you would equally fail to attain to the idea of God, since, as we have said, analytic judgments add no predicate to the subject, and can bring out only what is already contained in it, though before analysis not apprehended.

The illusion of our philosophers and some of our theologians on this point is in the fact that they unconsciously in analyzing existence or the contingent, do recognize and assert the necessary and real as creating it. The contingent is dependent and therefore cannot stand alone on its own basis, and is inconceivable without that which is not contingent on which it depends for existence. In itself, isolated from God, it is simply nothing. The analysis of nothing gives nothing; from nothing, nothing comes. Therefore analysis of the simple idea of existence, or existence by itself alone, conducts directly and immediately to nullism. Here are the two rocks on which modern philosophy splits. German philosophy, starting from Being, or what it calls the Absolute, remains forever in Being or the Absolute, and can never assert the contingent or relative. Cartesianism, or the prevailing French philosophy, starting from personal existence, or the contingent, remains forever in it, and can never get beyond subjectivism, to the assertion of real and necessary Being, that is to say, is doomed to end in simple nihilism. This too was the case with all ancient Pagan philosophy, for that dissolved the original synthesis by leaving out the copula, and turned forever in the subject, real and necessary Being, or in the predicate, contingent and dependent existence.

We avoid either error only by recognizing the original synthesis, or divine synthetic judgment intuitively affirmed to us, Being creates existences. Having in this judgment the three terms which embrace all reality, analysis of any one of the terms is subordinated to it, and enlightened and directed by it. Analysis is, then, obliged to study things not merely in themselves but in their relations, and thus remains within the region of reality. In this original synthetic judgment there are the three terms of a judgment proper, subject, predicate, and copula, and these three terms are not only the basis or foundation of all reality, but they run through it and are preserved through all the range of secondary causes and effects; so that following the synthetic method, analysis cannot isolate or take things out

of the relations implied or asserted in this judgment. The proper subject of analysis becomes under the synthetic method not particular things in their isolation, but particulars in their relations to the general or the whole; it becomes simply an instrument of synthesis, and serves only to render more apparent or more striking the real synthesis which embraces all things, Being and existences in their actual relations.

All philosophy deserving that name is necessarily synthetic; it is really the *σοφία* of the Greeks, the *sapientia* of the Latins, and is properly defined, the science and application of principles. Its aim is to ascertain and to comprehend the real principles of things, *causæ causarum*, understood both as first principles and last principles, or as first cause and final cause, and their application in the order of production and in the order of consummation, or in the first and second cosmic cycles—as Gioberti would say, in genesis and palingenesis or palingenesia. Such being the nature and aim of philosophy, it is only sad merriment that sneers at our preference of the synthetic to the analytic method, and a merriment which proves that he who indulges it has yet to obtain the first philosophic conception; and that how much soever he may have read in philosophical works, how much soever he may have studied Dmowski, Liberatore, Bouvier, or the Lugdunensis, he has not entered even the vestibule of the temple of philosophy, far less its adytum.

This being premised, we can understand what should be meant by the Philosophy of Revelation. By revelation we understand the making known, or the communication to man in a supernatural manner, of an order of truth above the natural order or that which comes within the range, by its own unassisted powers, of our natural reason. By the philosophy of revelation is to be understood the truths so made known or communicated, considered in their relation to the natural, or what we may term the rational order, or the comprehension of both orders of truth in their real relations to one another, or their real synthesis, and in their relation in common to God the source of all truth, the first cause, and to God the end of all existence, or universal final cause. The propriety of a Philosophy of Revelation rests on the assumption that there is a real relation, independent of our thought, which our thought does not create, but simply discovers or apprehends, between the two orders

of truth, that they are not two mutually independent orders, but mutually touch and complete each other, and are both to be taken into the account when seeking to explain the origin, the progress, and the end of either. Neither order stands by itself alone or is for itself alone, but each is for the other; and neither in the most general and ultimate end of man is completed without the other, or the design of Providence in regard to man and the universe fully accomplished. To explain this relation, to show the mutual harmony of the two orders, the unity of their origin, the one common law to which they are subjected, and their final integration in union with God as the universal final cause, was the purpose of Gioberti in the work some fragments of which he had only written when death overtook him. Whether his work, had he lived to complete it, would have been all that could be desired on the subject, may well be doubted; but that it would have thrown great light on many of the highest, most important, and most difficult problems with which the human mind grapples or can grapple, no one who has made himself at all acquainted with the philosophical genius and vast erudition of this remarkable man can for one moment question. The fragments which his friend has collected and here published are so many Torsos for the study of the philosopher and the theologian. Much is wanting; but what we have are master-pieces in their way.

In our last Review we criticised unsparingly what we regarded as the errors into which the author has fallen. These errors are: 1. Confounding the natural and supernatural, or virtually denying all real distinction between them; 2. Identifying the Second Person of the Trinity with the creative act; 3. Representing the Incarnation as the completion of the act of creation, and each man as an inchoate God, or a God that begins; 4. Representing original sin as dialectical as well as sophistical; and 5. Asserting that all truth and life consist in relation. Some of our merry critics, who come under the description of what the late Daniel Webster called *captores verborum*, whether in good Latin or not, would add a sixth, namely, that he uses the terms *methexis* and *mimesis*, or in Italian, *la metessi* and *la mimesi;* terms which they probably are not familiar with, or at least affect not to understand.

In a reply to these merry critics, we may say the words are not uncommon in contemporary Italian, and the genius

of our language admits the incorporation of either Greek or Latin words in scientific writing, when needed. The terms in question are very convenient, and have no equivalents in Anglo-Saxon. They cannot be translated literally and exactly by any terms we are acquainted with in English or in Latin, and therefore in translating we transfer them in their Greek, not in their Italianized form. They are good Greek, and are used by Plato and by Clemens Alexandrinus substantially in the sense in which they are used by Gioberti, and pertain to a deeper and truer philosophy than they who object to them appear to have mastered. Amongst Latin authors, St. Augustine is the only one we have found thoroughly acquainted with the philosophy to which these terms pertain. He uses in their place *intelligible* and *visible;* but though the best terms he had in Latin, they are not their exact equivalents. The methexis is indeed the intelligible, but it is the created intelligible; the mimesis is the visible, but it is the visible that imitates or symbolizes the created intelligible. Properly speaking, however, the intelligible is not created, and therefore its substitution for the methexis is liable to lead to a very important, a very mischievous error, traces of which we find in some Scholastics and especially in our modern German rationalists.

Methexis is the *genus*, the *universal* of the Schoolmen; but it defines what neither *genus* nor *universal* does, and avoids the error alike of the Realists, Conceptualists, and Nominalists. What are *universals?* what are *genera?* ask the Schoolmen. Some answer, they are mere words; others that they are mental conceptions; others that they are entities. The last were called Realists; but, if you say *universals* or *genera* are entities, then you can have man without men. The first were called Nominalists; and if you say with them *universals* or *genera* are mere words with nothing corresponding to them existing *a parte rei*, then you have men without man, and the generation of individuals is inexplicable and inconceivable. If you say with the second, or Conceptualists, that they are mere mental conceptions, you escape no difficulty of the Nominalists. Later writers call them ideas, and understand by ideas *essentiæ rerum metaphysicæ*, that is to say, the types or exemplars of things in the divine mind, and therefore indistinguishable from the divine essence itself, which is either nominalism or pantheism, according to the point of view of the interpreter.

The word *methexis*, which implies participation, expresses accurately the truth which the Schoolmen failed to discover, or at least to express. *Genera*, according to the philosophy to which this word pertains, are not merely participated by individuals, whence generation, but themselves participate of Being; so that the methexis participates of Being through the act of creation, like every creature, and is participated of by the individuals of the race, and expresses precisely the relation of the genus to the Creator and to the creature, subsisting never without either. The methexis is never without the mimesis, or the mimesis without the methexis—the race without the individual, or the individual without the race, which it individuates, imitates, and symbolizes.

We shall understand this better by bearing in mind that God created all things, and caused all things created to bring forth fruit after their kind. Thus there is to be considered, first, creation; second, generation, production, not reproduction, as too often improperly asserted. The methexis of the universe is created, and is, in Gioberti's philosophy, the creative act extrinsecated, or the extrinsecation of the *Verbum*, the Word, extrinsecated in an individual male and female of each kind or species. If we speak of man, the methexis was immediately created and individualized in Adam, in whom there is the perfect union of the methexis and the mimesis, or the completion of the methexis with the mimesis. But from Adam, from whose side Eve was taken, or who was, as in the first chapter of Genesis it is said, created male and female, the individuation of the methexis goes on from generation to generation. The same order is constituted in principle through all the genera and species of the universe. The methexis is actual in relation to the Creator, potential in relation to individuals. But the methexis has and may have other applications, for the analogy of generation runs through the whole of the Creator's works, and in all created things which can be objects of our thought, we may discover the methexic and mimetic elements, often expressed by the terms substance and form, the real and the apparent, the thing and its symbol, the type and its fulfilment. When the Scriptures say, God is angry, or he repents, they speak mimetically, symbolically, and the methexic truth is what is really intended by these forms of expression. All language is either methexic or mimetic according to the point of view from which it is considered; mimetic as to the form, methexic as to the

noetic truth expressed; mimetic as a sign, methexic in that which is signified to the understanding. The terms may thus be universally applied, and their application is warranted by that great principle which St. Thomas, after Plato and St. Augustine, lays down, that God is *similitudo rerum omnium*, or that all things, in their order and according to their kind and species, copy or imitate him as their grand archetype or prototype. All orders of the cosmos or visible universe exist methexically and mimetically, the methexic manifesting itself continually in the mimetic, and the mimetic struggling eternally to become methexic. In this way the life, the discord, and the harmony of the universe are produced and perpetuated.

Since writing our previous article on Gioberti, a learned friend, far better versed in the language and thought of Gioberti than we are, has suggested to us that most of our criticisms are mistakes, and rest either on our misapprehension of the real meaning of the author, or on our having taken the opinions of a particular school of theologians for Catholic doctrine itself. We charged Gioberti with confounding the natural and supernatural, or with recognizing no real distinction between them, or with virtually denying all supernatural *order* as distinct from the natural and above it. This his friend says, is not true, for the author asserts most positively such order, and his whole philosophy of revelation demands it, only what we call the supernatural he calls palingenesia, and places in the second cycle, or the return of man to God, as his final Cause. The whole Christian order originates in and depends on the Incarnation indeed, but it is ordered in relation to man's destiny, or return to God as his supreme Good, not to his origin in God as his first cause, and, therefore, though it may have, since it proceeds from God, within itself the two motions, it must necessarily, when taken in its cosmic relation, pertain to the second cycle, as Gioberti asserts. It is a new creation, indeed, for it originates in the immediate creative act of God, but it cannot be regarded as an original creation throughout, otherwise it could not be palingenesia, *regeneration*, or a new birth. It has reference to generation, and renews it by grace.

The friend of Gioberti continues: "The doctrine you oppose to the author is untenable, for it makes the natural and the supernatural two distinct, independent, and disconnected creations, with only an arbitrary and unreal relation between them. Neither has any reason in the other.

On your doctrine nature might easily suffice for itself, and complete itself in its own order. Man, if he had been left to nature alone, even as his nature now subsists, could have had not only no conception of any thing above nature, but no aspiration even to any good above natural beatitude, above the limited, the finite, and, consequently, no aspiration to possess an infinite and unbounded good, contrary to the teaching of the Fathers and Great Doctors of the Church, especially St. Thomas. Man, on the theory of the natural and supernatural you have adopted and refined upon, is not even *in potentia* to the supernatural. How then do you bring the supernatural to him, or bring him to the supernatural, and supernaturalize your natural man? On your theory you do not harmonize nature and grace, the natural and supernatural; and, in spite of all your efforts, run into an absurd dualism. There is and can be on the supposition of the *status naturæ puræ* no commerce between the natural and supernatural, and can at best be only a sort of pre-established harmony, like that which Leibnitz imagined to explain the relation between soul and body. You fall into the very analytical errors you seek to avoid, and instead of being a synthetist, are a dualist.

"You complain of Gioberti that he denies the *status naturæ puræ* imagined by theologians, and undertake to prove that such state cannot be denied without contradicting the definitions of the Church, especially the definition given in the condemnation of the fifty-fifth proposition of Baius: *Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur.* This and the other propositions of Baius condemned by St. Pius V., you should bear in mind, were not condemned as in no sense true, but as false and heretical in the sense of the *asserters*, that is, in the sense in which they were maintained by Baius and his adherents. They maintain that God must have originally created and endowed man with the natural powers and faculties necessary to attain his destiny; but as man, as he is now born, evidently has not those powers and faculties, he could not have created him from the beginning such as he is now born. In this sense the proposition is condemned, and what is really asserted by the condemnation is not that God could have created man such as he is now born, but that he could have created man without the natural powers and faculties necessary to attain to final beatitude. This is evident from the Bull of the Holy Pontiff, and has been clearly shown by Berti, the theologian of Benedict XIV., and is confirmed, in some sense, by the refusal of Benedict XIV., to approve the condemnation of the doctrine of Berti which the Archbishop of Sens solicited. 'Berti,' says Père Gratry in a note to his *Connaissance de Dieu*, 'maintains the existence of a natural, innate desire in man of the intuitive vision. He has for him the whole Scotist school, before and after Baius. He has for him St. Thomas in the two *Sums*, and the greater part of the Thomists, especially Durandus and Soto. Molina and Estius, though not admitting the existence of this natural desire, agree that it is permitted to hold it, and that it is even the common opinion of the Scholastics, whose doctrine

Molina sums up in the sentence: *Beatitudinem in particulari esse finem nostrum naturalem, non quoad assecutionem, sed quoad appetitum et potentiam passivam.* Suarez makes the same avowal. But Bellarmin (*de Gratia Primi Hominis*, I. cap. 7) is remarkably explicit on this point, and full of the Augustinian sense. He asserts, after remarking that non parva quæstio est sitne sempiterna beatitudo, quæ in visione Dei sita est, finis hominis naturalis aut supernaturalis, *Beatitudinem finem hominis naturalem esse quoad appetitum, non quoad assecutionem;* and adds: *Non est autem natura humana indignum, sed contra potius ad maximam ejus pertinet dignitatem, quod ad sublimiorem finem condita sit, quam ut eum solis naturæ suæ viribus attingere possit.*'

"As it is allowable to assert the existence in man of the natural innate desire of beatitude possible only in glorification, or *visio Dei intuitiva*, and as it is agreed on all hands that this desire cannot be naturally fulfilled, it is perfectly true to say that God could have created man in the beginning such as he is now born, that is, with the innate natural desire of a good, or beatitude, without the natural ability to attain to it. In other words, you cannot conclude from the existence of the desire the natural ability to attain its satisfaction, because it may have entered into the designs of Providence to satisfy it by supernatural means. On the other hand, we cannot conclude from the absence of the ability, the non-existence of the desire.

"The existence of this desire of beatitude, without the natural ability to fulfil it, or to attain its satisfaction, that is, to see God in the beatific vision, is a proof that God could not have created and left man in a state of pure nature, for it is repugnant to his goodness, or even justice, to suppose him to have created man, and implanted in his nature desires for which he provides no means of satisfaction. This principle is recognized by all our theologians in their arguments from reason and nature for the immortality of the soul. The desire, if natural, and placed in the heart by the Creator himself, is a pledge or promise on the part of God of the means of its fulfilment. In giving the desire, he promises to render the end attainable. But as the end is not and cannot be attainable by any natural faculty, God gives, in the very nature of man, a pledge or promise of the supernatural, and, therefore, the *status naturæ puræ* is not only not a real state, but an impossible state. This desire is for an infinite and unbounded good, which is and can be only God, the Supreme Good itself. This good is not attainable by any of the powers conceded to man in the *status naturæ puræ;* and as the only good to which that nature, supposing it to be possible, can attain, is only an imperfect, a limited good, it can never satisfy our natural desire, and therefore can never be natural beatitude, or that in which the soul can repose in peace. The notion, then, of a natural beatitude, therefore of the *status naturæ puræ*, is untenable, and must be given up.

"In contending for the state of pure nature, you have followed, indeed,

the theologians of the Society of Jesus, but you have departed from the great current of Catholic theology, and are yourself more exposed to censure from maintaining it, than Gioberti is for denying it. You should have remembered, in arguing against him, that you were opposing to him only a modern theological opinion, not the generally received doctrine of Catholic fathers and theologians in all ages. You should have remembered that Gioberti has with him St. Augustine, St. Thomas, the greater part of the Thomists, all the Scotists, and especially the Augustinians; and as these have never been condemned or censured by the Church on this point, he is, at least, as safe in agreeing with them as you are in agreeing with the Jesuits. Besides, his view belongs to a much deeper, a more philosophical, and less superficial theology than that which I must believe you have quite too hastily adopted. You started right in your *Admonitions to Protestants*, commenced some years ago, but as yet left incomplete, apparently because you hesitated to follow out the principle on which you had proceeded, that nature does not suffice for itself, and has not, and cannot have its beatitude in its own order. It is to be regretted that you abandoned this sound Augustinian principle, and became entangled in the specious, but superficial sophisms of a school of comparatively recent date, and which has exerted a pernicious influence on modern theological and philosophical studies.

"Even they who assert the possibility of the *status naturæ puræ*, are obliged to concede, as a matter of fact, that man has his destiny in the supernatural order, or, as Gioberti would say, ultra-natural, an order lying beyond nature, not included in the cosmos, but necessary to its completion or fulfilment. Perhaps a deeper philosophy, and a more careful study of the subject, would lead them a little farther, and show that God, having given to man the natural desire for beatitude attainable only in glorification, this supernatural order was thereby rendered necessary, that nothing short of a supernatural union with himself, through the Incarnation, could possibly secure beatitude. Beatitude demands the complete and perfect satisfaction of desire, its complete and perfect fulfilment; but the desire, as we find it in man, can be satisfied or fulfilled with nothing short of glorification. God might, perhaps, have created man without this desire; that is to say, he might have created him a pure animal; but then he would have been no longer man, or endowed with a rational soul. Having determined to create man or rational soul, he could not give him beatitude in a created order, for no rational soul can be satisfied with any thing less than the infinite, and not even God can create the infinite. The only possible beatitude for a rational soul is in the possession of God himself; and as no created nature can, by its own powers, however high you exalt them, attain to this possession, beatitude can never be naturally attainable, and can be attainable only by supernatural means, aids, or assistance. The supernatural, in your sense of the word, then, must have entered into the original design of the

Creator in creating man, and be assumed as necessary to complete or fulfil it.

"Your objection, then, to Gioberti, that he represents the palingenesia as the second cycle, and asserts it to be necessary to complete the first cycle, or what is initial and inchoate in genesis, rests on no solid foundation. It is founded in a mistake on your part, and shows the inadequacy of your theology, and not the unsoundness of his. For what else can it be than what he represents it, if it is any thing? You seem to suppose that making it the complement of what is initial in nature is to confound it with nature, and to deny all real distinction between the natural and the supernatural. But this is not so. Gioberti defines the supernatural to be the immediate act of God, or that which God does immediately, not through the medium of second causes, and therefore he terms it the inexplicable, not because it is without law, for every act of God is law, but because it is explicable by no natural law, or laws inherent in the cosmos. Here is a very intelligible distinction between the natural and supernatural. Moreover, your insinuation that he confounds the supernatural with the superintelligible, is unjust. The superintelligible is that which exceeds our capacity to know, as the essences of things, but may still be in the order of nature, and to an intelligence capable of taking in the whole of nature, explicable by natural laws. The supernatural is not superintelligible regarded as the immediate act of God ; a miracle is a supernatural act, but not superintelligible ; it is simply inexplicable by any natural law, and therefore is called supernatural, and referred to God as its immediate author. What has misled you, was your feeling that Catholic faith obliges us to maintain the possibility of natural beatitude, therefore, that nature may be completed in her own order without supernatural assistance, or its elevation to a higher order, that is to say, that the desire for the infinite, innate in man and inseparable from his nature, can be satisfied with the possession of the finite, the creature, or mere created good. If you had seen that natural beatitude is impossible, and that the cosmos must be completed in palingenesia, or not completed at all, and man fail to return to God as final cause, you would have seen that the assertion of Gioberti by no means confounds the natural and the supernatural, or obscures the distinction between them.

"I am surprised that you have overlooked in all your criticisms on Gioberti what he calls the faculty of *sovrintelligenza*, which lies at the basis of his whole theory of the supernatural. You may dispute whether what he describes should be called a faculty or not, but you cannot deny and must assert in the soul a consciousness of its own insufficiency, and its aptitude for a knowledge which it has not, and cannot attain to by its own natural ability. He defines it the soul's consciousness, or sense of its own potentiality. It is this faculty in the soul, not of knowing the superintelligible indeed, but of knowing its own impotence, that renders it capable of receiving the revelation of the superintelligible, and under-

standing the necessity of the palingenesia to reduce its potentiality to act, and to complete in glorification what is now initial in its existence. The soul has an internal sense of its innate capacity for the infinite, for an unbounded good, for glorification in union with God as its final cause, and it is from this internal sense that springs that unbounded desire that can be satisfied with nothing short of possessing the infinite. Some little attention to this part of Gioberti's philosophy would enable you to understand how the supernatural may at once be natural or supernatural, according to the point of view from which it is considered; supernatural considered in its origin and end, and as a means or medium to an end; natural when considered as fulfilling the natural desire of the heart, and supplying man's natural impotence, or actualizing his potentiality. Christianity, I need not tell you, while it reveals the origin, is the religion of the means and the end, and, therefore, if it have reference to man at all, must be the completion of man's second cycle or return, without loss of individuality, to God as his final cause or last end. In the very nature of the case, regeneration, as it presupposes genesis or generation, cannot be in the first cycle, but must be in the second, and pertain to man's return to God, and not to his procession, by way of creation, from God. It, as supernatural and therefore depending on his immediate act, no doubt proceeds from God, but it is not a procession of existences from God, for the existences it concerns have already proceeded from God as their Creator, and are presupposed in genesis. The creation in the case is not the creation of new existences, but the creation of new or additional means by which men already created may attain to their true end. Creation as the medium or means to the end, or the motion of the means from God, Gioberti, of course, concedes, and, in this sense, what you assert with regard to the two cycles in the palingenesia may be conceded; but it makes nothing to your purpose, for, to be any thing to your purpose, there must be created originally a palingenesiac order of existences superior to and distinct from the cosmic, and then the palingenesiac return of existences to God would not be the return and glorification of men, but of this new palingenesiac order of existences. In your endeavor to maintain two corresponding cycles in two orders, you have really separated those orders, disjoined them one from another, and failed to connect in any way or manner the cosmic with the palingenesiac order, and to provide for the redemption, elevation, or glorification of men. You have dis-humanized Christianity, and therefore in principle denied the Incarnation, or that the Word was made flesh. Not your philosophy, but your theology has misled you, as it has misled many others, and made it impossible for them to show any synthetic relation between the natural and the supernatural, or between the Incarnation and the salvation and glorification of men. But connecting the supernatural order synthetically with the supernatural, and understanding the palingenesia not as a new creation, save as to the medium, as regeneration and not as generation, and you will have no difficulty in

accepting Gioberti's doctrine, that the second cycle is palingenesiac, completing nature, or what is inchoate or initial in the cosmos. It is only in this way that you can really assert Christianity as mediatorial and teleological, and connected in any way with the human race.

"You object, in the second place, that Gioberti identifies the Second Person of the Trinity with the creative act. You misapprehend him, or, at least, do not fully comprehend what he means. He identifies indeed the Word, *Verbum*, with the creative act of God, but only in the sense of the Greeks, who term the Word the substantial Act by which God creates all things as says St. John: *Παντα δι αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν, ὃ γέγονεν. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt: et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est.* It was not, of course, Gioberti's intention to assert that the Word is the creative act of God *ad extra*, and therefore to identify the *Λόγος* with creatures, or the external act; but, unless we would quarrel with St. John, he is the internal act by or through which all external acts are performed. This sufficiently disposes of all you say under this head.

"You object in the third place, that Gioberti represents the Incarnation as the completion of the act of creation, and each man as an inchoate God, or a God that begins. What else should he represent the Incarnation to be, except the completion of that act? That act is not completed without the return of existences to their final cause, and that return is only in the Incarnation, through which man attains to glorification. You object to saying that man is an inchoate God, or a God that begins: but it is not intended by this that man grows to be literally and identically God, but that he is progressive and crescent *ad infinitum*, and that the only term of his development and growth is God, for God alone is infinite; but Gioberti takes care to state particularly that man remains always, though united with God, individually distinct from him. As to his infinite growth and progress in the palingenesia, you must concede it, for it is asserted in asserting that man desires the infinite, and can find beatitude only in possessing it. As to your objections to the assertion that Christ is God, because perfect man, they spring from your not considering that man is completed, perfected only in God.

"You object to Gioberti that 'he represents original sin as dialectic as well as sophistical.' Yet you must admit yourself that sin is permitted by God himself, and therefore that it must spring not from a defect in the Creator's works, but from what in them is good and excellent, and also that it must serve in his design some good and excellent purpose, otherwise he would not have permitted it, or the Church sing, *O felix culpa!* Only a noble and rational nature can sin. Brutes cannot sin, nor even children before they come to the use of reason. The higher and nobler the nature, the greater the sin. As it springs from reason or rational nature, it is dialectic, and as it is an abuse of that nature, a misuse of human freedom, our creative power as second cause, it is sophisti-

cal. But as it tends through discord and the battle of opposites to the realization of harmony and union, it is also dialectic.

"In the fifth place, you find fault with Gioberti for saying that 'all truth and life are in relation—*versano in relazione.*' But you yourself maintain that all life is in relation, and maintain that things out of their real relations are dead, abstractions, nullities. Truth is, as St. Thomas maintains, in relation to some intelligence, and is affirmed of the object *a parte rei*, only in the respect that it is related to a knowing mind, either divine or human. It is the adequate object of intelligence, say the Schoolmen. It is then in relation. Moreover, if you identify it, as you do, with reality, real and necessary being, you must bear in mind, that being, the very essence of God, is in relation, for God is in his essence triune, essentially the three relations expressed by the terms Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Thus all your objections are futile, unfounded, or founded in your own errors and misapprehensions, and you seem to me to have treated Gioberti very much as your picayune critics treat you, ascribing to him your own prejudices, errors, and narrow conceptions, instead of rising to the dignity and comprehensiveness of his doctrine."

We cannot say that these explanations, offered or suggested by Gioberti's friend, completely satisfy us; but they certainly relieve Gioberti's doctrine from the principal objections we brought against it. His friend is rather severe upon us, but we never complain of severity if backed by intelligence, which in this case is the fact. Our readers will bear in mind, that we criticised Gioberti's doctrine simply as we understood it. But we conceded, at the conclusion of our article, that "it is possible that his friends may insist that his language admits of a different interpretation, one, if not in consonance with scholastic theology, at least in consonance with Catholic faith." The fact is, we had some misgivings on the point, and, had we not lost temporarily the use of our eyes, and been pressed for time, we should have further examined it, and rewritten our article before printing it. But what is printed, is printed, and must remain. Some of our criticisms are evidently unfounded and unjust. The answer of Gioberti's friend to our fifth objection, that truth and life are in relation, is to us satisfactory and conclusive, and wholly relieves Gioberti's doctrine from the charge of pantheism, which we brought against it. It proves that the creative act may be *actus ad extra*, and not, as we supposed Gioberti must hold, an act simply immanent in the actor, that is to say, in God himself. We have not, it is true, been in the habit of using the word *truth* in the sense in which Gioberti,

after St. Thomas, uses it, or is said to use it, by his friend. We use it in the sense of that which is, and therefore as identical with real or necessary being, or God, as existing independently, without any reference to its being the object of intelligence. In this sense it would obviously be improper to say that truth consists in relation; for although the distinction of three Persons in God implies three essential relations in Being, it does not seem to us to imply that Being itself is in relation. There are the three relations in Being, but the Being is essentially one, for we are obliged to assert, while asserting the three Persons of the Godhead, unity of essence. The suggestion, therefore, of the three essential relations of the Godhead, does not seem to us to prove that all truth is in relation. Gioberti's doctrine, however, is relieved from the charge we brought against it, by supposing him to adopt St. Thomas's definition of truth, and considering truth as consisting in the object regarded in relation to the intelligent subject. This is sufficient, and saves his doctrine from the error of the Hegelians and the Buddhists, which we supposed it to involve.

The answer to our strictures on Gioberti's doctrine in regard to original sin, is less satisfactory, and, as at present informed, we cannot see how sin, which is sophistical in its nature, can ever be dialectic. All sin is founded in pride, and is sophistical in that it denies the copula of the ideal, or divine judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, and assumes that existence is God, which it is not, save *mediante* the creative act. All sin, as all error, is pantheistic, virtually pantheism, the supreme sophism; because dialectics, or every logical judgment, requires the three terms, subject, predicate, and copula. So far we understand and agree with Gioberti, that sin is sophistical. But how sophistry can have its dialectic side, we do not understand, for we do not understand how the denial of any one of the three terms, on which all dialectics depends, can of itself induce the assertion of the term denied. We understand perfectly well that it is better to be a man than a brute; that it is better for a creature to be created with a noble and rational soul, and endowed with free will, though he may abuse his freedom, than it would be to be created without such soul or such endowment. But we cannot understand how the abuse of the freedom can of itself work any good, any more than we can understand how negation can make itself affirmation. That the nature from which sin springs is dialectic, therefore

good, and tends to good in spite of the sin, and even that sin may be the occasion of good, of even a higher good than might otherwise have been attained to, and therefore the goodness of God not only stand unimpeached, but be made even more manifest by permitting it, we can very well understand and do most fully believe; but that the sin, as an efficient cause, contributes to this end, we do not and cannot believe. We must stand by what we said on this point in our previous article, at least till we receive further explanations than any that have yet been offered us.

Indeed, we see not how Gioberti himself can, consistently with what he concedes as to the future destiny of man, really maintain that sin has its dialectic side. He defines sin as a fault of dialectics, which, according to his doctrine of the dialectic constitution of things, is correct. A fault may be the occasion of improvement, because its consequences may lead us to efforts which attain to a better understanding of principles and a more faithful adherence to them, than might otherwise have been the case. A man who has committed a fault and repaired it, in many respects stands higher than one who has committed no fault, that is, taking man as he is now constituted, and in the relations we are obliged to consider him; but then the fault must be repaired before any advantage is derived, or even derivable from it. Say the redeemed and the beatified may sing *O Felix Culpa*, certainly the unredeemed and the damned cannot so sing. Now, according to Gioberti himself, the sin, though repaired in the methexis, or the race, is not universally repaired in the mimesis, or individuals; and to us, as individuals, it is nothing that the race is redeemed and beatified, if we remain in sin, and suffer eternally in hell its consequences, without hope, or possibility of redemption or beatification. In the palingenesia there is, indeed, the methexis, as well as in generation; but the methexic principle in palingenesia is grace, and, in relation to it, those not regenerated by grace are as the unborn in the order of generation. The unregenerate remain forever in a sophistical state, and never attain to dialectic union and harmony; for them there is always a term wanting, and no logical conclusion is possible. How, then, in regard to these, can you say sin has its dialectic side, or that in them sin has been the occasion even, of any good? Are not those who die in actual sin even worse off than those who die with only original sin? Do they not suffer a greater, a severer pun-

ishment? In these you see the natural consequences and the full effects of sin, and these are evidently extremely sophistical. Where in these is your dialectic side of sin? Even if you suppose the punishment of sin is expiative, and tends to the melioration of the damned, it is not the sin, but the penalty, that works the melioration. And besides, the melioration, though eternally going on, can never overcome the original sophism, and re-establish dialectic union and harmony, that is, their return to God, or union with him as their final cause. If, in the race and individuals saved, the sin has been overcome, the fault repaired, and a higher good obtained, it has not been the sin that has done it, but grace, the methexic principle of the palingenesia.

Nor is it necessary, in order to reconcile the permission of evil with the providence of God, to assert a dialectic side for sin; it suffices for this to maintain with St. Augustine, that simple existence is itself good, and that it is better for the damned, even though they have thrown away the opportunity and means of beatitude, to exist than not to exist. God has done them no wrong; he has even done them a good in creating them, and still does them good in continuing them in existence. It is no objection to Divine Providence or Divine Goodness to say, that the Good they receive is imperfect good, inferior to that of the blessed in heaven; for if it were, it would be equally an objection to there being different degrees in intelligence and happiness, or in glory, of the saints, and to the whole hierarchical order of the heavens, as well as of the earth. To vindicate the ways of God, it is only necessary to show that all he does is good, and that existence is always better than non-existence; otherwise you would be obliged to maintain that God must create every existence possible for him to create, and exhaust on each creature his whole creative energy, which, if it could be exhausted, would not be infinite, and would therefore imply that God himself is not infinite.

The explanations offered in reply to our second and third Objections are upon the whole satisfactory as far as they go, and enable us to see that Gioberti's theory of the Incarnation may have an orthodox sense. Gioberti considers the Trinity as the archetype of creation, and that God being essentially three distinct Persons in one essence, impresses this original type on all his works; hence they are all dialectic, as represented in the ideal formula. The Word, *Λόγος*, or Second Person, may be regarded as the copula of

the divine Being, according to the Greek doctrine that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, as creation proceeds from God through the Word, the substantial Word externated in the creative act. The Incarnation is the summit or perfection of the creative act, in which the created is united or made one with the Creator, and surely creation can go no further, rise no higher. The point we overlooked here, is that the assumption of human nature in the Incarnation is in reference to the second cycle, and not to the first, not a new creation, but the completion or fulfilment of creation. This assumption founds, if you will, a new order in relation to the means and the end, but not in relation to the origin. It is supernatural, because immediately effected by God, and not, as the rationalists pretend, through the operations of nature or second causes. It is first effected, completed in the individual, to be, in some sense, successively effected or completed in the race, for Christ becomes the father of mankind in the palingenesia, as Adam was the father of mankind in the order of genesis. "He is God, because he is perfect man," does not mean that God is rendered actual by the perfection of man, but that man perfected, raised to the highest power, is God in the sense in which we say Christ is God, not God by the conversion of the human into the divine, but by the assumption of the human by the divine, and its elevation to be not the divine but the human nature of God, and, in this sense, not in the sense of the rationalists, we must understand the expression, man is an inchoate God, or a God that begins, or in other words, that man completed, or what is initial in man fulfilled and realized in the palingenesia, is union or oneness with the infinite, God. We shrunk from the phraseology, because we took it in the sense in which we had long found it taken by the rationalists and transcendentalists, and supposed that Gioberti used it in the same sense. Gioberti really means by it nothing more nor less than that man, through grace, is infinitely progressive and crescent, or that his progress has for its term the infinite, that is to say, God himself.

In the Incarnation the human is assumed by the divine, and man becomes God through the Divine Person who has assumed it. This union is full and complete, and raises man to infinite power. It is in him individual, but the individual is, so to speak, methexic, as was Adam. In Adam was contained methexically the whole human race in the order

of genesis; in Christ was contained the whole human race in the order of palingenesia, and the regenerated, those born of grace through him, bear a like relation to him to that borne by individuals in the order of genesis to Adam. Hence completed or attained to the term of rebirth, they become Christs, as individuals in the order of genesis become men; they become one with Christ, are methexically Christ, and, as Christ is God, they become God. But as individuals do not lose their individuality in becoming Adam, so the regenerate do not lose their individuality in becoming Christ any more than the human nature assumed by Christ loses its distinctively human character and becomes identically the divine nature. This point Gioberti is careful to mark, and, while he preserves in the Incarnation the distinction of two natures united in one Person, he retains in the deification of the race the distinct human individuality, and avoids thus the prominent errors of modern rationalists and pantheists. So it is suggested to us Gioberti should be understood, and, so understood, there is nothing, it strikes us, in his doctrine of Incarnation incompatible with rigid orthodoxy, the definitions of the Church, the teachings of the Fathers, or the great mediæval Doctors.

The answer of Gioberti's friend to the first objection we raised, founded on the denial of the *status naturæ puræ*, or natural beatitude, is, perhaps, sufficient to prove that our objection was not well taken, and is not, at least in all its parts, tenable. We reasoned from theology as we had been taught it, in accordance, as we supposed, with what was the generally received doctrine of theologians. It is true that we originally held and proceeded in all our reasoning on the assumption that man has no natural beatitude, that his beatitude is and must be in the supernatural order. On this assumption, which accorded with all the principles and reasonings that had brought us into the Church, we commenced the series of Essays which we called *Admonitions to Protestants*, and in which we intended to accomplish a work not dissimilar in its design to the work Gioberti has sketched out, but not completed, in the volume before us. We stopped almost at the beginning, because we were told by a learned Jesuit Father that the line of argument we were pursuing rested upon assumptions which the Church had condemned. He assured us that the Church had defined that God could have created man in the state in which he is now

born, sin excepted, consequently in a state of pure nature, therefore with simple natural beatitude. He cited in proof the condemnation of the 55th Proposition of Baius, already cited, *Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur*, and referred to what he assured us was the common doctrine of theologians, that infants dying unbaptized, not only do not suffer the tortures of the damned, but enjoy a high degree of natural beatitude. We found the Jesuits, who have in modern times been the leading theologians of the Church, very generally holding and teaching the doctrine of a *status naturæ puræ*, and we supposed, that if we did not accept it, we were at least not at liberty to deny it. We knew, however, that we were permitted to hold the Augustinian doctrine, and to maintain that man has his beatitude only in the supernatural order; but, engaged in a war against Jansenism, anxious to save nature, to assert the natural order, and maintain human freedom, we slid insensibly, we hardly know how, into the doctrine of the Society of Jesus, and have latterly followed it in all our theological discussions, whether with Catholics or non-Catholics. Without attempting here to decide between the two schools, it is certain that Gioberti has a right to follow the Augustinian school, and may therefore present the palingenesia as the completion or fulfilment of the cosmos in the sense suggested by his friend.

Assuming that the *status naturæ puræ* was possible, we naturally concluded that it had its complement in its own order, and therefore could be fulfilled or attain to beatitude in the order of nature itself, consequently that the supernatural, or the palingenesia, was necessary only in the bounty of God, which would confer on mankind an infinitely higher beatitude. We therefore represented the two orders, natural and supernatural, as two parallel orders, and conceived each order as having its own principle, medium, and end, and when, therefore, we found Gioberti presenting the palingenesia as the second cycle completing the cosmos, or what was initial in genesis, we conceived him to be confounding the two orders, and denying all real distinction between the natural and the supernatural; for our view was that the supernatural could complete only what was initial in the supernatural. The desire common to all men of beatitude, and which can be only supernaturally fulfilled, we explained not as innate in man, but as the result of his original supernatural elevation from which he fell, and of

the original revelation of a supernatural end made to our First Parents in the Garden, and continued, in some form and some measure, among all nations by tradition down to our own times. But the Fathers and the great mediæval Doctors, and nearly all modern theologians, if we except the theologians of the Society of Jesus, and perhaps we should not except all of them, hold that this desire is natural, is inherent in the very nature of a rational soul, and therefore may with strict propriety be called natural. Without the satisfaction of this desire there is and can be no beatitude, and, as this desire cannot be satisfied with any natural or created good or without the possession of the infinite, it follows necessarily that man can have his beatitude only in the supernatural order, and we may maintain with Gioberti that palingenesia completes the cosmos or what is initial in genesis.

The objection of Gioberti's friend to our view that the two orders are parallel, not the supernatural the completion of the natural, is well put; for it is evident that Christianity is the religion of the means and the end, is mediatorial and teleological, and must therefore presuppose nature and be designed to raise and conduct it to beatitude. This, after all, is what and all we really meant, and Gioberti's doctrine better expresses our meaning than we had expressed it ourselves. His doctrine, after all, is only what we had been trying to bring out in our various essays intended to explain and bring out the theological maxim *Gratia supponit naturam*. Furthermore, the question—if we assume that the two orders are parallel and not the one the completion of the other—how we connect them one with the other and show a synthetic relation between them, is very pertinent, and very difficult to answer, if indeed it be not unanswerable. This explanation may therefore be accepted. Perhaps, in point of fact, it was we and not Gioberti that was denying that "God could have created man in the beginning such as he is now born," for we are not sure but the doctrine we accepted denies that God can create man with any natural desires that cannot be satisfied in the natural order.

The heresy of Jansenism, which we had been told over and over again was only a logical conclusion from Augustinian premises, can be avoided, and nature asserted and vindicated on Gioberti's doctrine as well as on that of the Jesuits. The essential error of Jansenism is, as we have

often expressed it, in asserting the nullity of nature in order to assert the efficiency of grace; but the assertion of the palingenesia as the second cycle or fulfilment of what is initial in genesis, does not lessen nature or displace it in order to make way for grace. It presupposes and accepts nature, and completes it, fulfils what is initial in it, and enables it to repose in the infinite, where, and where alone is beatitude for a rational soul. It destroys or changes none of our natural faculties; it restricts in no respect the sphere of natural reason, for the man elevated to the palingenesiac order by regeneration remains man as fully as he was in the order of genesis; he may be more, in fact is more in relation to his final end; but is not and cannot be less. Nature is retained, for it is nature that is to be completed, fulfilled in the infinite, in glorification, which is what we have been so long laboring to establish and maintain against those who are constantly decrying nature, and representing reason as a false and illusory light. This is enough, and whether we come to it by the theology of the Augustinian school or that of the illustrious Society of Jesus, it makes, it seems to us, no difference.

These explanations and remarks show that, notwithstanding our criticisms, Gioberti on the points to which we objected may be explained, and should be explained, in an orthodox sense. We are the better pleased with this conclusion to which his friend has helped us, than we are with the one to which we ourselves came. There is always pleasure to a generous mind in the rehabilitation of characters that have been very generally assailed, especially when they were men eminent for their rich and original genius, and for their vast and profound erudition. To completely rehabilitate the character of Gioberti, and to prove his strict orthodoxy throughout, may be impossible, and we think that, notwithstanding all that has been said, or can be said, in his favor, he has fallen into some very grave errors. But he was certainly one of those men whom we would not lose to the Church, or to humanity. No man has lived in our day who has treated the highest and most difficult problems which concern the human race, with more earnestness, with more real learning, or with greater science, clearness, and depth. There are points, and those of grave import, in the volume before us, not yet touched upon, where, as at present informed, we cannot by any means go with him, but the example of such a mind in this

picayune age of meticulous orthodoxy, surveying with freedom and profound intelligence the whole field of theology and philosophy, of society, government, and morals, and fearlessly, in bold, manly, and dignified tones, expressing his honest and earnest convictions, is of the highest utility, and in the energy and activity it gives to thought and intelligence, the noble ardor with which it inspires lofty minds and generous hearts, far more than atones for all the errors into which it may have fallen. Every age has its own peculiar character, and its own peculiar wants, and the great want of our age is of great men, men who have force of character, patience and industry in study, strength and courage to break through the narrow and narrowing conventionalisms which cramp, belittle, and nullify the great majority even of those who pass for learned, intelligent, and thinking men.

Our old form of civilization is passing away, and there comes a fearful crisis in human affairs; a new order of civilization is gradually forming under the old, and will soon throw it off. With the change in the order of civilization will come, and must come, changes in the forms of all things pertaining to civilized life. You had great changes in the sixteenth century; society itself underwent a transformation; so did theology, science, art, and literature. The Society of Jesus performed no inconsiderable part in this transformation; it aided in recasting society; it recast theology, morals, science, literature, and art, and led them, and controlled them for two hundred years and over. But the world they formed is itself now passing away, or undergoing a new transformation, and we are passing through a crisis, though different from that of the sixteenth century, no less grave, or likely to be less serious, in its consequences. What we want are men to meet this crisis, men who know the present, know the past, and are able to foresee the future, —men who know what in the past must be retained, what in the present cannot be successfully, and ought not to be resisted, and what direction the future ought to take, in order more effectually to advance the interests of religion, and to promote civilization. Such men we cannot have, unless we treat them in a liberal and generous spirit, unless we cherish them as Providential men, show ourselves lenient toward their errors and short-comings, and grateful for every needed and opportune word they may utter, though a word unfamiliar to our ears, and bearing even the marks of nov-

elty. We want no new faith ; we want no new principles ; we only want the faith of the past renewed in the present, and the great and glorious principles which lie richly strown through all the works of the Fathers and great Doctors, brought out anew and wisely applied to the new wants and new circumstances of the new world springing into existence.

Starting now from the position that the natural is completed in the supernatural, we must assert a real relation between the two orders, depending on the creative act itself ; for, if there were no real relation between them, the supernatural, though it might be substituted for the natural, could never be its completion. This relation must be, not arbitrary, factitious, or mechanical, but a real, a living relation, and enter into the actual constitution of the Creator's works. If man is destined to a supernatural end, he must have a natural desire for that end, or be naturally *in potentia* to it, and therefore have in himself an inherent and natural want, which only the supernatural can fill up or satisfy. This natural desire or want through which the supernatural is really connected with or joined to the natural, or through which a living union is effected between them, is called by our theologians the natural and innate desire of beatitude, which can be attained to only in the possession of the infinite, of an unbounded good, that is to say, of God, the Supreme Good in itself. It is only by virtue of the fact of the existence in man, in his very nature, of a desire for beatitude not attainable in the natural order, that the philosophy of religion becomes practicable, or the relation between the natural and the supernatural, between reason and revelation, becomes capable of a scientific exposition. If we suppose in man nothing corresponding to what Gioberti calls the faculty of *sovrintelligenza*, or the soul's consciousness of its own infinite potentiality, reason and revelation would not only be distinct, but absolutely dissonant and their harmony be inconceivable, for there would be nothing in common between them, and no principle on which they could be harmonized ; in fact, the supernatural could never be made intelligible to man, not even analogically, and faith in the revelation of the superintelligible would be absolutely impossible, since no such revelation could be made even by Omnipotence to man. We say not merely that it could not be proved, but we say that it could not be made, because a revelation, whatever the matter revealed, can be

made only to reason, and it can be made to reason only on the ground that reason has the faculty or capacity of receiving it.

Nothing is more certain with regard to man than this faculty, as Gioberti calls it, of superintelligence, or the consciousness of the soul of its own inability to suffice for itself and its need of attaining to that which transcends its natural ability. Nothing is more certain than that the soul is conscious of capacities not fulfilled, of a potential knowledge not yet attained to, of a potential happiness not yet realized, of the capacity of eternal progress and an unbounded good. Hence, the soul's unrest, its dissatisfaction with its present state, and hence hope and effort.

> "Hope springs eternal in the human breast,
> Man never is, but always to be blest."

Nothing is more certain than that the desire of beatitude of which our theologians speak, is indestructible in the constitution of human nature as it now actually exists, than that man is devoured by a craving for what he has not, and that his soul is eternally tending upward to something which infinitely transcends its powers of attainment. It is from the secret consciousness which every soul bears within itself of a destiny to which it has no natural ability to attain, and of which it comes short in its highest and best sustained efforts, that springs all the tragedy of human life, that low melodious wail, or that loud and deep lament which marks the genuine poetry of all ages and nations.

But as this potentiality of the soul is not and cannot be actualized in the natural order, we may say, and say truly, that the natural has a presentiment of the supernatural, and hence it becomes possible by supernatural means to make known to man the superintelligible, and to enable him to attain that beatitude after which he never ceases to sigh and yearn. It is here in this fact of the soul's constitution, that the natural and the supernatural touch each other and come into dialectic harmony and union. This point is more clearly brought out and established by Gioberti as the basis of his Philosophy of Revelation, than by any other theological writer we are acquainted with; and nowhere does his rich genius, his original intelligence, or his vast erudition, stand him in better stead, than in showing and vindicating the synthetic relation of the natural and the supernatural. Probably the most important of his various publications

was one of the earliest, entitled *Teorica del Sovranaturale*. His theory of the supernatural is very profound, and is not easily mastered. We do not regard ourselves as having by any means fully mastered it; but from what we do understand of it, we are satisfied that it furnishes the principles of a real harmony between reason and revelation, and the basis of a solid union between rationalism and supernaturalism. The work before us was intended to be the development and application of this theory, showing that it is only in Catholicity that the various fragments of truth scattered through all other religions are collected, united and integrated in one original, symmeterical, complete, and living body of truth. Whether he has really succeeded in showing this or not, this is what needs to be done, and what must be done to save our age from pantheism and materalism, from petty rationalism and stolid atheism, and to recall it to the life and vigor of a reasonable, a sublime, and an energetic faith. Whoever does this work will have given what in its fullest, deepest, and highest sense is to be understood by the PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

This brief statement will show the importance, nay, the necessity of those researches, discussions, and speculations to which many excellent and saintly men are and always have been opposed. There have always been in the Church a class of men whom we may call "Literalists," who attach themselves to the literal statements of the Holy Scriptures, to what they call the simplicity of faith, and oppose all philosophical efforts to bring the natural and the supernatural into harmony. Thus, at that early day, we find St. Irenæus opposing the Christian Philosophical School of Alexandria, of which Clemens and Origen were, if not the founders, the most successful continuators. But he did not succeed, and his followers have not succeeded in preventing the great Doctors and Theologians, like St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas, from laboring with untiring industry, and with all their genius, intellectual power and erudition, to show the harmony of the natural and the supernatural, and the real synthetic relation there is between them. The human mind is so constituted that, if it acts at all, it must reduce, or labor to reduce, all branches of its knowledge and belief to a principle in which they are seen to be consistent, and but parts of one uniform and indissoluble whole. It is in vain we war against this tendency of human intelligence. It is in vain

we dwell on the dangers to which it exposes the simple believer, the errors and absurdities to which its indulgence may lead. We cannot suppress this tendency without suppressing the human mind itself, and even St. Irenæus himself is obliged to follow it to a greater or less extent in his writings against heretics, especially those philosophical heretics, the Gnostics, so often reproduced in our own day by rationalists and transcendentalists. Every man, if he thinks at all, if he really be a man, and conscious of the dignity he possesses as a rational soul, wishes and must wish to render himself an account of his own faith, whether in the natural or the supernatural.

Although there has always been a party in the Church opposed to this tendency, and therefore to all philosophizing on the subject of religion, the Church has never sanctioned their opposition, but has accepted and availed herself of the labors of the theologians and philosophers. She has accepted human intelligence; she has respected human reason, and aided and blessed its cultivation. She has canonized St. Augustine; she has canonized St. Anselm; she has canonized St. Thomas; she has canonized St. Bonaventura, and marked her high appreciation of Bossuet and Fénelon. All who engage in constructing a philosophy of religion are liable, no doubt, to fall into many errors; but it is even better to err than never to think; it is better sometimes to be wrong than never to be right; and a living dog is better than a dead lion. All that can be asked of those who err is humility, docility and a willingness to correct their errors when clearly and distinctly pointed out to them by the competent authority. Even the errors of great men are often more instructive and more salutary than the commonplace truths of little men; for they become provocative of thought and inquiry, and the occasion of the attainment to higher truths and their fuller appreciation.

ARTICLD IV.

THE GIOBERTIAN PHILOSOPHY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1864.]

We have for some time meditated laying before our readers, in a series of articles, a fuller and more connected account of the Giobertian Philosophy than we have heretofore given or than is accessible to the simply English-speaking public. We shall draw our account or exposition solely from Gioberti's own writings, without reference to the expositions which have been given either by his friends or his enemies. We intended, at first, to precede our exposition by a sketch of the author's life, but have concluded to confine ourselves to a few brief notices, as we have not as yet received the very full and elaborate Biography in three volumes octavo, not long since published at Turin.

Vincenzo Gioberti was born in Turin in the year 1801, and was educated in the University of his native city. His parents were respectable, but apparently not wealthy. They brought up their son for the priesthood, and at a suitable age he received orders, and became one of the chaplains to the king, Carlo Alberto. He was a most diligent student, and devoted himself most assiduously to the study of theology, philosophy, history, and literature, both ancient and modern. At an early age, whether before or after receiving orders, we are unable to say, he had his period of doubt, as have most young men of generous minds and liberal studies, with sufficient seriousness ever to think in regard to the grounds of their faith, and was induced to study profoundly the foundations not merely of the Catholic Church in whose communion he had been brought up, but of Christianity itself, nay, of all religion. The result of his studies was a firm and unwavering conviction, which never deserted him to the hour of his death, not of the truth and utility of all that passes for religion even among Catholics, but of Christianity, the Catholic Church, and the real Catholic dogmas.

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* *Teorica del Sovranaturale o sia Discorso sulle Convenienze della Religione Rivelata colla Mente umana, e col Progresso civile delle Nazioni.* Per VINCENZO GIOBERTI. Edizione seconda, ritoccata dell' Autore, e accresciuta di UN DISCORSO PRELIMINARE, e inedito, intorno certe Calunnie di un Nuovo Critico. Torino. 1850.

He studied the terrible questions raised by his doubts not professionally, as a lawyer studies his brief, but seriously, earnestly, in order to arrive at truth for himself, for his own mind and his own conscience, and with a science, an ability, and a genius for grappling with the profoundest and most abstruse philosophical and theological problems never surpassed, if equalled, since St. Augustine. He has especially investigated the relation of reason and revelation, faith and science, Church and state, religion and civilization, and attempted to determine scientifically the real ground on which the antagonism existing between them disappears and their dialectic harmony is founded and practically preserved. His genius as well as his learning is encyclopædic, and his works may be studied with equal advantage by the scholar, the artist, the philosopher, the theologian, and the cultivators of the so-called exact sciences.

Gioberti was a patriot, an Italian, and, an ardent lover of liberty, though not precisely in the sense of European democrats. He had the indiscretion, one day, to say in presence of a friend, that he thought "the people might, without danger to the State, be admitted to a liberal share in the government." His words were reported to the police, and on that very night he was ordered to leave, within twelve hours, the Sardinian territory. He belonged to none of the secret societies which were then plotting Italian insurrections, and does not appear to have had any political relations with the Italian Revolutionists of the time. He was a student, and an exemplary priest, not at all mixed up with political affairs. But he had in private conversation given utterance to a liberal sentiment. That was enough, and he was exiled. Exiled from his native country, he thought first of going to South America, but was induced by a friend to go to Paris. He found himself a stranger in that centre of the best and the worst influences of the age, poor, destitute of friends, suspended from his priestly functions, and without means of support, but the scanty and precarious pittance to be gained from ill-appreciated literary labors. He remained not long in Paris, but soon went to Belgium, and took up his residence at or near Brussels, where he remained during the greater part of his exile, finding employment and the means of living as a teacher in a private literary institution. He performed faithfully the duties of an instructor, lived frugally, gave very few hours to sleep, and devoted the greater part of his nights to study

and the composition of his works, which, after all, he has left unfinished. Here he composed and published the greater part of all his works published during his lifetime, while living in comparative obscurity, loved and honored by a few friends with whom he kept up an affectionate correspondence, and especially the poor, whose wants he freely and lovingly relieved to the full extent of his means. His works obtained at first only a limited circulation, and, though they secured him the admiration and esteem of the few, they gained him but little public consideration, and failed to make him regarded as the great man of Italy. The first work which obtained him that consideration was his *Del Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani*, published, 1843, under the Pontificate of Gregory XVI., a second edition of which, published at Lausanne, in 1846, in three volumes octavo, is now lying before us, and is the edition we use. This work met with an immense success; its publication was an event in the Italian *Risorgimento*.

In this work Gioberti maintains—which not every one will concede—that the moral and civil primacy of the world was given to Italy and the Pelasgic or Italo-Greek race, and belongs to the modern Italians as the representatives of that race and the old Romans. He maintains that this is the reason why the religious and ecclesiastical Primacy has been established at Rome, and hence is in some sense the right of the Roman or Italian people. The moral and civil primacy of the world was possessed and exerted in the interests of civilization by the old Romans, under both the Republic and the Empire, and by their successors the modern Italians, through the Moderatorship exercised by the Sovereign Pontiffs after the fall of the old Roman world, down to the end of the Middle Ages. But in consequence of the loss of the Papal Moderatorship and the division of the Peninsula into a number of petty States, the most of them dependencies on non-Italian powers, as Spain, France, and Austria, Italy, having in herself no centre of unity, has ceased for three hundred years or more to exercise the moral and civil primacy which belongs to her. She must now, for her own interest, the interest of both religion and civilization, recover it. As the means of recovering it, the several Italian States must unite and form an Italian Confederacy under the Presidency of the Pope, the several States retaining their respective constitutions and independence each within its own limits and in regard to all internal

affairs, whilst all national interests must be managed by the Federal Congress or Government. This plan was adopted by both France and Austria at the Preliminary Peace of Villa Franca, but its execution has thus far been defeated by Piedmontese ambition, and the monarchical and republican Unitarians, demanding not Italian union, but Italian unity, and supported by British diplomacy. The plan was not revolutionary in the least, and would have been admirable had it not been impracticable.

But whatever may be thought of the plan itself, it appealed to Italian patriotism, flattered Italian vanity, and held out a chance for the assertion of Italian nationality. It addressed also the purest and best feelings of the Italian people, and really inaugurated what has been called the *Risorgimento d' Italia*, and at once stamped its author as one of the leading minds, if not the leading mind of the Peninsula. The election of Pius IX., which soon followed, a friend of Gioberti, and himself an Italian patriot, who inaugurated his reign by several bold and liberal measures, looking to Italian resuscitation and independence, gave it new significance, and the introduction of Constitutional Government into Piedmont by Carlo Alberto seemed to open the way for Italian independence and a confederated Italy. Gioberti was recalled from his exile, and restored to his native country. He visited Rome where he was cordially received by the Holy Father, who gave him his blessing, and permission to celebrate Mass, and where he was honored by all that was distinguished in the city. His journey from Rome to Turin was a succession of ovations. In his native city he was held in the highest esteem; and after the disasters to the King in his attempt to rescue the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom from Austria, and to place its crown on his own head, he was made prime minister, and for a few months wielded the Piedmontese government. In this capacity he refused to recognize the short-lived Mazzinian Republic at Rome, opposed the intervention of non-Italian Powers for the restoration of the Pope, so as to give them no pretext for interfering in the affairs of Italy, and urged the Italian States themselves to unite and restore him his temporal principality. After the renewal of the war with Austria, which he opposed, but could not prevent, and the disastrous defeat of the Sardinians at Novara by old Radetzki, he left the ministry, went or was sent to Paris, where he remained till his death in 1852.

As a practical statesman, Gioberti was not successful. He failed, for he was guided by principle rather than expediency, had a respect for vested rights, and was more Italian than Piedmontese. He flattered no party, and favored the peculiar prejudices of no class or faction. He wished to retain the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, and was opposed to the consolidation of all Italy into a single unitarian state, whether monarchical or republican. His sympathies were Italian, embracing freedom and independence for the Peninsula, but he was no revolutionist, and had no sympathy with the Italian democrats, save in the one respect of rendering Italy independent of all ultramontane powers. He wished Italy to be independent alike of France and Austria, and to enable her to suffice for herself. He was, therefore, opposed alike, save so far as they hoped to use him, by the respective adherents of France and Austria, by both the monarchical and the democratic Unitarians, who demanded unity, not union. He had for enemies even among the nationals Mazzini, Garibaldi, and the Carbonari on the one hand, and all who, like Count Cavour who succeeded him, aimed simply at making Italy Piedmontese. Lacking the usual Italian suppleness, these proved too many and powerful for him, and his failure was inevitable. It is not as a practical statesman that he will live in the memory of mankind, or even in that of his own countrymen. A statesman as well as the commander of an army to be remembered must succeed. Him who fails the world always holds to be without merit. The Piedmontese minister is even now forgotten, though not even Cavour has contributed so much or half so much as Gioberti to the uprising and renovation of Italy; and if he had had his way, Nice and Savoy would not now make a part of France, giving the passes of the Alps to the perennial enemy of Italy. He must live, if at all, as the thinker, the erudite scholar, the classic writer, the profound philosopher, the acute theologian, the bold Catholic reformer.

After his retreat, exile, or mission to Paris, we know not which to call it, in 1849, he applied himself to his usual studies, and published, 1851, his *Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia*, his last publication during his lifetime. In this work he reviews, in part, his political career, points out the errors committed by the friends of the civil renovation of Italy, and gives his views of the course that should be taken in future to secure that renovation. The work is really his

apology for his political doctrines and action. In it he approaches more nearly than he had before done to the republican party, though he gives a most masterly refutation of the false democratic theory adopted by the European democratic party. He had attempted the renovation of Italy through the Princes, and they had failed him, and henceforth he must look to the people. In this work, also, he has a most bitter chapter on Pius the Ninth, not as Pope, but as temporal Prince, in which he accuses him of having deceived and betrayed the hopes of Italy, of having proved false to every one of his pledges; who, having commenced as a liberal Italian Prince, had fallen back under the Austrian *oscurantismo*, and used all his power and influence to defeat Italian independence and the progress of liberty. It is a bitter chapter, in which very little of the Christian or the philosopher is detected. It is unjust. Pius IX., if not a great man, is a good man; and if he has deceived others, it is because he first deceived himself. He is, if you will, a weak man, but he is honest and kind-hearted. His mistake as Prince was in raising expectations that he could not satisfy, in raising a storm that he had not the power to control or to direct. He miscalculated his own strength, or the power in our times of the Papacy. We felt it at the time, and our pages bear witness to our fears that the result would be disastrous. We were not for a moment deceived. Yet there was something grand in the position he assumed on his inauguration, in placing himself at the head of the modern movement, in giving it the sanction of his high office and sacred character, and in attempting to direct, as the Father of Christendom, that movement to the advancement of religion and civilization. The applause he received from the non-Catholic even more than from the Catholic world, so hearty, so enthusiastic, proved that it was not the Pontiff the world for four centuries had been warring against, but the defender of an obsolete phase of civilization; and that the moment he is seen marching at the head of modern society, all nations are ready to own his authority and follow his lead. But he assumed a position which he was personally too weak to maintain. He was not a Gregory VII., an Innocent III., nor even a Sixtus Quintus. He was unequal to the emergency himself had created, and, instead of overcoming adverse circumstances, was forced to yield to them, and take refuge in mere passive resistance, in the *non possu-*

mus. The system he found established by his predecessors was too strong for him, and he succumbed, and suffered the world he had sought to guide, but could not, to float past him. French arms restored him, re-established him nominally in his principality; but he has been, ever since he returned to Rome, virtually a prisoner of France on parole. Hence we heard no protest from him against the unprovoked war of France on Russia in 1854, or against the infamous Italian Campaign in 1859, directed against him as temporal Prince no less than against Austria. He is the prisoner and the pensioner of France, and there is no power in Europe on whom he can rely to set him free, and sustain his independence. This might have been foreseen, and should have been, and therefore he should not have ventured to raise the storm which he could neither allay nor direct. Still, Gioberti has no excuse for his bitter invectives against him, or for denying his moral worth, his goodness of heart, and his real excellence of character.

Gioberti, in the beginning of his career, while he confined himself almost exclusively to theology and philosophy, met with no serious opposition from the Jesuits—they were even disposed to applaud him; but after the publication of his *Del Primato*, and his Italian and political tendencies became manifest, they seem to have attacked him with great severity, not avowedly, indeed, for these tendencies, but for philosophical and theological views which they had previously commended. This brought out his most terrible work against the Society of Jesus, as reorganized by its so-called Second Founder, the celebrated Aquaviva, their fourth General, the *Gesuita Moderno*, in five volumes octavo. This work we have glanced over, but not read, and can speak of its character only by report. We began it, but we were repelled from continuing it by its uncalled for severity, and, as it seemed to us, its gross injustice to an illustrious body of men. He charges the Jesuits with having perverted Catholic theology, and with having introduced another Christ than the Christ of the Gospels and the Church. He exposes rudely their philosophy, ridicules their style as writers, and impeaches, apparently on documentary evidence, their honesty and historical veracity. This book sealed his fate. No Catholic writer can afford to have this illustrious order for his enemy, or can survive its enmity. He must not expect to hold his footing in the Church as an author, as a man, hardly as a Christian; and if he is not

driven out of the Church into heresy and schism, it will be through no forbearance of theirs. From the date of the publication of his *Gesuita Moderno*, Gioberti lost his standing with the dominant portion of his co-religionists, and it was more than any Catholic's reputation with his brethren was worth to venture to speak well of him even as a philosopher. We might quote Plato, Aristotle, Averrhoës, or Avicenna, any Pagan or Mahometan even, with respect, but must not name Gioberti without an anathema. More disinterested, more self-denying and laborious priests than the Jesuits generally, we have never known, and never expect to find; but like all religious orders and congregations in the Church, they are apt to forget in their corporate capacity, that they have only a human origin, and to proceed against their enemies as if they were founded immediately by God himself, and that they who question their honor as a Society question his. Chiefly through their exertions, and those under their direction, Gioberti has been widely regarded by Catholics as one who dishonored the priesthood, abandoned his faith, and died under the excommunication of the Church. His works, it is said, have been placed on the Index, and we certainly cannot cite them as the works of an approved and unsuspected Catholic author. But we say frankly that we have never found them maintaining any proposition censured by the Church. In his theology he follows the Thomists and the Augustinians much more nearly than he does the Jesuits; but this does not impeach his orthodoxy, though it may his judgment, and, still more, his prudence.

The circumstances attending Gioberti's death at Paris, at fifty-one, in the prime of his life, and the full vigor of his intellect, while engaged in completing works of vast extent, profounder and more important than any he had published, are variously related, and the exact truth will, perhaps, never be known, or if known, will never be acknowledged. It seems agreed on all hands that his death was caused by a fit of apoplexy, brought on by too intense study and over exercise of his brain, with too little rest, and too little sleep. He is said, by some, to have died suddenly, alone in his room, and without the last Sacraments, or the presence of a priest. This is the more common version. Others report that he so far revived as to receive the visit of his confessor, and the last rites of his Church; and that he finally expired with the most edifying marks of firm

faith and tender piety. Which is the true account we know not, although we believe it is conceded that he received Christian burial in consecrated ground, which would seem to imply the more favorable account. He was a man naturally of strong passions, but his life was morally irreproachable; remarkable for his temperance, his purity, and his charity to the poor. He is described to us by those who knew him well, to have been a very handsome man, above the medium size, with head, hair, and features of the English rather than of the Italian type. From a bust executed at Rome, in 1847, which we have seen, and which is said to be a capital likeness, we could not say that the representations of his character by his enemies are necessarily false. The head is large, the features are regular, classical, and finely chiselled, but they lack that open, frank, genial expression that at once inspires confidence and wins the heart. They have the air of a man too conscious of his own superiority, and too well satisfied with himself. It is the bust of a strong man, but of one against whom you feel it is no lack of charity to be on your guard.

As a writer, Gioberti, for classic purity, elegance, clearness, force, and dignity of style, has no superior, if any equal, in the Italian language. His taste is correct and his judgment sound, his diction is pure, choice, and exact, and his style noble, grand, majestic, as much so as that of Bossuet; calm, equal, natural, and graceful, fitted to the grand and lofty subjects on which he writes. He is a perfect master of his own language, and knows the exact value of every word he uses, its exact meaning, even to its finest and most delicate shade; and you cannot change a single word in any sentence he writes without changing its sense, or take a sentence out of its connection without impairing its meaning, and doing the writer great injustice. Yet he is never dry, stiff, or stilted; he moves with an easy, natural grace, and passes on through the most difficult and abstruse problems of theology and metaphysics without relaxing his gait, without the slightest apparent effort, or consciousness that he is not dealing in the ordinary way with the most ordinary topics. He has never to stop and take breath, is never labored, involved, obscure, or difficult. His march is even, easy, and unrestrained, and if you cannot follow him it is because you have no genius for the topics he discusses, or are fettered by your false training, and have your natural understanding perverted by absurd and incomprehensible systems. He is

always master of his language and of his subject, and the Italian is flexible to his purpose, and proves in his hands equal to the expression of the deepest and loftiest thought, and the nicest shades of meaning. He is never obliged to force it into any unnatural or unusual forms, to adopt any unidiomatic or unfamiliar locutions, or to disfigure it by the introduction of new and barbarous terms, as the scholastics were in their use of Latin, and as the recent English and Scottish writers are, or imagine they are, in the use of our own language. The metaphysicians of Oxford and Edinburgh write in a sort of jargon which has only a remote affinity to genuine, idiomatic, and classical English. They are as far from being masters of their mother tongue as they are from being masters of true philosophic thought.

Gioberti may not have the fervid eloquence we meet in the philosophical *Leçons* of our old master, Victor Cousin, nor his genial warmth, but he surpasses him in depth of thought, in ease, in sustained elegance and dignity of expression, and nobility and grandeur of style. He is master of what the French rhetoricians call the "grand style," which we need not say is infinitely remote from the pompous, met with so often in Italian, Spanish, and Irish writers who affect it, and fail ridiculously. Among French writers Bossuet stands first and almost alone as master of the grand or majestic style, and he succeeds only by sometimes forgetting to be French. Even he lacks the repose, the calm strength, and the easy, natural, and graceful gait of Gioberti. We see, as in his *Elevations*, or *Meditations, on the Mysteries*, that he does not rise easily and by his native strength to the height he aims at, and is obliged to work himself up, to make an effort, to strain and tug, as if in need of help. Gioberti's strength is always equal to his demands, and he rises easily and without effort to the highest possible regions of human thought, and possesses himself of the sublimest truths revealed to the human understanding. Among philosophers, Plato is the only one with whom, in this respect, it would not be unjust to compare him. He is clearer, more distinct, more exact in his thought and expression than Plato, equally profound and sublime, with a wider field of truth, and a firmer grasp, but is inferior to him in the poetic charm of his imagination. He is as witty as the old Greek, but has less of that modification of wit which the Latins called *urbanitas*, and less of that good natured raillery which exposes the error without wounding its defender, so con-

spicuous in the Athenian. His wit is apt to express itself in sarcasm, is a little bitter, is too superb, and seldom fails to wound. The Athenian laughs at you, makes you confess yourself a fool, but without offence, or forfeiting your friendship; you love him all the better for it. But if in this respect he has the advantage of the Italian, it is the only advantage. In philosophic genius, in intellectual strength, in the wonderful mastery of language, the Italian yields nothing to the Athenian, while in grasp of thought, in natural grandeur, in science, erudition, penetration, intuition, he surpasses him, and has been able to correct and complete his philosophy.

The great defect in Gioberti's character is an excessive pride, and a manifest lack of what is called the humility of the cross. His private correspondence, and even here and there a passage in his published writings, as well as the testimony of his friends, prove that he did not lack tenderness of heart, and that he was susceptible of sincere and lasting friendship. But in his finished writings his air is too superb, his manner towards his opponents too disdainful. He seems always too conscious of his own immeasurable superiority. But in all this we may misread his real character and do him great injustice. Genuine humility is always unconscious of itself, and what passes under its name is often only the most offensive form of pride. The studious effort which many writers make to conceal pride always betrays its existence. There is often less egotism in using than in avoiding the pronoun I. We know from experience that authors are accused of exorbitant pride, when that is the last vice with which they should be charged. Christian humility is the root of every Christian virtue, but it does not consist in hanging down one's head like a bulrush, or in proclamations of one's own unworthiness. It has no relation with self-abasement or servility of spirit or manner. It is compatible with magnanimity, nay, is the very basis of true magnanimity of soul. Its manner is always open, frank, manly. The humble man does not depreciate himself any more than he depreciates others; he simply forgets himself, and acts ingenuously, naturally, always according to the true relations of men and things. The humble man is a gentleman from an innate sense of truth and justice, from good feeling and good nature, what others are by artificial training. Still, we should like Gioberti better if he was more human, and less bitter and sarcastic; if the smile on his lips was less self-

complacent, less sardonic, more genial and warmer, more evidently a smile of the heart. The irony of Plato charms us and binds us to him as our brother, even when we feel that we are its subject. He is roguish, but not malignant. His wit is playful, good humored, a little of the *bon diable*, but never satanic. But Gioberti's wit, though delicate and keen, is felt, and the victim winces under the operation, and grows indignant at the wound it leaves. Yet he may be, after all, really as good natured as the old Athenian, but simply graver and more in earnest, and less conscious of the wounds he inflicts, or the pain he gives.

Since Gioberti's death, his friends have published, at Turin, eight volumes in octavo of unedited manuscripts, consisting of treatises blocked out, but unfinished, and selections from his correspondence. Of these, the *Protologia*, two volumes, *Della Filosofia della Rivelazione*, one volume, *Della Riforma Cattolica della Chiesa*, one volume, are all that we have studied. They were left indeed unfinished, and lack the developments and the last literary touches of the author, but they had advanced so far towards completion, that the reader familiar with his system of thought as contained in the works published during his life, finds little to regret under the point of view of philosophy or theology. Their general system of thought harmonizes with that in his finished productions, but there is to be found in them, here and there, a detached proposition which, it is very possible, is either not his, or if his, would have been modified or stricken out had he lived to complete and publish his works himself. These begun, but unfinished works, which we feel cannot in every respect be relied on, are necessary to the full understanding of the Giobertian philosophy, and they indicate, on the part of the author, more extended studies and more maturity of mind than his finished productions. What he had published during his life was only an introduction to the study of philosophy, only the prodrome to his system of thought, and these were intended, when completed, to be the system itself. It is this fact that renders the exposition of Giobertian philosophy so difficult. We have it not as a whole, nor with the author's last developments. It lay as a whole in his mind, he tells us, from the beginning, but we have only fragments of it. What he has left is a magnificent torso, which we are obliged to repair or complete by our own genius, in accordance with the original design of the

artist. To do justice to the exposition, one must be in some measure competent to conceive and fill up the original design from his own genius and philosophical knowledge. He needs to be the twin brother of Gioberti himself. We have no pretensions of this sort; and though not an absolute stranger to the subjects he treats, or the order of thought in which he moves, we are for from being able to do more than seize the bases and method of his system, and to present a few of its more salient points. We have neither the genius nor the learning, nor even the books at our command to do more, were we rash enough to attempt more.

The works Gioberti published during his life, with those published in his name by his friends since his death, embrace all science in its principle, method, unity, and universality, whether natural, revealed, metaphysical, theological, cosmological, political, ethical, physical, or æsthetical. But the outlines of his whole system, or sketch of the whole as first conceived in his mind, is in the volume named at the head of this article, the first work he published. He never deviated from his original conception, and no one can hope thoroughly to understand either his system or the growth of his mind without beginning by studying this volume, the driest and least attractive of all his works. Evidently, when he wrote it, though his whole scheme may have been in his mind, he was far from being master of his thought, and still further from that thorough master of style and language which he subsequently became, and of which the best specimens are the *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*, second edition, Brussels, 1842, in four volumes octavo and his *Gesuita Moderno*, published in 1847, in five volumes octavo, and his *Degli Errori Filosofici di Antonio Rosmini*, three volumes octavo, 1842. In his *Teorica del Sovranaturale* is the germ of all he has written, and nothing he has written is superior of its kind to the *Parte Terza*, which treats of the supernatural, of religion, and the Church in their relation to society, the state, or civilization.

The work, however, which must take precedence of the others in studying his philosophy, is the *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*, only the student must bear in mind, that though extending to four octavo volumes, it is only an introduction, and makes only one book out of eight contemplated by the author. In connection with this, must be studied the controversial work, *Degli Errori Filosofici di Antonio Rosmini.* These works contain his philosophical

principles and method, together with his criticisms on the various systems opposed to his own, especially the psychological system placed in vogue by Descartes, the pseudo-ontological theories of the modern Germans, and the French Eclecticism as so eloquently and learnedly set forth and defended by Victor Cousin, an author who must always have a place in the history of philosophy. Yet all that has been published by the author, even the incomplete works edited and published by his friends since his death, must be studied by one who would really master his philosophy in its relation to revelation, politics, the sciences, literature, and art. He will even then find many gaps, and regret that the author died before his work was done.

In endeavoring to give our readers a connected and systematic view of what we shall call the Giobertian Philosophy, we must, however, be permitted to proceed in our own way, and give his views, as we understand them, in our own language. We shall make our own statements of his principles, method, and views, without pretending to support them by textual citations. Those of our readers who have not read his works and have not access to them, will necessarily have to rely to a great extent on our understanding and fidelity for the correctness of our exposition, which will detract not a little from its value. The character of his works is such that we could not pursue a different course without reproducing them entire, and our space, as well as the patience of our readers, is limited What we propose is really an exposition, not a critical examination, not a defence, nor a refutation. On many of its points we have heretofore given our views, but we have never attempted to give a general view of Gioberti's philosophy as a system, and to enable our readers to judge of its merits or demerits for themselves. This is what we now undertake, without committing ourselves for or against it.

We know perfectly well that few of our countrymen hold philosophy in much esteem, and fewer still have studied it sufficiently to take an interest in the exposition of the system of even so distinguished a philosopher as Gioberti. The present, too, may be thought a most unfavorable time to call the attention of any class of readers to the examination of metaphysical questions, which requires repose, the mind to be at ease, in a period of peace and public tranquility. It may be thought that men's minds are now in no fit mood for such examination. When the nation is engaged

in a fearful struggle for its existence, and public duties and public affairs tax to the utmost every thought and energy of our Scholars as well as of our Statesmen and the Generals of our armies, who is at leisure for calm and tranquil studies? But times like ours are always times of great mental activity as well as of great physical energy, and the mind wrought up to its highest tension on public affairs must have its occasional relaxation; and there is always in every noble and generous nation minds of a character that find relaxation in a simple change of study, or in passing for but a brief hour from the agitation of public affairs, the excitement of battle, the cares of office or command, to the calm and serene study of philosophy, however severe it may be in itself. It gives relief and allures the mind to rest, although it exercises it severely, for it exercises it in a different way, on a different topic. We ourselves feel the dangers of the country, are agitated in its agitation, and fear some blunder may ruin it, and we should grow crazy, if we could not find distraction in those severe studies which we should, perhaps, shrink from, if all around us were tranquil and peaceful, and our mind found nothing around it to stimulate its activity. We might go to sleep, lie listlessly under a shady beach, or on a green bank, under the soft moonlight, listening to sweet music in the distance. The odds are that our exposition of the Giobertian Philosophy may find more readers now than it would in calmer and less stormy times.

Moreover, never was there a time since America was a nation, when it was more important for us as a people to have a true and solid philosophy, on which the statesman can rest his fulcrum. Whether we are aware of it or not, our institutions are not only on trial, but are undergoing revision, and it depends on the wisdom of our statesmen whether they shall be the better or the worse for it. All their defects are due not to what is called the practical wisdom of their framers, but to the false theories of government that prevailed at the time when they were framed; and those theories were due to the unsound philosophy which was then in vogue,—the sensist philosophy, represented for the English-speaking world by John Locke, and for France by the Abbé Condillac, and the Encyclopædists. This unsound philosophy flowed as an inevitable consequence from the psychological method of Descartes, who based all philosophy on a fact of consciousness,—*Cogito, ergo sum.*

This reduced all certainty to a sentimental affection, or an interior affection of the subject. From interior sentiment, to simple sensation, there is but a step, and that step was taken by Condillac, who not only resolved all knowledge, but the thinking subject itself, into *sensation transformée.* This metaphysics applied to society could give no human race, only simple isolated individuals, and applied to politics it could give only *le Contrât Social* of Rousseau, and vest the sovereign power of the state in the irresponsible will of the majority. It either denies all government, or asserts the despotism of the state:—of the majority, if the form of the government is republican; or the monarch, with Hobbes, if it is monarchical. Locke was an Englishman, and like Englishmen generally, failed to push his principles to their logical consequences, and threw together in his system of philosophy and of politics, ideas and principles which have no affinity for each other, and which will never assimilate and form a harmonious whole. The British Government is made up of inherent antagonisms, and is carried on only by the adroitness of the statesman in playing off one antagonism against another.

Locke was the great master of our American statesmen, and they undertook to found the state on a nicely adjusted balance of antagonisms, and relied solely on enlightened self-interest to preserve the balance. They builded better than they knew, but they left traces of their theory in both our State governments and the General Government. To those traces we owe the present rebellion and civil war. The real, the Providential, or unwritten constitution of the American state is profoundly philosophical—the only really dialectic constitution to be found in the history of nations. But the written constitutions only inadequately represent it, and the theories on which we have interpreted them are false, or at least one-sided. We have been developing them in the sense of the social-contract theory of Rousseau, or that of pure individualism; and, therefore, in the sense of democracy, which is simply social or civil despotism. The democracy of Jean Jacques Rousseau had its good side, we admit: it asserted the rights of the people, drew attention to the poor, the humble, the oppressed, and brought them into the state. It recognized the manhood of every man; but it failed to recognize the social rights of man, and to secure his manhood in face of the majority. It gave to society no solid basis, and recognized no law prescribing its

rights and limiting its powers, but that of the variable will or might of the individual. We have seen its sad effects in the first French Revolution, from 1790 to 1795, and can judge of it by the systems of socialism and communism to which it has given birth. The people are logical in the long run, and they tend constantly to eliminate all anomalies from their social and political systems. In Great Britain there is a strong tendency, on the one hand, to eliminate from the British Constitution the Established Church, the House of Lords, and the hereditary monarchy; and, on the other, to eliminate the democratic element, or to subject it by increasing the power of the throne. The struggle goes on, and may last for a century, should nothing extraordinary occur to hasten a conclusion; but, if it goes on, the stronger party must win the victory; and that party, in Great Britain, is certainly the Commons or the people. If the king and nobility become alarmed, and undertake to prevent any further development of the democratic element, they will precipitate a revolution, and the scenes of blood and terror of the old French Revolution will be re-enacted in the British Isles.

In our own country, we have, as a people, ever since 1801, been eliminating from our State constitutions every thing we have retained from our English ancestors, or from Colonial times, not in harmony with the false democracy taught by Rousseau, and of which Thomas Jefferson was the American exponent; and we have gone so far, and been so successful, that we have already precipitated the revolution, or the Rebellion seeking to become revolution. Now, when we have put down the rebellion, what are we to do? Replace the anomalies we have eliminated? That would avail nothing, for the inevitable struggle would commence to eliminate them anew. Go on in that direction we have been going, and seek to give a fuller expression still to the social-contract theory, to the false democracy inaugurated by Jefferson? We cannot, without running into anarchy, and being obliged to seek relief in monarchical despotism, to which too many among us are beginning already to look. This will never do, for it were a huge stride backward to barbarism. What are we to do? Where lies our salvation? Not the mere practical Statesman, nor the empirical philosopher can answer, as the confusion and uncertainty witnessed in Congress and the Administration amply prove. The Constitution of the state cannot rest on a

mere fact, it must rest on a principle, and have a dogmatic, not a merely empirical basis. This dogmatic basis or principle must be not an abstract theory which men weave from their brain, or spin from their own bowels, as the spider does his web; but must be real, with a real existence in the constitution of things, and as permanent and invariable as the law of nature. How are we to arrive at such a principle or dogmatic basis, and to build on it, without the science that explains to us the laws of the universe in their political application? And what is this science but philosophy, the science of reason, or reason knowing and comprehending itself? If you base your state on individualism, you establish an inextinguishable antagonism between the individual and the government, and can maintain the state only by force; that is, by constant violence to what you acknowledge to be individual rights. If you found it exclusively on the social idea, on the assumed authority of society, you establish despotism, destroy individual freedom, and the very conditions of progress. If you found it on both ideas, without the principle that harmonizes them, you have the British government over again with its inherent antagonisms. You must, if you would have it stable, both authoritative and free, conservative and progressive, preserving society and fostering individual progress, found your state on both ideas, but on them in their real synthesis, as they really exist in nature, not arbitrarily or artificially placed in juxtaposition. The grand defect of all so-called mixed governments, which have hitherto existed, is that they have been unscientific, arbitrarily constructed, not founded on the real relation which nature, or rather God in nature, establishes between them. They have recognized the dualism, but not the middle term that unites the extremes in one and the same conclusion. Such governments tend perpetually to dissolution, to simplify themselves by excluding one or the other idea, and therefore to become despotic; for all simple forms, that is, governments founded on one idea, whichever of the two ideas it may be, are real despotisms. Mr. Calhoun clearly saw and illustrated this, but he saw no way of remedying the evil save by a nicely adjusted balance of antagonisms, or in rendering the resistance equal in force to the aggression. Hence his doctrine of Nullification. But no man has so well illustrated this as Gioberti in his *Del Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia*, especially in his chapter on *False Democracy*, or democracy

as set forth by Jean Jacques Rousseau. The problem is, how to escape the despotism of any of the simple forms of government, and the inherent antagonisms and tendency to dissolution of so-called mixed governments. If our statesmen understand not the solution of this problem, they understand not how to meet the wants of American civilization, and to preserve the original and fundamental, the Providential constitution of the American people. But this solution they cannot understand, if they are ignorant of the *nexus*, the natural copula, which unites the two terms without destroying or distorting either; and they cannot arrive at this *nexus* without a philosophy that presents and explains things as they really exist, which no philosophy as taught in the schools has ever yet done, or can do.

The great bond of social union, and incentive as well as guide to individual progress, is religion, which represents the Idea or Divine element in human life, and the government of human affairs; but not a religion which has no Divine authority, and is itself subjected to the very opinions, passions, and interests it ought to control. No society, no government can long exist where religion is wanting. But here again meets us the same problem we have found in organizing the state, which is as truly a divine institution as the Church, and has, in its own order, just as good a right to exist. The difficulty in all the past has been that the two orders have existed in society as antagonists; and while Churchmen have struggled to subject the state to the Church, statesmen have labored to subject the Church to the state; the former to introduce the pantheistic idea, which denies the distinction between God and creature; and the latter to introduce the atheistic idea, which denies both God and creature—pure negation, and really no idea at all. Now here, as elsewhere, the problem is to reconcile the dualism without destroying it; to recognize the divine authority of the Church without losing the freedom and autonomy of the state; the invariability of faith without lesion to human progress; to reconcile the permanence of the Idea with its free and progressive development and application; for it is only on such conditions that religion can give stability and freedom to the state and aid the progress of civilization. Here, again, there is needed a middle term to unite the two extremes; and this middle term can be no human creation, no arbitrary contrivance; but to be a real middle term, and really effective, it must exist in the real universe; and man's

business is simply to recognize it, and govern himself accordingly. But this is the work of science, of philosophy, which recognizes and explains the divine order, the real relation between the Creator and his works, what is called theological science, and which in our expositions varies with our philosophical systems. Never were we more in need of that sublime and profound philosophy, which sees and explains things and relations as they really are, than now, when we have to take our reckoning and put the ship of state on its course. We cannot think, then, that we are forgetting the practical duties of the hour in calling the attention of thinking men to the consideration of those great principles, those stable and immutable ideas, as St. Augustine calls them, without which the world of mere facts could not exist, and without a knowledge of which, facts have no significance for the human mind—are absolutely inexplicable.

The first thing that strikes the ordinary reader, on becoming partially acquainted with the Giobertian Philosophy, is its apparent lack of novelty. It seems to be an old acquaintance and substantially what has always been known and held in the schools, only presented in a new suit of clothes. The majority of those who read his works, we suspect, find little, if any thing, new or remarkable in them. Gioberti's solutions of the old problems they will take to be ordinary solutions, and his principles those which have been generally received. There is some truth in this. Gioberti is not absolutely new and original, and there is scarcely a proposition to be found in the whole of his works to which we can point and say, Here is a proposition never before made. His principles are not new in philosophy, nor is his method of philosophizing. He nowhere breaks with the past, or interrupts the continuity of the higher philosophical tradition from Plato down to our own times. He himself says his philosophy is old, and no new invention of his—a philosophy that has been substantially held by all great philosophers, theologians, and doctors, in every age and nation. He does but renew the chain of philosophic tradition from the remotest antiquity, unhappily broken by that blundering *Bas-Breton*, René Descartes, since whom there really has been no philosophy in Europe; for the psychological and sensistic systems to which he gave birth, and which can result only in the destruction of both subject and object, or pure nihilism, do not deserve the name

of philosophy, not even as developed by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, or Victor Cousin. But, if he accepts the universal philosophical tradition, he has his own way of explaining it; and, to those who understand him, he has presented it in a new light, given it new significance, and made it appear a new thing. His originality is in the new relations under which he presents old and familiar truths, and in bringing out their deeper meaning, and presenting them in their unity and universality, and in their mutual relations in the order of reality. Here he presents much that is new, and which gives a new face to the whole of philosophical science.

The scholastics distinguish between the order of being and the order of knowing, and it is not rare to find them asserting that a proposition is untrue, in the order *cognoscendi*, and yet true in the order *essendi*, or really true but logically false. That is, dialectics follows the order of the mind, not the order of things. Hence originates the interminable question of certainty, around which the excellent Balmes says revolve all the questions of philosophy. The *pons asinorum* of nearly all modern philosophers is precisely this question of certainty, or to prove that knowing is knowing. They ask not, *what* do we know, but *how* do we know that we know? As if to know that we know was something more than simply to know! To know equals to know that we know, and if the simple knowing needs confirmation, so does the *knowing* that we know; and as it is impossible to get any thing more ultimate than knowing, or more certain than knowledge, the question of modern philosophers has and can have no other effect than to cast doubt on all knowledge, and to place philosophy on the declivity to universal scepticism, and absolute nihilism, to which nearly all philosophy since Descartes inevitably conducts. *Cogito, ergo sum*, is, in the first place, a paralogism, for *sum*, I am, is in *cogito*, I think, and that I think is no more evident than that I am or I exist. The one is as immediately a fact of consciousness as the other. In the second place, the pretended enthymeme simply states a fact of consciousness, or an internal affection of the sentient subject, from which it is impossible to deduce any objective existence. Moreover, if the simple knowing is not to be taken as certain till it is confirmed by something more ultimate, the fact of consciousness itself becomes uncertain, for consciousness, or what the schoolmen call the *sensus inti-*

mus, is only *knowing*. How do we know that we know that we have the internal affection? I think, therefore I am. But how do I know that I think. I think I think. But how do I know that I think I think? Thus we go on questioning forever, and can never get beyond the simple fact of knowing. If it be disputed that to know is to know, there is and can be for man no certitude either subjective or objective.

Gioberti finds, in his philosophy, no place for such questions, and does not once raise, or have occasion to raise, the question of the certitude of knowledge. To know is to know, and we either know or do not know. The error of modern philosophers arises chiefly from their discussing the question of method before the question of principles, which compels them to deal with logical abstractions instead of realities, and give us a *mundus logicus*, diverse from the *mundus physicus* or real world. What is not, is not intelligible, is not and cannot be known, for it is simply a negation, and negations are intelligible only in the truth they deny, and hence a universal denial, or the assertion of universal negation, is simply impossible. Descartes begins his philosophy with a Discourse on Method; Bacon's whole science is reducible to methodology; Locke begins his *Essay on the Human Understanding* by a dissertation on the origin of ideas, and proceeds to answer the question how we know, and what we are able to know, before he proceeds to discuss what we do know, or what are the principles of all science. Kant's masterly *Critik der reinen Vernunft* is really a criticism on method, not science; Victor Cousin says expressly all philosophy is in method. Tell us a philosopher's method, and we will tell you his philosophy. Balmes, who is constantly sailing in sight of the coasts of truth, but is always afraid to land, though he discovers many an inviting inlet and safe harbor, begins with method, and devotes his first book to the question of certitude. All assume that the first question to be settled is, How know we that we know? and that their first business is without science to construct a science of science, a *Wissenschaftslehre*. Consequently, they are obliged to proceed blindly, to deal with unrealities, and not only to place their philosophy out of the reach of the common mind, but in eternal opposition to common sense. The philosophy they build up with infinite labor and pains is no science of the living world, of concrete reality, but of logical abstractions, which are purely mental creations, without real existence in nature

Gioberti differs from them, and places the determination of principles before that of method. The principles give the method, not method the principles. The principles of philosophy are real, not mental abstractions; they are that without which the human mind can neither exist nor operate, without which all science is impossible, and therefore are given, not invented or found by the mind operating without them. Nearly all our philosophers send the mind, assumed to be as yet ignorant of principles, forth to seek them, forgetting that the mind without principles can neither operate or exist, because the first principles of all science are those which create and constitute the human intellect itself, or man as an intellectual or rational existence, capable of knowing and understanding. The mind, destitute of principles, cannot seek principles, and ignorant of them it cannot recognize them, or know them to be principles. Principles, then, must be given antecedently to all our mental operations, and be constitutive of the human reason or understanding, and therefore given by the Creator himself, and as given by him they are *a priori*, ideal, apodictic, not empirical, contingent, or doubtful, since, as doubt is a mental operation, we could not even doubt if we had them not. What these principles of all science are, and what are their characteristics, we shall endeavor, in a subsequent article, to set forth. Here we restrict ourselves to their objective reality.

Victor Cousin begins with method, and adopting the psychological or Cartesian method, could never attain to any but psychological principles, and hence his great difficulty was to identify what he calls absolute ideas, the ideas of the True, the Good, and the Fair, with being or objective reality. Psychological observation and induction may, perhaps, establish the psychological existence of these absolute ideas, as psychological facts, though not as ideas, but how from their psychological existence conclude their ontological existence or objective reality? Here was his difficulty, and he has never yet answered the criticism of Sir William Hamilton, published in 1829, in the *Edinburgh Review*. They are with him mere generalizations, like all inductions of psychological or even physical phenomena, and therefore simply abstractions; and abstractions, we repeat, have no existence, but are simply formed by the mind operating on the concrete. The mind forms them by abstracting from a number of concrete objects what is common to them all, and by con-

sidering it apart; but they have no reality, no subsistence, as separate or distinct from their concretes or the mind that forms them. An ontology based on them is no real ontology, is only a generalization, without reality. The character of necessity which Mr. Cousin says inheres in all absolute ideas, and which he relies on as evidence of their objective validity, or real ontological truth, avails him nothing, for that is only a psychological necessity, and cannot be shown by him to be an ontological necessity. Hence the God he concludes from them is only an abstract God, only a generalization, and no real God, no real, necessary, living Being at all.

Yet Cousin approaches the truth when he asserts that what he calls absolute ideas are constitutive of the reason, without which reason could neither exist nor operate. Whether his account of absolute ideas, and his analysis of what he calls the objective reason, are to be accepted or not, or whether he has any right on his own doctrine to assert reason as objective, or ideas as absolute or necessary, we do not now inquire. His merit does not, in our judgment, lie in stating truly the constitutive principles of reason, but in recognizing and giving prominence to the fact that reason has constitutive principles, and in maintaining, in opposition to his psychological method, that the ultimate principles of human science are given intuitively, not obtained by reflection. They are in the mind prior to all reflection, and therefore are not obtained, as his system pretends, by the Baconian method of observation and induction. So far he rises to a higher order of thought than his psychology warrants, at least apparently. But he falls back into his psychology the moment he undertakes to explain the fact of intuition. He distinguishes very clearly between intuition and reflection, shows that intuition must precede reflection, for reflection is a voluntary turning back of the mind upon what has been intuitively presented; but he makes intuition itself a psychological fact, making it depend on the spontaneous activity of reason or the intellect, forgetting that reason can no more operate spontaneously than reflectively, without its constitutive principles. Gioberti escapes his error, his contradiction, and confusion, by asserting the principles, the primitive intuition, not as the product of reason, but as really constitutive of it, as creating man, and enabling him to know by giving him *a priori* the faculty and the object of science.

Having settled the question of principles, we may proceed to the question of method. The peculiarity of Gioberti, in regard to method, is that while he holds that the first principles of all science are intuitive and constitutive of intelligence, and therefore objective and real, not merely psychological generalizations, or logical abstractions, and consequently affirming to us the real, not a fictitious world, he in the construction of science uses the *data* given by revelation as well as those given by natural reason. Philosophy, in his sense of the term, is not a science separate from theology, or that can be constructed without the aid of the superintelligible, which we can know only analogically through the medium of supernatural revelation. In his view all true philosophy is Christian and Catholic. Considered in itself there is but one order of truth, and in the higher sense but one truth, which he calls Idea or God himself, considered as the object of knowledge, or as it stands toward the human intellect, and is to us partly intelligible and partly superintelligible. As the intelligible has its root, its source, its essence, in the superintelligible, and has no existence without it, it follows that it is simply impossible to have a science of truth, of being, of things as they are, without the knowledge of that which is to us superintelligible. That knowledge of the superintelligible, of the origin, causes, and end of things which can be known to us only through the medium of revelation, is as essential to science as it is to being or existence. Here he separates from the pure rationalists, who reject revelation, and from the supernaturalists who reject reason, as well as from the Jesuits and their admirers, who, though they accept both rational truth and revealed truth, present them as two orders of truth, not contradictory the one to the other indeed, but lying one above the other, and without any real or necessary relation between them, constituting a dualism which can never be reconciled and brought into dialectic union, or real synthesis, by a middle term. This needs explanation.

The total separation of philosophy from revelation, and the attempt to make it a purely rational science, or to construct it by our natural light alone, is modern, and dates from René Descartes. We find nothing of the sort in antiquity, Jewish or Gentile. Plato and Aristotle are ignorant of it, and use revelation as they had it, or as the Greek world had retained it in their traditions; and if they fail to attain to a philosophy that truly explains the origin, cause,

laws, and end of the universe, it is not because their reason is false or uncultivated, but because their tradition of the primitive revelation is not preserved in its purity and integrity. The early Fathers understand by philosophy the Greek or Gentile wisdom, and some of them seem to take it for granted that the Gentiles had only the light of nature, and that this Greek wisdom is the measure of what man can do without revelation; but none of them ever suppose that philosophy can be complete without revelation, or theology be complete without philosophy, or the order of truth cognizable by the light of nature. They distinguish between Christian wisdom and Gentile wisdom, but never separate reason from revelation. The great Fathers, Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, Athanasius, Basil, the Gregories, Augustine, do not admit that Gentile wisdom is to be taken as the expression of reason isolated from revealed truth, and plainly teach that the Gentiles retained traditions of revealed wisdom. The Word, which is with God, is God, and the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into the world, they would have us believe, did not confine his inspirations and revelations to the Jews only, but in some degree extended them to the whole human race.

The Scholastics coming after the fall of Rome, the breaking up and almost total destruction of the Italo-Greek civilization, the lapse of the greater part of Western Europe into barbarism, when learning had declined and historical studies had fallen into almost universal neglect, very generally adopt the view that the Gentile wisdom, which with them as with the Fathers is what is meant by Philosophy, was the product of reason unaided by revelation, and hence its defects as philosophy. Exceptions to this statement may be found, but generally the Scholastics either were silent on the question, or regarded the Gentile world as abandoned to the simple light, or darkness, of nature, and as having never received, or if they had received, as having wholly lost all tradition of revealed wisdom. But none of them teach, not even St. Thomas of Aquino in his *Contra Gentiles*, that a consistent and complete philosophy or science even of the natural order is practicable with the simple light of reason alone; and we may add for what it is worth, that the late distinguished Theatine, Padre Ventura, labors to prove the Angel of the Schools, as St. Thomas was called, was a traditionalist, and held philosophy impossible without the tradition of revelation. This in a certain sense is true

of all the Scholastics, for even the most rigid of the Peripatetics never pretended that Aristotle, whose writings were their Bible of Science, had given a complete science of the natural order, although they held that he had given the last word of unassisted reason. In no instance do they separate faith from reason, or philosophy from theology, and present theology and philosophy as two distinct and mutually independent sciences. The error of the Scholastics, which had so disastrous effect, grew out of the *clerocratic* tendency of their times, which would subject the temporal to the spiritual, make the Pope, as head of the Church, the universal and sovereign lord in temporals, and vest the civil and political supremacy in the clerical order, and consisted in subjecting reason to faith, and in representing philosophy as the handmaid, slave [*ancilla*] of the clergy. They did not reject philosophy, but they enslaved it, first, to the clergy, and secondly, to Aristotle. As they held and were obliged to hold that the Bible interpreted by the Church was authoritative in matters of revelation or faith, so they held and insisted that all should hold that the writings of Aristotle interpreted by the professors, was authority in all matters of reason or science. He who departed from Aristotle was treated as a heretic in science, as he who departed from the Bible was a heretic in religion. Berengarius hardly fares worse than did poor Friar Bacon. Aristotle had given and closed the canon of science, as the Bible had that of revelation. No new scientific investigations in regard to either was needed or permitted, and the only intellectual labor allowable was that of the interpreter and the commentator. St. Thomas scrupulously reproduces Aristotle, whom he calls *Philosophus*, the Philosopher, and never in the slightest particular deviates from him, unless compelled by the revealed dogma. The same order was asserted throughout, and all was subjected by a merciless logic to external authority.

This clerocratic order, as far as it obtained, created an intolerable tyranny, allowed no freedom of mind, no intellectual or social development and progress. It created an invincible antagonism between the Church and Society, the Pope and the Emperor, the clergy and the politicians, theology and philosophy, revelation and reason. It produced a powerful reaction, and the enslaved elements, after a long struggle, emancipated themselves, but only to subject their former masters, and to tyrannize over them in turn, as

they themselves had been tyrannized over. Descartes was born in this reaction, and he labored to emancipate science alike from its subjection to the theologians and to Aristotle. He rejected, mentally, all the past, discarded all tradition, alike of revelation and of science, and resolved to accept nothing as science not obtained by logical deduction from the facts of his own individual consciousness. Hence his famous *cogito, ergo sum*, as his *primum philosophicum*, or first principle in science. He pretended that with reason alone, operating on the incontestable facts of individual consciousness, without any aid from tradition or revelation, it is possible to arrive at a complete philosophy or true science of the natural order, or in other words, individual reason alone is able, by its own light, by its own conceptions, to attain to a complete scientific system of the universe. He thus assumed what had never before been pretended, effected, in theory, an entire separation of philosophy from theology, and made it purely rationalistic. The rationalists, adopting his theory, go further, perhaps, than he was prepared to go, and conclude that, if our own reason, by its own light, operating upon its own conceptions, can explain the universe, there is no reason for demanding or accepting revelation. Here is the great difficulty in the way of the teaching which is generally patronized by the Jesuits. They assert the possibility of natural beatitude, and the sufficiency of reason in the order of nature, and so far are pure rationalists. They found the necessity of supernatural revelation on the fact or alleged fact that God has created or instituted a supernatural order, above the natural order, and by entering which we may attain to supernatural beatitude. But, if God had not seen proper to establish a supernatural order, man would have been left, without any detriment, to his simple natural light. Reason does not herself need or demand such supernatural order, and then there is no real or intrinsic relation between the two orders. How then prove to reason that the supernatural order really exists, or that a supernatural revelation has been made? This question is unanswerable, and the Society's teaching labors under all the disadvantages of exclusive rationalism on the one hand, and of exclusive supernaturalism on the other, and the Jesuits have had, in point of fact, the mortification of seeing the world under them as teachers either lapsing into rationalism and treating the question of revelation with superb indifference, or rejecting reason, discarding science,

and taking refuge in a one-sided, sophistical, and therefore immoral asceticism.

The scholastics recognize philosophy, assert even scientific tradition, but enslave the mind to the tradition, and philosophy to theology; the Cartesian emancipates philosophy from theology, and the mind from tradition, but at the expense of the continuity of the race, and of leaving all the past, all history unexplained, and without significance, thus isolating man from God, from nature, and from society, and ending necessarily in pure individualism, egoism,—nihilism, as history but too clearly demonstrates; Jesuitism accepts both rationalism and supernaturalism, rational conceptions and traditions, but as unrelated, without any intrinsic connection, or middle term which converts the dualism into a synthesis. Gioberti claims here to have found in the original principles of science and of things this middle term, which renders the two dialectic, unites them in a real synthesis, and destroys all antagonism.

There is, undoubtedly, a dualism which all science does and must recognize, and it is that of the supernatural and the natural, or in other words that of Being and existences, God and his works. The asserters of the sufficiency of reason and the defenders of the necessity of revelation, however, alike misplace this dualism, the only real dualism, *by confounding the natural with the intelligible*, and *the supernatural with the superintelligible*. But the superintelligible is as natural as the intelligible, and the intelligible as supernatural as the superintelligible. The intelligible and superintelligible are not two distinct or diverse orders; they are one and the same order, and the sole distinction between them is in relation to our understanding. We know the intelligible by immediate, direct intuition, but the superintelligible only analogically and as supernaturally revealed; but that which is revealed and made indirectly known to us through the medium of analogies borrowed from the intelligible and the sensible, is but the hidden complement of that which is intuitively apprehended, the part that remains in shadow, and which reason by her own light alone cannot illumine. This holds true with regard to the profoundest mysteries of Christianity. The reality asserted in these mysteries is an essential part of the intelligible reality, and intrinsically, substantially, joined to it, essential to its existence as a whole. God as real and necessary being is intelligible,—in his essence he is superintelligible; but God can-

not be without essence, and there is no real distinction between being and essence, as the schoolmen say, between the Divine *esse* and the Divine *essentia*. The essences of things are in all cases superintelligible, even the essences of created or natural things, but there is no thing without its essence, for the essence is that by virtue of which a thing is what it is. From revelation we learn that the essence of God is relation, the threefold relation, expressed in Christian theology by the word TRINITY, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but there is no distinction admissible between these and God, or between these and the Being of God, for they are relations in his being, and essential to him as one living being, or one God.

All the distinctively Christian mysteries are included in the Incarnation. The Incarnation, or the act of assumption by the Word of human nature, is supernatural, but no more supernatural than the act of God creating the cosmos, and indeed is only that act completed. It is teleological, not cosmic, but it is no after-thought designed to meet some unforeseen difficulty, or repair some unexpected damage. It is integral in the original plan of creation, and was as necessary to complete the cosmos, before as after man had sinned. It redeems man from sin, provides the atonement, and thus manifests the infinite mercy of God. It is, as redemption, an act of free, sovereign grace, for God is not obliged to pardon the sinner, and the sinner, who has knowingly abused his free will can do nothing to merit pardon, but it is always necessary to the fulfilment of creation, for never could man attain to the end of his existence, or to his complete beatitude, possible only in the supernatural, without being regenerated in Christ, united to him, and made one with him as he is one with God the Father. The mysteries are supernaturally revealed, because they are superintelligible, but they are themselves no more supernatural than the intelligible itself. The cosmos and palingenesia are supernatural in the creative act of God, and in that act they are identical, and simply the one completed creative act of God. There is then no radical diversity between what is called nature and what is called grace, between the natural order and the Christian order, for the Christian order is simply palingenesiac, the completion of the cosmic or generative, which without it would remain simply initial, inchoate, as is and must be our present life, which has no end, no purpose, no meaning, no reason, if

there be not another. The distinction between the two is simply the distinction between the commencement and the completion. Hence Gioberti says man in this life, or the cosmos, is a God that begins; in glory he is consummated. God completed. Through union by nature with the Incarnate Word, the creature becomes one with the Creator, and God is all and in all.

The supernatural is God and his immediate act. The natural is what is done, produced, or effected by second causes, operating according to their own laws. Viewed in its origin and end, or the creative act, the created universe is itself supernatural; for neither its origin nor its end is explicable by natural laws, or without the immediate creative act of God. The human race is propagated by natural generation, and its propagation is explicable on natural principles, but Adam and Eve must have been immediately created, and therefore in their origin supernatural. You do not get rid of the difficulty even if you prove, which you are not likely to do, that man has been developed from the tadpole, the chimpanzee, or the gorilla, for wherever you assert development, you must come at length to the commencement of the series, or to that which is not the product of development. You may even prove the gaseous theory held by some physicists, and that the universe existed primarily in a gaseous state, and even go so far as to resolve all the various gases into a single gas; but you have got rid of no difficulty. Whence that single gas itself? You can no more explain the origin of that gas without the creative act of God, than you can that of the universe itself, supposing it to have existed originally in the same state in which we now find it. The universe is, then, inexplicable without creation, and, therefore, without the supernatural. The distinction between the supernatural and the natural is not that between the intelligible and the superintelligible, for God and his creative act are supernatural, but nothing, as we shall show hereafter, is more intelligible to us than God and his creative act. God is not only intelligible *per se*, but he and his creative act are the source and conditions of all intelligibleness and intelligence.

Now God and his works constitute a real dualism, and are distinguishable one from the other, but not separable. They are distinguishable as Creator and creature; and are never to be confounded one with the other; but they are also united as Creator and creature, joined together in a real

synthesis by the creative act; for the act is in the actor, and the effect is in the act, and cannot subsist a moment without the act. Let God cease his creative act, and the universe instantly drops into nothing, and is as if it had not been. The conservation of existences is their continued creation; the creative act and the conservative act are one and the same act, and we have already seen that identical with it is the teleological and palingenesiac act, or the act of consummation or glorification, and hence the Universe in its origin, its medium, and its end, is, to those who can understand it, only the exterior expression of the interior essence of God, of Being itself, asserted in the Christian dogma of the Trinity. Hence, all ages and nations have referred the origin, preservation, and consummation of things to the sacred Triad in some form, and held that in the Sacred Triad, in some form, is the secret of all being and existence, the key to the Universe. As the Universe is dialectically, synthetically, really, united to God in the creative act, and though distinguishable, inseparable from him, it follows that there can be no philosophical science separate from theology, or science of God. Philosophy must explain the Universe in its principles and causes, and as these are in God, it must include the science of Being as well as of existences, of the supernatural as well as of the natural. Humboldt, in his *Cosmos*, gives us much useful information, but he gives us science only in a secondary sense, for science, properly so called, is not in the observation and classification of facts, nor obtained from them either by deduction or induction; for it consists precisely in their explication, in joining them to their principles and causes in which is their true sense or significance. As these principles and causes are to a great extent superintelligible to us, it is clear that no true science, in its higher sense, no real philosophy is possible without revelation, any more than it is without theology. Hence, Gioberti unites Creator and creature, reason and revelation in his philosophy. He so unites them because they are united in reality, and the science of the creature is not possible without the science of the Creator, of existences without the science of Being, of the intelligible without the science of the superintelligible, of the cosmic without the palingenesiac. Science is science of things as they really are, in their real principles and relations, not as they are not. As the two series of terms in the real world, are never separable the one from the other, so must they be inseparable in all real

science, or true philosophy. This is what is meant when it is said philosophy in its principle and method must follow the order *essendi*, and not what the schoolmen call the order *cognoscendi*, which is merely that of conception or abstraction.

The difficulty which so many feel in accepting revelation as an element in philosophical science, is much lessened, if not completely removed, by Gioberti's doctrine of the supernatural, which distinguishes it from the superintelligible, and unites or identifies the natural and the supernatural in the creative act of God, thus making the supernatural as intelligible to us as the natural. The difficulty has grown out of supposing revelation to be the revelation of an order distinct from, above, and intrinsically unconnected with the order intelligible to our natural reason,—a doctrine of which the Jesuits and their followers are the chief patrons, of which we find no trace in Jewish or Gentile antiquity, in the early Fathers, hardly any in the great mediæval doctors, and which has grown out of the misunderstanding of the condemnation of the 55th Proposition of Baius, and the very poorly managed controversy with the Jansenists; or, to be more precisely exact, of the controversy about nature and grace, which arose in the early part of the sixteenth century, between Catholics and Protestants, and in the seventeenth between the Molinists or Jesuits and the Augustinians and Thomists—a controversy which had in the same century its counterpart amongst Protestants in the controversy, not yet ended, between the Calvinists and the Arminians. But by showing that the distinction between truths of reason and truths of revelation is not the distinction between nature and grace, or between natural and supernatural, but between the intelligible and superintelligible, the difficulty is lessened, because the distinction is not of orders, but simply that of our mode or manner of knowing. The intelligible and the superintelligible are not two ontologically distinct and unconnected orders, but one and the same order. What is made known by revelation is intrinsically one with what is immediately apprehended by natural reason, and in fact, the revealed truth is an essential part of the rational truth. This is of great importance.

But Gioberti does not stop here. He asserts for the human mind the faculty of superintelligence, *sovrintelligenza*, by which the superintelligible and the intelligible are in some sense identified subjectively as well as objectively. This is

developed at length in the volume before us, and will come under our notice again hereafter; for much in Gioberti's whole system of science depends on it. The faculty, which he calls *sovrintelligenza*, and which we are obliged to translate by the term *superintelligence*, is unlike our other faculties, in this, that it seizes its object, the superintelligible, only negatively. By it we know not what the superintelligible is, but that there is a superintelligible, a reality transcending not only what we know, but even what without revelation we are able to know. It springs from the soul's consciousness of her own potentiality, and of her present impotence to know and possess all reality. By it the soul is advertised that she has been created with powers which are unfulfilled, and for an end, an infinite reality, which by her own powers alone she is impotent to possess. Hence, she is satisfied with no finite knowledge, and however far she may roll back the clouds of her ignorance and enlarge the field of her science, she feels that there is an infinitude beyond, which she longs for as the lover for the absent beloved, and sorrows in her heart till she finds it present, and sees God face to face, in his very essence, as he is in himself. Therefore, St. Thomas and all great theologians maintain that man has the natural desire to see God in the beatific vision. This is wherefore the soul can never rest in any finite or created good, but in the midst of all that creatures can bestow, sighs and yearns for a good she has not. She hungers and thirsts for an unbounded good, and can be satisfied with nothing short of the infinite Good, the infinite God, who is her supreme Good, the supreme Good, the Good in itself, to speak in the language of Plato. Now this is not the intellect, for that has for its object the intelligible, and can advertise us of the existence of nothing beyond what is actually apprehended. Whence, then, this undeniable advertisement of the superintelligible, this assertion of the superintelligible which we know is, but know not, and have no natural means of knowing, what it is? Whence comes this craving for the infinite, and this impotence of the soul to satisfy herself with the finite, noted by all moralists and masters of spiritual life? You cannot resolve it into will, for the will is in itself blind, and follows, not precedes intellect. You cannot resolve it into that supreme affection of the soul which Plato calls love, for, if you mark well, it is the basis and condition of that love. It is not a mere negation of the object, for

the soul does not desire or long for an absent good unless aware that it exists, though absent. It is impossible, then, to resolve this faculty into any of our other faculties, and, therefore, it must be asserted as a distinct, though a peculiar faculty.

Gioberti has been the first philosopher, as far as we know, to assert a distinct faculty of superintelligence; not, we repeat, a faculty that cognizes the superintelligible, for that would be a contradiction in terms, but which advertises the soul that there is the superintelligible, and that it is necessary to complete or fulfil the intelligible. Advertised of so much, we are advertised that revelation is necessary to complete or fulfil our science or philosophy. This faculty is in the soul a premonition, a forefeeling of revelation, a craving for it, and an aptitude to receive it. It is the psychological basis of faith,—*fides humana*, we add, so as to have no quarrel with the theologians,—that by which man is rendered a creditive subject. By intellect he is rendered an intelligent subject; by the faculty of superintelligence he is rendered creditive or capable of faith; and the distinction between being capable of knowing and of believing is, if we understand the author, the distinction between the two faculties. We know the intelligible; we believe the superintelligible; and all is superintelligible to us that is not the direct object of the intellect, or logically deducible therefrom; consequently, the ordinary facts of history are as superintelligible as revelation, and as little the direct object of our intelligence or logical deductions.

The fact established, that the act of revelation is no more supernatural than the act of creation or our own continued existence, and that what is revealed pertains to and is an integral part of what is intuitively apprehended, combined with our faculty of superintelligence, places revelation, in regard to our science, in precisely the same category with all history or tradition, and renders it credible in the same way and by the same degree of testimony. Gioberti is not a Cartesian, and does not hold it possible to construct philosophy by logical deductions from the facts of individual consciousness, simply, because man does not exist as an isolated individual, and because he is progressive and has a history. He takes man as he finds him, as the theologians say, in the *sensus compositus*, with his memories and his hopes, his reminiscences and his prophecies. Revelation, in relation to the man of to-day, is historical, traditionary, and for the

philosopher is in the category of general tradition. It enters into and forms an integral part of the traditionary wisdom of mankind, embodying his past developments, his Ideal, and the law of his future progress. The human race is continuous, and it needs not to begin, and cannot begin *de novo*, to-day in science any more than in existence. Philosophy must accept and explain the past as well as the present and future, for the whole life of man, past and to come, is but one life, indissolubly united both to God and to nature. It must give us the Divine Idea which the past has been developing, and which the future must develop and complete in the life of the race.

It will, perhaps, relieve some minds prejudiced against recognizing supernatural revelation as an element or condition of science, to know that Gioberti holds that the revelation was made in the beginning, that it is coeval with the race, and was infused into man by his Creator along with language, which is the medium of its transmission, and from which it is taken. Language contains both the intuition of the intelligible and the revelation of the superintelligible. They are incorporated into it in their true synthesis or union, and the human mind has never operated without them both, for it has never operated and never could operate without language of some sort. There never has been a purely rational science, borrowing nothing from revelation; nor a purely revealed science or faith, borrowing nothing from natural reason. There has never been an age, nation, or individual wholly destitute of revelation. The revelation is as old and as universal as language. The Word, the Idea, the Truth, both as revealed and as naturally intelligible, is universal, but is transmitted in its integrity only when and where language, the medium of its transmission, is preserved uncorrupted. Where language is corrupted and the integrity of speech is lost, the tradition of the truth in its integrity, whether revealed or rational, is corrupted, and comes to us distorted or mutilated; and hence, though all nations have it, all do not receive it or transmit it in its integrity and purity. Since the confusion and corruption of language at the building of Babel, and the consequent dispersion of mankind, the tradition has been transmitted through two channels—the one orthodox, the other heterodox. The heterodox tradition comes down to us through the Gentiles; the orthodox from the Patriarchs, through the Jewish Synagogue and the Christian Church, infal-

lible by the divine assistance in preserving the language of truth in its integrity and free from corruption or confusion. Nevertheless, the philosopher must study the tradition under both its forms, if he would master it and understand the past civilization of the race; as he who would master the Christian dogmas, get at their real sense, must study them in the sects, in their heterodox developments as well as in the infallible speech of the Church. The study of heresy helps us to the comprehension of orthodoxy.

If we have made Gioberti's thought at all plain, it will be seen that, though he combines both reason and revelation in the development of science, he does not, with the French Traditionalists, make the first principles of science depend on revelation; or, with the Scholastics, make philosophy the slave of theology, for theology itself is a human science. For him reason and revelation stand on the same footing, are alike supernatural and divine in their origin and light, and both present to the mind one and the same objective truth. If there is apparent collision, for real collision is impossible, neither yields to the other; for one or the other has been misconceived, and the investigation must be continued till the mediating term that reconciles them is found. The dogma expresses the Idea, which is divine and infallible, but the language in which it is expressed may be misinterpreted, and our theories and speculations concerning it may need revision. The dogma is infallible, but theologians are fallible; and while they have retained the infallible speech in which it is expressed, they may fail to seize its true sense; for, though the dogma is infallible, nothing guaranties the infallibility of our minds in our understanding and appropriation of it.

The full appreciation of much that we have thus far advanced depends upon principles and views which remain to be set forth. We have not followed Gioberti's order, but have followed the order which best suited our own convenience. The view we have given is a general view, taken substantially from the work before us, and is, in the main, introductory. We will now give an exposition of his Ideal Formula.

Gioberti, as we have said, places the question of principles before that of method. Method is the way in which the mind develops and applies principles already in its possession, not that by which it finds or obtains them. The

Human mind cannot operate, cannot even exist without principles, and therefore it does not and cannot obtain them by its own operations. They precede experience, and therefore must be given, and be intuitive, objective, independent of the mind, ultimate, and universal; irreducible to any thing back or outside of them, and comprehending all the knowable, *omne scibile*, and therefore all the real.

That principles precede method, are prior to experience, that without which no experience is possible, and therefore given not found, is not a new doctrine, peculiar to Gioberti. It has been asserted and ably maintained by Dr. Reid, the eminent founder of the Scottish school, in opposition to Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, who derive them from experience, and even from sensible experience, or sensation. Dr. Reid, after Father Buffier, calls them Common Sense, the principles of Common Sense, the principles of Belief, and sometimes, if our memory serves us, the Constituent Principles of Human Nature. Reid's terminology may be objected to, and he fails to set forth his first principles with the requisite depth and scientific precision; but in asserting them as prior to experience, and as its necessary conditions, therefore as given, not found he has shown real philosophic genius, and given to philosophical studies a true scientific direction. He has utterly demolished the empiricism of the sensistic and materialistic schools of Locke and Condillac, and must be honored, unless we are to except Cardinal Gerdil, the able defender of Malebranche, as the most genuine philosopher of the eighteenth century. His defect is that, though he asserts his principles as prior to experience, and independent of it, he does not show that they are more ultimate than human nature, and are really independent of the human understanding itself. He goes in the right direction, but not far enough, and not necessarily any further than Leibnitz went in the amendment he proposed to the peripatetic maxim assumed by Locke in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*. The peripatetics adopt the maxim, that "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu," which Leibnitz accepts with the amendment, NISI IPSE INTELLECTUS, making it read, "There is nothing in the understanding which was not first in the senses, save the understanding itself."

Locke had rejected the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas, maintained that the mind originally exists as a blank sheet, and denied all principles not derived from sensible experi-

ence. Leibnitz, by his amendment, asserts that the understanding itself precedes experience, and in experience recognizes or apperceives itself, and supplies the ideal element of experience. This was something, indeed much, for it introduced into experience noetic or non-sensible principles; but it did not necessarily assert any principles as given prior to experience, or as more ultimate than the human understanding itself, as subsequently maintained by Immanuel Kant. The understanding might, and he maintains that it does, draw its principles from its own funds [*fonds*], that is, from itself, its own innate and essential faculties. It is true that he asserts with St. Augustine, eternal ideas, which he calls "the eternal verities" of things, but intent on the question of method rather than that of principles, he asserts them as noetically perceived, not as intuitively given. Man has the innate faculty of thinking them, but they are obtained by the exercise of that faculty. In their affirmation the activity is on the part of the understanding itself. The only distinction he allows between intuition and reflection, is the distinction between simple perception and apperception, and these are both operations of the mind, and differ only in degree. Simple perception he defines to be the simple apprehension of the object without noting that we apprehend it; apperception [*ad-perceptio*] is perception prolonged, or which notes itself, and in which we recognize that it is we that perceive; that is, consciousness [*cum-scientia*] or a perception that is at once the object perceived and the subject perceiving, *perceptum et percipiens*. We find in him no recognition of intuition in any sense distinguishable from the immediate apprehension by the mind of ideas, either in itself or in God, who, according to him, is the place of ideas,—*locus idearum*, which is far removed from intuition in the Giobertian sense. Principles, on the Leibnitzian doctrine, are, after all, empirically obtained, and it may, therefore, still be questioned whether they are really objective or simple mental inventions or fictions.

Immanuel Kant, the greatest of the German philosophers since Leibnitz, maintains, with Dr. Reid, the necessity of something in the understanding prior to experience, as the necessary *a priori* condition of experience itself. He clearly and accurately distinguishes between analytic judgments and synthetic judgments, judgments *a priori* and judgments *a posteriori*, and maintains that synthetic judgments *a posteriori* are absolutely impossible without synthetic judgments

a priori; or in other words, no experience is possible without principles given prior to experience. These principles which precede experience, and render experience possible, he calls, after Aristotle, *categories*, and in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, he professes to give an exact enumeration and a rigidly scientific description of them. But while accepting the amendment of Leibnitz to the peripatetic maxim, he takes it in a subjective sense, and makes the principles or categories forms of the understanding, *formæ intellectus*, which assert for the understanding nothing beyond or more ultimate than itself. He thus rendered all science subjective, and therefore no science at all; and he himself avows that the effect of his investigation is to demolish science to make way for faith. On Reid's or Leibnitz's doctrine, principles, if not proved to be objective, real, independent of the mind, are, at least, not denied to be so, and science is possible; but on Kant's doctrine they cannot be, and science is asserted to be impossible. The Egoïstic philosophy, so energetically asserted by Fichte, that God and the external world are only the soul projecting itself, is only a logical deduction from the Kantian premises, which, though not asserted either by Leibnitz or Reid, is necessarily denied by neither.

M. Victor Cousin, the greatest name among French philosophers since Malebranche, saw clearly enough the defect of Reid's philosophy, introduced into France by M. Royer-Collard; saw also that Kant's doctrine denied the possibility of science, and attempted to assert, in emendation of both, the real objectivity of principles. He holds, indeed, at once from the Scottish school, the Kantian, the Hegelian, of which we shall soon speak, and the Cartesian. After Descartes, he holds that the discussion of method must precede the discussion of principles, or that method gives the principles, instead of principles giving the method. Meaning to be universal, he mistakes eclecticism for synthetism, and gives us syncretism instead of real dialecticism. He reduces, with admirable analysis, the categories of Kant and Aristotle, and asserts their objectivity and priority to experience; he distinguishes between intuition and reflection, and maintains that principles are given intuitively, as Gioberti does; but he defines intuition to be the act of the spontaneous reason, which is, in reality, identical with the reflective reason. Intuition and reflection are, according to him, only two modes of rational activity. In both modes reason is one and the same, and one and the same faculty of human

nature, only in intuition the human personality does not, and in reflection it does, intervene. The distinction between them is very like that which theologians make between *actus hominis* and *actus humanus*. As he distinguishes reason in both its modes from God, and makes it either man or an abstraction, he really asserts no objective principles at all. As he says, the objective reason is objective only in relation to the personality constituted by the will. It is, therefore, really subjective, and he fails to escape the subjectivism he condemns in Kant, or the Egoïsm of Fichte, unless he accepts pure nihilism.

Schelling and Hegel, from whom Cousin borrows his ontology, give us what they call the Philosophy of the Absolute, still somewhat in vogue among our German friends. But Schelling maintains the identity of subject and object, and thus asserts, from the subjective point of view, the Egoïsm of Fichte, and, under the objective point of view, the Pantheism of Spinoza, while under both he denies intuition and even the possibility of science. Hegel differs in many important respects from Schelling, but really recognizes no principium, no intuition. The Absolute, he asserts, is no real being, it is only an abstraction, and therefore no real principle of experience, but is obtained by experience, or the operations of the human mind on its own ideas. It is not primitive, and instead of preceding reflection, is formed by it. Even by Hegel's own avowal his *reine Seyn*, which is his *primum*, is identical with *das Nicht-Seyn*, therefore mere possible being. It is, then, less ultimate than real being, for the possible is possible only in the real. It is the real that gives the possible, not the possible that gives the real. Hegel's *reine Seyn* or Absolute is therefore empirical, psychological, and less ultimate than the Common Sense of Reid. He is more abstract, more difficult to understand, than the Scotsman, but his philosophy is really less genuine, less profound, and infinitely less worthy of confidence.

All the men we have named, with the exception of Reid and Father Buffier, belong to the peripatetic school, and however much they may laud Plato, are really disciples, and not always worthy disciples, of Aristotle. The peripatetics, mediæval or modern, doubtless admit the necessity of principles given prior to experience, and they all assert *ens* as the primitive object of the mind. But they do not recognize *ens* as intuitively given, and really hold that it is

empirically obtained. The *ens* does not affirm itself to the mind, but is affirmed by the mind's own activity, the *intellectus agens* of St. Thomas. The being apprehended may be either real being or possible being, a real existence or an *ens rationis*, or pure fiction. It is then neither intuitive nor ultimate, and consequently no *principium*, either in science or in being. In fact, the disciples of Aristotle make no distinction between intuition and reflection. Their great principle, called the principle of contradiction, that is, that something cannot both be and not be at one and the same time, is derived from reflection, not intuition. Doubtless they assert the categories and predicaments of Aristotle, but then they never assert them as being or things existing independently of the mind, but as laws or forms of logic, proved by Kant to be forms of the understanding, and therefore are neither principles of science nor of things. They are abstract forms, which reflection in its operations must observe; but they are distinguishable from reality, and may or may not have contents. Hence the distinction between what is called the logical world and the real world, *mundus logicus* and *mundus physicus*, which renders it necessary, after having constructed our logical universe, to inquire if there be or be not a real universe behind it, and represented by it. These schoolmen deal not with intuitions, but with conceptions or logical abstractions, and their philosophy consists in empty forms and dry technicalities, as lifeless and barren of results as wearisome and repulsive to the student.

Gioberti takes something in transforming it from all these, but among modern philosophers he assigns the highest rank to the Scotsman Reid and the Italian Galuppi. He accepts these as far as they go. He himself, however, holds, from Pythagoras, Plato, St. Augustine, St. Bonaventura, Malebranche, Vico, Leibnitz, Fénelon, rather than from Aristotle, St. Thomas, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Schelling, Hegel. In common with all philosophers of the first line, he asserts immediate intuition of principles or Ideas, the objectivity of the Ideal, and its identity with real and necessary being or with God, regarded as facing the human intellect. The Idea, or God, affirms himself intuitively, and God is the first principle in science and in being, and hence Gioberti calls principles ideas, and, when formally stated, the Ideal Formula. To be truly scientific, the formula must contain all that precedes experience, the ideal principle of all reality

and of all science. Idea with Gioberti is never taken in a psychological sense. He does not mean by the term the intelligible species or image of the schoolmen, something between the thing and the mind, with which the understanding is immediately conversant, the representation of the object to the mind, nor yet the immediate mental apprehension or perception of the object; but the intelligible object itself, which immediately affirms itself in intuition, prior to all experience, and independent of all operation on the part of the mind itself,—in a sense analogous to that in which it is used by Plato, from whom we hold it.

Plato understood by *idea* the type or model in the Divine Mind, and the real thing itself formed after it. In his doctrine the type or model and the thing formed after it are identical, for Plato, like all the Gentile philosophers, had lost the conception of creation. The Idea in the divine mind, according to Plato, at least as we understand him, forms the particular thing by impressing itself on a pre-existing uncreated matter, as the seal upon wax, thus rendering the matter, as the peripatetics would say, *materia formata*. It is called *idea* because, considered in the divine mind, it is both *seeing* and *seen*, and, considered in the thing, it is that which God sees, and which the human mind must see and know in order to have real science, that is, science identical with Divine science; for Plato would recognize nothing else as science. The idea is, then, the real, intelligible object, intelligible alike to the divine mind and to the human mind. According to Plato, the reality is in the idea, the *forma* of the Latins, and what is not idea, what is sensible, variable, perishable, is phenomenal not real, and therefore no object of science. His error lies in asserting matter as pre-existing, eternal, as Pythagoras did before him; in overlooking the creative act, or confounding creation with formation; in supposing the types or models in the divine intelligence are the essences of things themselves, and in holding that all that is not idea is unreal, phenomenal, unsubstantial, of which science takes no more account than of simple shadows. Whoever understands his famous cave, sees that he regards precisely as a shadow all that is not idea. He denied the reality, to use one of his own terms, of the mimesis. It is impossible, therefore, to clear him of the double error of pantheism and dualism,—pantheism in identifying the divine ideas with the essences of things,—dualism in asserting the eternity of matter, and

therefore God and matter as two originally and reciprocally independent principles, whence is explained the origin of evil by the supposed intractableness of matter, a doctrine which has influenced disastrously many of the ascetic practices even of Christians.

But it is evident that, however in these respects Plato may have erred, he held ideas to be what in science and in things is constitutive, formative, permanent, invariable, immutable, universal, and eternal. Hence St. Augustine says: "Ideas are certain primordial forms, or persistent and immutable reasons, which are themselves not formed, and therefore, being eternal and always the same are contained in the divine intelligence. And since they themselves neither begin nor end, they are that according to which are said to be formed all things which may or do begin and end."* Ideas, according to Gioberti, are not created things themselves, are not the genera and species of things, the universals of the schoolmen, but they are in all things that which is necessary and eternal, or non-contingent. This is Plato's sense, freed from the error of denying all reality or substantive existence to the contingent. These "primordial forms, principales formæ," these "persistent and immutable reasons of things, rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles," are what Gioberti understands by the Idea or the Ideal. As ideas are contained in the divine mind, and as what is contained in the divine mind is God, or as St. Thomas says, "idea in mente divina nihil aliud est quam essentia Dei," the Idea or Ideal is and must be identically God himself, real and necessary being considered as facing our intellect. We say considered as facing our intellect, because idea is related to our intelligence as well as to the Divine intelligence, and therefore is God in his intelligibleness to us, not God considered in his essence which is superintelligible to us, and intelligible only to himself. But as no distinction is admissible in God himself, between his essence and his intelligibleness to us, the Ideal is really and truly God, and hence all that in the object of human science is eternal, universal, and necessary, or non-contingent, instead of being forms of the understanding, or abstract categories and predicaments, is simply being, that is, God himself.

This explains the sense in which Gioberti takes the word *idea*, and wherefore he calls his *principium* the *Ideal For-*

*Lib. de divers, Quæst. lxxxii. Quæst. 46, 2.

mula. The Formula itself is, in his language, L'ENTE CREA L'ESISTENZE, which we render in Latin, *Ens creat existentias*, and in English, Being creates existences, substantially the first verse of Genesis, "In principio Deus creavit cœlum et terram—in the beginning God created heaven and earth," or the first article of the Creed, "I believe in one God, Maker of heaven and earth and all things visible and invisible." It is the true formula, for it asserts the real principles of science and of things, in their real relation. It is ultimate, for back of God and his creative act, nothing can be thought or conceived into which it can be resolved; it is universal, for God and creature include all that is or exists, all the knowable, because all the real. It is intuitive, for it precedes experience, and without it no experience is possible. It is certain, because it affirms itself to the mind, and is not found, invented, imagined, or created by it.

Yet simple and true as this is, men who have been trained in false systems of philosophy find great difficulty in accepting it, and even in understanding it. "It is true," say some, "but a truth of revelation, not of philosophy; we know it by supernatural revelation, not by our natural reason;" "it is true, and a truth of philosophy," say others, "but is the last word of philosophy, not its first; its end, not its beginning; that which science succeeds in demonstrating, not that with which it sets out." But both of these classes assume that method precedes principles, and confound intuition with reflection. The second class assumes that the formula is presented as a theorem, and forget that Gioberti contends that it is an axiom. The formula, taken as a theorem, is demonstrable only at the end of philosophy, but without it as an axiom no demonstration is possible. All demonstration must proceed from a principle or axiom, which itself is not demonstrable. How then proceed to demonstrate the formula without the principles it affirms? Take the arguments of theologians to prove the existence of God or the fact of creation; they all presuppose the mind to be already in possession of the ideas of the necessary and the contingent, of cause and effect, and their relation, which Reid, Hume, and Kant have amply proved are not and cannot be derived from experience, or placed in the mind by reflection. These ideas are either real intuitions or abstractions. If abstractions, you can, by starting from them as your premises, end only in abstractions, demonstrate only an abstract God, and you have still to prove that there is a real living

God corresponding to your abstract God. This is the difficulty with Cousin. He attempts to conclude God from what he calls necessary and absolute ideas, but as he has distinguished reason, of which they are the constituent principles, from God, and made it human, he can never assert their objective reality, or show them to be necessary and absolute, save for man. The God he asserts is an abstraction or generalization, and as far as his philosophy goes, no real God at all. If these ideas are real intuitions, then the Ideal Formula is conceded as the real beginning or starting-point of science and things, and philosophy, faith, and common sense are harmonized.

The difficulty arises from the quiet assumption of our modern peripatetics, that abstractions are objects of science, and are intelligible without their concretes. As abstractions are formed by the mind, and have only a psychological existence, they assume, whether aware of it or not, that the mind can be its own intelligible object, or, what is the same thing, that the subject can think, act, know, without any object really distinguishable from itself. Hence they direct all their efforts to the solution of what to them is the gravest of all problems, Is knowledge knowledge? or, Has our knowledge any objective validity? In knowing do we know any thing beyond the cognitive subject and its own modes and affections? These questions are unanswerable, as the whole history of philosophy shows, but they are absurd, and no real philosopher ever asks them. It is difficult to conceive a man standing over against himself and looking into his own eyes. Man, St. Thomas held, is not intelligible in himself, or the direct object of his own intelligence, because he is not intelligence in himself. Human thought is always and invariably the product of two factors operating from opposite directions, and called in recent philosophy subject and object. This much is formally asserted by Cousin, who tells us thought is a phenomenon which is composed simultaneously and indissolubly of three elements, the subject, the object, and the form. The subject is *le moi*, I, *ego*, the object is *le non-moi*, not-I, *non-ego*, and the form is their relation. But perhaps no one has more clearly shown or established this than Pierre Leroux, who, whatever his faults and fancies, does not, in our judgment, deserve the disdain with which the superb Italian uniformly treats him. He has, it is true, accumulated more materials than he has digested, and lacks that serenity of

temper and that mental equilibrium which we look for in a philosopher; but he has real philosophic aptitude, and his genius occasionally flashes far into the darkness, and throws a brilliant if not a steady light on more than one obscure problem. His doctrine of Life, that man lives only by communion with his Maker, his fellow-men, and nature, is in perfect accordance with Gioberti's philosophy, though his development and application of it are unscientific, and often absurd. He denied with Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel, that the mimesis, that is, the individual and the sensible, is real,—held it to be purely phenomenal, and accordingly defined the individual man to be "sensation sentiment cognition," thus making the substantive existence that is sensibly affected, that feels and knows, the race, the generic, not the individual man; hence he was led to define death to be the absorption of the individual in the race, or the individual becoming latent in the race,—which is almost asserted by Gioberti himself in one of his unfinished and posthumous works,—and to predicate immortality or future life of the race only, not of individuals. Individuals disappear; the race survives. He is as far from admitting the future life of individuals as are the Oriental Emanationists, but he absorbs them in the race, not as they do in God, the fountain from which they had emanated.

But notwithstanding all this, Leroux has really established that thought consists simultaneously in three distinct though inseparable elements,—subject, object, and their relation. Cousin, as we have said, had asserted the same, but virtually abandoned it by restricting the subject to the personality constituted by the will, and maintaining that we observe directly, by an internal sense, the phenomena of our own consciousness, or that by an interior sense we perceive directly the phenomena of our interior world, as we do by the external senses the phenomena of the exterior world. Hence, though no thought without both subject and object in immediate relation, yet man may be himself both subject and object, and therefore think with no object but himself. Leroux denies this subjectivo-objectivism, so rife in Germany, and shows that the object, by the very force of the term, is opposed to the subject, and stands over against it, and therefore must be distinct from and independent of the subject. By an admirable analysis of the so-called fact of consciousness, he shows that even in consciousness we have no direct perception of ourselves, and, in fact,

recognize ourselves as thinking subjects only as reflected from the object. Hence the object is not only distinct from our personality, or reason acting at the command and under the direction of the will, but from our whole intelligence, whether reflective or spontaneous. The ideal, in the Gobertian sense, as in the Platonic, is always and everywhere really objective, and never subjective. It is always ontological, and never psychological. The object then must be intuitive, and if intuitive, real, for nothing unreal can affirm even itself. The fact then that man thinks at all, since he can think himself only as mirrored in the object, establishes at once a real objective world, and avoids the passage from the subjective to the objective, the *pons asinorum* of nearly all modern as of many ancient philosophers, for both are given distinctly and simultaneously in every mental operation.

Gioberti arrives at the same conclusion by another process, which we shall have occasion to develop before long. All we say here is, that the doctrine accords with his, and is conclusive against all who maintain that man can be the direct and immediate object of his own intelligence, or that he can know himself in himself, that is, against all exclusive psychologists, who hold or imply that man suffices for himself. Only a being that has the reason of his existence in himself can suffice for himself; only a being who is intelligence in himself can be his own object, or sufficient in himself for his own intelligence. Hence only God is intelligible in himself, or in himself the object of his own intellect, or can know himself directly and immediately in himself; and his eternal knowledge of himself in himself, Christian theology teaches us, generates the Eternal Word consubstantial with himself, because generated in himself without the aid or co-operation of another.

Philosophers have so long regarded the categories as the abstract forms of logic, and treated them as neither wholly psychological nor wholly real, that they do not easily recognize the fact that as abstract they are nullities, and no object of the intellect. Abstractions are formed by the mind operating on the concrete intuitively presented, and are real only in their concretes. There is no abstract necessary, eternal, universal, and immutable, and these ideas are and can be real only as concreted in real, necessary, eternal, universal, and immutable being; there is no abstract contingent, particular, variable, or mutable; there are and can

be only contingent, particular, variable, and mutable existences, any more than there can be roundness with nothing round, or whiteness with nothing white. Overlooking this fact, philosophers, or many of them at least, take these abstractions as ideas with which, as Locke says, the mind is immediately conversant, and construct with them a formal or abstract universe, which, though rigidly logical, on the supposition that logic is formal and not real science, is of no scientific value, for it has no contents, no objective basis, no reality, no existence *a parte rei*, as say the schoolmen. Assuming that the categories are formal, that is, are abstractions, they see not that ideas are intuitive, and the intuition of real being. Forgetting or not heeding that so-called absolute ideas are real only in real and necessary being, we have amongst us men who seek to concrete them in nature, to identify them with the natural principles and laws of the universe, thus speculatively denying God while intuitively affirming him. Gioberti refutes all these by his formula, which makes the ideal real, and abstractions nullities, save in the concrete.

For these and other considerations, Gioberti integrates the abstract in the concrete or real, and maintains that only real being can be the direct and immediate object of intuition. What is not, is not intelligible, and, consequently, nothing is intelligible but that which is. That which is, is being. Only being, then, is intelligible in itself, and what is not being is intelligible only in being, or the intelligibleness of being. The peripatetics concede this, and contend that only what they call *ens* can be an object of intellect; but they deny it in maintaining the *ens intelligibile* may be either *ens reale*, real being, or *ens possibile*, or merely possible being; for possible being, not existing save in the mind or ability of the real to create it, can be no intelligible object, and in itself is incapable of being intellectually apprehended. Understanding that only the real is knowable or cognizable, there is no difficulty in accepting the Ideal Formula, for all the real, therefore all the knowable, is embraced in it. God and his creation include all the real. There is and can be nothing else. The formula is absolutely universal. Discarding the notion that ideas are abstractions, and that abstractions have in themselves any reality, and integrating ideas in the real, or identifying them with real being, it is evident, even to the most ordinary understanding, that there is and can be nothing to be known but God and his

creative act or creation. What is not God is creature, and what is not creature is God.

This, simply stated, is undeniable: and yet there are comparatively few among modern philosophers who clearly and distinctly admit it, and are governed by it in their systems. They seem to suppose there is something, or that the mind comes into relation with something, which is neither, which is not, strictly speaking, either God or creature. Such are the absolute ideas of the True, the Good, and the Fair, which, according to Cousin, constitute the objective or impersonal reason. Cousin certainly does not mean to assert them as something created, and though he makes them the Word of God, the Logos, he denies them to be God, for with him the Word is not God. What are they, then? If neither God nor creature, they are nothing, and who but God from nothing can produce something? Rosmini, who justly ranks among the profoundest and acutest thinkers of our day, falls into the same mistake. He maintains that the object intuitively apprehended by the mind is being, but being in general, *ens in genere*. But this being in general, this *ens in genere*, is, according to him, neither God nor creature, and yet he holds it to be something very real. What is it, then? Had he asked himself this question, and used his simple common sense in answering it, he would have seen at once that if neither God nor creature, it is simply nothing, or a purely psychological abstraction, and, like all abstractions in themselves, a pure nullity.

The theologians find a difficulty in recognizing the idea as God, and conceding that he is the intuitive object of our intelligence, or that the intelligible is God, for this, as they understand it, implies that we have intuition of God in this life, while they hold intuition of God is reserved as the reward of the blest in heaven, and is naturally possible to no creature. But the intuition reserved to the blest is the intuitive vision of God, or seeing God as he is in himself, in his essence, which is indeed naturally possible to no creature, and is possible to man hereafter only through union with Christ and glorification in him, who has, by becoming incarnate, raised human nature to be the nature of God, and is distinctly and indissolubly both God and man, or the union without confusion of both natures, the human and the Divine, in one Divine Person. But the intuition asserted by Gioberti is not the intuition of God as he is in his essence, nor intuition at all in the sense of the theologians.

Their intuition is vision, and also the act of the human intelligence itself. Gioberti's intuition is not vision, and is not the act of the human intelligence itself. God in it affirms himself as intelligible object, as the immediate object and light of the understanding; not, if we may so speak, as God, but as real and necessary being, which we know, by revelation preserved in language, and by reflection, is God. All men, from the first instant of their existence, have the intuition, for it is the intuition that creates and constitutes the human understanding; but it is only through instruction, and their own reflection on the intuition or idea immediately affirmed, that any of them become aware that the idea is God, and most of them never do become aware of it. St. Augustine, who is a great philosopher and a great theologian, as well as a great saint, holds that the idea is present to all minds, but that all do not take note that it is God. It must not be difficult, therefore, to distinguish between this and the intuitive vision in which theologians find the blessedness of the saints in glory.

It being settled that abstractions are in themselves nullities, it must be held either that sheer negation can be an object of science and intuitively affirmed, or else that only being, and only real being, is intelligible, for the possible being of the schoolmen, and the being in general of Rosmini, are mere abstractions. No negation is intelligible, save in the affirmation it denies. Nothing has no attributes, no predicates, and we can never affirm so much of it as to affirm that it is, since precisely it is not. We cannot think it, and it cannot present itself or affirm itself as an object of thought. Hence it is, no man can make an absolute denial, for the denial is intelligible only in the idea affirmed. It follows, then, that only real being is intelligible. What is not is not intelligible. What is not real, independent being, existing and acting in, of, and from itself, cannot affirm itself intuitively to the mind, as its intelligible object. All intuition is, then, intuition of real, independent, self-existing, and self-acting being, and such being is in all theologies termed God. Of course we cannot demonstrate or prove from principles more ultimate than the affirmation or judgment, that being is, for the formula is given as an axiom, not as a theorem. All that we can do is to show that it is impossible to deny it, and that its denial would be the denial of all science, of all reality. Axioms are never demonstrable; they are given, and affirm themselves. This is all

that is possible, and all that the most rigid logic ever demands.

Only being is intelligible in itself, and consequently, without intuition of being, nothing is or can be known. But the simple intuition of being does not suffice for science, or is not an adequate *primum philosophicum*. The intuition of being is the *primum ontologicum*, but with the ontological *primum* alone, it is impossible to advance beyond the judgment or affirmation, being is. This intuition does not furnish the adequate ideal formula, which must include existences in their principle as well as being itself, and also in their real relation to being. Hence the Giobertian Formula asserts not only Being is, but Being *creates existences;* not only God is, but God is creator. In it you have a real affirmation or judgment, with the three terms essential to every judgment, subject, predicate, and copula. The subject is being, *l'Ente;* the predicate is existences, and the copula is the creative act.* Now the ideal formula expresses all the terms of this ideal judgment, or judgment that precedes all experience, or activity of the human mind, and all the three terms must be taken in the relation asserted in the formula as the real *primum philosophicum*, or scientific starting point of philosophy.

Descartes and the psychologists start with the predicate, with the assertion of existences alone, *Cogito ergo sum*, I think, therefore I am. They start with a falsehood, that the thinking subject is being, whereas it is only *in* and *from* being, that is, existence. I have not my being in myself, and I stand only in my Creator, in whom I live, and move, and have my being. But this falsehood superinduces another, that I am capable of thinking myself in myself, or am immediately intelligible to myself in and by myself. But as no predicate stands by itself, no one is intelligible by itself. Only being is intelligible *per se*, consequently no

* We express the predicate in the plural, *existences*, not in the singular, *existence*, for existence in the singular is often used for *is*, and to say Being creates existence might be understood as simply asserting Being is, or that Being makes its own existence, and not that Being creates an existence distinct from itself. *Existence* etymologically expresses a derivation from another [*exstare*], and implies that it has not its being or its cause in itself. It is a word admirably formed to express a dependence on, and distinction from, Being. It is distinct from Being, but dependent on it, and inseparable from it without annihilation, as is the effect in relation to the cause, or the creature to the creator. While then we apply *esse* to God, we use *existere* in relation to contingents or creatures.

existence is intelligible save in and by being. Malebranche proved clearly that existences are not intelligible in themselves, or anywhere save in God. Hence his *Vision in God;* but in being we, strictly speaking, see only the ideas, archetypes, or possibilities of things, and hence the great Arnaud objected to Malebranche that he gave us only an ideal, that is to say, a possible universe, and no actually created universe at all. The objection was well taken. Gioberti while he accepts from Malebranche the assertion that we see in God, adds to it, virtually, *and by him.* Being is intelligible *per se*, and whatever else is intelligible, is intelligible in and by being—*in Deo ac per Deum.* Existences are intelligible only in and by being, in and from which they exist. It is impossible then to have intuition of existences without the ideal intuition of being creating them, that is, it is impossible to have intuition of the predicate, which is nothing by itself alone, without intuition of both the subject and the copula. Being can stand alone, be an affirmation or judgment in itself, for he who says *being*, says *being is*, but neither the predicate nor copula can stand alone, or separated from being. Creation is nothing without the being that creates, as an act without the actor is nothing. Existence separated from being, and the creative act of being, that makes it all it is, is also nothing, and nothing is not intelligible. Hence the psychologist who starts with *cogito*, or the soul alone, starts either with the false assumption that the soul, which is simply existence, is being, and therefore God, and hence, if logical, arrives at the egoïsm of Fichte, and recognizes nothing as existing but the soul and its own modes or affections; or with an abstraction, and, if logical, ends in the nihilism of Hegel, and all the pseudo-ontologists.

It will do no better to start with the copula alone. The creative act, as we have just seen, is nothing without a being whose act it is. Where there is no actor there is no act; and a creative act that creates nothing, or produces no effect, is no creative act at all. The copula unites the subject and predicate, and expresses the relation between them. But relation is intelligible, because real, only in the related. The copula can no more stand alone than the predicate, a fact commended to the consideration of those cultivators of the sciences who assert the activity of what they call the laws of nature, the active principles of the universe, without admitting any being who in them is the actor. Our friends

the Positivists, the disciples of the disciple of Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, would do well to ask themselves, if activity is conceivable without an actor, or a real actor without a real being who acts?

If we take with the exclusive ontologists, like Rothenflue, Fournier, Martin, among the Jesuits, and the highly respectable school of Louvain, the subject, Being, *l'Ente*, or God alone, as our starting-point, or Ideal Formula, in one respect, indeed, we stand better than they who take either the copula or predicate alone; for the intuition of being, as we have just seen, contains in itself a complete judgment, that can stand by itself. Being is equivalent to being is, and contains in itself subject, predicate, and copula. But this, though a complete *primum ontologicum*, is not a complete *primum philosophicum*, for it asserts nothing distinguishable from being, and philosophy has to deal with existences as well as with being, with psychology as well as with ontology. The being affirmed in intuition is real, independent, self-existent being, therefore necessary, eternal, universal, and self-sufficing being, being in itself, being in all its plenitude and perfection. It is, then, free from all external and all internal necessity of going out of itself to express, realize, or complete itself. It is the plenitude of being in itself. How, then, from the intuition of being conclude creation, or the creation of any thing distinct from being? If nothing without God, or within him, forces him to create, creation must be a free act, which he may or not perform, as it seems to him good. Creation is not, then, deducible from the intuition of being. Cousin has felt this. No one has better understood that deduction is analysis, and that analysis gives only what is necessarily in the subject analyzed. He therefore attempts to solve the difficulty by denying that creation is the free act of God, except as free from external compulsion, and making it an internal necessity. He says God is being, being in that he is substance, and substance in that he is cause. But this does not solve the difficulty, for it makes creation necessary, and, therefore, no creation at all. Creation on this supposition is necessarily implied in the nature or very essence of God, and whatever is so implied is God. It also implies that God is not being in its plenitude, is not self-sufficing, but must go out of himself to complete himself. His activity is not complete in himself, and is completed only in creating or causing externally, or *ad extra*, as say the schoolmen. This denies that he is, as

say the theologians, most pure act, and supposes that his being, his substance, his activity is incomplete, in part at least, potential, and that he actualizes and completes himself only in external creation or production, which would suppose the potential, which is no real being, can act, and that God depends for his perfection on his own works.

The ontologists among the Jesuits, and the school of Louvain, all worthy, under many relations, of our high esteem, are saved from the logical consequences of restricting the Ideal Formula to its first term only by their theology, which discards pantheism and asserts creation, a universe, not indeed without God, but distinct from him, and related to him as creature to creator. But, unhappily, their principles of philosophy are not in accord with their theology, and they find themselves utterly unable to harmonize their science and their faith. The German philosophers, not protected by their faith or theology, push their principles to their logical consequences, and hardly affect to deny the pantheism inevitably involved. Those among them even who profess to be ontologists, like Schelling, Hegel, and their followers, are really psychologists, for the being they assert is not real being intuitively affirmed, but an abstraction, and their real logical termination is nihilism. But waiving this, and supposing it to be real objective being, they are, as they hardly attempt to conceal, unable to assert any created universe, or universe distinguishable from God. The Rosminians would, no doubt, excellent people as many of them are, were we to call them pantheists, feel themselves grossly misrepresented, but if they are not so in principle, it is because they are not ontologists, and do not recognize the intuition of being at all. Rosmini takes as his *principium* the idea of being, and with the idea of being alone for his ideal formula, he can by no possible logical process arrive at any thing but being; and he who embraces in his philosophy only being is a pantheist. Rosmini, however, is really a psychologist, for the being he asserts is being in general, *ens in genere*, and therefore abstract being, and all abstractions are, as we have shown, psychological nullities, and the Rosminians are logically atheists rather than pantheists.

Many ontologists assert, no doubt, both creation and created existences; but where do they get them, or what right have they to assert them, if they are not given in the primitive intuition and included in the Ideal Formula? Ros-

mini believes as firmly in creation and the reality of existences as we do, and so did Malebranche; but neither could do so in accordance with his own principles. Father Rothenflue gives us an excellent refutation of pantheism, but in doing so he departs from the exclusive ontology he begins by asserting, and assumes that the mind has the conception of the contingent. But whence comes this conception of contingency? Surely it cannot be obtained by logical deduction from the intuition of real and necessary being, because it is not contained in that intuition. It cannot be obtained by reflection, for reflection originates nothing, and can attain to no matter not contained in the intuition. Rosmini must then concede that the conception is purely psychological, a creation of the mind itself, as are all abstractions, and therefore worthless, or else acknowledge that it is given in intuition, and therefore that he has mutilated the ideal formula by restricting it to being alone. He—and he only follows Malebranche—attempts to get at existences as distinguished from being by means of the sensibility. Intuition supplies the idea of being, the sensibility supplies the particular, and the mind applies the idea to the sensible, and affirms its existence. This process would not be wholly objectionable, on the supposition that the mind by intuition is already in possession of being, existences, and their real relation; but according to Rosmini the intuition gives only being, and, even at that, only being in general. Now, how from this intuition affirm that the sensible is a real objective though a contingent existence, especially if contingent existences are not given in the intuition or comprehended in the ideal formula? In fact, from his *data*, *ens in genere*, which is a psychological abstraction, and the sensible, which is simply a psychological sentiment, mode, or affection, Rosmini can logically assert only himself, and both the God and the external universe he arrives at, are only psychological abstractions or generalizations of himself. Or, conceding the being he asserts is real, necessary being, he gets nothing by his sensibility beyond what is contained in the idea intuitively given, and its affections are only phantoms, illusions.

The sensibility can place us by itself in possession of no objective existence or existences. That the intellect by virtue of the ideal intuition perceives directly, as is so ably maintained by Sir William Hamilton, external things or the external universe may be conceded or asserted; but

sensibility itself goes not beyond the sensation, and sensation is simply an affection of the sentient subject, and is purely subjective. Sensation itself, being an internal affection, cannot advertise us of any external existence. It feels, it does not know, and hence all pure sensism ends in pure nihilism. Sensibility undoubtedly plays an important part in all our knowledge. Man can act only as he is, and he is not pure intelligence, or a purely cognitive subject, but soul and body combined, and nothing can be an object of his reflective reason, in which the intellectual activity and action are properly his own, that is not sensibily represented. But the perception of the object is intellectual, and it is the intellect or noetic faculty that receives the intuition, and consequently the senses introduce no object not contained in the intuition, or presented by it. The vast labors of philosophers to establish the validity of the testimony of the senses are thrown away, because there happens to be no such testimony. The senses do not testify, but the understanding testifies through the senses; for sensibility, as distinguished from understanding or the noetic faculty, is not cognitive, and can take note of nothing. It is impossible, then, when we have excluded from intelligible intuition the external world, or the created universe, to assert it on the authority of sensibility. This was the weak point of Malebranche's doctrine, and completely vitiates that of Rosmini. As the intuition of being does not include that of existences, it is evident that if we make the intuition of the subject our starting-point, and deny that we have intuition of the predicate and copula, we can never arrive at the assertion of contingent existences, and our science will be confined to being alone, which is pantheism.

But, unhappily, pantheism is not philosophy, but the denial of all philosophy. It is not science, but the negation of science, for if it concedes an intelligible object, it denies the intelligent subject. All science is dialectic, and is never possible with only one term. Hence Christian theology, which asserts that God knows himself in himself, or is in himself infinite intelligence, teaches that he is in his essence Trinity, and therefore dialectic. All knowledge is a judgment, and every judgment, as any tyro in logic knows, demands three terms. How then construct science with only a single term? Pantheism is the supreme sophism, and undoubtedly the first sophism in the development of the human intellect, and the mother of all the sophisms into which mankind have fallen or can fall. There can be no

science unless there can be a distinction between the intellective subject and the intelligible object, and an affirmation of the object to the subject. But pantheism denies man, the intellective subject. If we do not exist, certain is it we cannot know. God may know himself with nothing but himself, because he is Tri-unity, and therefore self-sufficing; but his knowledge is within himself and of himself; but if we are indistinguishable from him, there is for us no knowledge, because no substantive existence to know or to be known. According to pantheism, we and the universe have no existence, are purely phenomenal, merely attributes, modes, or affections of God, are, in fact, God, and indistinguishable from him. There is no humanity, there is only divinity, and how without humanity can there be human science? Hegel, indeed, seeks to avoid the difficulty by supposing Being to be engaged in developing and realizing, or actualizing himself in the external universe, or that what we call the external universe simply marks in its several orders the various stages in the divine or ontological progress, and that God attains to self-consciousness or to a recognition of himself first in man, or that he is ignorant of himself out of man, or till he has actualized himself to the degree called man. But this absurd theory, wrought out with infinite subtilty and skill, denies the intuition of real and necessary being, with which it professes to start; for real and necessary being excludes all potentiality, and is necessarily most pure act, *actus purissimus*, and the progress or procession of the Divine Being must be eternal and in the Divine Being himself. If conscious of himself at all, it must be in himself, and his consciousness must be, like real and necessary being itself, eternal and infinite, which it certainly is not in man.

It is, then, we repeat, impossible to have science without the three terms of the Ideal Formula. No man has more ably demonstrated the impossibility of deriving all science, by way of deduction, from a single principle, than M. Cousin. More than one principle, then, must be given by intuition. But this is not enough. Several principles avail us no more than one, unless they are given in their real relation. This is the mistake of the eclectics, both ancient and modern. There is, no doubt, truth in all systems, and no system can be complete that omits it; but the science of truth cannot be constructed by collecting and adding together the separate truths of partial and incomplete sys-

tems; for truth is not made up of separate parts brought together, but is one living and indissoluble whole. The Eclectic, as Cousin himself maintains, cannot safely proceed at random in his selection, but must have a scientific rule by which to determine what he will take or what he will leave. This rule is possible only on condition that he has already in principle the truth in its unity and integrity; or in other words, we must have the true system which embraces science in its unity and universality, before we can say what in the several systems is true, or what is false. The ideal formula must be, not eclectic, but synthetic. Balmes, who deserves great credit as a thinker and a writer, and who really is one of the great men of our century, while refuting the notion that philosophy is to be deduced from one principle alone, fails to present the several principles he asserts in their dialectic relation. He is, indeed, more intent on method than on principles, and more engaged with the questions, Can we know? how we know? and how we know that we know? than on the question, What do we know? But still he recognizes the necessity to science of principles, only he treats them rather as found by reflection than as intuitively given, and confounds, as do many others, the question of principles with the question of the origin of ideas,—a question which in its ordinary sense has no place in the Giobertian philosophy. He derives all knowledge through ideas and the senses. Ideas are representative, and are all resolvable into the idea or representation of *l'ente*, or being; but he denies the idea to be being itself, or that we have intuition of being. Whence then the affirmation of being in science? He answers that it is affirmed instinctively. Instinct, as he defines it, is the immediate act of the Holy Ghost, that is, of Being itself, which is virtually what Gioberti means by intuition. But existences, creatures, the external universe, he takes on the testimony of the senses, in which respect he agrees with Rosmini. Supposing him thus far right, supposing that he really asserts intuition of Being and of existences, or that we really perceive, as Sir William Hamilton maintains, external things, the external universe, he fails to assert as intuitively apprehended, any relation between them. He gives you being and he gives you existences, but without the link that connects them; and after supposing both to be present to the mind, Balmes has to settle the question of their relation,—whether or not being creates the existences, or whether they are related as creator

and creature. This question shows a defect in his ideal formula, for it cannot be settled scientifically without the intuition of the real relation between them, or of the creative act. Balmes supposes both to be given, but not in their synthesis, or dialectic relations, and is therefore no better off than though he had only one term alone. There is no judgment unless the subject and predicate are united through the copula.

The Ideal formula, as given by Gioberti, is synthetic, and really dialectic. It gives the first *ontologicum*, Being, and the first *psychologicum*, Existence, in their real relation as the *primum philosophicum*. All that is or exists, and the real relation between being and existences, are affirmed intuitively to the mind, as the *a priori* principles of all the knowable and all the real. But this does not imply that the knowledge of things is deduced from the terms of the formula, by way of analysis, as if intuition excluded experience, contemplation, reflection, investigation, observation, and induction. It must be remembered that the formula is intuitive, and gives of actual science only the non-empirical elements, what precedes experience and renders experience possible. It is the *Ideal* formula, the ideal judgment, which enters into every judgment of experience, but is not the empirical judgment itself, as we shall hereafter more fully explain

We call the judgment ideal, or the ideal formula, though it adds to the idea, or real and necessary being, the predicate existences, with the copula which unites them to being. This is done because the predicate is the subject or being *mediante* the copula or creative act, and because the copula is being in its act, and the predicate is only the copula in its external terminus. Also, because though being is a complete judgment in itself, even it can be a judgment or affirmation to us only in case we exist, and by the creative act of being, which places us in existence. The ideal judgment, though the judgment of being, cannot be affirmed to us without placing us and including us as one of its terms. Being is ideal, as we have defined, only in relation to our intelligence, only in that it faces the human intellect, and is its intelligible object. Idea is itself, then, though really identical with being, a relative term, and expresses being not in itself, but only in its relation to our intelligence; and as relation is real only in the related, it must include our existence as well as real being itself, and, therefore, the formula, *l'ente crea l'esistenze*, is rightly called the *ideal* formula

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPERNATURAL.*

[From the American Catholic Quarterly Review for January, 1876.]

We have no intention of reviewing at present the very remarkable work, the title of which is placed at the head of this article. We have as yet received only four of the five volumes of which it is to consist, and these we have not sufficiently studied to be able to pass an intelligent judgment on their contents. We introduce them in order to express our cordial approval of the author's design, our sense of the rare philosophical and theological learning and ability with which it appears to be executed, and also as a text of some remarks of our own on the general subject, or the so-called philosophy of the supernatural.

There may be readers who doubt if there is or can be any such thing as a philosophy of the supernatural, for there are many persons, who, though they deny not a supernatural order, never recognize any relation or analogy between it and the natural order. For them the Creator's works, instead of forming one dialectic whole, exist as two separate and unrelated, if not antagonistic orders. The author of the work before us is not one of these. He holds that the Creator's works form a complete and harmonious whole, and that the natural finds its complement or fulfilment in the supernatural. The natural and the supernatural form in his view only two parts of one homogeneous and indissoluble whole, and therefore must have a real relation the one to the other, and necessarily have not only their points of analogy, but also somewhere their points of contact. Both orders are homogeneous parts of one system, or of one design, one divine decree, or the one divine creative act. If this is so, there may be a philosophy of the supernatural as well as of the natural.

Philosophy is the science of principles; not, as the superficial thinkers or unthinkers of our materialistic age would have us believe, of sensible or material facts, the proper object of the physical sciences, as astronomy, electricity, chemistry, mechanics, geology, hydraulics, &c. Principles

**Principii di Filosofia Soprannaturale.* Libri Tre. Genova. 1869–74.

precede facts, originate and govern them. Indeed we know not facts themselves, nor understand their significance or meaning, until we have referred them to their principles. What in the English-speaking world is in our days called philosophy is simply an induction from the observation of the facts of the physical order, and is confined by Sir William Hamilton to physics, psychology and logic, and excludes not only the supernatural, but the supersensible or intelligible, though within the province of natural reason. But without meaning to disparage philosophy in this sense, or the physical sciences, the fruits of which are seen in the mechanical inventions and material progress of the age, we must maintain that it is infinitely below philosophy, properly so-called. It is, in a subordinate sense, *scientia*, but not *sapientia*, according to Aristotle, the science of principles which are supersensible and not obtained by way of induction from sensible facts, whether facts of external nature, or of the soul itself. All principles are supersensible and are objects of the intellect; in no case of the senses. Some of them are known or knowable by the light of nature; others only by the light of supernatural revelation. The science of the former is the philosophy of the natural; of the latter is the philosophy of the supernatural.

These two philosophies are of principles equally certain; for the light of reason and the light of revelation are both emanations of the divine light or Logos, and each is infallible. We may err and take that to be reason which is not reason, or that to be revelation which is not revelation; but neither can itself err, for both rest on the veracity of God, who is Truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived. The science of revealed principles is as truly science as is the science of principles known by the light of nature, and differs from it only as to its medium. We may then speak of the philosophy of the supernatural with as much propriety and confidence as of the philosophy of the natural.

The philosophy of the supernatural follows the analogy of the natural. The philosophy of the natural presents the principles of the natural so far as they are cognizable by natural reason in their intelligible phase, their relation to one another, and the facts of the sensible order which they explain and govern. The philosophy of the supernatural presents the principles so far as revealed of the supernatural order, their mutual relation and reciprocal dependencies, and their relation to the natural order which they explain

and complete, and which without them is not only incomplete, but absolutely without purpose or meaning. This is what the professor has attempted to show in his *Principii de Filosofia Soprannaturale*, with what success we are not a competent judge; but so far as we have read the volumes published, and are capable of judging, he has not failed; and if he has not completely succeeded, he has proved himself a philosopher and theologian of the first order, and produced a work which for depth, originality, and importance, has not been surpassed, if equalled in modern times. While the professor accepts the maxim, *gratia supponit naturam*, he refutes the rationalistic assumption that the natural exists for itself alone, that it does or can suffice for itself, or is any thing without the supernatural in which it has its origin, medium, and end.

The questions treated belong properly to the domain of theology, but lie back of those ordinarily treated by our modern theologians. Since the rise of scholasticism, theology has pursued the analytical method, and has been, for the most part, studied in separate questions and articles in detail, rather than as a uniform and indissoluble whole. The articles and dogmas of faith have been dissected, analyzed, accurately described, and labelled, but except by a few superior minds not presented in their unity or as integral and inseparable members of one living body. The objection of the traditionalists to the scholastic method that it is rationalistic and of Döllinger and German professordom that it is theological, not historical, and places reason above revelation, deserves no respect, and, if we are not mistaken, has been reprobated by the Holy See. As against the traditionalists and the German professors, the scholastic method is approved in the *Syllabus*, but this does not prohibit us from pointing out that it tends to make the student lose sight of the faith objectively considered as an organic whole. What moderately instructed theologian ever regards the natural and the supernatural as parts of one dialectic system, distinct, if you will, but inseparable in the divine decree, or that does not look upon them as two disconnected and independent systems? Who ever thinks of looking below the dogma to the catholic principle that underlies it, governs it, and binds it to every other dogma, and integrates it in the living unity of the divine purpose in creation?

We do not pretend to enumerate and describe the principles of the supernatural philosophy, for we are neither

philosopher nor theologian enough for that; we lack both the ability and the learning to do any thing of the sort. All we aim at here is to show that there is a philosophy of the supernatural as well as of the natural; and that we live in times when for the vindication of the faith against the various classes of its enemies, it is necessary to recognize and study it to a far greater extent than it is ordinarily studied in our seminaries. The age has no respect for authority, and though we prove conclusively that the Church is divinely commissioned and assisted to teach the faith, and is therefore infallible, we do not meet the real difficulties of the more cultivated classes of unbelievers, or prepare them to accept any article, dogma, or proposition of faith for the reason that she teaches it. The world outside of the Church may be credulous and superstitious, able, as Clemens of Alexandria said to the Greeks, "to believe any thing and every thing except the TRUTH," but have undeniably lost all faith in the supernatural order, and really believe only in the natural, if indeed even so much as that. Our spiritists, who profess to have communications with the spirits of the departed, do not really admit a supernatural order. The real cause of this unbelief, so far as it is intellectual, not moral, is in the assumption that the natural and the supernatural are held by the Church as by the sects to be two separate, independent, and unrelated orders, indeed as two antagonistic orders. They take their views of Christian theology not from the teaching of the Church, but from such errorists as Calvinists and Jansenists, who in their theories demolish nature to make way for grace. The supernatural appears to them an anomaly in the Creator's works; something arbitrary, illogical, without any reason in the nature of things, or the principles of the universe. No amount of evidence, they contend, can suffice to prove the reality of any order that is above nature or the reach of natural reason. Hence they attempt to reduce miracles and all marvelous events, too well authenticated to be denied as facts, to the natural order, explicable by natural laws, though we may as yet be ignorant of these laws. Carlyle, one of the oldest of contemporary British thinkers and writers, in his *Sartor Resartus*, has a chapter headed *natural-supernaturalism*, in which he reduces the supernatural to the natural, and therefore really denies it while apparently asserting it. Natural supernaturalism is a contradiction in terms; and it is more manly to deny the supernatural out-

right than it is to attempt to explain it by the operation of natural laws.

Now, it is necessary, in order to meet and refute this objection, and the reasoning by which they who urge it attempt to sustain it, to show that without confounding the supernatural with the natural or obliterating the distinction between them, the supernatural is not anomalous, arbitrary, or illogical, but is as original and integral in the Creator's design as the natural itself. The natural and supernatural are two parts of one original plan of creation, and are distinguished only as the initial is distinguished from the teleological or completion. The natural is initial, the supernatural is teleological, or the perfection or fulfillment of the natural. It was in the beginning, ἐν ἀρχῇ, *in principio*, the design of the Creator that the natural should be perfected, completed, or fulfilled in the supernatural. Indeed, we do not understand how the natural could possibly be perfected in the natural, the creature, which is necessarily imperfect, in the creation. To assume that man can be perfected in the natural order is to assume that he has no destiny, his existence no purpose, and therefore no meaning, which would be tantamount to assuming that he is a mere nullity, nothing at all. Man, nature, the universe, all creation, originates in and proceeds by the creative act of God from the supernatural, for God the Creator is necessarily supernatural, that is, above and over nature. Nature originates in the supernatural, and since we know from revelation, and might infer from reason itself, that God creates all things for himself, it has and can have its destiny or end only in the supernatural. The good of every creature is in attaining its end, the fulfillment or perfection of its nature, and hence the notion broached and defended by some theologians—not, indeed, of the first order—of a natural beatitude, is inadmissible, and originates in a superficial and incomplete view of the Creator's design in creation, and, we may add, of the nature of things, in the very assumption on which is founded the objection of the unbeliever. They consider nature as a whole, and once created with its laws, that it suffices or might have sufficed for itself—a purely deistical conception, and not changed in its nature by what these same theologians add, that God by his superabounding goodness has provided for those that love him something better, even supernatural beatitude. There is and can be no natural beatitude; because, whatever is natural is finite, and

the soul hungers and thirsts for an unbounded good, and can be satisfied with nothing short of the Infinite; that is to say, God himself, who is the Supreme Good in itself. "I shall be satisfied," says holy Job, "when I awake in thy likeness." There is rest for the soul only in God. Prophets, poets and sages of all nations and ages, as well as Christian preachers have borne witness to the insufficiency of every created or finite good to satisfy the soul and give it real beatitude. All this proves that man was created for a supernatural, not a natural beatitude or end, and therefore that the supernatural entered into the divine plan of creation. Whence it follows that the alleged *status naturæ puræ* is a pure abstraction, and has never existed in an actual state, as the theologians who insist on it, for the most part, concede and hold, as we do. We are laboring to prove that man, in point of fact, is and always has been under a gracious or supernatural providence, and, therefore, from the first destined to a supernatural end, attainable only through a supernatural medium. The original justice in which Adam was constituted, and which placed him on the plane of his destiny, was supernatural, not produced by his nature; and when by his prevarication he lost it, he fell below his nature, became darkened in his understanding, weakened in his will, and captive to Satan, from whose power he is delivered only by the Incarnate Word.

That man is created for a good that transcends nature is indicated not only by his inability to satisfy himself with any natural, that is, created good, but also by his consciousness of his own imperfection or incompleteness, that his reason is limited, and that he is capable of being more than he is or can be by his unassisted natural powers. There is something mysterious and inexplicable to us in this fact—a fact which seems to us to imply that we have an obscure sense of the supernatural, which the vast majority of mankind in all ages and nations in one form or another recognize. Gioberti, in his *Teorica del Sovranaturale*, ascribed it to a faculty of the soul, which he calls *Sovrintelligenza*, that is to say, a natural faculty of knowing what transcends nature. But this seems to us inadmissible, indeed a contradiction in terms. A faculty is a power, and the faculty asserted by Gioberti would be the power of knowing the superintelligible. But if we have a natural faculty of knowing the superintelligible, it is not superintelligible, but intelligible. Yet the fact that reason asserts

her own limitations, and therefore something beyond which limits her, or that nature asserts her own insufficiency, whatever the explanation, is indisputable. This to us proves the reality of the supernatural and its relation to the natural, though it tells us not what the supernatural is, or what are its specific principles.

We may perhaps establish even more conclusively still the reality of the supernatural, and the relation of the natural to it, by rational science or reason itself. The Holy See has defined against the Traditionalists and anti-scholastics that the existence of God as well as the immortality of the soul and the free will of man can be proved with certainty by reason prior to faith, and we think we have fully proved that God is, in our *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, whatever may be thought of our criticisms on one or two popular arguments commonly adduced to prove the divine existence. The principles of rational science, as the author of the work before us asserts, are all included in the ideal or rational formula, *l'Ente crea l'esistenze*, or *Ens creat existentias*. We say nothing here as to the way in which the mind comes into possession of this formula, but this much we hold is certain, that there is no mental operation and no mind possible, without the principle summarized or expressed by it. These principles connect all existences with God by his creative act, and consequently show that the natural is really related to the supernatural, for the Creator of nature is necessarily above nature, that is, supernatural.

As existences proceed from the supernatural, *mediante* the creative act of God, it follows that the assumption of unbelievers and modern infidel scientists is inadmissible, namely, that the natural and supernatural are two distinct, separate, and unrelated orders, and that the supernatural is not necessary to complete the science of the natural. The contrary is the scientific fact; and, as the natural does not and cannot exist without the supernatural, the science of the supernatural by Divine revelation or otherwise is essential even to the science of the natural. There is no science without principles, and all principles are supernatural, even the principles of the natural order itself. They who undertake to explain the cosmos by what they call natural laws, which are obtained by induction from the facts they observe, uniformly fail, and fall into the greatest absurdities, as we see in old Democritus and Epicurus, as well as in such miserable charlatans as Darwin, Tyndall, Huxley, and Herbert

Spencer; because induction from facts gives only generalizations, classifications called natural laws, never transcending the region of facts or the particulars generalized or classified. It never gives us principles, which always precede the facts, produce, underlie, and control them.

We have established two points, namely, that the supernatural really exists, and that the natural has its principle, origin, and end in it, and therefore is dialectically or really related to it, dependent on it as the creation is dependent on the Creator, or the effect on the cause. We speak with diffidence, for we are fully aware of our own limited knowledge; but we think that our theologians have not dwelt with due emphasis on this second point, the dialectic relations of the natural to the supernatural, and have, by their neglect, given occasion to unbelievers to suppose that we really, when we are not assumed to deny nature in the sense of Calvinists and Jansenists, exclude the supernatural from the primary design of creation, and hold it and the natural to be two separate and unrelated orders. We know that it was a long time before we learned to connect them by a real nexus, to think of them otherwise than as two parallel orders, without any real passage from the one to the other, any reason in the constitution of the natural for anticipating or asserting the supernatural. They seem to us, in their fear of running one order into the other, and confounding nature with grace, to have left it to be inferred that the natural order would have sufficed for us, if God in his excessive goodness had not resolved to provide something better for us.

Having established by rational science the reality of the supernatural, and of the dialectic relation of the natural to it, or that the natural and the supernatural are parts of one and the same system, we may proceed to inquire what are the principles of the supernatural, or, as says our author, "of the philosophy of the supernatural." This is a subject that is only imperfectly treated by our modern theologians, for our theologians have, from the scholastics down, generally pursued, as we have said, the analytic method, and have been more intent on stating, elucidating, and defending the several articles and dogmas of the faith separately than on considering them as a whole, or in their synthetic relations. They have dissected the faith for the convenience of teaching it; studied and described with due precision and exactness its several parts; but they rarely enable the student to view the faith as a whole, or its several parts in their systematic

relations, or in connection with the principle from which they all proceed. The theologians follow the method of the catechism, indeed, but rarely do more than simply develop and amplify it. We say not, and must not be understood as implying that they do not teach the truth, or all that is necessary for salvation. Indeed for the generality of mankind the analytic method is the only practical method. It is the only method possible in catechisms, and in them we must adopt it, or abandon all catechetical instruction. This method is natural, is sufficient for all except those whose duty it is to set forth and defend the faith against its more subtle assailants. It does not suffice to refute the objections of unbelievers in our day, who have gone so far as to reject all authority, not only of revelation, but of reason itself. To meet these we must have the philosophy of the faith.

The *principium* or principle, as we have seen, of philosophy, or rational science, or the science of reason, is *Ens creat existentias*, or as the author of the work before us says, *l'Ente crea l'esistente.* Being creates or is creating existences, corresponding to the first verse of *Genesis.* "*In principio, Deus creavit cælum et terram,*" or to the first article in the creed, "I believe in one God, maker of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible." Those scientists, whether in ancient or modern times, who seek to explain the origin of things without the recognition either of one God or his creative act are worthy of no consideration, and may be set down as ignorant of the first principle of all science, and as perceiving no distinction between a principle and a fact, or a fact and a factor. The world is not eternal; for what is eternal is one, and immutable, and cannot of itself change either in substance or in form. Yet the world is multiple and constantly changing. All things change their form at least under the very eye of the spectator. There is no change without motion, and there is no motion without a first mover itself immovable; for an infinite series is an infinite absurdity. It matters not that it is said only the form changes, for the form cannot change itself any more than the substance can change itself. The change must have a beginning, which must be the effect of a cause independent of itself. Hence Herbert Spencer's pretence that the universe is explicable by evolution, by matter and motion, by the simple processes of expansion and contraction, or concentration and dispersion, is repugnant to every principle of science or reason. Whence the concentration

or the dispersion? They result from the inherent laws of matter, it is said. But the inherent laws of matter must be always the same, and operate always in the same direction, and therefore cannot of themselves produce such contrary results as concentration and dispersion. Wherever there is change there must be a cause independent of the thing changed, and this necessarily induces the assertion of a First Cause, itself uncaused, and effectively disposes of the doctrine, which asserts that the principle of things, though intelligent, is inherent in the cosmos, or that makes God the soul of the world—as did Plato and Aristotle, or as does Brahminism.

The universe is explicable, and science in any degree possible only by virtue of the rational formula, *Ens creat existentias*, Being is creating or creates, existences or creatures. This is the first and last principle of all rational or ideal philosophy.

The principle of theology, or what we here call supernatural philosophy, and known to us only by revelation, is, our author says, "The Father through Christ, (*per Cristo*) deifies or is deifying existences or creatures," that is, supernaturally elevating them to union or oneness with God, the creature to oneness with the Creator. The medium of this deification is the Incarnation, or the Word made flesh. The fact affirmed in the ideal or rational formula that existences proceed from God by way of creation, or that God creates the world, and is its first cause, proves that he creates it for some end, that it has a final cause, and a final cause and end, like its first cause above and beyond itself. We know from rational philosophy that our final cause or the end for which we are created is supernatural, but we know only in a general way that it is supernatural, not specifically or in particular in what it consists. This we know only by revelation. We can know from reason that God creates us for himself, because beside him there is nothing for which he can create us. But we cannot know from reason, that he creates us to deify us, to make us one with himself, "partakers," as St. Peter says, "of his divine nature," *naturæ consortes divinæ*. Nor can we know by natural reason that this deification of the creature is to be effected through the Incarnation or the Word made flesh. The whole principle and scope of the teleological order, or what Gioberti calls the second cycle or the return of existences to God without absorption in him as their final cause or last end, transcends the reach of our

natural faculties, or the light of nature, and is known only by supernatural revelation.

As the philosophy of the natural order consists in the reduction of the facts of that order to their principles and their integration in the ideal or rational formula, *Ens creat existentias*, so supernatural philosophy, or theology, consists in the reduction of all the facts, mysteries, articles, and dogmas of the supernatural order and their integration in the revealed formula, "The Father through Christ deifies or is deifying *existentias*, or the creature, that is, elevating the creature to oneness with the Creator. The medium of the revealed formula is the Word made flesh or the Incarnation, that is, the Hypostatic Union, by which the created nature becomes the nature of God, or the creature is made one with the Creator, as the medium of the rational or ideal formula is the creative act of Being, *Ens*, or God. It is in this medium or creative act that the natural and supernatural coalesce and become one, for the Hypostatic Union, or the Incarnation of the Word is effected by the creative act, and is that act raised to its highest power, is its supreme effort; for it is impossible for the creative act to rise higher or to go further than to make the creature one with its Creator. The two orders, the natural and supernatural, are dialectically united by one and the same medium, and—inasmuch as both proceed from the same principle—by one and the same divine creative act.

The point we make here is that the act which creates the natural is the identical act which creates the Hypostatic Union, and founds the supernatural. The Hypostatic Union or Incarnation, is itself in the initial order, in the first cycle, or the order of the procession of existences by act of creation from God as first cause. It completes that order of carrying the creative act to its highest pitch, and initiates or founds the teleological order, or the order of the return of existences without absorption in him to God, as final cause, or their last end. This order, called by St. Paul the new creation, and usually termed the supernatural order, is therefore founded on the Incarnation. In it we enter by regeneration, and the race are propagated by the election of grace from Christ by the Holy Ghost, as in the first cycle, or the initial order, they are propagated from Adam by natural generation. Hence Christ is called the second Adam, the Lord from heaven. He is the Father of regenerated humanity, as Adam is of generated or natural humanity. Hence

we see the reason why without the new birth it is impossible to enter the kingdom of heaven or to see God.

If the natural and the supernatural universe are homogeneous parts of one and the same system, the point on which we here specially insist, the whole of both parts have their unity in the principle from which they proceed, and as the natural is created and exists for the supernatural, it is integrated in the principle of the supernatural, *Verbum caro factum est*, or the Incarnation. Hence it follows that the entire creation, whether in the natural or supernatural, the initial or the teleological order, exists for the Incarnation, and finds in its relation to the Word made flesh its significance, its purpose, its unity, and its integrity. This granted, it follows again that the denial of the Incarnation would be the denial not only of the entire supernatural order or the whole Christian system, but of all existences, whether natural or supernatural, by denying this final cause, as essential to any created existence as the first cause. It would deny the very end for which all things exist, and deny the universe itself, by denying it any purpose or meaning. What means nothing is nothing. The Incarnation is the key to all the Creator's works, and we have not mastered theology or the philosophy of the supernatural, till we are able to say that the denial of any one item in those works involves the denial of the Incarnation, or the Word made flesh. It is the highest and supreme principle of all science, and without it nothing in the universe is scientifically explicable. The greatest absurdity into which men can fall, is that of our modern scientists, who imagine that there can be science without theology, and who affect to treat theology as no science at all, but a vain imagination, or the product of a superstitious fancy. The Scholastics understood the matter when they treated theology as "the Queen of the Sciences." The feebleness, superficiality and conceitedness of the modern sciences are unquestionably due to the very general neglect in our day of the study of theology. By that neglect men have lost the key to the sciences, become weak in understanding, puffed up with a foolish pride, and nearly as stupid as the brute beasts from which they imagine they have been evolved. In reading their works, one is tempted to doubt the fact of the evolution. A respectable monkey might well disown the speculations of a Darwin, a Tyndall, a Huxley, a Sir John Lubbock, a Herbert Spencer, to say nothing of their congeners in France and

Germany. Yet these are the instructors, and held to be the great lights of the age, entitled to look down with pity on a St. Augustine, a St. Gregory the Great, a St. Thomas, and all renowned theologians who, under God, have rescued the human race from the barbarism, ignorance, and superstition into which the great Gentile Apostacy had plunged them, and into which apostacy from the papacy is plunging them anew.

It follows from the unity of the principle of both the natural and the supernatural that the creation in both its parts is one system, and also that the faith is one, and the several articles and dogmas recognized and treated by theologians form not simply a union, but are strictly one, flowing from one and the same principle, through one and the same medium, to one and the same end. Hence the destructive nature of heresy, which accepts some articles of the faith and rejects others. As all depend alike on the Incarnation, the principle of the teleological order, the denial of any one item of the faith is the denial of the Incarnation. All heresy impugns the Incarnation, and is of the nature of infidelity, or the absolute rejection of Christ, the Word made flesh. This theology or the philosophy of the Supernatural must establish, as we intended to prove in this present article by descending to particulars, and showing it in detail; but, much to our regret, we must reserve it for a future opportunity. We shall on resuming the subject endeavor to show the relation of each particular doctrine of the Church to the Incarnation, and make good the several positions thus far assumed. *

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* This was Dr. Brownson's last writing. He made several efforts to redeem the promise here given, but was never again strong enough to sit at his table to write. He survived only three months longer.

It has been thought best to place this article immediately after the essays on Gioberti, because it modifies and corrects some things contained in the articles on Gioberti's *Teorica del Covranaturale*. The author of the *Principii di Filosofia Soprannaturale* has much similarity with Gioberti as regards the principles of philosophy.—Ed.

AN OLD QUARREL.

[From the Catholic World for May, 1867.]

Those of our readers who have studied with the care their importance demands the papers on the *Problems of the Age* which have appeared in this magazine, can not have failed to perceive that the great questions now in discussion between Catholics and non-Catholics lie, for the most part, in the field of philosophy, and require for their solution a broader and profounder philosophy than any which obtains general currency outside of the church. We think, also, that no one can read and understand them without finding the elements or fundamental principles of a really Catholic philosophy, which, while it rests on scientific truth for its basis, enables us to see the innate correspondence or harmony of reason and faith, science and revelation, and nature and grace—the principles of a philosophy, too, that is no modern invention or new-fangled theory which is brought forward to meet a present emergency, but in substance the very philosophy that has always been held by the great fathers and doctors of the church, and professed in Catholic schools and seminaries.

Yet there is one point which the writer necessarily touches upon and demonstrates as far as necessary to his purpose, which was theological rather than purely philosophical, that, without interfering in the least with his argument, already complete, may admit of a more special treatment and further development. We refer to the objectivity and reality of ideas. The reader acquainted with the history of philosophy in the middle ages will perceive at once that the question of the reality of ideas asserted by the writer takes up the subject-matter of the old quarrel of the nominalists, conceptualists, and realists, provoked by the *Proslogium* of St. Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, in the eleventh century, really one of the profoundest thinkers, greatest theologians, and most ingenious philosophers of any age.

St. Anselm wished to render an account to himself of his faith, and to know and understand the reasons for believing in God. He did not doubt the existence of God; he indeed

held that God cannot be thought not to be; he did not seek to know the arguments which prove that God is, that he might believe, but that he might the better know and understand what he already believed. Thus he says: "Neque enim quæro intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo quia nisi credidero, non intelligam." We believe that we may understand, and we cannot understand unless we believe—a great truth which modern speculators do not recognize. They reverse the process, and seek to know that they may believe, and hold that the first step to knowledge is to doubt or to deny.

In his *Monologium*, St. Anselm had proved that God is, and determined his attributes by way of induction from the ideas in the human mind, but it would seem not wholly to his satisfaction, or, at least, that in writing that work he discovered, or thought he discovered, a briefer and more conclusive method of demonstrating that God is. He had already proved by psychological analysis, in the way Cousin and others have since done, that the human mind thinks most perfect being, a greater than which cannot be thought. This he had done in his *Monologium*. In his *Proslogium* he starts with this idea, that of *ens perfectissimum*, which is, in fact, the idea of God. "The fool says in his heart there is no God;" not because he has no idea of God, not because he does not think most perfect being, a greater than which cannot be thought, but because he does not understand that, if he thinks it, such being really is. It is greater and more perfect to be *in re* than it is to be only *in intellectu*, and therefore the most perfect being existing only in the mind is not a greater than which cannot be thought, for we can think most perfect being existing *in re*. Moreover, if most perfect being does not exist *in re*, our thought is greater and more perfect than reality, and consequently we can rise above God, and judge him, *quod valde est absurdum*.

Leibnitz somewhere remarks that this argument is conclusive, if we first prove that most perfect being is possible; but Leibnitz sh uld have remembered that the argument *ab esse ad posse* is always valid, and that God is both his own possibility and reality. Cousin accepts the argument, and says St. Anselm robbed Descartes of the glory of having produced it. But it is evident to every philosophical student that the validity of the argument, if valid it is, depends on the fact that ideas are objective and real, that is, depends on the identity of the ideal and the real.

Roscelinus, or Rosceline, did not concede this, and pronounced the argument of St. Anselm worthless. Confounding, it would seem, ideas with universals, he denied their reality, and maintained that they are mere words without any thing either in the mind or out of it to respond to them, and thus founded Nominalism, substantially what is now called materialism. He rejects the universals and the categories of the peripatetics, and recognizes only individual existences and words, which words, when not the names of individual things, are void of meaning. Hence he denied the whole ideal or intelligible world, and admitted only sensibles. Hobbes and Locke were nominalists, and so is the author of Mill's *Logic*. Mr. Herbert Spencer is a nominalist, but is better described as an atomist of the school of Leucippus and Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius. We know very little of Rosceline, except that he lived in the eleventh century, was born in Brittany, the native land of Abelard and Descartes, and incurred, for some of his speculations concerning the Trinity, the censures of the church. None of his writings have come down to us, and we know his doctrine only from the representations of others.

Guillaume de Champeaux, in the following century, who professed philosophy for a time at St. Victor, and was subsequently Archbishop of Paris, is the founder, in the middle ages, of what is called Realism, and which counts among its disciples Duns Scotus and William of Occam. He is said to have maintained the exact opposite of Rosceline's doctrine, and to have held that ideas, or universals, as they then said, are not empty words, but entities, existing *a parte rei*. He held, if we may believe Abelard, that not only genera and species, but such abstractions as whiteness, roundness, squareness, &c., are real entities. But from a passage cited from his writings by Abelard, from which Abelard infers he had changed his doctrine, Cousin, in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, argues that this must have been an exaggeration, and that Guillaume only held that such so-called universals as are really genera and species have an entitative existence. This is most probably the fact; and instead, then, of being driven to change his doctrine from what it was at first, as Abelard boasts, it is most likely that he never held any other doctrine. However this may be, his doctrine, as represented by Abelard, is that which the old realists are generally supposed to have maintained.

Abelard follows Guillaume de Champeaux, with whom

he was for the earlier part of his career a contemporary. Confounding, as it would seem, ideas with universals, and universals with abstractions, he denied alike Rosceline's doctrine that they are mere words, and Guillaume de Champeaux's doctrine that they are entities or existences *a parte rei*, and maintained that they are conceptions, really existing *in mente*, but not *in re*. Hence his philosophy is called Conceptualism. He would seem to have held that universals are formed by the mind operating on the concrete objects presented by experience, not, as since maintained by Kant, that they are necessary forms of the understanding. Thus, *humanitas*, humanity is formed by the mind from the concrete man, or *homo*. There is no humanity *in re;* there are only individual men. In the word humanity the mind expresses the qualities which it observes to be common to all men, without paying attention to any particular man. The idea humanity, then, is simply the abstraction or generalization of these qualities. Abelard, it would appear from this, makes what we call the race a property or quality of individuals, which, of course, excludes the idea of generation. There is, as far as we can see, no essential difference between the conceptualism of Abelard and the nominalism of Rosceline; for, by denying the existence *in re* of genera and species, and making them only conceptions, it recognizes as really existing only individuals or particulars.

St. Thomas Aquinas, than whom no higher authority in philosophy can be named, and from whose conclusions few who understand them will be disposed to dissent, differs from each of these schools, and maintains that universals are conceptions existing *in mente cum fundamento in re*, or conceptions with a basis in reality, which is true of all abstractions; for the mind can form no conceptions except from objects presented by experience. We could form no conception of whiteness if we had no experience of white things, or of roundness if we had seen nothing round. We imagine a golden mountain, but only on condition that gold and mountain are to us objects of experience. This is certain, and accords with the peripatetic maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, which Leibnitz would amend by adding, *nisi ipse intellectus*, an amendment which, perhaps, contains in germ the whole Kantian philosophy.

But St. Thomas, as we shall see further on, does not confound ideas with universals, nor does he hold genera and

species to be simply the abstraction or generalization of the qualities of individuals or particulars. Genera and species are real, or there could be no generation. But the genus or species does not exist apart from its individuation, or as a separate entity. There are no individuals without the race, and no race without individuals. Thus the whole race was individualized in Adam, so that in his sin all men sinned. But as genera and species, the only real universals, do not exist apart from their particulars, and are distinctly possessed or apprehended only as disengaged from their particulars, which is done only by a mental operation, St. Thomas might say they exist *in mente cum fundamento in re*, without asserting them to be real only as properties or qualities of particulars.

Plato is commonly held to be the father of the ideal philosophy or ideal realism. We know very little of the philosophy that prevailed before him and cannot say how much of the Platonic philosophy is original with him, or how much of it he took from his predecessors, but he is its originator as far as our knowledge extends. It is from him that we have the word *idea*, and his whole philosophy is said to be in his doctrine of ideas; but what his doctrine of ideas really was is a question. He seems when treating the question, What is it necessary to know in order to have real science? to understand by idea *causa essentialis*, or the thing itself, or what in any thing is real, stable, and permanent, in distinction from the sensible, the phenomenal, the variable, and the transitory. The real existence of things is their ideas, and ideas are in the Logos or divine mind. These ideas God impresses on an eternally existing matter, as the seal upon wax, and so impressed they constitute particulars. Aristotle accuses Plato of placing the ideas *extra Deum*, and making them objects of the divine contemplation, but the accusation is not easily sustained; and we think all that Plato does is to represent the ideas as *extra Deum* only as the idea or design of a picture or a temple in the mind of the artist is distinguishable from the artist himself. But in God all ideas must be eternal, and therefore really his essence, as is maintained by St. Thomas. If this is really Plato's doctrine, it is dualism inasmuch as it asserts the eternity of matter, and pantheism inasmuch as the ideas, the reality of things, are identical with the divine mind, and therefore with God himself. On this doctrine, what is that soul the immortality of which Plato so strenuously main-

tains? Is it the divine idea, or the copy of the idea on matter?

When treating the question, How we know? Plato seems to understand by ideas not the ideas in the divine mind, but their copies impressed on matter, as the seal on wax. According to him, all knowing is by similitude, and as the idea leaves its exact image or form on matter, so by studying that image or copy we arrive at an exact knowledge of the idea or archetype in the divine mind. This is plain enough; but who are *we* who study and know? Are we the archetypal idea, or are we its image or copy impressed on matter? Here is the difficulty we find in understanding Plato's doctrine of ideas. According to him all reality is in the idea, and what is not idea is phenomenal, unsubstantial, variable, and evanescent. The impress or copy on matter is not the idea itself, and is no more the thing itself than the reflection one sees in a mirror is one's self. Plato speaks of the soul as imprisoned in matter, and ascribes all evil to the intractableness of matter. Hence he originates or justifies that false asceticism which treats matter as impure or unclean, and makes the proper discipline of the soul consist in despising and maltreating the body, and in seeking deliverance from it, as if our bodies were not destined to rise again, and, reunited to the soul, to live forever. The real source of Manicheism is in the Platonic philosophy. We confess that we are not able to make out from Plato a complete, coherent, and self-consistent doctrine of ideas. St. Thomas corrects Plato, and makes ideas the archetypes, exemplars, or models in the divine mind, and identical with the essence of God, after which God creates or may create existences. He holds the idea, as idea, to be *causa exemplaris*, not *causa essentialis*, and thus escapes both pantheism and dualism, and all tendency to either.

Aristotle, a much more systematic genius, and, in our judgment, a much profounder philosopher than Plato, rejects Plato's doctrine of ideas, and substitutes for them substantial forms, which in his philosophy mean real existences distinct from God, and which are not merely phenomenal, like Plato's copies on wax. True, he, as Plato, recognizes an eternal matter, and makes all existences consist of matter and form. But the matter is purely passive; and, as nothing, according to his philosophy, exists, save in so far as active, it is really nothing, exists only *in potentia ad formam*, and can only mean the ability of God to place

existences after the models eternal in his own mind. His philosophy is, at any rate, more easily reconciled with Christian theology than is Plato's.

Yet Aristotle and the schoolmen after him adopt Plato's doctrine that we know by similitude, or by ideas in the sense of images, or representations, interposed between the mind and the object, or thing existing *a parte rei*. They suppose these images, or intelligible species, form a sort of intermediary world, called the *mundus logicus*, distinguished from the *mundus physicus*, or real world, which they are not, but which they image or represent to the understanding. Hence the categories or predicaments are neither forms of the subject nor forms of the object, but the forms or laws of logic or this intermediary world. Hence has arisen the question whether our knowledge has any objective validity, that is, whether there is any objective reality that responds to the idea. Perhaps it is in this doctrine, misunderstood, that we are to seek the origin of scepticism, which always originates in the speculations of philosophers, never in the plain sense of the people, who never want, when they know, any proof that they know.

This Platonic and peripatetic doctrine, that ideas are not the reality, but, as Locke says, that "with which the understanding is immediately conversant," has been vigorously assailed by the Scottish school, which denies intermediary ideas, and maintains that we perceive directly and immediately things themselves. Still the old doctrine obtains to a very considerable extent, and respectable schools teach that ideas, if not precisely images, are nevertheless representative, and that the idea is the first object of mental apprehension. Balmes never treats ideas as the object existing *in re*, but as its representation to the mind. Hence the importance attached to the question of certainty, or the objective validity of our knowledge, around which Balmes says turn all the questions of philosophy; that is, the great labor of philosophers is to prove that in knowing we know something, or that to know is to know. This is really the *pons asinorum* of modern philosophy as it was of ancient philosophy: How know we that knowing is knowing, or that in knowing we know? The question as asked is unanswerable and absurd, for we have only to know with which to prove that we know, and he who knows knows that he knows. We know that we know says no more than we know.

The quarrel has arisen from confounding ideas, universals,

genera and species, and abstractions or generalizations, and treating them all as if pertaining to the same category. These three things are different, and cannot be scientifically treated as if they were the same; yet nominalists, realists, and conceptualists recognize no differences among them, nor do the Platonists. These hold all the essential qualities, properties, or attributes of things to be ideas, objective and real. Hippias visits Athens, and proposes during his stay in the city to give the eager Athenians a discourse, or, as they say nowadays, a lecture, on beautiful things. Socrates is delighted to hear it, and assures Hippias that he will be one of his audience; but as he is slow of understanding, and has a friend who will be sure to question him very closely, he begs Hippias to answer beforehand a few of the questions this friend is certain to ask. Hippias consents. You propose to discourse on beautiful things, but tell me, if you please, what are beautiful things? Hippias mentions several things, and finally answers, a handsome girl. But that is not what my friend wants to know. Tell me, by what are beautiful things beautiful? Hippias does not quite understand. Socrates explains. All just things, are they not just by participation of justice? Agreed. And all wise things by participation of wisdom? It cannot be denied. And all beautiful things by participation of beauty? So it seems. Now tell me, dear Hippias, what is beauty, that which is so not by participation but in itself, and by participation of which all beautiful things are beautiful? Hippias, of course, is puzzled, and neither he nor Socrates answers the question.

But we get here a clue to Plato's doctrine, the doctrine of the methexis, to use his own term. He would seem to teach that whatever particular thing exists, it does so by the methexis, or participation of the idea. The idea is that which makes the thing what it is, *causa essentialis*. Thus, a man is man by participation of the man-idea, or the ideal man, humanity; a horse is a horse by participation of the horse-idea, or ideal horse; a cow is a cow by participation of the cow-idea, ideal cow, or *bovosity;* and so of a sheep, a weazel, an eagle, a heron, a robin, a swallow, a wren, an oak, a pine, a juniper. To know any particular thing is to know its idea or ideal, and to know its idea or ideal is to have true science, for it is science of that in the thing which is real, stable, invariable, and permanent. This doctrine is very true when by ideas we understand genera and species,

but not, as we have already seen, and as both Rosceline and Abelard prove, when we take as ideas the abstract qualities of things. Man is man by participation of humanity; but is a thing white by participation of whiteness, round by participation of roundness, hard by participation of hardness, beautiful by participation of beauty, or just by participation of justice, wise by participation of wisdom? What is whiteness, roundness, hardness, beauty, justice, or wisdom in the abstract, or abstracted from their respective concretes? Mere conceptions, as said Abelard, or, rather, empty words, as said Rosceline. When Plato calls these ideas, and calls them real, he confounds ideas with genera and species, and asserts what is manifestly untenable.

Genera and species are not abstractions; they are real, though subsisting never apart from individuals. Their reality is evinced by the process called generation, by which every kind generates its like. The race continues itself, and does not die with the individual. Men die, humanity survives. It is all very well to say with Plato individuals are mimetic, and exist as individuals by participation of the idea, if we assume ideas are genera and species, and created after the models or archetypes in the divine mind; but it will not do to say so when we identify ideas with the divine mind, that is, with God himself. We then make genera and species ideas in God, and since ideas in God are God, we identify them with the divine essence—a doctrine which the Holy See has recently condemned, and which would deny all reality distinguishable from God, and make all existences merely phenomenal, and reduce all the categories, as Cousin does, to being and phenomenon, which is pure pantheism. The *ideæ exemplares*, or archetypes of genera and species, after which God creates them, are in the divine mind, but the genera and species, the real universals, are creatures, and as much so as individuals or particulars themselves. They are creatures by the direct creation of God, without the intervention of the plastic soul asserted by Plato, accepted by Cudworth, and, in his posthumous essay on the Methexis and Mimesis, even by Gioberti. God creates all living creatures in genera and species, as the Scripture plainly hints when it says: "And God said, Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after its *kind*, which may have seed in itself upon the earth." Not only in the vegetable but also in the animal world, each living creature

brings forth its kind—a fact without which generation would be unintelligible, and which our scientific men who dream of the formation of species by natural selection, and are laboring hard to prove that man has been developed from the tadpole or monkey, would do well to remember.

Genera and species are real, and so far, if we call them ideas, ideas or universals are real, as Plato and the old realists asserted. But when we understand by ideas or universals the simple abstractions or generalizations of the essential qualities or attributes of things, as whiteness, redness, roundness, hardness, beauty, justice, goodness, they are real only in their concretes or subject. Objects may be really white, red, hard, heavy; things may be really beautiful; actions may be really just, wise, and good; but what we call beauty, justice, wisdom, goodness, can exist only as attributes or qualities of being, and are real only in their concretes. They can be reflected by creatures, but have no reality as abstractions. Abstractions, as St. Thomas says, have a foundation in reality, because they are formed by the mind by way of abstraction from objects presented by experience, and experience can present only that which is real; but as abstractions they are nullities, as Rosceline rightly held.

It is necessary, then, to distinguish between genera and species and abstractions, and it would save much confusion to drop the name of ideas as applied to them, and even as applied to the intermediary world supposed to be inserted between the object and subject, as that world is commonly represented. This intermediary world, we think, has been successfully assailed by the Scottish school, as ordinarily understood; but we do not think that the scholastics meant by it what is commonly supposed. These intermediary ideas, or intelligible species, seem to us in St. Thomas to perform in intellectual apprehension the office performed by light in external vision, and to be very defensible. They are not the understanding itself, but they are, if we may be allowed the expression, the light of the understanding. St. Thomas holds that we know by similitude. But God, he says, is the similitude of all things, *Deus est similitudo omnium rerum.* Now say, with him and all great theologians, that God, who is light itself, is the light of the understanding, the light of reason, the true light that lighteth every man coming into this world, and the whole difficulty is solved, and the scholastics

and the philosophy so long taught in our Catholic schools and seminaries are freed at once from the censures so freely bestowed on them by the Scottish school and others. We suspect that we shall find seldom any reason to dissent from the scholastic philosophy as represented by St. Thomas, when once we really understand it, and adjust it to our own habits of thought and expression.

Supposing this interpretation to be admissible, the Scottish school, after all, must modify its doctrine that we know things directly and immediately; for as in external things light is necessary as the medium of vision, why should not an intelligible light be necessary as the medium of the intellectual apprehension of intelligibles? Now, as this light has in it the similitude of the things apprehensible by it, and is for that same reason light to our understanding, it may, as Plato held, very properly be expressed by the word *idea*, which means likeness, image, or representation. The error of Plato would not then be in holding that we know only *per ideam* or *per similitudinem*, but in confounding Creator and creature, and recognizing nothing except the idea either to know or to be known. On this interpretation, the light may be identical with the object, or it may not be. Being is its own light, and is intelligible *per se;* objects distinguishable from being are not, and are intelligible only in the light of being, or a light distinguishable from themselves. As being in its full sense is God, we may say with Malebranche that we see all things in God, but must add, *and by the light of God*, or *in Deo et per Deum.*

Assuming ideas as the light by which we see to be the real doctrine of the scholastics, we can readily understand the relation of ideas to the peripatetic categories or predicaments, or forms under which all objects are and must be apprehended, and thus connect the old quarrel of the philosophers with their present quarrel. The categories, according to the Platonists, are ideas; according to the peripatetics, they are the forms of the *mundus logicus*, which, as we have seen, they distinguish from the *mundus physicus.* The Scottish school having demolished this *mundus logicus*, by exploding the doctrine of intermediary ideas which compose it, if we take that world as formal, and fail to indentify it with the divine light, the question comes up, Are the categories or self-evident truths which precede all experience, and without which no fact of experience is possible, really objective, or only subjective? The question is,

if we duly consider it, Is the light by which we see or know on the side of the subject or on that of the object? Or, in other words, are things intelligible because we know them, or do we know them because they are intelligible? Thus stated, the question seems to be no question at all; but it is made a very serious question, and on the answer to it depends the validity or invalidity of St. Anselm's argument.

We have already expressed the opinion that the scholastics as represented by St. Thomas really mean by their phantasms and intelligible species, or intermediary ideas by which we attain to the knowledge of sensibles and intelligibles, simply the mediating light furnished by God himself, who is himself light and the Father of lights. In this case the light is objective, and by illumining the object renders it intelligible, and at the same time the subject intelligent. But Reid, who denied intermediary ideas, seemed to suppose that the light emanates from the subject, and that it is our powers that render the object intelligible. Hence he calls the categories first principles of science, constituent principles of belief, or common sense, and sometimes constituent principles of human nature. He seems to have supposed that all the light and activity is on the side of the subject, forgetting that the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not, or that the light shines, and the darkness does not compress it, or hinder it from shining, without our perceiving it or the objects it illumines.

Kant, a German, but, on one side, of Scottish descent, adopts the principles of Reid, but sets them forth with greater precision and more scientific depth. Denying with Reid the mediating ideas, he makes the categories, which, according to Aristotle, are forms of the *mundus logicus*, or intermediary world, forms of the subject or the subjective laws of thought. He does not say with Roscelin that they are mere words, with Abelard that they are mere conceptions, nor with St. Thomas that they are, taken as universals, conceptions *cum fundamento in re*, but forms of the reason, understanding, and sensibility, without any objective validity. They are not derivable from experience, because without them no experience is possible. Without what he calls synthetic judgments *a priori*, such as, Every phenomenon that begins to exist must have a cause, which includes the judgment of cause, of universal cause, and of necessary cause, we can form no synthetic judgment *a posteriori*. Hence he concludes that the categories, what some philoso-

phers call first principles, necessary truths, necessary ideas, without which we do not and cannot think, are inherent forms of the subject, and are constitutive of reason and understanding. He thus placed the intelligibleness of things in the elemental constitution of the subject, whence it follows that the subject may be its own object, or think without thinking any thing distinct from itself. We think God, man, and nature, not because they are, and think them as we do, not because they are really such as we think them, but because such is our mental constitution, and we are compelled by it to think them as we do. This the reader must see is hardly disguised scepticism, and Kant never pretended to the contrary. The only escape from scepticism, he himself contends, is to fall back from the pure or speculative reason on the practical reason, or the moral necessities of our nature, and yield to the moral imperative, which commands us to believe in God, nature, and duty.

Kant has been followed by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who differ more or less from one another, but all follow the fundamental principle he asserted, and end in the doctrine of absolute identity of subject and object. "*Cogito, ergo sum*," said Descartes: "I think, therefore I am." "To think," used to say our old friend Bronson Alcott, "is to *thing*; to thing is to give or produce reality. My thought is creative: I think, therefore I am; I think God, therefore he is; nature, and therefore nature exists. I by thinking make them, that is, *thing* them, render them real." No bad statement, as far as it goes, of the development Kant's doctrine received from his disciple Fichte. The only defect is that his later disciples, instead of making thought creative, have made it identical with the object. St. Anselm says: "I think most perfect being, therefore most perfect being is;" and so does Descartes, only Descartes substitutes God for most perfect being; but St. Anselm never said it in the sense that most perfect being is because I by my thought make it. Only a modern transcendentalist gone to seed could say that. The trouble with this whole scheme is that it puts me in the place of God, and makes me myself God, which I am quite sure I am not. It would be much more philosophical to say: I exist, therefore I think; I think being because it is, not that it is because I think it. Things do not exist because we think them, but we think them because they exist; they are not intelligible because we think them, but we think them because they are intelligible.

Yet the germ of our friend Alcott's philosophy was in Kant's doctrine, which places the *forma* of the thought in the subject instead of the object.

Whether the categories, as given by Aristotle, are inexact, as Kant alleges, or whether, as given by Kant himself, they are reducible in number to two, as M. Cousin pretends, or to one, as Rosmini maintains, enters not into the present enquiry, which relates not to their number, but their objective reality. Kant in regard to philosophy has done simply what Reid did, only he has done it better or more scientifically. He has fully demonstrated that in every fact of experience there enters a non-empirical element, and, if he holds with Leibnitz that that element is the human understanding itself, he has still demonstrated that it is not an abstraction or generalization of the concrete qualities of the objects presented by experience.

Take the ideas or categories of the necessary, the perfect, the universal, the infinite, the perfect, the immutable, the eternal. These ideas, it is willingly conceded, never exist in the human mind, or are never thought, without their opposites, the contingent, the finite, the imperfect, the particular, the variable, the temporal; but they do not, even in our thought, depend on them, and are not derived or derivable from them by abstraction or generalization. Take the synthetic judgment instanced by Kant, Every thing that begins to exist must have a cause. The idea of cause itself, Hume has shown, is not derivable from any fact of experience, and Reid and Kant say the same. The notion we have of power which founds the relation of cause and effect, or that what we call the cause actually produces or places the effect, these philosophers tell us, is not an object of experience, and is not, obtainable from any empirical facts. Experience gives only the relation of what we call cause and effect in time, that is, the relation of antecedence and consequence. Main de Biran and Victor Cousin, it is true, deny this, and maintain that the idea of cause is derived from the acts of our own will, which we are conscious of in ourselves, and which not merely precede their effects, but actually produce them. We will to raise our arm, and even if our arm be paralytic or held down by a stronger than ourself, so that we cannot raise it, we still by willing produce an effect, the volition to raise it, which is none the less real because, owing to external circumstances not under our control, it does not pass beyond our own interior.

But even granting this, how from this particular act of causation conclude universal cause, or even from universal cause necessary cause? We by willing produce the volition to raise our arm, therefore every thing that begins to exist must have a cause. The argument from the particular to the universal, *non volet*, say the logicians, and still less the argument from the contingent to the necessary.

Take the idea of the perfect. That we have the idea or category in the mind is indisputable, and it evidently is not derivable by abstraction or generalization from the facts of experience. We have experience only of imperfect things, and no generalizing of imperfection can give perfection. Indeed, without the category of the perfect, the imperfect cannot be thought. We think a thing imperfect, that is, judge it to be imperfect—and every thought is a judgment, and contains an affirmation—because it falls short of the ideal standard with which the mind compares it. The universal is not derivable from the particular, for the particular is not conceivable without the universal. We may say the same of the immutable, the eternal, the infinite, the one, or unity.

By abstraction or generalization we simply consider in the concrete a particular property, quality, or attribute by itself, and take it *in universo*, without regard to any thing else in the concrete thing. It must then be a real property, quality, or attribute of the concrete thing, or the abstraction will have no foundation in reality. But the universal is no property, quality, or attribute of particulars, the immutable of mutables, the eternal of things temporary, the necessary of contingents, the infinite of finites, or unity of multiples, otherwise particulars would be universals, mutables immutables, temporals eternals, contingents necessaries, finites infinites, and multiples one—a manifest contradiction in terms. The generalization or abstraction of particulars is particularity, of mutables is mutability, of temporals temporality, of contingents contingency, of finites finiteness, of multiples plurality or multiplicity. The overlooking of this obvious fact, and regarding the universal, immutable, eternal, &c., as abstractions or generalizations of particulars, mutables, temporals, and so on, has given birth to the pantheistic philosophy, than which nothing can be more sophistical.

The ideas or categories of the universal, the immutable, and the eternal, the necessary, the infinite, the one or unity,

are so far from being abstractions from particular concretes that in point of fact we cannot even think things as particular, changeable, temporal, contingent, finite, or multiple without them. Hence, they are called necessary ideas, because without them no synthetic judgment *a posteriori* or fact of experience is possible. They are not abstractions formed by the human mind by contemplating concrete things, because the human mind cannot operate or even exist without them, and without them human intelligence, even if supposable, could not differ from the intelligence of the brute, which, though many eminent men in modern science are endeavoring to prove it, cannot be accepted, because in proving we should disprove it.

The question now for philosophy to answer, as we have already intimated, is, Are these ideas or categories, which precede and enter into every fact of experience, forms of the subject or human understanding, as Kant alleges, or are they objective and real, and, though necessary to the existence and operation of the human mind, are yet really distinct from it, and independent of it, as much so as if no human mind had been created? This is the problem.

St. Thomas evidently holds them to be objective, for he holds them to be necessary and self-evident principles, principles *per se nota*, as may be seen in his answer to the question, *Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum?* and we need strong reasons to induce us to dissent from any philosophical conclusion of the Angelic Doctor. Moreover, Kant by no means proves his own conclusion, that they are forms of the subject. All he proves is that there is and can be no fact of human knowledge without them, which may be true without their being subjective. He proves, if you will, that they are constituent principles of the human understanding, in the sense that the human understanding cannot exist and operate without their initiative and concurrence; but this no more proves that they are forms of the subject than the fact that the creature can neither exist nor act without the creative and concurrent act of the Creator proves that the Creator is an inherent law or form of the creature. To our mind, Kant confirms a conclusion contrary to his own. His masterly *Critik der reinen Vernunft* establishes simply this fact, that man's own subjective reason alone does not suffice for science, and that man, in science as in existence, is dependent on that which is not himself; or, in a word, that man depends on the intelligibleness of the object, or that

which renders it intelligible, to be himself intelligent, or knowing. Man is, no doubt, created with the power or faculty of intelligence, but that power or faculty is not the power or faculty to know without an intelligible object, or to know what is not knowable independently of it. Hence, from Kant's facts, we conclude that the ideas or categories, without which no object is intelligible and no fact of intelligence possible, are not subjective, but objective, real, and independent of the subject.

The matter is simple enough if we look at it freed from the obscurity with which philosophers have surrounded it. Thought is a complex fact, the joint product of subject and object. God is his own object, because he is self-existent and self-sufficing: is in himself, as say the theologians, *actus purissimus*, most pure act, which permits us up to a certain point to understand the eternal generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost. God, being self-existent and self-sufficing, needs and can receive nothing from without his own most perfect being. But man is a dependent being, a creature, and does not and cannot suffice in himself for either his own existence or his own intelligence. He cannot think by himself alone or without the concurrence of the object, which is not himself. If the concurrence of the object be essential to the production of our thought, then that concurrence must be active, for a passive concurrence is the same as no concurrence at all. Then the object must be active, therefore real, for what is not real cannot act or be active. Then the object in our thought is not and cannot be ourself, but stands over against us. Now, we know that we think these ideas, and that they are the object in our thought without which we cannot think at all. Therefore, they are objective and real, and neither ourself nor our creations, as are abstractions.

This conclusion is questioned only by those persons who have not duly considered the fact that there can be no thought without both subject and object, and that man can never be his own object. To assume that he can act, think, or know with himself alone, without the concurrence of that which is not himself and is independent of him, is to deny his dependence and assume him to be God—a conclusion which some think follows from the famous "*Cogito, ergo sum*" of Descartes, and which is accepted and defended by the whole German pantheistic school of the present day. Indeed, as atheism was in the last century, so pantheism is

in the present century the real enemy philosophy has to combat. In concluding the reality of the object from the fact that we think it, we are far from pretending that thought cannot err; but the error is not in regard to what we really think, but in regard to that which we do not think, but infer from our thought. We think only what is intelligible, and what is intelligible is real, and therefore true, for falsehood, being unreal, is unintelligible, and therefore cannot be thought. But in converting our thought into a proposition, we may include in the proposition not only what we thought, but what we did not think. Hence the part of error, which is always the part not of knowledge, but of ignorance. It is so we understand St. Augustine and St. Thomas.*

These considerations authorize, or we are much mistaken, the conclusion that the ideas or categories, which the schoolmen hold to be forms of the intermediary or logical world, and Kant to be forms of the subject, are objective and real, and either the intelligible object itself or the objective light by which it is rendered intelligible or knowable. Plato, Aristotle, and the scholastics, if we have not misapprehended them, regard them, in explaining the fact of knowledge, rather as the light which illumines the object than the object itself. Yet, when the object is intelligible in itself, or by its own light, St. Thomas clearly identifies it with the object, and distinguishes it from the object only when the object is not intelligible *per se*. Thus, he maintains with St. Augustine that God knows things *per ideam;* but to the objection that God knows them by his essence, he answers that God in his own essence is the similitude, that is, the idea, of all things: *Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.* Therefore, idea in God is nothing else than the essence of God.†

The doctrine of St. Thomas is that all knowledge is by ideas, in the sense of image, likeness, or similitude. In God the idea, image, likeness, or similitude, the *species* is not distinguishable from the divine essence, for he is in his

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* Vide St. Augustine, in lib. lxxxiii. Qq., quæst. xxii., and St. Thomas, Summa Theol., p. 1, quæst. xvii. a. 3 in c. The words of St. Augustine are "*Omnis qui fallitur, id quo fallitur, non intelligit.*" Hence the intellect is always true.

† Summa Theol., p. 1, quæst. xv. a. 1 *ad* 3. The question is *de Ideis*, and we think the reader, by consulting what St. Thomas says in the body of the article, will agree that, though we have used a different phraseology, we have simply given his sense.

essence *similitudo omnium rerum*. Now, though we are created after the *idea exemplaris*, or model eternal in his essence, and therefore in our degree copy or imitate him, we have not in us the types or models of all things, are not in ourselves *similitudo omnium rerum*, and therefore are not intelligent in ourselves alone. The ideas by which things are intelligible and we intelligent must be distinct from us, and exist independent of us. As no creature any more than we has in itself the likeness of all things, or is in itself its own *idea exemplaris*, no creature can be in itself alone intelligible. Hence what the schoolmen call idea or intelligible species must be equally distinct from and independent of the object when the object is *aliquid creatum*, or creature. Hence, while both the created subject and the created object depend on the idea, the one to be intelligible, the other to be intelligent, the idea, intelligible species, the light—as we prefer to say—is independent of them both. The idea *in re* is not something intermediary between subject and object, as is sometimes supposed, but the light that intervenes between them, as the necessary condition of knowledge in creatures. This seems to us to be the real doctrine of the scholastics, as represented by St. Thomas, and is, in our judgment, indisputable.

We call the idea, regarded as intervening in the fact of knowledge, the light, and thus avoid the question whether all knowledge is by similitude or not. It may be that the idea is light because it contains the image or likeness of the object, but that seems to us a question more curious than practically important. We cannot see that the explication of the mystery of knowing is carried any further by calling the idea image or similitude than by simply calling it the intelligible light. The Platonists and peripatetics seem to us to come no nearer the secret of knowledge by so calling it than do our philosophers to the secret of external vision, when they tell us that we do not see the visible object itself, but its image painted by the external light on the retina of the eye. How do we see the image or picture, and connect it with the external object? When we have called the object or the idea light, we seem to ourselves to have said all that can be said on the point, and to retain substantially the scholastic doctrine of ideas, or intelligible species, which asserts, we add, by the way, what is perhaps very true, but which after all brings us no nearer to the secret of knowledge, or the explanation of how in the last analysis we do or can know at all.

How we do or can know seems to us an inexplicable mystery, as is our existence itself. That we do know is certain. Every man knows, and in knowing knows that he knows; but how he knows no man knows. To deny is as much an act of reason as is to affirm, and no one can deny without knowing that he denies. Men may doubt many things, but universal doubt is a simple impossibility, for whoever doubts knows that he doubts, and never doubts that he doubts or that doubt is doubting. In all things and in all science we arrive at last, if we think long and deep enough, at a mystery which it is in no human power to deny or to explain, and which is explicable only in God by his divine science. Hence it is that philosophy never fully suffices for itself, and always needs to be supplemented by revelation, as nature to attain its end must not only be redeemed from the fall, but supplemented by grace. Man never suffices for himself, since his very being is not in himself; and how, then, shall philosophy, which is his creation, suffice for itself? Let philosophy go as far as it can, but let the philosopher never for a moment imagine that human reason will ever be able to explain itself. The secret as of all things is in God and with him. Would man be God, the creature the Creator?

If we have seized the sense of the scholastic philosophy as represented by St. Thomas, and are right in understanding by the intelligible species of the schoolmen the light by which the object is intelligible, therefore the object itself when the object is intelligible *per se*, and the intelligible light when it is not, the ideal is objective and real, and both the old quarrel and the new are voided. Abstractions are null; genera and species are real, but creatures; ideas, as the intelligible light by which we know, are not forms of the subject, but objective and real, and in fact the light of the divine being, which, intelligible by itself, is the intelligibility of all created existences. St. Anselm's argument is, then, rigidly sound and conclusive: we think most perfect being *in re;* and therefore such being is, or we could not think it, since what is not cannot be thought. If the most perfect being, a greater than which and the contrary of which cannot be thought, be only in our thought, then we are ourself greater than the most perfect being, and our thought becomes the criterion of perfection, and we are greater than God, and can judge him.

This follows from the fact that the ideal is real. The ideas of the universal, the infinite, the perfect, the neces-

sary, the immutable, the eternal, cannot be either the intelligible object or the intelligible light, unless they are being. As abstractions, or as abstracted from being, they are simple nullities. To think them is to think real, universal, infinite, perfect, necessary, immutable, and eternal being, the *ens perfectissimum* of St. Anselm, the *ens necessarium et reale* of the theologians, a greater than which or the contrary of which can not be thought. That this *ens*, intuitively affirmed to every intellect, is God, is amply shown in our other papers, and also that *ens* or being creates existences, and hence there is no occasion for us to show it over again.

But it will not do to say, as many do, that we have intuition of God. The idea is intuitive; and we know by intuition that which is God, and that he is would be indemonstrable if we did not; but we do not know by intuition that what is affirmed or presented in intuition is God. When Descartes says, "I think God, therefore God is," he misapprehends St. Anselm, and assumes what is not tenable. St. Anselm does not say he thinks God, and therefore God is; he says, "I think most perfect being, a greater than which cannot be thought," and therefore most perfect being is. The intuition is not God, but most perfect being. So the ideal formula, *ens creat existentias*, would be indefensible, if *Deus* were substituted for *ens*, and it read, God creates existences. That is true, and *ens*, no doubt, is *Deus;* but we know not that by intuition, and it would be wrong to understand St. Augustine, who seems to teach that we know that God is by intuition, in any other sense than that we have intuition of that which can be demonstrated to be God. We know by intuition that which is God, but not that it is God.

St. Thomas seems to us to set this matter right in his answer to the question, *Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum?* He holds that *ens* is *per se notum*, or self-evident, and that first principles in knowing, as well as in being, evidence themselves, but denies that *Deum esse sit per se notum*, He holds that *ens* is *per se notum*, or self-evident, and that first principles in knowing, as well as in being, evidence themselves, but denies that *Deum esse sit per se notum*, because the meaning of the word Deus or God is not self-evident and known by all. His own words are: *Dico ergo hæc propositio*, DEUS EST, *quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia prædicatum est idem cum subjecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus*

de Deo QUID EST, *non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari.**

St. Thomas adds, indeed, *Sed indiget demonstrari per ea quæ sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus;* but this is easily explained. The saint argues that it is not self-evident that God is, because it is not self-evident what he is; for, according to the scholastic philosophy, to be able to affirm that a thing is, it is necessary to know its quidity, since without knowing what the thing is we cannot know that it is. What God is can be demonstrated only by his works, and that it can be so demonstrated St. Paul assures us, Rom. i, 20: *Invisibilia ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et divinitas;* or as we venture to English it: "The invisible things of God, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the foundation of the world, being understood (or known) by the things that are made." St. Paul appeals to the things that are made not to prove that God is, but to show what he is, or rather, if we may so express ourself, to prove that he is God, and leaves us, as does St. Thomas, to prove, with St. Augustine, St. Anselm, Fénelon, and others, that he is, by the argument derived from intuitive ideas, or first principles, commonly called the *argumentum a priori*, though that, strictly speaking, it is not, for there is nothing more ultimate or universal in science than is God himself, or, rather, that which is God.

The ideal formula is true, for it is contained in the first verse of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and in the first article of the creed, "I believe in one God, maker of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible;" and what it formulates is, as we have shown, intuitive, and the human mind could not exist and operate if it were not so; but the formula itself, or, rather, the formulation as an intellectual judgment, is not so. The judgment was beyond the reach of all Gentile philosophy, which nowhere asserts or recognizes the fact of creation; it is beyond the reach of the mass even of the Christian people, who hold that God creates the world as an article of faith rather than as a scientific truth; it is denied by nearly all the systems of philosophy constructed by non-Catholics even

* Summa Theol. part 1, quæst. 2 a. 1 in c.

in our own day, and it may well be doubted if science, unaided by revelation, could ever have attained to it.

This relieves the formula of the principal objections urged against it. The ideas formulated are the first principles in science with which all philosophy must commence, but the formulation, instead of being at the beginning, does not always appear even at its conclusion. The explanations we have offered show that there is no discrepancy between its assertion and the philosophy of St. Thomas. Indeed, the formula in substance is the common doctrine of all great Catholic theologians in all ages of the church, and may be seen to be so if we will only take the pains to understand them and ourselves. The objection, that the doctrine that we have intuition of most perfect being assumes that we have the intuitive vision of God even in this life, cannot stand, because that vision is vision of God as he is in himself, and this asserts only intuition of him as idea, which we even know not by intuition is God. The result of our discussion is to show that the sounder and better philosophy of our day is in reality nothing but the philosophy of St. Anselm and St. Thomas, which in substance has been always, and still is, taught with more or less clearness and depth in all our Catholic schools.

VICTOR COUSIN AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.

[From the Catholic World for June, 1867.]

The papers some months since announced the death at Paris of M. Victor Cousin, the well-known eclectic philosopher and Orleanist statesman. The reëstablishment of the Imperial *régime* in France had deprived him of his political career, never much distinguished; and whatever interest he may have continued to take in philosophy, he produced, as far as we are aware, no new philosophical work after the revolution of July, 1830, except prefaces to new editions of his previous writings, or to other writers whose works he edited, and some "Rapports" to the Academy, among which the most notable is that on the unpublished works of Abelard, preceded by a valuable introduction on the scholastic philosophy, which he afterward published in a separate volume under the title of *La Philosophie Scholastique*.

M. Cousin was born at Paris in 1792, and was, the New American Cyclopedia says, the son of a clock maker, a great admirer of Jean Jacques Rousseau, and he was, of course, brought up without any religious faith or culture, as were no small portion of the youth of France born during the Revolution. Pierre Leroux maliciously accuses Cousin, after he had quarrelled with him, of having been, when they were fellow-students together, a great admirer of *L'Ami du Peuple*, the journal in which Marat gained his infamous notoriety. His early destination was literature, and he was always the *littérateur* rather than the philosopher; but early falling under the influence of M. Royer-Collard, a stanch disciple of the Scottish school, founded by Reid and closed by Sir William Hamilton, he directed his attention to the study of philosophy, became master of conferences in the Normal School, and, while yet very young, professor of the history of philosophy in the *Faculté des Lettres* at Paris. His course for 1818, and a part of his course for 1819 and 1820, have been published from notes taken by his pupils. Being too liberal to suit the government, he was suspended from his professorship in 1824, but was restored in 1828, and continued his lectures up to the

Revolution of 1830. Since then he has made no important contributions to philosophical science.

The greater part of M. Cousin's philosophical works are left as fragments or as unfinished courses. His course of 1829–30 ends with the sensist school, and the critical examination of Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding.* His translation of Plato was completed indeed; but the arguments or introductions, except to a few of the Dialogues, and the Life of Plato promised, have never appeared. He seems to have exhausted his philosophical forces at an early day, and after publishing a new and revised edition of his previous writings, to have devoted himself chiefly to literature, especially to the literary history of the first half of the seventeenth century, and the biography of certain eminent ladies that played a very distinguished part in the political intrigues and insurrections of the period. It is doubtful if any man living had so thorough and minute a knowledge of the literature, the religious controversies, the philosophy, the politics, and the biography of the period from the accession of Louis XIII. to the end of the wars of the Fronde, and the triumph of Mazarin over his enemies, as he possessed. His *Duchesse de Longueville*, *Madame de Sablé*, *Duchesse de Chevreuse*, and *Madame de Hautefort*, and his history of the conclusion of the wars of the Fronde, are, as literary works, unrivalled, written with rare simplicity, purity, grace, and delicacy of expression and style, and have an easy natural eloquence and charm never surpassed by any writer even in the French language. He has resuscitated those great dames of the seventeenth century, who live, love, sin, repent, and do penance in his pages as they did in real life. He seems, as a Parisian has said, to have really fallen in love with them, and to have regarded each of them as his mistress, whose honor he must defend at the risk of his life.

The French, we believe, usually count M. Villemain as the most perfect master of their beautiful language; but to our taste he was surpassed by Cousin, if not in the delicacy of phrase, which only a Frenchman born or bred can appreciate, in all the higher qualities of style, as much as he was in depth and richness of feeling, and variety and comprehensiveness of thought. Cousin was by far the greater man, endowed with the richer genius, and, as far as we can judge, equally polished and graceful as a writer. As a philosophical writer, for beauty, grace, elegance, and eloquence

he has had no equal since Plato; and he wrote on philosophical subjects with ease and grace, charmed and interested his readers in the dryest and most abstruse speculations of metaphysics. His rhetoric was captivating even if his philosophy was faulty.

M. Cousin called his philosophical system eclecticism. He starts with the assumption that each philosophical school has its special point of view, its special truth, which the others neglect or unduly depress, and that the true philosopher weds himself to no particular school, but studies them all with impartiality, accepts what each has that is positive, and rejects what each has that is exclusive or negative. He resolves all possible schools into four—1st, The Sensist; 2d, the Idealistic—subjectivistic; 3d, the Sceptical; 4th, the Mystic. Each of these four systems has its part of truth, and its part of error. Take the truth of each, and exclude the error, and you have true philosophy, and the whole of it. Truth is always something positive, affirmative. What then is the truth of scepticism, which is a system of pure negation, and not only affirms nothing, but denies that any thing can be affirmed? How, moreover, can scepticism, which is universal nescience, be called a system of philosophy? Finally, if you know not the truth in its unity and integrity beforehand, how are you, in studying those several systems, to determine which is the part of truth and which the part of error?

There is no doubt that all schools, as all sects, have their part of truth, as well as their part of error; for the human mind cannot embrace pure, unmixed error any more than the will can pure, unmixed evil; but the eclectic method is not the method of constructing true philosophy any more than it is the method of constructing true Christian theology. The Catholic acknowledges willingly the truth which the several sects hold; but he does not derive it from them, nor arrive at it by studying their systems. He holds it independently of them; and having it already in its unity and integrity, he is able, in studying them, to distinguish what they have that is true from the errors they mix up with it. It must be the same with the philosopher. M. Cousin was not unaware of this, and he finally asserted eclecticism rather as a method of historical verification, than as the real and original method of constructing philosophy. The name was therefore unhappily chosen, and is now seldom heard.

Eclecticism can never be a philosophy. All it can be is a method, and is, as Cousin held, a method of verification rather than of construction. Cousin's own method was not the eclectic, but avowedly the psychological; that is, by careful observation and profound study of the phenomena of consciousness, to attain to a real ontological science, or science of the soul, of God, and nature. This method was severely criticised by Schelling and other German philosophers, and has been objected to by ontologists generally, as giving not a real ontology, but only a generalization. Dr. Channing called the God asserted by Cousin "a splendid generalization"—a very just criticism, but perhaps not for the precise reason the eloquent Unitarian preacher assigned Cousin does not maintain, theoretically at least, that we can, by way of induction or deduction from purely psychological facts, attain to a real ontological order. His real error was in the misapplication of his method, which led him to deny what he calls necessary and absolute ideas, and terms the idea of the true, the idea of the beautiful, and the idea of the good, are being, and therefore God, and to represent them as the word of God—the precise error which, Gioberti rightly or wrongly maintains, was committed by Rosmini. It must be admitted that Cousin is not on this point very clear, and that he often speaks of ontology as an induction from psychology, in which case the God he asserts would be, for the reason Channing supposes, only a generalization.

But we think it is possible to clear him from this charge, so far as his intention went, and to defend the psychological method as he professed to apply it. He professed to attain to ontology from the phenomena of consciousness, or the facts revealed to consciousness; but he labors long and hard, as does every psychologist who admits ontology at all, to show, by a careful analysis and classification of these phenomena or facts, that there are among them some, at least, which are not derived from the soul itself, which do not depend on it, and do actually extend beyond the region of psychology, and lead at once into the ontological order. In other words, he claims to find in his psychological observation and analysis real ontological facts. It is from these, not from purely psychological phenomena, that he professes to rise to ontology. So understood, what is called the psychological method is strictly defensible. Every philosopher does and must begin by the analysis of thought, that is, in the language of Cousin, the fact of consciousness, and there

is no other way possible. That the ideal formula enters into every one of our thoughts is not a fact that we know without thought, and it can be determined only by analyzing the thought one thinks, that is, the fact of consciousness. The quarrel here between the psychologists and the ontologists is quite unnecessary.

What is certain, and this is all the ontologist need assert, or, in fact, can assert, is that ontology is neither an induction nor a deduction from psychological data. God is not, and cannot be, the generalization of our own souls. But it does not follow from this that we do not think that which is God, and that it is from thought we do and must take it. We take it from thought and by thinking. What is objected to in the psychologists is the assumption that thought is a purely psychological or subjective fact, and that from this psychological or subjective fact we can by way of induction attain to ontological truth. But as we understand M. Cousin, and we studied his works with some care thirty or thirty-five years ago, and had the honor of his private correspondence, this he never pretends to do. What he claims is that in the analysis of consciousness we detect a class of facts or ideas which are not psychological or subjective, but really ontological, and do actually carry us out of the region of psychology into that of ontology. That his account of these facts or ideas is to be accepted as correct or adequate we do not pretend, but that he professes to recognize them and distinguish them from purely psychological facts is undeniable.

The defect or error of M. Cousin on this point was in failing, as we have already observed, to identify the absolute or necessary ideas he detects and asserts with God, the only *ens necessarium et reale*, and in failing to assert their objectivity to the whole subject, and in presenting them only as objective to the human personality. He never succeeded in cutting himself wholly loose from the German nonsense of a subjective-object or objective-subject, and when he had clearly proved an idea to be objective to the reflective reason and the human personality, he did not dare assert it to be objective in relation to the whole subject. It was impersonal, but might be in a certain sense subjective, as Kant maintained with regard to the categories. There always seemed to remain in his mind some confusion between the subject and object, and hence his translator, in *Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature*, never ventures to translate *le moi et le*

non-moi, subject and object, or the soul and the world, but introduces into the language such barbarisms as the *me* and the *not-me*. Indeed, at the time those *Specimens* were published, there were few, if any, of the scholars of the modern Athens that understood or could be made to understand the real distinction between objective and subjective; and we observed the other day, in looking over the *Einleitung* of a German professor, that he speaks of the objective-object, the objective-subject, the subjective-object, and the subjective-subject.

It is very easy to understand why Kant should assert objective-subjective, for he held that the categories are necessary, irresistible, and indestructible forms of the subject, but independent of the human will or personality, or of proper human activity, nay, the very conditions of that activity, imposed on us not by our will, but by the very constitution of our intellectual nature. But why Cousin should have hesitated to assert the complete distinction between subject and object in thought is what we are unable to explain. He maintains strenuously that the object is distinct from the personality of the subject, or that it is always, in his own language, *le non-moi*, but not that it is distinct from the whole soul. He distinguishes in the subject between personal activity and impersonal. The personal is subjective, the impersonal is objective, but objective in relation to what? To the personal only. There is, no doubt, the distinction he asserts, and it is recognized by all our theologians in their distinction between *actus humanus* and *actus hominis*. The *actus humanus* is an act of free will, the *actus hominis* is an involuntary act; but both are acts of the subject, man. All action of man, whether personal or impersonal, voluntary or involuntary, is subjective, but for involuntary acts he is not held morally accountable.

This same failure to mark the real distinction between subjective and objective, and making it simply the distinction between personal and impersonal, *le moi* and *le non-moi*, has greatly depreciated the value in his philosophy of the distinction M. Cousin notes between intuition and reflection. According to him they are but two modes of the activity of one and the same reason—which reason, he asserts is our faculty of intelligence. Reason, he says, is our only faculty of knowing, by which we know all that we do know, whatever the sphere or object of our knowledge. Reason, then, is subjective, and consequently so are all its

modes of activity. Intuition is as subjective as reflection, and hence the distinction between intuition and reflection, really so important when rightly understood, says nothing in favor of the objectivity of what M. Cousin calls absolute or necessary ideas. It is in his philosophy simply a distinction between personal and impersonal, between the spontaneous and the reflective activity of the same subject; yet it is on this very distinction that he bases the validity of his ontology and his whole metaphysical system. By it he explains genius, inspiration, revelation, and religious faith. These are operations of the spontaneous reason, and divine because the activity of the spontaneous reason is not personal. In this way, he legitimates all the religions of all the ages and nations. He places prophetic and apostolic inspiration and the inspirations of genius in the same category, and resolves them all, in the last analysis, into what we commonly call enthusiasm. But as reason, whether personal or impersonal, is subjective, a faculty of the human soul, it is not easy to see why its spontaneous activity should be more divine or authoritative than its reflective activity. Does M. Cousin hold with the Arabs that the ravings of the maniac are divine inspirations?

Cousin seems to us never to have clearly understood the real character of the distinction between intuition and reflection, on which he rightly insists. Intuition is impersonal, divine, infallible, authoritative, he maintains, while reflection, partaking of the imperfections and pettinesses of our own personality, is individual, fallible, and without authority, save as supported by intuition. All that we ever do or can know is given us primarily in intuition, and what is so given constitutes the common sense, the common faith or belief of the race. There is less, but there can never be more, in reflection than in intuition. The difference between the two is the difference between *seeing* and *beholding*. We see what is before us, but to behold it we look. we look that we may determine what it is we see. But it is clear from this illustration that the intuition is as much the act of the subject as is the reflection. The only difference between them is that asserted by Leibnitz between simple perception and apperception. In simple perception we perceive all the objects before me, without noting or distinguishing them; in apperception we note that it is we who perceive them, and distinguish them both from ourself and from one another. The intuition is *a posteriori*, and is no synthetic

judgment *a priori*, as Kant terms what must precede experience in order to render experience possible.

Nor is it true to say that all our knowledge is given in the primitive intuition. What is given in the primitive intuition is simply the ideal, self-evident truths, as say some; first principles of all science, which are at the same time the first principles of all reality, and could not be the first principles of science if they were not the first principles of reality, say others. Even they who assert that the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, is intuitive, never pretend that any thing more than the ideal element of thought or experience is intuitive. The ideal formula is simply the scientific reduction of the categories of Aristotle and Kant to three, and their identification with reality; that is, their reduction to being, existence, and the creative act of being, which is the real nexus between them. These three categories must be given intuitively, or *a priori*, because without them the intelligence is not constituted, and no science, no experience, is possible. But in them, while the principles of all science are given, no knowledge or apprehension of particular things is given. The intuition constitutes, we would say creates, the faculty of intelligence, but all science is acquired either by the exercise of that faculty or by divine revelation addressed to it.

Reduced to its proper character as asserted by M. Cousin, intuition is empirical, and stands opposed not to reflection, but to discursion, and is simply the immediate and direct perception of the object without the intervention of any process, more or less elaborate, of reasoning. This is, indeed, not an unusual sense of the word, perhaps its more common sense, but it is a sense that renders the distinction between intuition and reflection of no importance to M. Cousin, for it does not carry him out of the sphere of the subject, or afford any basis for his ontological inductions. He has still the question as to the objectivity and reality of the ideal to solve, and no recognized means of solving it. His ontological conclusions, therefore, as a writer in The Christian Examiner told him as long ago as 1836, rest simply on the credibility of reason or faith in its trustworthiness, which can never be established, because it is assumed that to the operation of reason no objective reality is necessary, since the object, if impersonal, may for aught that appears be included in the subject. Notwithstanding his struggles and efforts of all sorts, we think, therefore,

that it must be conceded that Cousin remained in the sphere of psychology, and that the facts the study and analysis of consciousness gave him, have in his system no ontological value, for he fails to establish their real objectivity. His passage from psychology is a leap over a gulf by main strength, not a regular dialectic passage, which he professes to have found, or which he promises to provide, and which the true analysis of thought discloses.

M. Cousin professes to have reduced the categories of Kant and Aristotle to two, substance and cause, or substance and phenomenon. But, as he in fact identifies cause with substance, declaring substance to be substance only in so much as it is cause, and cause to be cause only in so much as it is substance, he really reduces them to the single category of substance, which you may call indifferently substance or cause. But though every substance is intrinsically and essentially a cause, yet, as it may be something more than cause, it is not necessary to insist on this, and it may be admitted that he recognizes two categories. Under the head of substance he ranges all that is substantial, or that pertains to real and necessary being, and under the head of cause the phenomenal, or the effects of the causative action of substance. He says he understands by substance the universal and absolute substance, the universal, necessary, and real being of the theologians, and by phenomena not mere modes or appearances of substance, but finite and relative substances, and calls them phenomena only in opposition to the one absolute substance. They are created or produced by the causative action of substance. If this has any real meaning, he should recognize three categories, as in the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, that is, being, existence, or creature, and the creative act of being, the real nexus between substance or being and contingent existences, for it is that which places them and binds them to the Creator. In the ideal formula the categories are all reduced to three, which really include them all and in their real relation. Whatever there is to be known must be arranged under one or another of the three terms of the formula, for whatever is conceivable must be being, the creative act of being, or the product of that act, that is to say, existences. The ideal formula is complete, for it asserts in their logical relation the first principles of all the knowable (*omne scibile*) and all the real (*omne reale*), and of all the knowable because of all the real, for what is not real is

not knowable. M. Cousin's reduction to substance and cause, or being and phenomena, besides being not accurately expressed, is unscientific and defective.

We do not think M. Cousin ever intended to deny the creative act of being, or the reality of existences, or what he calls phenomena, but he includes the act in his conception of substance. God is in his own intrinsic nature, he maintains, causative or creative, and cannot, therefore, not cause or create. Hence, creation is necessary. Being causative in his essence, essentially a cause, and cause being a cause only inasmuch as it causes or is actually a cause, God is, if we may so speak, forced to create, and to be continuously creating, by the intrinsic and eternal necessity of his own being. This smacks a little of Hegelianism, which teaches that God perfects or fills out his own being, or realizes the possibilities of his own nature, in creating, and arrives at self-consciousness first in man—a doctrine which our Boston transcendentalists embodied in their favorite aphorism, "In order to be you must do"—as if without being it is possible to do, as if imperfection could make itself perfection, or any thing by itself alone could make itself more than it is!

But the doctrine that substance is essentially cause, and must from intrinsic necessity cause in the sense of creating, is not tenable. We are aware that Leibnitz, a great name in philosophy, defines substance to be an active force, a *vis activa*, but we do not recollect that he anywhere pretends that its activity necessarily extends beyond itself. God is *vis activa*, if you will, in a supereminent degree; he is essentially active, and would be neither being nor substance if he were not; he is, as say Aristotle and the schoolmen, most pure act; and hence the theologians discover in him a reason for the eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost, or why God is necessarily indivisible Trinity; but nothing in this implies that he must necessarily act *ad extra*, or create. He acts eternally from the necessity of his own divine nature, but not necessarily out of the circle of his own infinite being, for he is complete in himself, the plenitude of being, and always and every where suffices for himself, and therefore for his own activity. Creation, or the production of effects exterior to himself, is not necessary to the perfection of his activity, adds and can add nothing to him, as it does and can take nothing from him. Hence, though we cannot conceive of him without conceiving him as infinitely, eternally, and essentially

active, we can conceive of him as absolute substance or being without conceiving him to be necessarily acting or creating *ad extra.*

M. Cousin evidently confounds the interior act of the divine being with his exterior acts, or acts *ad extra*, or creative acts. God being most pure act, says the eclectic philosopher, he must be infinitely active, and if infinitely active he must develop himself in creation; therefore, creation is necessary, and God cannot but create. This denies while it asserts that God is in himself most pure act, and assumes that his nature has possibilities that can be realized only in external acts. It makes the creation necessary to the perfection of his being, and assumes either that he is not in himself *ens perfectissimum*, or most perfect being, or that the creation, the world, or universe, is in itself God; that is, the conception of God as most perfect being includes both substance and cause, both being and phenomenon. Hence, with the contradiction of which M. Cousin gives more than one example, and which no pantheistic philosopher does or can escape, in asserting creation to be necessary, he declares it to be impossible; for the phenomena substantially considered are God himself, indistinguishable from him, and necessary to complete our conception of him as absolute substance, or most perfect being.

In the preface to the third edition of his *Philosophical Fragments*, M. Cousin says the expression, "Creation is necessary," is objectionable, as irreverent, and appearing to imply that God in creating is not free, and he willingly consents to retract it. But we cannot find that he does retract it, and, if he retracts the expression, he nowhere retracts the thought. He denies that he favors a system of fatalism, and labors hard to prove that though God can not but create, yet that in creating he is free. God, he says, must act according to his own essential nature, and cannot act contrary to his own wisdom and goodness; yet in acting he acts freely. There is a distinction between liberty and free will. Free will is liberty accompanied by deliberation and struggles between opposite motives and tendencies. In God there can be no hesitancy, no deliberation, no struggle of choice between good and evil. Yet is he none the less free for that. There are sublime moments when the soul acts spontaneously, with terrible energy, without any deliberation. Is the soul in these sublime moments deprived of liberty? The saint, when, by long struggles and severe discipline, he has

overcome all his internal enemies, and henceforth acts right spontaneously, without deliberating—is he less free than he who is still in the agony of the struggle, or are his acts less meritorious? Is the liberty of God taken away by denying that he is free to act contrary to his nature?

Whether the distinction here asserted between liberty and free will is admissible or not, or whether all that is alleged to be true or much of it only error, we pass over, as the discussion of the question of liberty would lead further than we can now go; but in all he says he avoids the real question at issue. Certainly, there can be no hesitancy on the part of God, no interior struggle as to choice between good and evil, no deliberation as to what he shall do or not do; nothing that implies the least possible imperfection can be in him. Certain, again, is it that God is not free to alter his own nature, to change his own attributes, or to act contrary to them, to the eternal essences of things, or to his own eternal ideas. But that is not the question. The real question is, Is he free to create or not create at his own will and pleasure? Among the infinite number of contingents possible, and all according with his own essential attributes, is he free to select such as he chooses, and at his own will and pleasure give them existence? This is the only question he had to answer, and this question he studiously avoids, and fails, therefore, to show that they are wrong who accuse him of asserting creation as the necessary and not the free act of God. The charge of asserting universal fatalism and pantheism he therefore fails to meet. He fails to vindicate the liberty of God, and therefore, though he asserts it, the liberty of man. All pantheism is fatalistic, and the doctrine of Spinoza is not more decidedly pantheistic than the system adopted and defended by Cousin.

We are far from believing that M. Cousin thought himself a pantheist, for we do not think he ever understood his own system. He was more than most men the dupe of words, and, though not destitute of philosophical genius, philosophy was never his natural vocation, any more than it was his original destination. He was always, as we have said, the *litterateur* rather than the philosopher. Much allowance should also, no doubt, be made for the unsettled state of philosophy in France when he became, under Royer-Collard, master of conferences in the Normal School of Paris, and the confused state of philosophical language that was then in use. Throughout his whole ontology, he is misled

by taking the word substance instead of *ens* or being. He says that he understands by substance, when he asserts, as he does, that there is only one substance, what the fathers and doctors of the church mean by the one supreme, necessary, absolute, and eternal being, the *Ego sum qui sum*, I am that am, of Exodus, the name under which God revealed himself to Moses. This is an improper use of the word. No doubt being is substance, or substantial, but the two terms are not equivalents. Being has primary reference to that which is, as opposed to that which is not, or nothing; substance is something, and so far coincides with being, but something in opposition to attribute, mode, or accident, or something capable of supporting attributes, modes, or accidents. Being is absolute in and of itself, and therefore strictly speaking one, and it is only in a loose sense that we speak of beings in the plural number, or call creatures beings. There is and can be but one only being, God, for he only can say, *Ego sum qui sum*, and whatever existences there may be distinguished from him have their being not in themselves, but in him, according to what St. Paul says, "in him we live, and move, and have our being:" *in ipso vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.* There is in this view nothing pantheistic, for being is complete in itself and sufficient for itself. Consequently, there can be nothing distinguishable from being except placed by the free creative act of being, that is, creation or creatures. The creature is not being, but it holds from being by the creative act, and may be and is a substance, distinct from the divine substance. Being is one, substances may be manifold. Hence, in the ideal formula, the first term or category is *ens*, not *substans* or *substantia.*

Cousin, misled by Descartes and Spinoza, and only imperfectly acquainted with the scholastic philosophy, adopts the term substance instead of being, and maintains sturdily, from first to last, that there is and can be but one substance. Whence it follows that all not in that one substance is unsubstantial and phenomenal, without attributes, modes, or activity. Creatures may have their being in God and yet be substances and capable of acting from their own centre as second causes; but, if there is only one substance, they cannot themselves be substances in any sense at all, and can be only attributes, modes, or phenomena of the one only substance, or God. God alone is in himself their substance and reality, and their activity is really his activity. By taking

for his first category substance instead of *ens* or being, M. Cousin found himself obliged virtually to deny the second. He says he calls the second category phenomena, only in opposition to the one universal substance, that he holds them to be relative or finite substances. This shows his honorable intentions, but it cannot avail him, for he says over and over again that there is and can be but one substance. Either substance is one and one only, he says formally, or it is nothing. The unity of substance is vital in his system, and unity of substance is the essential principle of pantheism. He himself defines substance as that which exists in itself and not in another.

M. Cousin says pantheism is the divinization of nature, or nature taken in its totality as God. But this is sheer atheism or naturalism, not pantheism. The essence of pantheism is in the denial of substantial creation or the creation of substances. The pantheist can, in a certain manner, even admit creation, the creation of modes or phenomena, and there are few pantheists who do not assert as much. The test is as to the creation of substances, or existences that can support attributes, modes, or accidents of their own, instead of being simply attributes, modes, or accidents of the one substance, and thus capable of acting from their own centre as proper second causes. He who denies the creation of such existences is a pantheist, and he who affirms it is a theist and no pantheist, however he may err in other matters. Had M. Cousin understood this, he would have seen that he had not escaped the error of Spinoza. With only one substance, it is impossible to assert the creation of substances. The substance of the soul and of the world, if there is only one substance, is God, and they are only phenomenal or mere appearances; the only activity in the universe is that of God; and what we call our acts are his acts. Whatever is done, whether good or evil, he does it, not only as *causa eminens* or *causa causarum*, but as direct and immediate actor. The moral consequences of such a doctrine are easy to be seen, and need not be dwelt upon.

No doubt M. Cousin, when repelling the charge of pantheism preferred against him, on the ground of his maintaining that there is only one substance, thought he had said enough in saying that he used the word phenomena in the sense of finite or relative substances; but if there is only one substance, how can there be any finite and relative substances? And he, also, should have considered that his use

of the word phenomena was the worst word he could have chosen to convey the idea of substance, however finite, for it stands opposed to substance. He says *le moi* and *le non-moi* are in relation to substance phenomenal. Who from this could conclude them to be themselves substances? He says he could not maintain that they are modes or appearances of substance only, because he maintains that they are forces, causes. But it sometimes happens to a philosopher to be in contradiction with himself, and always to the pantheist, because pantheism is supremely sophistical and self-contradictory. It admits of no clear, consistent, logical statement. Besides, no man can always be on his guard, and when his system is false, the force of truth and his good sense and just feeling will often get the better of his system. He has, indeed, said the soul (*le moi*) and the world (*le non-moi*) are forces, causes; but he has also said, as his system requires him to say, that their substantial activity is the activity of the one only substance, which is God.

It were easy to justify these criticisms by any number of citations from M. Cousin's several works, but it is not necessary, for we are attempting neither a formal exposition nor a formal refutation of his system; we are merely pointing out some of his errors and mistakes, for the benefit of young and ingenuous students of philosophy, who need to be shown what it is necessary to shun on the points taken up. Most, if not all, of M. Cousin's mistakes and errors arose from his having considered the question of method before he had settled that of principles. He says a philosopher's whole philosophy is in his method. Tell me what is such or such a philosopher's method, and I will tell you his philosophy. But this is not true, unless by method he means both principles and method taken together. Method is the application of principles, and presupposes them, and till they are determined it is impossible to determine the method to be adopted or pursued. The human mind has a method given it in its very constitution, and we cannot treat the question of method till we have ascertained the principles of that constitution. Principles are not found or obtained by the exercise of our faculties, because without them the mind can neither operate nor even exist. Principles are and must be given by the Creator of the mind itself. To treat the question of method before we have ascertained what principles are thus given, is to proceed in the dark and to lose our way.

Undoubtedly, every philosopher must begin the construction of his philosophy by the analysis of thought, either as presented him in consciousness or as represented in language, or both together. This is a mental necessity. Since philosophy deals only with thought or what is presented in thought, its first step must be to ascertain what are the elements of thought. So far as this analysis is psychological, philosophy begins in psychology; but whether what is called the psychological method is or is not to be adopted, we cannot determine till we have ascertained the elements, and ascertained whether they are all psychological or not. If on inquiry it should turn out that in every thought there is both a psychological and an ontological element given simultaneously and in an indissoluble synthesis, it is manifest that the exclusively psychological method would lead only to error. It would leave out the ontological element, and be unable to present in its true character even the psychological; for, if the psychological element in the real order and in thought exists only in relation with the ontological, it can be apprehended and treated in its true character only in that relation. Whether such be the fact or not, how are we to determine till we know what are the principles alike of all the knowable and of all the real—that is, have determined the categories?

The error of the psychological method is not that it asserts the necessity of beginning our philosophizing with the analysis of thought, or what M. Cousin calls, not very properly, the fact of consciousness, but in proceeding to study the facts of the human soul, as if man were an isolated existence, and the only thing existing; and after having observed and classified these facts, either stopping with them, as does Sir William Hamilton, or proceeding by way of induction, as most psychologists do, to the conclusion of ontological principles—an induction which both Sir William Hamilton and Schelling have proved, in their criticisms of Cousin's method, is invalid, because no induction is valid that concludes beyond the facts or particulars from which it is made. The facts being all psychological, nothing not psychological can be concluded from them. Cousin feels the force of this criticism, but, without conceding that his method is wrong or defective, seeks to avoid it by alleging that among the facts of consciousness are some which, though revealed by consciousness or contained in thought, are not psychological, and hence

psychology leads of itself not by way of induction, but directly, to ontology. The answer is pertinent, for if it be true that there is an ontological element in every thought, the analysis of thought discloses it. But, hampered and blinded by his method, Cousin fails, as we have seen, to disengage a really ontological element, and in his blundering explanation of it deprives it of all real ontological character. His God is anthropomorphous, when not a generalization or a pure abstraction. What deceives the exclusive psychologists, and makes them regard their inductions of ontology from psychological facts as valid, is the very important fact that there are no exclusively psychological facts; and in their psychology, though not recognized by them as such, and according to their method ought not to be such, there are real ontological elements—elements which are not psychological, and without which there could be no psychological elements. These elements place us directly in relation with the ontological reality, and the mistake is in not seeing or recognizing this fact, and in assuming that the ontological reality, instead of being given, as it is, intuitively, is obtained by induction from the psychological. Ontology as an induction or a logical conclusion is sophistical and false; as given intuitively in the first principles of thought, it is well founded and true. The mistake arises from having attempted to settle the question of method before having settled the question of principles. The simple fact is that the soul is not the only existence, nor an isolated existence. It exists and operates only in relation with its Creator and upholder, with the external world, and with other men or society, so that there are and can be no purely psychological facts. The soul severed from God, or the creative act of God, cannot live, cannot exist, but drops into the nothing it was before it was created. Principles are given, not found or obtained by our own activity, for, as we have said, the mind cannot operate without principles. The principles, as most philosophers tell us, are self-evident, or evidence themselves. If real principles, they are and must be alike the principles of being and of knowing, of science and reality. They must include in their real relations both the psychological and the ontological. As the psychological does not and cannot exist without the ontological, and, indeed, not without the creative act of the ontological, science is possible only on

condition that the ontological and the psychological, as to their ideal principles, are intuitively given, and given in their real synthesis, as it has been abundantly shown they are given in the ideal formula. The ontological and psychological being given intuitively and simultaneously in their real relation, it follows necessarily that neither the exclusively psychological method nor the exclusively ontological method can be accepted, and that the method must be synthetic, because the principles themselves are given in their real synthesis. Clearly, then, the principles must determine the method, not the method the principles. It is not true, then, to say that all one's philosophy is in one's method, but that it is all in one's principles. If M. Cousin had begun by ascertaining what are the principles of thought, necessarily asserted in every thought and without which no thought is possible, he could never have fallen into pantheism, which every thought repudiates, and which cannot even be asserted without self-contradiction, because in every thought there is given as essential to the very existence of thought the express contradictory of pantheism of every form.

M. Cousin professes to be able, from the method a philosopher follows in philosophizing, to foretell his philosophy; but although we would speak with the greatest respect of our former master, from whom we received no little benefit, we must say that we have never met a man, equally learned and equally able, so singularly unhappy in explaining the systems of the various schools of philosophy of which he professes to give the history. We cannot now call to mind a single instance in which he has seized and presented the kernel of the philosophical system he has undertaken to explain. He makes the Theætetus of Plato an argument against the sensists, or the doctrine of the origin of all our ideas in sensation—when one has but to read that Dialogue to perceive that what Plato is seeking to prove is that the knowledge of the sensible, which is multiple, variable, and evanescent, is no real science at all. Plato is not discussing at all the question of how we know, but what we must know in order to have real science. Cousin's exposition of what he calls the Alexandrian theodicy, or of neoplatonism, is, notwithstanding he had edited the works of Proclus, a marvel of misapprehension alike of the Alexandrian doctrine and of Christian theology. He describes with a sneer the scholastic philosophy as being merely "a commentary on

the Holy Scriptures and texts from the fathers." He edited the works of Descartes, but never understood more of that celebrated philosopher than enough to imbibe some of his worst errors. He has borrowed much, directly or indirectly, from Spinoza, but never comprehended his system of pantheism, as is evident from his judgment that Spinoza erred only in being too devout and too filled and penetrated with God!

He misapprehends entirely Leibnitz's doctrine of substance, as we have already seen. His own system is in its psychological part borrowed chiefly from Kant, and in its ontological part from Hegel, neither of whom has he ever understood. He has the errors of these two distinguished Germans without their truths or their logical firmness. And perhaps there was no system of philosophy, of which he undertook to give an account, that he less understood than his own. He seems, after having learned something of the great mediæval philosophers in preparing his work, *Philosophie Scholastique*, to have had some suspicions that he had talked very foolishly, and had been the dupe of his own youthful zeal and enthusiasm; for, though he afterwards published a new edition of his works without any essential alteration, as we infer from the fact that they were placed at Rome on the Index, he published, as far as we are aware, no new philosophical work, and turned his attention to other subjects. Even in his work on the Scholastics, as well as in his account of Jansenism in his work on Madame de Sablé, we recollect no re-assertion of his pantheism, nor even an unorthodox opinion.

It was a great misfortune for M. Cousin as a philosopher that he knew so little of Catholic theology, and that what little he did know, apparently caught up at second-hand, only served to mislead him. We are far from building science on faith or founding philosophy on revelation, in the sense of the traditionalists; yet we dare affirm that no man who has not studied profoundly the Gospel of St. John, the Epistles of St. Paul, the great Greek and Latin fathers, and the mediæval doctors of the Church, is in a condition to write any thing deserving of serious consideration on philosophy. The great controversies that have been called forth from time to time on the doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the two natures and the two wills in the one person of our Lord, the Real Presence of our Lord's body, soul, and divinity in the Eucharist, liberty and

necessity, the relations of nature and grace, and of reason and faith, throw a brilliant light on philosophy far surpassing all the light to be derived from Gentile sources, or by the most careful analysis of the facts of our own consciousness. The effort, on the one hand, to demolish, and on the other to sustain, Catholic dogma, has enlightened the darkest and most hidden passages of both psychology and ontology, and placed the Catholic theologian, really master of the history of his science, on a vantage ground which they who know it not are incapable of conceiving. Before him your Descartes, Spinozas, Kants, Fichtes, Schellings, Hegels, Cousins, dwindle to philosophical pigmies.

The excellent M. Augustin Cochin thinks that M. Cousin rendered great service to the cause of religion by the sturdy warfare he carried on in defence of spiritualism against the gross sensism and materialism of the eighteenth century, and nobody can deny very considerable merit to his Critical Examination of Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*, which has no doubt had much influence in unseating Locke from the philosophical throne he formerly occupied. But the reaction against Locke and Condillac, as well as the philosophers of Auteuil, had commenced long before Cousin became master of conferences in *L'Ecole Normale;* and we much doubt if the more subtile and refined rationalism he has favored is a less dangerous enemy to religion and society than the sensism of Condillac, or the gross materialism of Cabanis, Garat, and Destutt de Tracy. Under his influence infidelity in France has modified its form, but only, as it seems to us, to render itself more difficult of detection and refutation. Pantheism is a far more dangerous enemy than materialism, for its refutation demands an order of thought and reasoning above the comprehension of the great mass of those who are not incapable of being misled by its sophistries. The refutation of the pantheism of our days requires a mental culture and a philosophical capacity by no means common. Thousands could comprehend the refutation of Locke or Condillac, where there is hardly one who can understand the refutation of Hegel or Spinoza.

Besides, we do not think Cousin can be said to have in all cases opposed the truth to sensism. His spiritualism is not more true than sensism itself. He pretends that we have immediate and direct apprehension of spiritual reality—that is, pure intellections. True, he says that we apprehend the noetic only on occasion of sensible affection, but on such

occasion we do apprehend it pure and simple. This is as to the apprehension itself exaggerated spiritualism, and would almost justify the fair pupil of Margaret Fuller in her exclamation, "O Miss Fuller! I see right into the abyss of being." Man, not being a pure intelligence, but intelligence clothed with sensibility, has and can have no pure intellections. M. Cousin would have been more correct if, instead of saying that the affection of the sensibility is necessary as the occasion, he had said, we know the supersensible indeed, but only as sensibly represented.

In this sense we understand the peripatetics when they say: "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu." The medium of this sensible representation of the intelligible or spiritual truth to the understanding is language of some sort, which is its sensible sign. M. Cousin would have done well to have studied more carefully on this subject the remarkable work of De Bonald, a work, though it has some errors, of an original genius of the first order, and of a really profound thinker. Had he done this, he might have seen that the reflective reason cannot operate without language, and understood something of the necessity of the infallible church to maintain the unity and integrity of language, whose corruption by philosophers invariably involves the loss of the unity and integrity of the idea. It might also have taught him that a philosophy worth any thing cannot be spun by the philosopher out of his own consciousness as the spider spins her web out of her own bowels, and that without as much at least of primitive revelation or the primitive instruction given by God himself to the race, as is embodied in language, no man can successfully cultivate philosophy.

As minister of public instruction under Louis Phillipe, M. Cousin labored hard and with some success, we know not how much, to extend primary schools in France; but he in part neutralized his services in this respect by his defence of the university monopoly, his opposition to the freedom of education, his efforts to force his pantheistic or at best rationalistic philosophy into the colleges of the university, and his intense hatred and unrelenting hostility to the Jesuits, who have first and last done so much for education and religion in France as well as elsewhere. Ordinarily a man of great candor, and of a most kindly disposition, his whole nature seemed to change the moment a Jesuit was in question. He was no friend to the Catholic religion, and

after the writer of this became a Catholic, he forgot his French politeness, and refused to answer a single one of his letters. To him we were either dead or had become an enemy. He moreover never liked to have his views questioned. In politics he belonged to the *Doctrinaire* school, and supported the *juste milieu*. In the Revolution of 1848, and under the Republic, he opposed earnestly socialism, and attempted to stay its progress by writing and publishing a series of philosophical tracts, as if philosophy could cure an evil which it had helped to create. When society is in disorder, old institutions are falling, and civilization is rapidly lapsing into barbarism, it is only religion, speaking from on high with the power of truth and the authority of God, that can arrest the downward tendency. "Religion," said La Mennais in the first volume of his *Essay on Indifference in Matters of Religion*, "is found at the cradle of nations; philosophy at their tomb." Woe to the nation that exchanges faith for philosophy! Its ruin is at hand, for it has lost the principle of life. After the *coup d' état* little was heard of Cousin either in the world of politics or philosophy, and his last years appear to have flowed away in the peaceful pursuits of literature.

Rumors from time to time reached us during the last dozen years that M. Cousin had become a Catholic, and for his sake we regret that they have remained unconfirmed. It is reported, on good authority, that he regularly attended Mass, and was accustomed to say his morning and evening prayers before an image of Our Lady; but it is agreed by his most intimate Catholic friends that he never made any formal profession of Catholic faith, and died without receiving or asking the sacraments of the church. That in his later years his mind turned at times towards the church, that his feelings towards religion were softened, and that he felt the need of faith, is very probable; but we have seen no evidence that he ever avowed publicly or privately any essential change in his doctrine. He always held that the Catholic faith is the form under which the people do and must receive the truth; but he held that the truth thus received does not transcend the natural order, and is transformed with the *élite* of the race into philosophy.

We have found in his works no recognition of the supernatural order, or the admission of any other revelation than the inspiration of the impersonal reason. Providence for him was fate, and God was not free to interpose in a super-

natural way for the redemption and salvation of men. Creation itself was necessary, and the universe only the evolution of his substance. There is no evidence that we have seen that he ever attained to the conviction that creation is the free act of the Creator, or felt even for a moment the deep joy of believing that GOD IS FREE. Yet it is not ours to judge the man. We follow him to the mouth of the grave, and there leave him to the mercy as well as the justice of him whose very justice is love.

We are not the biographer of Victor Cousin; we have only felt that we could not let one so distinguished in life, who had many of the elements of a really great man, and whom the present writer once thought a great philosopher, pass away in total silence. Genius has always the right to exact a certain homage, and Victor Cousin had genius, though not, in our judgment, the true philosophical genius. We have attempted no regular exposition or refutation of his philosophy; our only aim has been to call attention to his teachings on those points where he seemed to approach nearest the truth, and on which the young and ardent philosophical student most needs to be placed on his guard, to bring out and place in a clear light certain elements of philosophic truth which he failed to grasp. We place not philosophy above faith, but we do not believe it possible to construct it without faith; yet we hold that it is necessary to every one who would understand the faith or defend it against those who impugn it. If on any point what we have said on the occasion of the departure of the founder of French eclecticism shall serve to make the truth clearer to a single ingenuous and earnest inquirer, we shall thank God that he has permitted us to live not wholly in vain.

THE CHURCH REVIEW AND VICTOR COUSIN.*

[From the Catholic World for April, 1868.]

The article in the *Church Review* promises an estimate of the character of Dr. O. A. Brownson as a philosopher; but what it says has really no relation to that gentleman, and is simply an attempt, not very successful, nor very brilliant indeed, to vindicate M. Cousin's philosophy from the unfavorable judgment we pronounced on it, in the magazine of last June.

The main purpose of the reviewer seems to be to prove that we wrote in nearly entire ignorance of M. Cousin's philosophy, and to vindicate it from the very grave charges we urged against it. As to our ignorance, as well as his knowledge, that must speak for itself; but we can say sincerely that we should be most happy to be proved to have been in the wrong, and to see Cousin's philosophy cleared from the charge of being unscientific, rationalistic, pantheistic, or repugnant to Christianity and the church. One great name would be erased from the list of our adversaries, and their number would be so much lessened. We should count it a great service to the cause which is so dear to us, if the *Church Review* could succeed in proving that the errors we laid to his charge are founded only in our ignorance or philosophical ineptness, and that his system is entirely free from them. But though it talks largely against us, assumes a high tone, and makes strong assertions and bold denials, we cannot discover that it has effected any thing, except the exhibition of itself in an unenviable light. It has told us nothing of Cousin or his philosophy not to be found in our article, and has not in a single instance convicted us of ignorance, malice, misstatement, misrepresentation, or even inexactness. This we shall proceed now to show, briefly as we can, but at greater length, perhaps, than its crude statements are worth.

The principal charges against us are: 1. We said M. Cousin called his philosophy eclecticism; 2. We wrongly

* *The American Quarterly Church Review.* New York: January, 1868. Art. ii., "O. A. Brownson as a Philosopher. Victor Cousin and his Philosophy. *Catholic World.*"

denied scepticism to be a system of philosophy; 3. Showed our ignorance of Cousin's doctrine in saying it remained in psychology, never attained to the objective, or rose to ontology; 4. Misstated his doctrine of substance and cause; 5. Falsely denied that he admits a nexus between the creative substance and the created existence; 6. Falsely asserted that he holds creation to be necessary; 7. Wrongly and ignorantly accused him of Pantheism; 8. Asserted that he had but little knowledge of Catholic theology; 9. Accused him of denying the necessity of language to thought.

In preferring these charges against M. Cousin's philosophy, we have shown our ignorance of his real doctrine, our contempt for his express declarations, and our philosophical incapacity, and the reviewer thinks one may search in vain through any number of magazine articles of equal length, for one more full of errors and fallacies than ours. This is bad, and, if true, not at all to our credit. We shall not say as much of his article, for that would not be courteous, and instead of saying it, prefer to let him prove it. We objected that M. Cousin assuming that to the operation of reason no objective reality is necessary, can never, on his system, establish such reality; the reviewer, p. 541, gravely asserts that we ourselves hold, that to the operations of reason no objective reality is necessary, and can never be established! This is charming. But are these charges true? We propose to take them up *seriatim*, and examine the reviewer's proofs.

1. We said M. Cousin called his philosophical system eclecticism. To this the reviewer replies:

"'Eclecticism can never be a philosophy;' making, among other arguments, the pertinent inquiry: 'How, if you know not the truth in its unity and integrity beforehand, are you, in studying those several systems, to determine which is the part of truth and which of error?'

"We beg his pardon, but M. Cousin never called his philosophical system Eclecticism. In the introduction to the *Vrai, Beau et Bien*, he writes:

"'One word as to an opinion too much accredited. Some persons persist in representing eclecticism as the doctrine to which they would attach my name. I declare, then, that eclecticism is, undoubtedly, very dear to me, for it is in my eyes the light of the history of philosophy; but the fire which supplies this light is elsewhere. Eclecticism is one of the most important and useful applications of the philosophy I profess, but it is not its principle. My true doctrine, my true flag, is spiritualism; that philosophy, as stable as it is generous, which began with

Socrates and Plato, which the gospel spread abroad in the world, and which Descartes placed under the severe forms of modern thought.'

"And the principles of this philosophy supply the touchstone with which to try 'those several systems, and to determine which is the part of truth and which of error.' Eclecticism, in Cousin's view of it, as one might have discovered who had 'studied his works with some care,' is something more than a blind syncretism, destitute of principles, or a fumbling among conflicting systems to pick out such theories as please us."

If M. Cousin never called his philosophical system eclecticism, why did he defend it from the objections brought against it, that, 1. Eclecticism is a syncretism—all systems mingled together; 2. Eclecticism approves of every thing, the true and the false, the good and the bad; 3. Eclecticism is fatalism; 4. Eclecticism is the absence of all system? Why did he not say at once that he did not profess eclecticism, instead of saying and endeavoring to prove that the eclectic method is at once philosophical and historical?*

Every body knows that he professed eclecticism and defended it. As a method, do you say? Be it so. Does he not maintain, from first to last, that a philosopher's whole system is in his method? Does he not say, "Given a philosopher's method, we can foretell his whole system"? And is not his whole course of the history of philosophy based on this assumption? We wrote our article for those who knew Cousin's writings, not for those who knew them not. There is nothing in the passage quoted from the reviewer, quoted from Cousin, that contradicts what we said. We did not say that he always called his philosophy eclecticism, or pretend that it was the principle of his system. We said:

"There is no doubt that all schools, as all sects, have their part of truth, as well as their part of error; for the human mind cannot embrace pure, unmixed error any more than the will can pure, unmixed evil; but the eclectic method is not the method of constructing true philosophy any more than it is the method of constructing true Christian theology. The Catholic acknowledges willingly the truth which the several sects hold; but he does not derive it from them, nor arrive at it by studying their systems. He holds it independently of them; and having it already in its unity and integrity, he is able, in studying them, to distinguish what they have that is true from the errors they mix up with it. It must be the same with the philosopher. *M. Cousin was not unaware of*

* See *Fragments Philosophiques*, t. i. pp. 39–42.

this, and he finally asserted eclecticism rather as a method of historical verification, than as the real and original method of constructing philosophy. The name was therefore unhappily chosen, and is now seldom heard." (*Ante*, p. 309.)

Had the reviewer read this passage, he would have seen that we were aware of the fact that latterly Cousin ceased to profess eclecticism save as a method of verification; and if he had read our article through, he would have seen that we were aware that he held spiritualism to be the principle of his system, and that we criticised it as such.

2. Cousin counts scepticism as a system of philosophy. We object, and ask very pertinently, since he holds every system has a truth, and truth is always something affirmative, positive, "What, then, is the truth of scepticism, which is a system of pure negation, and not only affirms nothing, but denies that any thing can be affirmed?" Will the reviewer answer the question?

The reviewer, of course, finds us in the wrong. Here is his reply:

"In the history of the progress of the human mind, the phase of scepticism is not to be overlooked. At different periods it has occurred, to wield a strong, sometimes a controlling, often a salutary, influence over the thought of an age. Its work, it is true, is destructive, and not constructive; but not the less as a check and restraint upon fanciful speculation, and the establishment of unsound hypotheses, it has its *raison d'être*, and contributes, in its way, to the advancement of truth. Nor can the works of Sextus, Pyrrho, Glanvil, Montaigne, Gassendi, or Hume be considered less 'systematic' than those of any dogmatist, merely from their being 'systems of pure negation.'" (P. 533.)

That it is sometimes reasonable and salutary to doubt, as if the reviewer should doubt his extraordinary genius as a philosopher, we readily admit; but what salutary influence has ever been exerted on science or morals by any so-called system of scepticism, which denies the possibility of science, and renders the binding nature of virtue uncertain, we have never yet been able to ascertain. Moreover, a system of pure negation is simply no system at all, for it has no principles and affirms nothing. A sceptical turn of mind is as undesirable as a credulous mind. That the persons named, of whom only one, Pyrrho, professed universal scepticism, and perhaps even he carried his scepticism no further than to doubt the reality of matter, may have rendered some service to the cause of truth, as the drunken helotæ promoted temperance among the Spartan youth, is possible; but they

have done it by the truth they asserted, not by the doubt they disseminated. There is, moreover, a great difference between doubting, or suspending our judgment where we are ignorant or where our knowledge is incomplete, and erecting doubt into the principle of a system which assumes all knowledge to be impossible, and that certainty is nowhere attained or attainable. It seems, we confess, a little odd to find a Church Review taking up the defence of scepticism.

3. We assert in our article that M. Cousin, though he professes to come out of the sphere of psychology, and to rise legitimately to ontology, remains always there; and, in point of fact, the ontology he asserts is only an abstraction or generalization of psychological facts. The reviewer is almost shocked at this, and is "tempted to think that the time" we claim to have spent in studying the works of Cousin with some care "might have been better employed in the acquisition of some useful knowledge more within the reach of our 'understanding.'" It is possible. But what has he to allege against what we asserted, and think we proved? Nothing that we can find except that Cousin professes to attain, and perhaps believes he does attain, to real objective existence, and, scientifically, to real ontology. But, good friend, that is nothing to the purpose. The question is not as to what Cousin professes to have done, or what he has really attempted to do, but what he has actually done. When we allege that the being, the God asserted by Cousin, is, on his system, his principles and method, only an abstraction or a generalization; you do not prove us wrong by reiterating his assertion that it is real being, that it is the living God, for it is, though you seem not to be aware of it, that very assertion that is denied. We readily concede that Cousin does not *profess* to rise to ontology by induction from his psychology, but we maintain that the only ontology he attains to is simply an induction from his psychology, and therefore is, and can be, only an abstraction or a generalization. We must here reproduce a passage from our own article.

"What is certain, and this is all the ontologist need assert, or, in fact, can assert, is, that ontology is neither an induction nor a deduction from psychological data. God is not, and cannot be, the generalization of our own souls. But it does not follow from this that we do not think that which is God, and that it is from thought we do and must take it. We take it from thought and by thinking. What is objected to in psychologists is the assumption that thought is a purely psychological or

subjective fact, and that from this psychological or subjective fact we can, by way of induction, attain to ontological truth. But as we understand M. Cousin, and we studied his works with some care thirty or thirty-five years ago, and had the honor of his private correspondence, this he never pretends to do. What he claims is, that in the analysis of consciousness we detect a class of facts or ideas which are not psychological or subjective, but really ontological, and do actually carry us out of the region of psychology into that of ontology. That his account of these facts or ideas is to be accepted as correct or adequate we do not pretend, but that he *professes* to recognize them and distinguish them from purely psychological facts is undeniable.

"The defect or error of M. Cousin on this point was in failing, as we have already observed, to identify the absolute or necessary ideas he detects and asserts with God, the only *ens necessarium et reale*, and in failing to assert them in their objectivity to the whole subject, and in presenting them only as objective to the human personality. He never succeeded in cutting himself wholly loose from the German nonsense of a subjective-object or objective-subject, and when he had clearly proved an idea to be objective to the reflective reason and the human personality, he did not dare assert it to be objective in relation to the whole subject. It was impersonal, but might be in a certain sense subjective, as Kant maintained with regard to the categories." (*Ante*, p. 311.)

The reviewer, after snubbing us for our ignorance and ineptness, which are very great, as we are well aware and humbly confess, replies to us in this manner:

."And yet nothing in Cousin is clearer or more positive than that this 'pure and sublime degree of the reason, when will, reflection, and personality are as yet absent'—this 'intuition and spontaneous revelation, which is the primitive mode of reason'—is objective to the whole subject in every *possible* sense, and is, consequently, conformed to the objective, and a revelation of it.

"Can the critic have read Cousin's Lectures on Kant, 'thirty or thirty-five years ago'? If so, we advise him to refresh his memory by a re-perusal, and perhaps he may withdraw the strange assertion that Cousin held an 'absolute idea to be impersonal, but that it might be in a certain sense subjective, as *Kant maintained with regard to the categories.*' 'The scepticism of Kant,' says Cousin,* 'rests on his finding the laws of the reason to be subjective, personal to man; but here is a mode of the reason where these same laws are, as it were, deprived of all subjectivity—where the reason shows itself almost entirely impersonal.

"How the critic would wish this impersonal activity to be objective to the 'whole subject,' and not to the 'personal only,' as if there was any greater degree of objectivity in one case than in the other, it is not

* Lecture viii.

easy to see. It looks like a distinction without a difference. The abstract and logical distinction is apparent, but though distinct, the 'whole subject,' and the 'human personality,' cannot be separated, so that what is objective to one, shall not be so to the other also. The 'whole subject' is, simply, the thinking, feeling, willing being, which we are, as distinguished from the world external to us. If an idea, then is revealed to us by what is completely foreign to us—if an act of the reason is spontaneous and unreflective, that is, impersonal—what is there that can be more objective to the subject?

"We have said, that such an act is objective to the subject in every *possible* sense. For we are not to forget the conditions of the case. 'Does one wish,' says Cousin, 'in order to believe in the objectivity and validity of the reason, that it should cease to make its appearance in a particular subject—in man, for instance? But then, if reason is outside of the subject, that is, of myself, it is nothing to me. For me to have consciousness of it, it must descend into me, it must make itself mine, and become in this sense subjective. A reason which is not mine, which, in itself being entirely universal, does not incarnate itself in some manner in my consciousness is for me as though it did not exist.* Consequently, to wish that the reason, in order to be trustworthy, should cease entirely to be subjective, is to demand an impossibility.'" (Pp. 534, 535.)

We have introduced this long extract in order to give our readers a fair specimen of the reviewer's style and capacity as a reasoner. It will be seen that the reviewer alleges, as proof against us, what is in question—the very thing that he is to prove. We have read Cousin's *Lectures on Kant*, and we know well, and have never thought of denying, that he criticises Kant sharply, says many admirable things against him, and professes to reject his subjectivism; we know, also, that he holds what he calls the impersonal reason to be objective, operating independently of us; all this we know and so stated, we thought, clearly enough, in our article; but we, nevertheless, maintain that he does not make this impersonal reason really objective, but simply independent in its operations of our personality. He holds that reason has two modes of activity—the one personal, the other impersonal; but he recognizes only a distinction of modes, sometimes only a difference of degrees, making, as we have seen, as quoted by the reviewer, the impersonal reason a sublimer "degree" of reason than the personal. He calls the impersonal reason the spontaneous reason, some-

* Lectures on Kant, viii.

times simply spontaneity. All this is evident enough to any one at all familiar with Cousin's philosophical writings.

But what is this reason which operates in these two modes, impersonal and spontaneous in the one, personal and reflective in the other? As the distinction between the personal and impersonal is, by Cousin's own avowal, a difference simply of modes or degrees, there can be no entitative or substantial difference between them. They are not two different or distinct reasons, but one and the same reason, operating in two different modes or degrees. Now, we demand, what is this one substantive reason operating in these two different degrees or modes? It certainly is not an abstraction, for abstractions are nullities and cannot operate or act at all. What, then, is it? Is it God, or is it man? If you say it is God, then you deny reason to man, make him a brute, unless you identify man with God. If you say it is man, that it is a faculty of the human soul, as Cousin certainly does say—for he makes it our faculty and only faculty of intelligence—then you make it subjective, since nothing is more subjective than one's own faculties. They are the subject itself. Consequently the impersonal reason belongs as truly to man, the subject, as the personal reason, and therefore is not objective, as we said, to the whole subject, but at best only to the will and the personality—what Cousin calls *le moi*. The most distinguished of the disciples of Cousin was Theodore Jouffroy, who, in his confessions, nearly curses Cousin for having seduced him from his Christian faith, whose loss he so bitterly regretted on his dying-bed, and who was, in Cousin's judgment, as expressed in a letter to the writer of this article, "a true philosopher." This true philosopher and favorite disciple of Cousin illustrates the difference between the impersonal reason and the personal by the difference between *seeing* and *looking*, *hearing* and *listening*, which corresponds precisely to the difference noted by Leibnitz between what he calls simple *perception* and *apperception*. In both cases it is the man who sees, hears, or perceives; but in the latter case, the will intervenes and we not only see, but look, not only perceive, but appercceive.

Now, it is very clear, such being the case, that Cousin does not get out of the sphere of the subject any more than does Kant, and all the arguments he addnces against Kant, apply equally against himself; for he recognizes no actor in thought, or what he calls the fact of consciousness, but the subject. The fact which he alleges, that the impersonal

reason necessitates the mind, irresistibly controls it, is no more than Kant says of his categories, which he resolutely maintains are forms of the subject. Hence, as Cousin charges Kant very justly with subjectivism and scepticism, we are equally justified in preferring the same charges against himself. This is what we showed in the article the reviewer is criticising, and to this he should have replied, but, unhappily, has not. He only quotes Cousin to the effect that, "to wish the reason, in order to be trustworthy, should cease entirely to be subjective, is to demand an impossibility," which only confirms what we have said.

We pursue in our article the argument still further, and add:

"Reduced to its proper character as asserted by M. Cousin, intuition is empirical, and stands opposed not to reflection, but to discursion, and is simply the immediate and direct perception of the object without the intervention of any process, more or less elaborate, of reasoning. This is, indeed, not an unusual sense of the word, perhaps its more common sense, but it is a sense that renders the distinction between intuition and reflection of no importance to M. Cousin, for it does not carry him out of the sphere of the subject, or afford him any basis for his ontological inductions. He has still the question as to the objectivity and reality of the ideal to solve, and no recognized means of solving it. His ontological conclusions, therefore, as a writer in the *Christian Examiner* told him as long ago as 1836, rest simply on the credibility of reason or faith in its trustworthiness, which can never be established, because it is assumed that, to the operation of reason, no objective reality is necessary, since the object, if impersonal, may, for aught that appears, be included in the subject." (*Ante*, p. 314.)

We quote the reply of the reviewer to this at full length, for no mortal man can abridge or condense it without losing its essence.

"If a man speaks thus, after a careful study of Cousin, it is almost useless to argue with him. He either has not understood the philosopher, or his scepticism is hopelessly obstinate. Intuition, as asserted by Cousin, is not reduced to its proper character, but simply misrepresented, when it is called empirical; for it is the primitive mode of reason, and prior to all experience. It is a revelation of the objective to the subject, and to be a revelation must, of course, come into the consciousness of the subject. Cousin has carefully and repeatedly established the true character of intuition as a disclosure to the understanding in the reason, and free from any touch of subjectivity. *Of course, his ontological conclusions rest on a belief in the credibility of reason, and, of course, this credibility can never be established in a logical way, although, metaphysically, it is abund-*

antly established. One may 'assume,' to the end of time that 'to the operation of reason no objective reality is necessary, since the object may, for aught that appears, be included in the subject,' but the universal and invincible opinion of the human race has been, and will be, to the contrary of such an assumption.

"As firmly as Reid and Hamilton have established the doctrine of sensible perception, and the objective existence of the material world, has Cousin that of the objective existence of the absolute, and, on the very same ground, the veracity of consciousness. And the mass of mankind have lived in happy ignorance of any necessity of such arguments. When they sowed and reaped, and bought and sold, they never questioned the real existence of the objects they dealt with; *nor did they, when the idea of duty or obligation made itself felt in their souls, dream that, 'for such an operation of reason, no objective reality was necessary.'*

"Men have an unquestioning but unconquerable belief, that the very idea of obligation implies *something outside of them,* that obliges. Something other than itself it must be, that commands the soul. Right is a reality, and duty a fact. The philosophy, that does not come round to an enlightened and intelligent holding of the unreflecting belief of mankind, but separates itself from it, is worse than useless. In such wisdom it is indeed 'folly to be wise.' And this philosophic folly comes from insisting on a logical demonstration of what is logically undemonstrable —of what is superior, because anterior to reasoning. We cannot *prove* to the understanding truths which are the very basis and groundwork of that understanding itself." (Pp. 536, 537.)

This speaks for itself, and concedes, virtually, all we alleged against Cousin's system; at least it convicts us of no misapprehension or misrepresentation of that system; and the reviewer's sneer at our ignorance and incapacity, however much they may enliven his style and strengthen his argument, do not seem to have been specially called for. Yet we think that both he and M. Cousin are mistaken when they assume that to demand any other basis for science than the credibility or faith in the trustworthiness of reason, is to demand an impossibility, for a science founded on faith is simply no science at all. There is science only where the mind grasps, and appropriates, not its own faculties only, but the object itself. The reason, personal or impersonal, is the faculty by which we grasp it, or the light by which we behold it; not the object in which the mental action terminates, but the medium by which we attain to the object. If it were otherwise, there might be faith, but not science, and though reason might search for the object, yet it would always be pertinent to ask, Who or what vouches for reason? Descartes answered, The veracity of God, which, in one

sense, is true, but not in the sense alleged; for on the Cartesian theory we might ask, what vouches for the veracity of God? The only possible answer would be, it is reason, and we should simply travel in a circle without making the slightest advance.

The difficulty arises from adopting the psychological method of philosophizing, or assuming, as Descartes does in his famous *cogito, ergo sum*, I think, therefore, I exist, that man can think in and of himself, or without the presence and active concurrence of that which is not himself, and which we call the object. Intuition, on Cousin's theory, is the spontaneous operation of reason as opposed to discursion, which is its reflex or reflective operation, but supposes that reason suffices for its own operation. In his course of philosophy professed at the Faculty of Letters in 1818, he says, in the consciousness, that is, in thought, there are two elements, the subject and object; or, in his barbarous dialect, *le moi et le non-moi*; but he is careful to assert the subject as active and the object as passive. Now, a passive object is as if it were not, and can concur in nothing with the activity of the subject. Then, as all the activity is on the side of the subject, the subject must be able to think in and of itself alone. The fact that we think an existence other than ourself, on this theory, is no proof that there is really any other existence than ourself till our thought is validated, and we have nothing but thought with which to validate thought.

The *cogito, ergo sum* is, of course, worthless as an argument, as has often been shown; but there is in it an assumption not generally noted; namely, that man suffices for his own thought, and, therefore, that man is God. God alone suffices, or can suffice, for his own thought, and needs nothing but himself for his thought or his science. He knows himself in himself, and is in himself the infinite *Intelligibile*, and the infinite *Intelligens*. He knows in himself all his works from beginning to end, for he has made them, and all events, for he has decreed them. There is for him no medium of science distinguishable from himself; for he is, as the theologians say, the adequate object of his own intelligence. But man being a creature, and therefore dependent for his existence, his life, and all his operations, interior and exterior, on the support and active concurrence of that which is not himself, does not and cannot suffice for his thought, and he does not and cannot think in and of him-

self alone, in any manner, mode, form, or degree, or without the active presence and concurrence of the object, as Pierre Leroux has show in his otherwise very objectionable *Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme*. The object being independent of the subject, and not supplied by the subject, must exist *a parte rei*, since, if it did not, it could not actually concur with the subject in the production of thought. There can arise, therefore, to the true philosopher, no question as to the credibility or trustworthiness of reason, the validity or invalidity of thought. The only question for him is, Do we think? What do we think? He who thinks, knows that he thinks, and what he thinks, for thought is science, and who knows, knows that he knows, and what he knows.

The difficulty which Cousin and the reviewer encounter arises from thus placing the question of method before the question of principles, as we showed in our former article. No such difficulty can arise in the path of him who has settled the question of principles—which are given, not found, or obtained by the action of the subject without them—and follows the method they prescribe. The error, we repeat, arises from the psychological method, which supposes all the activity in thought is in the subject, and supposes reason to be operative in and of itself, or without any objective reality, which reality, on Cousin's system, or by the psychological method, can never be established.

The reviewer concedes that objective reality cannot be established *in a logical way*, but maintains that there is no need of so establishing it; for "men have an unquestioning, an unconquerable *belief* that the very idea of obligation implies something outside of them." Nobody denies the belief, but its validity is precisely the matter in question. How do you prove the validity of the idea of obligation? But the reviewer forgets that Cousin makes it the precise end of philosophy to legitimate this belief, and all the universal beliefs of mankind, and convert them from beliefs into science. How can philosophy do this, if obliged to support itself on these very beliefs?

The reviewer follows the last passage with a bit of philosophy of his own; but, as it has no relevancy to the matter in hand, and is, withal, a little too transcendental for our taste, he must excuse us for declining to discuss it. We cannot accept it, for we cannot accept what we do not understand, and it professes to be above all understanding. In fact, the reviewer seems to have a very low opinion of

understanding, and no little contempt for logic. He reminds us of a friend we once had, who said to us, one day, that if he trusted his understanding and followed his logic he should go to Rome; but, as neither logic nor understanding is trustworthy or of any account, he should join the Anglican Church, which he incontinently did, and since, we doubt not, found himself at home. Can it be that he is the writer of the article criticising us?

The reviewer, in favoring us with this bit of philosophy of his own, tells us, in support of it, that Sir William Hamilton says, "All thinking is negation." So much the worse, then, for Sir William Hamilton. All thinking is affirmative, and pure negation can neither think nor be thought. Every thought is a judgment, and affirms both the subject thinking and the object thought, and their relation to each other. This, at least sometimes, is the doctrine of Cousin, as any one may ascertain by reading his essays, *Du Fait de Conscience* and *Du premier et du dernier Fait de Conscience.** Though even in these essays the doctrine is mixed up with much that is objectionable, and which leads one, after all, to doubt if the philosopher ever clearly perceived the fact, or the bearing of the fact, he asserted. Cousin often sails along near the coast of truth, sometimes almost rubs his bark against it, without perceiving it. But we hasten on.

4. We are accused of misstating Cousin's doctrine of substance and cause. Here is our statement and the reviewer's charge:

"'M. Cousin,' continues *The Catholic World*, 'professes to have reduced the categories of Kant and Aristotle to two—substance and cause; but as he in fact identifies cause with substance, declaring substance to be substance *only in so much* [the italics are ours] as it is cause, and cause to be cause *only in so much* as it is substance, he really reduces them to the single category of substance, which you may call, indifferently, substance or cause. But, though every substance is intrinsically and essentially a cause, yet, as it *may be something more* than a cause, it is not necessary to insist on this, and it may be admitted that he recognized two categories.'

"What is exactly meant by these two contradictory statements it is not easy to guess; but let Cousin speak for himself:†

"'Previous to Leibnitz, these two ideas seemed separated in modern philosophy by an impassable barrier. He, the first to sound the nature

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**Fragments Philosophiques*, t. i. pp. 248, 356.

†VI. Lecture, Course of 1818, on the Absolute.

of the idea of substance, brought it back to the notion of force. This was the foundation of all his philosophy, and of what afterward became the Monadology. . . . But has Leibnitz, in identifying the notion of substance with that of cause, presented it with justness? Certainly, substance is revealed to us by cause; for, suppress all exercise of the cause and force which is in ourselves, and we do not exist to ourselves. It is, then, the idea of cause which introduces into the mind the idea of substance. But is substance nothing more than cause which manifests it? . . . The causative power is the essential attribute of substance; it is not substance itself. In a word, it has seemed to us surer to hold to these two primitive notions; distinct, though inseparably united; one, which is the sign and manifestation of the other, this, which is the root and foundation of that.'

"One would think this sufficiently explicit for all who are not afflicted with the blindness that will not see." (P. 539.)

We see no self contradiction in our statement, and no contradiction of M. Cousin. We maintain that M. Cousin really, though probably not intentionally or consciously, reduces the categories of Kant and Aristotle to the single category of substance, and prove it by the words italicized by the reviewer, which are our translation of Cousin's own words. Cousin says, in his own language, in a well-known passage in the first preface of his *Fragments Philosophiques*, "Le Dieu de la conscience n'est pas un Dieu abstrait, un roi solitaire, relégué pardelà la création sur le trône désert d'une éternité silencieuse, et d'une existence absolue qui ressemble au néant même de l'existence: c'est un Dieu à la fois vrai et réel, à la fois substance et cause, toujours substance et toujours cause, *n'étant substance qu'en tant que cause, et cause qu'en tant que substance*, c'est-à-dire, étant cause absolue, un et plusieurs, éternité et temps, espace et nombre, essence et vie, indivisibilité et totalité, principe, fin, et milieu, au sommet de l'être et à son plus humble degré, infini et fini, tout ensemble, triple enfin, c'est-à-dire, à la fois Dieu, nature, et humanité. En effet, *si Dieu n'est pas tout il n'est rien*."* This passage justifies our first statement, because Cousin calls God substance, the one, absolute substance, besides which there is no substance. But as our purpose, at the moment, was not so much to show that Cousin made substance and cause identical, as it was to show that he made substance a necessary cause, we allowed, for reasons which he himself gives in the passage cited by

**Fragments Philosophiques*, t. i. p. 76.

the reviewer from his course of 1818 on the Absolute, that he might be said to distinguish them, and to have reduced the categories to two, instead of one only, as he professes to have done. But the reviewer hardly needs to be told that, when it is assumed that substance is cause only on condition of causing, that is, causing from the necessity of its own being, the effect is not substantially distinguishable from the substance causing, and is only a mode or affection of the causative substance itself, or, at best, a phenomenon.

5. Accepting substance and cause as two categories, we contend that Cousin requires a third; namely, the creative act of the causative substance, and contingent existences, as asserted in the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*. To this the reviewer cites, from Cousin, the following passage in reply:

"In the fifth lecture of the course of 1828, M. Cousin says:

"'The two terms of this so comprehensive formula do not constitute a dualism, in which the first term is on one side and the second on the other without any other connection between them than that of being perceived at the same time by the intelligence; so far from this, the tie which binds them is essential. It is a connection of *generation* which draws the second from the first, and constantly carries it back to it, and which, with the two terms, constitutes the *three* integrant elements of intelligence. . . . Withdraw this relation which binds variety to unity, and you destroy the necessary bond of the two terms of every proposition. These three terms, distinct, but inseparable, constitute at once a triplicity and an indivisible unity. . . . Carried into Theodicy, the theory I have explained to you is nothing less than the very foundation of Christianity. The Christians' God is at once triple and one, and the animadversions which rise against the doctrine I teach ought to ascend to the Christian Trinity.'" (P. 540.)

We said in our article, "Under the head of substances he (Cousin) ranges all that is substantial or that pertains to real and necessary being, and under the head of cause the phenomenal or the effects of the causative action of substance. He says he understands, by substance, the universal and absolute substance, the real and necessary being of the theologians; and by phenomena, not mere modes or appearances of substance, but finite and relative substances, and calls them phenomena only in opposition to the one absolute substance. They are created or produced by the causative action of substance.* If this has any real meaning, he

* *Fragments Philosophiques*, t. i. pp. xix. xx.

should recognize three categories as in the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, that is, Being, existences, or creatures, and the creative act of being, the real nexus between substance or being and contingent existences, for it is that which places them and binds them to the Creator."

The passage cited by the reviewer from Cousin is brought forward, we suppose, to show that it does recognize this third category; but if so, what becomes of the formal statement that he has reduced the categories to *two*, substance and cause, or, as he sometimes says, substance or being and phenomenon? Besides, the passage cited does not recognize the third term or category of the formula. It asserts not the *creative* act of being as the *nexus* between substance and phenomenon, the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative, &c.; but *generation*, which is a very different thing, for the generated is consubstantial with the generator.

6. We are arguing against Cousin's doctrine, that God, being intrinsically active, or, as Aristotle and the schoolmen say, *actus purissimus*, most pure act, must therefore necessarily create or produce exteriorly. In prosecuting the argument, we anticipated an objection which, perhaps, some might be disposed to bring from Leibnitz's definition of substance, as a *vis activa*, and endeavored to show that, even accepting that definition, it would make nothing in favor of the doctrine we were refuting, and which Cousin undeniably maintains. We say, "The doctrine that substance is essentially cause, and must, from intrinsic necessity, cause in the sense of creating, is not tenable. We are aware that Leibnitz, a great name in philosophy, defines substance to be an active force, a *vis activa*, but we do not recollect that he anywhere pretends that its activity necessarily extends beyond itself. God is *vis activa*, if you will, in a supereminent degree; he is essentially active, and would be neither being nor substance if he were not; he is, as Aristotle and the schoolmen say, most pure act; . . . but nothing in this implies that he must necessarily act *ad extra*, or create. He acts eternally from the necessity of his own divine nature, but not necessarily out of the circle of his infinite being, for he is complete in himself, is in himself the plenitude of being, and always and everywhere suffices for himself, and therefore for his own activity. Creation, or the production of effects exterior to himself, is not necessary to the perfection of his activity, adds nothing to him, as it can take noth-

ing from him. Hence, though we cannot conceive of him without conceiving him as infinitely, eternally, and essentially active, we can conceive of him as absolute substance or being, without conceiving him to be necessarily acting or creating *ad extra*."

The reviewer says, sneeringly, "This is the most remarkable passage in this remarkable article." He comments on it in this manner:

"Thus appearing to accept the now exploded Leibnitzian theory, which Cousin has combated both in its original form, and as maintained by De Biran, our critic tries to escape from it by this subtle distinction between the southern and south-eastern sides of the hair. He enlarges upon it. God, according to him, is indeed *vis activa* in the most eminent degree, but this does not imply that he must act *ad extra*, or create. He acts eternally from the necessity of his nature, but not necessarily out of the circle of his own infinite being. Hence, though we cannot conceive of him but as infinitely and essentially active, we can conceive of him as absolute substance without conceiving him to be necessarily creating, or acting *ad extra*. M. Cousin, he says, evidently confounds the interior acts of the divine being with the exterior or creative acts.

"We have no wish to deny that he does make such a confusion. To one who holds that 'to the operation of reason no objective reality is necessary, and that such reality can never be established,' this kind of subjective activity of the will, which seems so nearly to resemble passivity—these pure acts, or volitions, which never pass out of the sphere of the will into causation — may be satisfactory; but to one who believes that God is not a scholastic abstraction—to one who worships the 'living God' of the Scriptures—it will sound like a pitiful jugglery with words thinly veiling a lamentable confusion of ideas. God is a person, and he acts as a person. The divine will is no otherwise conceivable by us than as of the same nature as man's will; it differs from it only in the mode of its operation—for with him this is always immediate, and no deliberation or choice is possible—and it is as absurd to speak of the activity of his will, the eminently active force, never extending 'out of the circle of his own infinite being,' as it would be to call a man eminently an active person whose activity was all merely purpose or volition, never passing into the creative act *ad extra*, or out of the circle of his own finite being.

"If St. Anselm is right, that, to be *in re* is greater than to be *in intellectu*, then has the creature man, according to the critic, a higher faculty than his Creator *essential'y and necessarily* has. For his will is by nature causative, creative, productive *ad extra*, and it is nothing unless its activity be called forth into act external to his personality, while the pure acts of the divine will may remain for ever enclosed in the circle of the divine consciousness without realizing themselves *ad extra!*" (Pp. 540, 541.)

We do not like to tell a man to his face, especially when he assumes the lofty airs and makes the large pretensions of our reviewer, that he does not know what he is talking about, or understand the ordinary terms and distinctions of the science he professes to have mastered, for that, in our judgment, would be uncivil; but what better is to be said of the philosopher who sees nothing more in the distinction between the divine act *ad intra*, whence the eternal generation of the Son and the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost, and the divine act *ad extra*, whence man and nature, the universe, and all things visible and invisible, distinguishable from the one necessary, universal, immutable, and eternal being, than in "the distinction between the southern and south-eastern sides of the hair"? The Episcopalian journals were right in calling the *Church Review's* criticism on us "racy," "rasping," "scathing;" it is certainly astounding, such as no mortal man could foresee, or be prepared to answer to the satisfaction of its author.

In the passage reproduced from ourselves we neither accept or reject the definition of substance given by Leibnitz, nor do we say that Cousin accepts it, although he certainly favors it in his introduction to the *Posthumous Works of Maine de Biran*, and adduces the fact of his having adopted it in his defence against the charge of pantheism,* but simply argue that, if any one should adopt it and urge it as an argument for Cousin, it would be of no avail, because Leibnitz does not pretend that substance is or must be active outside of itself, or out of its own interior, that is, must be creative of exterior effects. This is our argument, and it must go for what it is worth.

We admit that in some sense God may be a *vis activa*, but we show almost immediately that it is in the sense that he is most pure act, that is, in the sense opposed to the *potentia nuda* of the schoolmen, and means that God is *in actu* most perfect being, and that nothing in his being is potential, in need of being filled up or actualized. When we speak of his activity, within the circle of his own being, we refer to the fact that he is living God, therefore, Triune, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. As all life is active, not passive, we mean to imply that his life is in himself, and that he can and does eternally and necessarily live, and is the very fulness of life in himself; and therefore nothing is wanting to his infinite and

* *Fragments Philosophiques*, t. i. p. xxi.

perfect activity and beatitude in himself, or without any thing but himself. This is so because he is Trinity, three equal persons in one essence, and therefore he has no need of any thing but himself; nothing in his being or nature necessitates him to act *ad extra*, that is, create existences distinct from himself. Does the reviewer understand us now? He is an Episcopalian, and believes, or professes to believe, in the Trinity, and, therefore, in the eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost. Do not this generation and this procession imply action? Action assuredly and necessarily, and eternal action too, because they are necessary in the very essence or being of God, and he could not be otherwise than three persons in one God, if, *per impossibile*, he would. The unity of essence and trinity of persons do not depend on the divine will, but on the divine nature. Well, is this eternal action of generation and procession *ad intra*, or *ad extra?* Is the distinction of three persons a distinction *from* God, or a distinction *in* God? Are we here making a distinction as frivolous as that "between the southern and south-eastern sides of a hair?" Do you not know the importance of the distinction? Think a moment, good friend. If you say the distinction is a distinction *from* God, you deny the divine unity—assert three Gods; if you say it is a distinction in God, you simply assert one God in three persons, or three persons in one God, or one divine essence. If you deny both, your God is a dead unity in himself, not a living God.

The action of God *ad intra* is necessary, proceeds from the fulness of the divine nature, and the result is the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost. Now, can you understand what would be the consequence, if we made the action of God *ad extra*, or creation, proceed from the necessity of the divine nature? The first consequence would be that creation is God, for what proceeds from God by the necessity of his own nature is God, as the Arian controversy long ago taught the world. The second consequence would be that God is incomplete in himself, and has need to operate without, in order to complete himself, which really denies God, and therefore creation, every thing, which is really the doctrine of Cousin, namely, God completes himself in his works. Can you understand now, dear reviewer, why we so strenuously deny that God creates or produces existences distinguishable from himself, through

necessity? Cousin says that God creates from the intrinsic necessity of his own nature, that creation is necessary. You say he has retracted the expression. Be it so. But, with all deference, we assert that he has not retracted or explained away his doctrine, for it runs through his whole system; and as he nowhere makes the distinction between action *ad intra* and action *ad extra*, his very assertion that God is substance only in that he is cause, and cause only in that he is substance, implies the doctrine that God, if substance at all, cannot but create, or manifest himself without, or develop externally. What say we? Even the reviewer sneers at the distinction we have made, and at the efforts of theologians to save the freedom of God in creating. Thus, in the paragraph immediately succeeding our last extract, he says, "But all this quibbling comes from an ignorant terror, lest God's free-will should be attacked." The reviewer, on the page following, admits all we asserted, and falls himself, blindfold, as it were, into the very error he contends we falsely charge to the account of Cousin. "The necessity he (Cousin) speaks of is a metaphysical necessity, which no more destroys the free-will of God, than the metaphysical necessity of doing right, that is, obligation, destroys man's free-will."* (P. 542.) *Metaphysical* necessity, according to the reviewer, p. 537, means real necessity, since he says, "Metaphysics is the science of the real," and therefore God is under a real necessity of creating. Yet it is to misrepresent Cousin to say that, according to him, creation is necessary! But assume that, by *metaphysical*, the reviewer means *moral;* then God is under a moral necessity, that is, morally bound to create, and consequently would sin if he did not. But we have more yet, in the same paragraph: "A power essentially creative *cannot but create.*" Agreed. But to assert that God is essentially creative, is to assert that he is necessary creator, and that creation is necessary, for

* The reviewer, misled by the evasive answer of Cousin, supposes the objection urged against his doctrine, that creation is necessary, is, that it destroys the free-will of God; but that, though a grave objection, is not the one we insisted on; the real objection is, that if God is assumed to create from the necessity of his own nature, he is assumed not to create at all, for what is called his creation can be only an evolution or development of himself, and consequently producing nothing distinguishable in substance from himself, which is pure pantheism. Of course, all pantheism implies fatalism, for if we deny free-will in the cause, we must deny it in the effect; but it is not to escape fatalism, but pantheism that Cousin's doctrine of necessary creation is denied, as we pointed out in our former article.

God cannot change his essence or belie it in his act. But this assertion of God as essentially creative, is precisely what we objected to in Cousin, and therefore, while asserting that God is infinitely and essentially *active* in his own being, we denied that he is essentially *creative*. He is free in his own nature to create or not, as he pleases. The reviewer does not seem to make much progress in defending Cousin against our criticisms.

7. That Cousin was knowingly and intentionally a pantheist, we have never pretended, but have given it as our belief that he was not. We do not think that he ever comprehended the essential principle of pantheism, or foresaw all the logical consequences of the principles he himself adopted and defended. But his doctrine, notwithstanding all his protests to the contrary, is undeniably pantheism, if any doctrine ever deserved to be called by that name. It is found not here and there in an incidental phrase, but is integral; enters into the very substance and marrow of his thought, and pervades all his writings. We felt it when we attempted to follow him as our master, and had the greatest difficulty in the world to give him a non-pantheistic sense, and never succeeded to our own satisfaction in doing it.

Cousin's pantheism follows necessarily from two doctrines that he, from first to last, maintains. First, there is only one substance. Second, creation is necessary. He says in the *Avertissement* to the third edition of his *Philosophical Fragments* that he only in rare passages speaks of substance as one, and one only, and when he does so, he uses the word, not in its ordinary sense, but in the sense of Plato, of the most illustrious doctors of the church, and of the Holy Scripture in that sublime word, I AM THAT I AM; that is, in the sense of eternal, necessary, and self-existent Being. But this is not the case. The passages in which he asserts there is and can be only one substance, are not rare, but frequent, and to understand it in any of these passages in any but its ordinary sense, would make him write nonsense. He repeats a hundred times that there is, and can be, only one substance, and says, expressly, that substance is one or there is no substance, and that relative substances contradict and destroy the very idea of substance. He is talking, he says in his defence, of absolute substance. Be it so; interpret him accordingly. "Besides the one only absolute substance, there is and can be no substance, that is, no other one only absolute substance." Think you M. Cousin writes in that

fashion? But we fully discussed this matter in our former article, and as the reviewer discreetly refrains from even attempting to show that we unjustly accused him of maintaining that there is and can be but one substance, we need not attempt any additional proof. The second doctrine, that creation is necessary, the reviewer concedes and asserts, "In Cousin, as we have attempted to explain, creation is not only possible, but *necessary*," repeating Cousin's own words.

"As to Cousin's pantheism, if any one is disposed to believe that the systems of Spinoza and of Cousin have any thing in common, we can only recommend to him a diligent study of both writers, freedom from prejudice, and a distrust of his own hastily formed opinions. It is too large a question to enter upon here, but we would like to ask the critic how he reconciles the two philosophers on the great question he last considered—the creation. In Spinoza, there is no creation. The universe is only the various modes and attributes of substance, subsisting with it from eternity in a necessary relation. In Cousin, creation, as we have attempted to explain, is 'not only possible but necessary.' The relation between the universe and the supreme Substance is not a necessary relation of substance and attribute, but a contingent relation of cause and effect, produced by a creative fiat." (P. 545.)

A necessitated creation is no proper creation at all. And Cousin denies that God does or can create from nothing; says God creates out of his own fulness, that the stuff of creation is his own substance, and time and again resolves what he calls creation into evolution or development, and makes the relation between the infinite and the finite, as we have seen, not that of *creation*, but that of *generation*, which is only development or explication. He also denies that individuals are substances, and says they have their substance in the one absolute substance. Let the reviewer read the preface to the first edition of the *Fragments*, reproduced without change in subsequent editions, and he will find enough more passages to the same effect, two at least in which he asserts that finite substances, not being able to exist in themselves without something beyond themselves, are very much like phenomena; and his very pretension is, that he has reduced the categories of Kant and Aristotle to two, substance or being, and phenomenon.

Now, the essential principle of pantheism is the assertion of one only substance and the denial of all finite substances. It is not necessary, in order to be a pantheist, to maintain that the apparent universe is an eternal mode or attribute of

the one only substance, as Spinoza does; for pantheism may even assert the creation of modes and phenomena, which are perishable; its essence is in the assertion of one only substance, which is the ground or reality of all things, as Cousin maintains, and in denying the creation of finite substances, that can act or operate as second causes. Cousin, in his doctrine, does not escape pantheism, and we repeat, that he is as decided a pantheist as was Spinoza, though not precisely of the same school.

The reviewer says, p. 544, "We proceed to another specimen of the critic's accuracy; 'M. Cousin says pantheism is the divinization of nature, taken in its totality as God. But this is sheer atheism.'" Are we wrong? Here is what Cousin says in his own language: "Le panthéisme est *proprement* la divinisation du tout, le grand tout donné comme Dieu, l'univers Dieu de la plupart de mes adversaires, de Saint-Simon, par example. C'est au fond un veritable athéisme."* If he elsewhere gives a different definition, that is the reviewer's affair, not ours. We never pretended that Cousin never contradicts himself, or undertook to reconcile him wich himself; but the reviewer should not be over-hasty in charging inaccuracy, misrepresentation, or ignorance where none is evident. He may be caught himself. The reviewer stares at us for saying Cousin's "exposition of the Alexandrian philosophy is a marvel of misapprehension." Can the reviewer say it is not? Has he studied that philosophy? We repeat, it is a marvel of misapprehension, both of Christian theology and of that philosophy itself. The Neoplatonists were pantheists and emanationists, and Cousin says the creation they asserted was a creation proper. Let that suffice to save us from the scathing lash of the reviewer.

8. We said, in our article, "It was a great misfortune for M. Cousin that what little he knew of Catholic theology, caught up, apparently, at second hand, served only to mislead him. The great controversies on Catholic dogmas have enlightened the darkest passages of psychology and ontology, and placed the Catholic theologian on a vantage-ground of which they who know it not are incapable of conceiving. Before him your Descartes, Spinozas, Kants, Fichtes, Hegels, and Cousins dwindle into pigmies." The reviewer replies to this:

**Fragments Philosophiques*, t. i. pp. 18, 19.

"This is something new indeed, and we think the great Gallican churchmen of the seventeenth century, whom Cousin understood so intimately, and for whom he had so sincere an admiration, would be the last to claim an exclusive vantage-ground from their knowledge of the controversies on Catholic dogma. For these men, alike of the Oratory and of Port Royal, were Cartesians, and their faith was interwoven with their philosophy; it was not in opposition to it. And they knew that that philosophy was based upon a thorough understanding of the great 'controversies on Catholic dogma,' which had been carried on in the schools by laymen as well as by ecclesiastics.

"But who is the Romish theologian the critic refers to, and how is it he makes so little use of his 'vantage-ground'? Since Descartes brought modern philosophy into being by its final secularization, we do not recollect any theologian so eminent that all the great men he has named dwindle into pigmies before him. Unless, indeed, this should take place from their being so far out of the worthy man's sight and comprehension, as to be 'dwarfed by the distance,' as Coleridge says." (Pp. 546, 547.)

We referred to no *Romish* theologian in particular; but if the reviewer wants names, we give him the names of St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, St. Anselm, St. Bonaventura, St. Thomas of Aquino, Fonseca, Suarez, Malebranche, even Cardinal Gerdil, and Gioberti, the last, in fact, a contemporary of Cousin, whose *Considerazioni sopra le dottrine del Cousin* prove his immense superiority over him, and of the others named with him. Cousin may have admired the great Gallican churchmen of the seventeenth century, but intimately understand them as theologians, he did not, if we may judge from his writings; moreover, all the great churchmen of that century were not Frenchmen. As great, if not greater, were found among Italians, Spaniards, Poles, and Germans, though less known to the Protestant world. Has the reviewer forgotten, or has he never known, the great men that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries flourished in the great religious orders, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, the Augustinians, and especially the Jesuits—men whose learning, genius, and ability were surpassed only by their humility and sanctity?

But we spoke not of Cousin's little knowledge of churchmen, but of his little knowledge of Catholic theology. The reviewer here, probably, is not a competent judge, not being himself a Catholic theologian, and being comparatively a stranger to Catholic theology; but we will accept even his judgment in the case. Cousin denies that there is any thing in his

philosophy not in consonance with Christianity and the church; he denies that his philosophy impugns the dogma of the Word or the Trinity, and challenges proof to the contrary. Yet what does the reviewer think of Cousin's resolution of the Trinity, as cited some pages back, in his own language, into God, nature, and humanity? He says God is triple. "C'est-à-dire, à la fois Dieu, nature, et humanité." Is that in consonance with Catholic theology? Then, of the Word, after having proved in his way that the ideas of the true, the beautiful, and the good are necessary and absolute ideas, and identified them with the impersonal reason, and the impersonal reason with the Logos, he asks what then? Are they God? No, gentlemen, they are not God, he answers, but the Word of God, thus plainly denying the Word of God to be God. Does that prove he knew intimately Catholic theology? What says the reviewer of Cousin's doctrine of inspiration and revelation? That doctrine is, that inspiration and revelation are the spontaneous operations of the impersonal reason as distinguished from the reflective operations of the personal reason, which is pure rationalism. Is that Catholic theology, or does it indicate much knowledge of Catholic theology, to say it is in consonance with that theology?

In his criticism on the Alexandrians or Neoplatonists, he blames them for representing the multiple, the finite, what they call creation, as a fall, and for not placing them on the same line with unity, the infinite, or God considered in himself. Is that in accordance with Catholicity, or is it a proof of his knowledge of Catholic theology to assert that it is, and to challenge the world to prove the contrary? But enough. No Catholic theologian, not dazzled by Cousin's style, or carried away by his glowing eloquence and brilliant generalizations, can read his philosophical works without feeling that he was no Christian believer, and that he neither knew nor respected Catholic faith or theology. In his own mind he reduced Catholic faith to the primitive beliefs of the race, inspired by the impersonal reason, and as he never contradicted these as he understood them, he persuaded himself that his philosophy did not impugn Christianity and the church.

9. The reviewer says:

"One more extract, by way of capping the climax. Seemingly ignorant of Cousin's criticism upon De Bonald's now exploded theory of language, and his exposition of De Biran's, the critic thinks, 'He would

have done well to have studied more carefully the remarkable work of De Bonald; had he done so, he might have seen that the reflective reason cannot operate without language.' Has this man not read what Cousin has written, on the origin, purpose, uses, and effects of language, that he represents him as believing that the reflective reason can operate without language, without signs!" (P. 547.)

If M. Cousin maintains that the reflective reason cannot operate without language, as in some sense he does, it is in a sense different from that in which we implied he had need to learn that fact. We were objecting to the spiritualism—we should say intellectism, or nocticism—which he professed, that it assumed that we can have pure intellections. Cousin's doctrine is that, though we apprehend the intelligible only on the occasion of some sensible affection, yet we do apprehend it without a sensible medium. This doctrine we denied, and maintained, in opposition, that, being the union of soul and body, man has, and can have in this life, no pure intellections, and that we apprehend the intelligible, as distinguished from the sensible, only through the medium of the sensible or of a sensible representation, as taught by Aristotle and St. Thomas. The sensists teach that we can apprehend only the sensible, and that our science is limited to our sensations and inductions therefrom; the pure transcendentalists, or pure spiritualists, assert that we can and do apprehend immediately the noetic, or, as they say, the spiritual; the peripatetics hold that we apprehend it, but only through the medium of sensible representation; Cousin, in his electicism, makes the sensation the occasion of the apprehension of the intelligible, but not its medium. On his theory the sensible is no more a medium of noetic apprehension than on that of the transcendentalists; for the occasion of doing a thing is very different from the medium of doing it.

Now, language is for us the sign or sensible representation of the intelligible, and, as every thought includes the apprehension of the intelligible, therefore to every thought language, of some sort, is essential. The reviewer stumbles, and supposes that we are accusing Cousin of being ignorant of what he is not ignorant of, because he supposes that we mean by reflective reason the discursive as distinguished from the intuitive faculty of the soul, which, if he had comprehended at all our philosophy, he would have seen is not the case. Intuition with us is ideal, not empirical. It is not our act, whether spontaneous or reflective, but a divine

judgment affirmed by the Creator to us, and constituting us capable of intelligence, of reason, and reasoning. Reflective reason is our reason, and the reflex of the divine judgment, or the divine reason, directly and immediately affirmed to us by the Creator in the very act of creating us. Not only discursion, then, but what both Cousin and the reviewer call intuition, or immediate apprehension, is an operation of the reflective reason. Hence, to the operation of reason in the simple, direct apprehension of the *intelligible*, as well as in discursion or reasoning, language of some sort, as a sensible medium, is necessary and indispensable. When the reviewer will prove to us that Cousin held, or in any sense admitted this, he will tell us something of Cousin that we did not know before, and we will then give him leave to abuse us to his heart's content.

But we have already dwelt too long on this attempt at criticism on us in the *Church Review*—a *Review* from which, considering the general character of Episcopalians, we expected, if not much profound philosophy or any very rigid logic, at least the courtesy and fairness of the well-bred gentleman, such as we might expect from a cultivated and polished pagan. We regret to say that we have been disappointed. It sets out with a promise to discuss the character of Dr. Brownson as a philosopher, and confines itself to a criticism on an article in our magazine without the slightest allusion to a single one of that gentleman's avowed writings. Even supposing, which the *Review* has no authority for supposing, that Dr. Brownson wrote the article on Cousin, that article was entitled to be treated gravely and respectfully; for no man in this country can speak with more authority on Cousin's philosophy, for no one in this country has had more intimate relations with the author, or was accounted by him a more trustworthy expositor of his system.*

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* "En. 1836 et 1837, M. Brownson (*The Christian Examiner*, Septem. 1836, *Cousin's Philosophy;* Ibid, May, 1837, *Recent Contributions to Philosophy*), a publié une apologie de mes principes on brille un talent de pensée et de style qui, régulièrement développé, promet à l'Amérique un écrivain Philosophique du premier ordre—Mais savez-vous ce qui accrédite la nouvelle Philosophie française à New York et à Boston? C'est avec son charactère moral et religieux, sa méthode, cette méthode Psychologique qui fait presque sourire M. le President de l'Académie Royale de Munich. Il y a plus; dès que cette méthode franchit certaines limites et s'élève a une certaine hauteur, les esprits les plus énergiques out peine à la suivre et reculent devant des conclusions dogmat-

As to the reviewer's own philosophical speculations, which he now and then obtrudes, we have, for the most part, passed them over in silence, for they have not seemed to us to have the stuff to bear refuting. The writer evidently has no occasion to pride himself on his aptitude for philosophical studies, and is very far from understanding either the merits or defects of such a man as Victor Cousin, in every respect so immeasurably above him. We regret that he should have undertaken the defence of the great French philosopher, for he had little qualification for the task. He has provoked us to render more glaring the objectionable features of Cousin's philosophy than we wished. If he sends us a rejoinder, we shall be obliged to render them still more glaring, and to sustain our statements by citation of passages from his works, book and page marked, so express, so explicit, and so numerous, as to render it impossible for the most sceptical to doubt the justice of our criticism.

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iques qui, en Allemagne, ve souffrent pas la moindre difficulté et sont admises comme d'elles-mênes (Voyez dans le *Boston Quarterly Review*, 1838. No. 1, January, un article de M. Brownson: *Philosophy and Common Sense*, en réspouse à un article du *Christian Examiner*, Nov., 1837, intitulé—*Locke and Transcendentalism*)." Cousin, *Fragments Philosophiques*, 3 ème edition, pp. vi, vii.

For the benefit of such readers as may desire to know Dr. Brownson's early views of Cousin's Philosophy, an article on *The Eclectic Philosophy* written by him in 1838, is given in the Appendix at the end of this volume. See also *Philosophy and Common Sense*, Vol. I., p. 1.—Ed.

THE CARTESIAN DOUBT.*

[From the Catholic World for November, 1867.]

The Churchman, an Episcopalian weekly periodical, contains an article of no little philosophic pretension, entitled *Science and God*, which we propose to make the occasion of a brief discussion of what is known in the philosophic world as the Cartesian Doubt, or Method of Philosophizing. *The Churchman* begins by saying:

"A distinction is frequently and very justly taken between philosophic and religious scepticism. When Descartes, in order to find firm ground for his philosophical system, declared that he doubted the truth of every thing, even of the existence of the sensible world and the being of God, he did it in the interest of science. He wished to stand upon a principle which could not be denied, to find a first truth which no one could question. And this philosophic scepticism is an essential element in all investigations of truth. It says to every accredited opinion, Have you any right to exist? are you a reality or a sham? By thus exploring the foundation of current beliefs, we come to distinguish those which have real vitality in them, and stand on the rock and not on the sand; and by gathering up the living (true) and casting away the dead, (false,) science goes step by step toward its goal."

Whether Descartes recommended a real or only a feigned doubt, as the first step in the scientific process he defended, has been and still is a disputed point. If it is only a feigned or pretended doubt, it is no real doubt at all, and he who affects it is a real believer all the time. It is a sham doubt, and we have never seen any good in science or in any thing else come from shams or shamming. If the doubt is real, and is extended to all things, even to the being of God and our own existence, as Descartes recommends, we are at a loss to understand any process by which it can be scientifically removed. To him who really doubts of every thing, even for a moment, nothing can be proved, for he doubts the proofs as well as the propositions to be proved. All proofs must be drawn either from facts or from principles, and none can avail any thing with one who holds all facts and principles doubtful. The

* *The Churchman*, Hartford, Ct., August 31, 1867.

man who really doubts every thing is out of the condition of ever knowing or believing any thing. There is no way of refuting a sceptic but by directing his attention to something which he does not and cannot doubt; and if there is nothing of the sort, his refutation is impossible.

Descartes according to *The Churchman*, when he declared he doubted the truth of every thing, even of the existence of the sensible world and the being of God, did it in the interest of science, in order to find firm ground for his philosophical system. Doubt is ignorance, for no man doubts where he knows. So Descartes sought a firm ground for his philosophical system in universal ignorance! "He wished to stand upon a principle which could not be denied, a first truth which no one could question." If he held there is such a principle, such a first truth, or any thing which cannot be denied, he certainly did not and could not doubt every thing. If he doubted the being of God, how could he expect to find such a principle or such a first truth? *The Churchman* seems to approve of the Cartesian doubt, and says, "This philosophical scepticism is an essential element in all investigations of truth." If this real or feigned scepticism were possible, no investigations could end in any thing but doubt, for it would always be possible, whatever the conclusions arrived at, to doubt them. But why can we not investigate the truth we do not doubt or deny?

Moreover, is it lawful, even provisionally, in the interest of science, to doubt, that is, to deny, the being of God? No man has the right to make himself an atheist even for a moment. The obligation to believe in God, to love, serve, and obey him, is a universal moral obligation, and binds every one from the first dawn of reason. To doubt the being of God is to doubt the whole moral order, all the mysteries of faith, the entire Christian religion. And does *The Churchman* pretend that any man in the interest of science or any other interest has the right voluntarily to do that?

Undoubtedly, every man has the right to interrogate "every accredited *opinion*," and to demand of it, "Have you any right to exist? are you a reality or a sham?" But the right to question "accredited opinions" is one thing, and the right to question the first principles either of science or of faith is another. A man has no more right voluntarily to deny the truth than he has to lie or steal. *The Churchman*

will not deny this. Then either it holds that all science as all faith is simply opinion, or it deceives itself in supposing that it accepts the Cartesian doubt or adopts its philosophical scepticism. Doubt in the region of simple opinion is very proper. It would be perfectly right for *The Churchman* to doubt the opinion accredited among Protestants that Rome is a despotism, the papacy a usurpation, the Catholic religion a superstition, or that the church has lost, falsified, corrupted, or overlaid the pure Christian faith, and demand of that opinion, "Have you any right to exist? are you a reality or a sham?" And we have little doubt, if it would do so, that it would find itself exchanging its present opinion for the faith "once delivered to the saints." It is clear enough from the extract we have made that *The Churchman* means to justify scepticism only in matters of opinion, and that it is far enough from doubting of every thing, or supposing that there is nothing real which no man can doubt.

But, if we examine a little more closely this Cartesian method which bids us doubt of every thing till we have proved it, we shall find more than one reason for rejecting it. The doubt must be either real or feigned. If the doubt is only feigned for the purpose of investigation, it amounts to nothing, serves no purpose whatever; for every man carries himself with him wherever he goes, and enters into his thought as he is, with all the faith or science he really has. No man ever does or can divest himself of himself. Hence the difficulty we find even in imagining ourselves dead, for even in imagination we think, and in all thinking we think ourselves living, are conscious that we are not dead. In every thought, whatever else we affirm, we affirm our own existence, and this affirmation of our own existence is an essential and inseparable element of every thought. When we attempt to think ourseves dead, we necessarily think ourselves as surviving our own death, and as hovering over our own grave. No one ever thinks his own death as the total extinction of his existence, and hence we always think of the grave as dark, lonely, cold, as if something of life or feeling remained in the body buried in it. Men ask for proofs that the soul survives the dissolution of the body, but what they really need is proof that the soul dies. Life we know; but death, in the sense of total extinction of life, we know not; it is no fact of our experience. Life we can conceive, death we cannot. We are

always living in our conceptions, and that we die with our body we are utterly unable to think, because we can think ourselves only as living.

The thinker, then, enters as an indestructible element into every one of his thoughts. Then he must enter as he is and for what he is. His real faith or science enters with him, and no doubt can enter that is not a real doubt. A feigned or factitious doubt, being unreal, does not and cannot enter with him. He is always conscious that he does not entertain it, and therefore can never think as he would if he did. The Christian, firm in his Christian faith, whose soul is clothed with Christian habits, cannot think as an infidel, or even in thought put himself in the infidel's position. Hence one reason why so many defences of Christianity, perfectly conclusive to the believer, fail of their purpose with the unbeliever. Even the unbeliever trained in a Christian community or bred and born under Christian civilization cannot think as one bred and born under paganism. What we assert is, that every man thinks as he is, and cannot think otherwise; simply what all the world means when it says of a writer, "Whatever else he writes, he always writes himself." Men may mimic one another, but always each in his own way. The same words from different writers produce not the same impression upon the reader. Something of himself enters into whatever a man thinks or does, and no translator has ever yet been able to translate an author from one language to another without giving something of himself in his translation. The Cartesian doubt, then, if feigned, factitious, or merely methodical, is impracticable, is unreal, and counts for nothing; for all along the investigator thinks with whatever faith and knowledge he really has; or simply, we cannot feign a doubt we do not feel.

It will be no better if we assume that the doubt recommended is real. No man really doubts what he does not doubt, and no man does or can doubt of every thing; for even in doubt the existence of the doubter is affirmed. But suppose a man really does doubt of every thing, the Cartesian method will never help him to resolve his doubts. From doubt you can get only doubt. To propose doubt as a method of philosophizing is simply absurd, as absurd as it would be to call scepticism philosophy, faith, or science. The mind that doubts of every thing, if such a mind can be supposed, is a perfect blank, and, when the mind is a perfect blank, is totally ignorant of every thing, how is it to

understand, discover, or know that any thing is or exists? There have indeed been men, sometimes men called philosophers, who tell us that the mind is at first a *tabula rasa*, or blank sheet, and exists without a single character written on it. If so, if it can exist in a state of blank ignorance, how can it, we should like to know, ever become an intelligent mind, or ever know any thing more than the sheet of paper on which we are now writing? Intelligence can speak only to intelligence, and no mind absolutely unintelligent can ever be taught or ever come to know any thing? But if we assume that the mind is in any degree intelligent, we deny that it can doubt of every thing; for there is no intelligence where nothing is known, and what the mind knows it does not and cannot doubt. Either, then, this blank ignorance is impossible, or no intelligence is possible.

But, as we have already said, no man does or can doubt of every thing, and hence the Cartesian method is an impossible method. Descartes most likely meant that we should doubt of every thing, the external world, and even the being of God, and accept nothing till we have found a principle that cannot be denied, or a first truth that cannot be doubted, from which all that is true or real may be deduced after the manner of the geometricians. He did not mean to deny that there is such first truth or principle, but to maintain that the philosopher should doubt till he has found or obtained it. His error is in taking up the question of method before that of principles or first truths—an error common to nearly all philosophers who have succeeded him, but which we never encounter in the great Gentile philosophers, far less in the great fathers and mediæval doctors of the church. These always begin with principles, and their principles determine their method. Descartes begins with method, and, as Cousin has justly said, all his philosophy is in his method. But, unhappily, his method, based on doubt, recognizes and conducts to no principles, therefore to no philosophy, to no science, and necessarily leaves the mind in the doubt in which it is held to begin. The discussion of method before discussing principles assumes that the mind is at the outset without principles, or, at least, totally ignorant of principles; and that, being without principles or totally ignorant of them, it is obliged to go forth and seek them, and, if possible, find or obtain them by its own active efforts.

But here comes the difficulty, too often overlooked by our

modern philosophers. The mind can neither exist nor operate without principles, or what some philosophers call first truths. The mind is constituted mind by the principles, and without them it is nothing and can do nothing. The supposed *tabula rasa* is simply no mind at all. Principles must be given, not found or obtained. We cannot even doubt without them, for doubt itself is a mental act, and therefore the principles themselves, without which no doubt or denial is possible, are not and cannot be denied or doubted; for even in denying or doubting the mind affirms them. Principles, again, cannot be given the mind without its possessing them, and for the mind to possess a thing is to know it. As the principles create or constitute the mind, the mind always knows them, and what it knows it does not and cannot doubt. The philosopher, as distinguished from the sophist, does not start from doubt, and doubt of every thing till he has found something which he cannot doubt; but he starts from the principles themselves, which, being given, are *nota per se*, or self-evident, and therefore need no proof—in fact, are provable only from the absurd consequences which would follow their denial.

Having begun with a false method, Descartes fails in regard to principles, and takes as the first truth which cannot be doubted what, either in the order of being or knowing, is no first truth or ultimate principle at all. He takes as a principle what is simply a fact—the fact of his own personal existence, or of an internal personal sentiment: *Cogito, ergo sum*, I think, therefore I exist. Regarded as an argument to prove his existence, as Descartes evidently at first regarded it, this enthymem is a sheer paralogism, and proves nothing; for the consequence only repeats the antecedent; *sum* is already in *cogito*. We affirm that we exist in affirming that we think. But pass over this, and give Descartes the benefit of an explanation, which he gives in one of his letters when hard pressed by his acute Jesuit opponent, that he does not pretend to offer it as an argument to prove that he exists, but presents it simply as the fact in which he finds or becomes conscious of his existence. There is no doubt that in the act of thinking we become conscious that we exist; for, as we have already shown, the subject enters into every thought as one of its integral and indestructible elements; but this does not relieve him. He "wished," as says *The Churchman*, "to stand upon a principle which could not be denied, to find a first truth

which no one could question." This principle or first truth he pretends is his own personal existence, expressed in the sophism, I think, therefore I exist, *Cogito, ergo sum.* We agree, indeed have already proved, that no one can deny or doubt his own personal existence, although it is possible for a man to set forth propositions which, in their logical development, would deny it. But the method Descartes defends permits him to assert nothing which cannot be deduced, after the manner of the geometricians, from the principle or first truth on which he takes his stand; and unless he can so deduce God and the universe, he must deny them.

But from the fact that he exists, that is, from his own personal existence, nothing but himself and what is in him and dependent on him can be deduced. Geometrical or mathematical deduction is nothing but analysis, and analysis can give nothing but the subject analyzed. Now, it so happens that we do not contain God and the external universe in ourselves. Following the Cartesian method, we can attain, then, to no existence but ourselves, our own personal phenomena. We can deduce no existence but our own, and are forced, if logical, to doubt or deny all other existence, that is, all existence but our personal existence, and our own interior sentiments and affections. We are the only existence; we are all that is or exists, and hence either we are God or God is not. What is this but the absolute egoism of Fichte?

Descartes himself seems to have felt the difficulty, and to have seen that God cannot, after all, be deduced from the fact of personal existence; he therefore asserts God as an innate idea, and concludes his real and independent being from the idea innate in his own mind. Analysis of his own mind discloses the idea, and from the idea he concludes, after the manner of St. Anselm, that God is. But when we are given as the principle or first truth, how conclude from our idea, which is simply a fact of our interior life, that there is any thing independent of us to correspond to it? Here Descartes was forced to depart from his own method, and make what on his system is a most unwarrantable assumption, namely, that the idea, being innate, is deposited by God in the mind, and, as God cannot lie, the idea must be true, and therefore God is. That is, he takes the idea to prove the being of God, and the veracity of God to prove the trustworthiness of the idea! But he was to doubt the

being of God till he had geometrically demonstrated it; he therefore must prove that God is before he can appeal to his veracity. His method involved him in a maze of sophistries from which he was never able to escape. God concluded from our idea, innate or otherwise, is only our idea, without any reality independent of us. The argument of St. Anselm is valid only when *idea* is taken objectively, not subjectively, as Descartes takes it.

What Descartes really meant by innate ideas we do not know, and we are not certain that he knew himself; but he says, somewhere in his correspondence, that, when he calls the idea of God innate, he only means that we have the innate faculty of thinking God. His argument is, "I think God, and therefore God is." Still the difficulty according to his own method remains unsolved.

Given our own personal existence alone as the principle or first truth, it follows that, at least in science, we are sufficient for ourselves. Then nothing distinguishable from ourselves is necessary to our thought, and there is no need of our going out of ourselves to think. How, then, conclude that what in thought seems to be object is really any thing distinguishable from ourselves? We think God, but how conclude from this that God is distinct from and independent of us, or that he is any thing but a mode or affection of our own personal existence? The fact is, when we take our own personal existence alone as the principle from which all objects of faith or science are to be deduced, we can never attain to any reality not contained in our existence as the part in the whole, the effect in the cause, or the property in the essence. Exclusive psychology, as has been shown over and over again, can give us only the subjectivism of Kant, or the egoism of Fichte, resulting necessarily in the nihilism, or identity of being and not-being, of Hegel.

The psychologists generally do not, we are aware, concede this; but they are not in fact, whatever they are in theory, exclusive psychologists, and their inductions of God and an external universe are made from ontological as well as from psychological *data*. They begin their process, indeed, by analyzing the mind, what they call the facts of consciousness, but they always include in their premises non-psychological elements. Their inductions all suppose man and the universe are contingent existences, and as the contingent is inconceivable as contingent without the necessary, they conclude, since the contingent exists, very logically, that there

really is also the necessary, or necessary being, which is God. But the necessary, without which their conclusion would and could have no validity, is not a psychological fact or element; otherwise the soul itself would be necessary being, would be itself God. The mistake arises from regarding what philosophers call necessary ideas, such as the idea of the necessary, the universal, the immutable, the eternal, &c., because held by the mind, as psychological, instead of being, as they really are, ontological. Being ontological, real being, the inductions of the psychologists, as they call themselves, do really carry us out of the psychological order, out of the subjective into the objective. But, if their inductions were, as they pretend, from exclusively psychological data, they would have no value beyond the soul itself, and the God concluded would be only a psychological abstraction. Indeed, most psychologists assert more truth than their method allows, are better than their systems. Especially is this the case with Descartes. On his own system, logically developed, he could assert no reality but his own individual soul or personal existence; yet, in point of fact, he asserts nearly all that the Catholic theologian asserts, but he does it inconsistently, illogically, unscientifically, and thus leads his followers to deny every thing not assertable by his method.

But, as we have said, Descartes does not attain by his method to a first principle. Not only cannot the being of God and the existence of the external universe be deduced from our own personal existence, but, by his method, our personal existence itself cannot be logically asserted. It is not ultimate, a first principle, or a first truth. Our personal existence cannot stand by itself alone. It is true Descartes says, *Cogito, ergo* SUM; but we cannot even think by ourselves alone, and even he does not venture to take *sum* in the absolute sense of *am*, as in the incommunicable name by which God reveals himself to Moses, I AM WHO AM, or I AM THAT AM. Even he takes it in the sense of *exist*, *Cogito, ergo sum*, I think, therefore I exist. He never dared assert his own personal existence as absolute, underived, eternal, and necessary being; it remained for a Fichte, adopting the Cartesian method, to do that. Between being and existence, *essentia* and *existentia*, there is a difference which our philosophers are not always careful to note. Existence is from *exstare*, and strictly taken, means standing from another, or a derivative and dependent, therefore a contingent exist-

ence, or creature, whose being is in another, not in itself. We speak, indeed, of human beings, but men are *beings* only in a derivative sense, not in the primary or absolute sense. Hence the Apostle to the Gentiles says, "In him (God) we live, and move, and are," or have our being. In ourselves we have no being, and are something only as created and upheld by him who is being itself, or, to speak after the manner of Plato, being in himself. Evidently, then, our personal existence is not ultimate, therefore not the first principle, nor the first truth. The ultimate, at least in the order of being, is not the soul, a contingent existence, but, real being, that is, God himself.

But as we have and can have no personal existence except from God, it is evident that we cannot assert our personal existence by itself alone; and to be able to assert it at all, we must be able to assert the being of God. Now, Descartes tells us that we must doubt the being of God till we can prove it after the manner of the geometricians. But how are we to do this? We cannot, as we have seen, deduce his being from our own personal existence; and what is still more to the purpose, while we deny or doubt his being, we cannot assert or even conceive of our own, because our existence, being derivative, dependent, having not its being in itself, is not intelligible or conceivable in or by itself alone. The contingent is not conceivable without the necessary. They are correlatives, and correlatives connote each other. Now, if we deny or doubt the being of God, we necessarily deny or doubt our own personal existence, impossible and inconceivable without God. With God disappears the existence of the external universe and our own. If, then, it were possible to doubt of the being of God, we should doubt of all things, and should have nothing left with which to prove that God is. God is the first principle in being and in knowing, and if he is denied, all is denied. Atheism is nihilism.

Descartes evidently assumes that it is both possible and lawful to doubt the being of God, nay, that we ought to do so, till we have geometrically demonstrated that he is, and *The Churchman* tells us that this "scepticism is an essential element in the investigation of truth." We cannot bring ourselves to believe it. God, the theologians tell us, is real and necessary being, the contrary of which cannot be thought, and it is the fool, the Scriptures tell us, that says "in his heart, God is not." The evidence of this is in the

fact that we do in every thought think our own existence, and cannot deny it if we would; and in the further fact that we always do think our own existence as contingent, not as necessary being; and that we cannot think the contingent without at the same time thinking the necessary, as we have sufficiently shown. As there can without God be nothing to be known, we must dissent from *The Churchman*, as from Descartes himself, that a philosophical scepticism which extends even to the being of God is an essential element in the investigation of truth. It seems to us the worst way possible to truth, that of beginning by denying all truth, and even the possibility of truth. The man who does so, humanly speaking, puts himself out of the condition of discovering or receiving truth of any sort. He who seeks for the truth should do so with an open mind and heart, and with the conviction that it is. We must open our eyes to the light, if we would behold it, and our hearts to the entrance of truth, if we would have it warm and vivify us. Those men who shut their eyes, compress their lips, and close the aperture of their minds are the last men in the world to discover or to receive the truth, and they must expect to walk in darkness and doubt all their lives. Scepticism is a worse preparation for investigating truth than even credulity, though scepticism and credulity are blood relations, and usually walk hand in hand.

If it were possible to doubt the being of God, or to think a single thought without thinking him, we should prove ourselves independent of him, and therefore deprive ourselves of all possible means of proving that he is. If, for instance, we could think our own existence, as is assumed in the Cartesian enthymem, *Cogito, ergo sum*, without in the same indissoluble thought thinking God, there would be no necessity of asserting God, and no possible argument by which we could prove his being, or *data* from which he could be concluded. Man can no more exist and act in the intellectual order, without God, than in the physical order. If you suppose men capable of thinking and reasoning without the intellectual apprehension of the divine Being, as must be the man who really doubts the being of God, there is no possible reason for asserting God, and it is a matter of no practical moment in the conduct of life whether we believe in God or not. The fact is, no man can doubt the being of God any more than he can his own personal existence. The Cartesian method, if followed strictly, would

lead logically to universal nihilism; for he who doubts the being of God must, if logical, doubt of every thing, and he who doubts of every thing can be convinced of nothing

We say not only that atheism is absurd, but that it is impossible; and they who with the fool say there is no God, if sincere, deceive themselves, or are deceived by the false methods and theories of philosophers, or sophists rather. No man can think a single thought without thinking both God and himself. The man may not advert, as St. Augustine says, to the fact that he thinks God, but he certainly thinks, as we showed in our article on *An Old Quarrel*, that which is God. No man ever thinks the imperfect without thinking the perfect, the particular without the universal, the mutable without the immutable, the temporal without the eternal, the contingent without the necessary. The perfect, the universal, the immutable, the eternal, the necessary are not abstract ideas, for there are no abstractions in nature. Abstractions are nullities, and cannot be thought. The ideas must be real, and therefore being; and what is perfect, universal, immutable, eternal, real and necessary being but God? That which is God enters into every one of our thoughts, and can no more be denied or doubted than our own existence. Those poor people who regard themselves as atheists so regard themselves because they do not understand that the so-called abstract or necessary ideas are not simply ideas in the mind or psychological phenomena, but are objective, real being, the eternal, immutable, self-existent God, in whom we live, and move, and have our being. No doubt we need instruction and reflection to understand this, but this instruction is within the reach of all men, and every mind of ordinary capacity is adequate to the necessary reflection. In point of fact, it is the philosophers that make atheists, and the atheism is always theoretical, never real.

There is no doubt that a little ingenuity may deduce something like this doctrine from Descartes's assertion of innate ideas, but not in the sense Descartes himself understood the word *idea*. With Descartes the word *idea* never means the objective reality, but its image in the mind; never being itself, but its mental representation, leaving it necessary, after having ascertained that we have the idea, to prove that it represents an objective reality—a thing which no man has ever done or ever can do. His subsequent explanation that he meant, by asserting that the idea of God

is innate, simply the innate faculty of thinking God, was a nearer approach to the truth perhaps, but did not reach it, because it assumed that the intuition of that which really is God follows the exercise of the faculty of thinking, instead of preceding and constituting it, and is not an *a priori* but an empirical intuition. If we could suppose the faculty constituted, existing, and operative, without the intuition of real and necessary being, and that the idea is obtained by our thinking, there would still remain the question as to the objective validity of the thought. If Descartes had identified the idea with being regarded as intelligible to us, and represented it as creating or constituting the faculty of thinking, he would have reached the truth; but this he could not do by his method, which required him to recognize as his principle only his own personal existence, and to deduce from it, after the manner of the geometricians, whatever he recognized as true. God, or what is God, could be obtained or presented only by the exercise of our faculty of thinking, and not by the creative act of God affirming himself as the first principle alike of thought and the faculty of thinking.

If Descartes had properly analyzed thought and ascertained its essential and indestructible elements, he would have avoided the error of resolving the thinker into thought, *la pensée*, which denied the substantive character of the soul and made it purely phenomenal, and have ascertained that, beside the subject of our personal existence, but simultaneously with it, there is affirmed what in the order of reality precedes it,—God himself, under the form, if we may so speak, of real, necessary, universal, eternal, and independent idea or being. There is given in every thought, as its primary and essential element, a real ontological element, without which no thought is possible. This, not our personal existence, is the first truth or principle which every philosopher must recognize, if he would build on a solid foundation and not in the air, and this principle can no more be denied or doubted than our personal existence itself, for without it we could not think our personal existence, nay, could not exist at all, as capable of thought.

But even if, by a just analysis, Descartes had found that this ontological element is a necessary and indestructible element of thought, he would have still greatly, fatally erred if he had taken it as his first principle and refused to admit any existence not logically deducible from it, that is, dedu-

cible from it "after the manner of the geometricians," as required by his method. Father Rothenflue, Father Fournier, and the Louvain professors reject the Cartesian psychology, and assume Ens, or being, which they very properly identify with God, as the first principle in science. This is proper. But how do they pass from being to existences, from the necessary to the contingent, from God to creation? We cannot deduce logically existences from being, because logic can deduce from being only what is necessarily contained in being, that is, only being. If we say, given being existences logically follow, we assume with Cousin that God cannot but create, that creation is a necessity of his own nature, and therefore necessary, as necessary as God himself, which denies the contingency of creatures, and identifies them with necessary being. This is precisely what Descartes himself does after he has once got possession, as he supposes, of the idea of God, or proved that God is. Creation on his system is the necessary, not the free act of the Creator.

There are, as has often been remarked, two systems in Descartes, the one psychological and the other ontological; as there are in his great admirer and follower, Victor Cousin. The two systems are found in juxtaposition indeed, but without any logical or generic relation. Descartes proceeds from his personal existence as his principle, which gives him nothing but his personal existence; then finding that he has the idea of God, for we presume he had been taught his catechism, he takes the idea as his principle, and erects on it a system of ontology. In this last he was followed by Malebranche, a far greater man than himself. Malebranche perceived, what we have shown, that we have direct and immediate intelligence of God, that he, as idea, is the immediate object of the understanding, and that we see all things in him. Hence his well-known *Visio in Deo*, or Vision in God, which would be true enough if we had the vision of the blest, and could see God as he is in himself; for God sees or knows all things in himself, and has no need to go out of himself to know any thing he has made. But this is not the case with us. We do not see things themselves in God, but only their idea or possibility. From the idea of God we may deduce his ability to create, and that the type of all creatable things must be in him; but as creation is on his part a free, not a necessary act, we can, as Malebranche was told at the time, see a possible, but not an

actual universe in God; hence, by his vision in God, he attained only to a pure idealism, in which nothing actually distinguishable from God was apprehended or asserted.

Spinoza, greater still than Malebranche, followed also Descartes in his ontological system, and took being, which he calls substance, as his principle. Substance, he said, is one and ultimate, and nothing is to be admitted not obtainable from it by way of logical deduction. Spinoza was too good a logician to suppose that the idea of creation is deducible from the idea of God, for a necessary creation is no creation at all, but the simple evolution of necessary being or substance. Hence nothing is or exists except the one only substance and its modes and attributes. His attributes are infinite, since he is infinite substance; but we know only two, thought and extension. The so-called German ontologists in the main follow Spinoza, and like him admit only being or substance, and its attributes or modes. This system makes what are called creatures, men and things, modes of the divine Being, in which he manifests his attributes, thought and extension; hence it is justly called pantheism, which, under some of its forms, no one can escape who admits nothing not logically deducible from the idea of substance, being, or God; for deduction, we have said, is simply analysis, and analysis can give only the subject analyzed. As the analysis of our personal existence or the soul can give only us and our attributes, modes, and affections, and therefore the egoism of Fichte, which underlies every purely psychological system, so the analysis of the idea of being can give only being and its modes or attributes, or the pantheism of Spinoza, which underlies the ontology of Descartes, and every system of exclusive ontology.

No philosopher is ever able to develop his whole system, and present it in all its parts, or foresee all its logical consequences. It is only time that can do this, and the vices of a method or a system can be collected fully only from its historical developments. The disciples of Descartes, who in France started with his psychological principle, ended in the pure sensism, or sensation transformed, of Condillac, and those who in Germany started with the same principle, ended in the absolute egoism of Fichte, who completed the subjectivism of Kant, and reached the point where egoism and pantheism become identical. Those, again, who in any country have started with the ontological principle of Descartes and followed his method, have, however they may

have attempted to disguise their conclusions, ended in denying creation and asserting some form of pantheism. The materialism which prevailed in the last century, and obtains to a great extent even in the present, is not a historical development of Cartesianism, so much as of the English school founded by Bacon, and developed by Hobbes and Locke, and completed by the French idealists of Auteuil, who were noted for their Anglomania. Cartesianism led rather to what is improperly termed idealism, to the denial of the material universe, or its resolution into pure sensation.

Yet it is instructive to observe that the historical development of the psychological principle represented by Fichte and that of the ontological principle represented by Spinoza terminate in identity. Fichte saw he could not make the soul the first principle without taking it as ultimate and denying its contingency, or that he could not make the soul that from which all that exists proceeds without assuming that the soul, the ego, is God. Hence his twofold ego, the one absolute and the other phenomenal or modal. He thus identifies the soul with God, and concludes that nothing except me and my phenomenon, or attributes and modes, is or exists: I am all. Spinoza, starting from the opposite pole, the ontological, finds that he can logically deduce from being only being; and calling being substance, and substance God, he concludes with an invincible logic nothing is or exists, except God and his modes or attributes. The form may differ, but the conclusion is identical with the last conclusion of egoism, and it is noteworthy that even Fichte, in the last transformation of his doctrine, substituted God for the soul, and made God the absolute, and the soul relative and phenomenal, or a mode of the divine Being.

Whether, then, we start with the soul as first principle or with God, we can never by logical deduction arrive at creation, or be able to assert any existence as distinguishable from the divine Being. Neither can be taken exclusively as the *primum philosophicum*, and exclusive ontology is as faulty and as fatal in its consequences as exclusive psychology. The fact is, we can neither doubt the being of God nor our own personal existence; for both are equally essential and indestructible elements of thought, given in the primitive intuition, though being is logically prior to existence, and our *primum philosophicum* must include both.

But the soul is given in the intuition as contingent, and

being is given as necessary. The contingent cannot exist any more than it can be thought without the necessary. It then depends on the necessary, and can exist only as created and upheld by it. The real principle, or *primum philosophicum*, is then, as has been amply shown, the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, or Being creates existences. This presents the ontological principle and the psychological not in juxtaposition merely, but in their real and true relation. This formula enables us to avoid alike pantheism, atheism, idealism, and materialism, and to conform in principle our philosophy to the real order of things and the Catholic faith. But it is only in principle, for Gioberti himself calls the formula *ideal*. It does not, after all, give us any science of actual existences, or itself furnish its own scientific explication and application. Apply to it the method of Descartes, and lay it down that every thing is to be doubted till proved, and we are not much in advance of Cartesianism. We know God is, we know things exist, and God has created or creates them; but we do not know by knowing the formula what God is, what things do or do not exist. It gives us the principles of science, but not the sciences; the law which governs the explication of facts, not the facts themselves. We cannot deduce, after the manner of the geometricians, any actual existence or fact from the formula, nor any of the sciences. There is an empirical element in all the sciences, and none of them can be constructed by logical deduction even from a true ideal formula, and to deny every thing not logically deducible from it would leave us in the purely ideal, and practically very little better off than Descartes himself left us. The Cartesian method based on doubt, then, whether we start with an incomplete or a complete ideal formula, can never answer the purpose of the philosopher, or enable us to construct a concrete philosophy that includes the whole body of truth and all the scientific facts of the universe.

We do not pretend that philosophy must embrace all the knowable, *omne scibile*, in detail; it suffices that it does so in principle. No doubt the ideal formula does this, as in fact always has done the philosophy that has obtained in the Catholic schools. But though the ideas expressed in the ideal formula are intuitive, the constitution of the mind, and basis of all intelligence, and are really asserted in every thought, we very much doubt if they could ever have been reduced to the formula given by Gioberti if

men had never received a divine revelation from God, or if they had been left without any positive instruction from their Creator. We are as far as any one can be from building science on faith; but we so far agree with the traditionalists as to hold that revelation is necessary to the full development of reason and its perfect mastery of itself. One great objection to the Cartesian doubt or method is, that it detaches philosophy from theology, and assumes that it can be erected into an independent science sufficient for itself without any aid from supernatural revelation, and free from all allegiance to it. This had never been done nor attempted by any Christian school or even non-Christian school prior to Descartes, unless the pretension of Pomponatius and some others, that things may be theologically true yet philosophically false, and who were promptly condemned by Leo X., be understood as an attempt in that direction. The great fathers of the church and the mediæval doctors always recognized the synthesis of reason and revelation; and, while they gave to each its part, they seem never to have dreamed of separating them, and of cultivating either as independent of the other; yet they have given us a philosophy which, if not free from all defects, is superior, under the point of view of reason alone, to any thing that has elsewhere ever been given under that name. He who would construct a philosophy that can stand the test even of reason must borrow largely from St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, and the later scholastics.

It is also an objection to the Cartesian doubt that it is not only a complete rupture with revealed theology, but also with tradition, and is an attempt to break the continuity of the life of the race, and to sever the future of humanity from its past. We are among those who regard the Catholic beliefs and traditions of mankind as integral elements in the life of the race itself, and indispensible to its continuous progress. The future always has its germ in the past, and a beginning *de novo* for the individual as for society is alike impossible and undesirable. The Cartesian doubt overlooks this, and requires the individual to disgarnish his mind of every relic and memorial of the past, of every thing furnished by his parents and teachers, or the wisdom of ages, and after having become absolutely naked and empty, and made himself as ignorant and impotent as the new-born babe, to receive nothing till he, with-

out experience, without instruction, has by his own unaided powers tested its truth. As reasonable would it be for the new-born infant to refuse the milk from its mother's breast, till it had by the exercise of its faculties settled the question of its wholesomeness.

We object, finally, that it tends to destroy all respect for authority, all reverence for tradition, all regard for the learning and science of other ages and other men, and to puff up the individual with an overweening self-conceit, and sense of his own sufficiency for himself. It renders all education and instruction useless and an impertinence. It tends to crush the social element of our nature, and to create a pure individualism, no less repugnant to government and society than to religion and the divine order, according to which all men are made mutually dependent, one on another. Doubtless, Descartes only developed and gave expression to tendencies which were in his time beginning to be active and strong; but the experience of the civilized world only historically verifies their destructive, anti-philosophical, anti-religious, and anti-social character. Yet his method is still, in substance if not in form, very extensively accepted and followed, as the example of *The Churchman* proves.

We do not by any means believe that Descartes had any suspicion of the real character of his philosophic enterprise. We are far from agreeing with Gioberti that he was a disguised Protestant designedly laboring to complete the work undertaken by Luther. We doubt not that he really accepted the Church, as he always professed to do, though most likely he was far enough from being a fervent Catholic; but he was bred a soldier, not a philosopher or a theologian; and though he may have been, and we believe he was for his time a great mathematician and a respectable physicist, he was always a poor theologian, and a still poorer metaphysician. His natural ability was no doubt worthy of admiration, but he had no genius for metaphysics, and his ignorance of the profounder philosophy of antiquity and of the mediæval doctors was almost marvellous. He owed in his own day his popularity to the fact that he discoursed on philosophy in the language of the world, free from the stiff formulas, the barbarous locutions, and the dry technicalities of the schools. He owed much to the merits of his style, but still more to the fact that he wrote in the vernacular instead of the Latin tongue, then unusual with writers of philosophical treatises, and non-professional men and

court-bred ladies could read him and fancy they understood philosophy. His works were "philosophy-made-easy," and he soon became the vogue in France, and France gives the fashion to the world. But it would be difficult to name a writer who has exerted in almost every direction an equally disastrous influence on modern thought and civilization; not that his intentions were bad, but that his ignorance and presumption were great.

The Cartesian method has no doubt favored that lawless and independent spirit which we see throughout modern society, and which is manifested in those Jacobin revolutions which have struck alike at ecclesiastical and political authority, and at times threatened the civilized world with a new barbarian invasion; but the evil resulting from that method which is now the most to be deplored is the arrogant and independent tone assumed by modern science, and its insolence toward the sacred dogmas of faith. Descartes detached philosophy, and with it all the sciences, from faith, and declared them independent of revelation. It is especially for this that Cousin praises him. But modern so-called science is not contented even with independence; it aspires to dominate and subject faith to itself, or to set up its own conclusions as the infallible test of truth. It makes certain inductions from a very partial survey of facts, concocts certain geological, physiological, ethnological, and philological theories at war with the dogmas of faith, and says with sublime insolence that therefore faith must give way, for science has demonstrated its falsity! If the Church condemns its unsupported conclusions, there is forthwith a deafening clamor raised that the Church is hostile to science, and denies the freedom of thought and the inalienable rights of the mind! *The Churchman* sees this, and has written the very article from which we have made our extract to show its injustice; but with what success can it hope to do it, after beginning by approving the Cartesian method and conceding modern science, in principle, all it asks?

We have said and shown over and over again that the Church does not condemn science. Facts, no matter of what order, if facts, never do and never can come in collision with her teaching, nor can their real scientific explanations ever conflict with revelation or her dogmas. The Church interferes not with the speculations or the theories of the so-called *savans*, however crude, extravagant, or absurd they may be, unless they put forth conclusions

under the name of science which militate against the Christian faith. If they do that, she condemns their conclusions so far as repugnant to that faith. This supervision of the labors of *savans* she claims and exercises for the protection of her children, and it is as much in the interest of science as of faith that she should do so. If we were to believe what men counted eminent in science tell us, there is not a single Christian dogma which science has not exploded; yet, though modern investigations and discoveries may have exploded several scientific theories once taught in the schools and accepted by Catholics, we speak advisedly when we say science has not exploded a single dogma of the Church, or a single proposition of faith she has ever taught. No doubt, many pretendedly scientific conclusions have been drawn and are drawn daily that impugn the faith; but science has not confirmed one of them, and we want no better proof that it never will confirm them than the bare fact that they contradict the faith the Church believes and teaches. They can all be scientifically refuted, and probably one day will be, but not by the people at large, the simple and unlettered; and therefore it is necessary that the Church from time to time should exert her authority to condemn them, and put the faithful on their guard against them. This is no assumption to the injury of science, for in condemning them she seeks only to save the revealed truth which they impugn. It is necessary, also, that men should understand that in science as well as in faith they are not independent of God, and are bound by his word wherever or whatever it speaks. Descartes taught the world to deny this and even God himself till scientifically proved, and hence the pains we have taken to refute his method, to show its unscientific character, and to indicate some of the fatal consequences of adopting it.

We know very well that Bossuet and Fénelon are frequently classed with the disciples of Descartes, but these men were learned men and great theologians, and they followed Descartes only where he coincided with the general current of Catholic philosophy. Either was a far profounder philosopher than Descartes ever could have been, and neither adopted his method. The same may be said of other eminent men, sometimes called Cartesians. The French place a certain national pride in upholding Descartes, and pardon much to the sophist in consideration of the Frenchman; but this consideration cannot weigh with us any more than it did with the Italian Jesuit, the eminent Father Tapparelli,

we believe, who a few years since, in some remarkable papers in *La Civiltá Cattolica*, gave a most masterly refutation of Descartes's psychological method. Truth is of no nation, and a national philosophy is no more commendable than a national theology, or a national church. It is no doubt to the credit of a nation to have produced a really great philosopher, but it adds nothing to its glory to attempt to make pass for a great philosopher a man who was in reality only a shallow sophist. It was one of the objectionable features in the late M. Cousin that he sought to avail himself of the national prejudices of his countrymen, and to make his system pass for French or the product of French genius. The English are in this respect not less national than the French, and Bacon owes his principal credit with them to the fact that he was a true Englishman. All real philosophy, like all truth, is catholic, not national.

In regard to the scepticism *The Churchman* deems so essential in the investigation of truth, we have already remarked that a sceptical disposition is the worst possible preparation for that investigation. He who would find truth must open his heart to it, as the sunflower opens her bosom to the sun, and turns her face toward it in whatever quarter of the heavens it may be. Those who, like *The Churchman*, know not the truth in its unity and catholicity, and substitute opinion for faith, will do well so far to doubt their opinions as to be able thoroughly to investigate them, and ascertain if they have any solid foundation. There are reasons enough why they should distrust their own opinions, and see if the truth is not really where the great majority of the civilized world for ages has told them it is to be found. They ought to doubt, for they have reason to doubt, not of every thing, not of God, not of truth, but of their own opinions, which they know are not science nor faith, and therefore may be false. Scientific men should doubt not science, nor the possibility of science, but their theories, hypotheses, and conjectures till they have proved them; and this all the same whether their theories, hypotheses, and conjectures are taken from the schools or are of their own concoction. But this is something very different from presenting to the world or to one's self the being of God, the creation, the immortality of the soul, and the mysteries of faith as opinions or as theories to be doubted till proven after the manner of geometricians. These are great truths which cannot be reasonably doubted; and, if we find people

doubting them, we must, in the best way we can, convince them that their doubts are unreasonable. The believer need not doubt or deny them in order to investigate the grounds of his faith, and to be able to give a reason for the hope that is in him. We advance in the knowledge of truth by means of the truth we have; and the believer is much better fitted for the investigation of truth than the unbeliever, for he knows much better the points that need to be proved, and has his mind and heart in a more normal condition, more in harmony with the real order of things, and is more able to see and recognize truth.

But this investigation is not necessary to justify faith in the believer. It is necessary only that the believer may the better comprehend faith in its relations with the general system of things, of which it forms a part, and the more readily meet the objections, doubts, and difficulties of unbelievers. But all cannot enter into this investigation, and master the whole field of theology, philosophy, and the sciences, and those who have not the leisure, the opportunity, and ability to do it, ought not to attempt it. The worst possible service we can render mankind is to teach them that their faith is unreasonable, or that they should hold themselves in suspense till they have done it, each for himself. They who can make the investigation for themselves are comparatively few; and shall no man venture to believe in God and immortality till he has made it? What, then, would become of the great body of the people, the poorer and more numerous classes, who must be almost wholly occupied with procuring the means of subsistence? If the tender mercies of God were no greater than those of the Cartesian philosophers and our Episcopalian *Churchman*, the poor, the unlettered, the simple, the feeble of intellect would be obliged to live without any rule of duty, without God in the world, or hope in the world to come. For them the guidance and consolations of religion would alike be wanting.

We may see here why the Church visits with her censures whatever tends to unsettle or disturb the faith of the people, for which an unbelieving and unreasoning world charges her with denying reason, and being hostile to freedom of thought and scientific investigation. We do not hope to convince the world that it is unjust. The Church is willing that every man who can and will think for himself should do so; but the difficulty is, that only here and there one,

even at best, does or can so think. It is not that she is unwilling that men should reason, if they will really reason, on the grounds of faith, but that most persons who attempt to do so only reason a little way, just far enough to raise doubts in their minds, doubts which a little more knowledge would solve, and then stop, and refuse or are unable to reason any further. It is the half-reason, the half-learning, the half-science that does the mischief; as Pope sings:

> "A little learning is a dangerous thing:
> Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring;
> There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
> But drinking largely sobers us again."

Many may take "shallow draughts," but very few can "drink deep," and those shallow draughts, which are all that except the very few can take, are more hurtful to both intellectual and moral health than none at all. The Church certainly does not encourage those to reason on sacred subjects who can or will reason only far enough to doubt, and to puff themselves up with pride and conceit. She, however, teaches all the faith, and gives to every one who will listen to her voice as solid reasons for it as the wisest and most learned and scientific have or can have. In this, however the world may blame or vituperate her, she only pursues the course which experience and common sense approve and pronounce wise and just.

The attempt to educate the mass of the people up to the point of making each individual able to understand and solve all the difficulties in the way of faith has never succeeded, and can never succeed. The mass of the people need and always will have teachers of some sort whom they do and must trust. We see it in politics. In the most democratic state the mass of the people follow like sheep a few leaders, wise and prudent men sometimes, perhaps oftener ignorant but cunning and unscrupulous demagogues. All may be made to understand that in matters of faith the teachers are commissioned by the Church, and that the Church is commissioned by God himself, who teaches in and through her, and no one has or can have any better reason for believing any thing, for none better is conceivable. It is the assumption that the people are to judge for themselves without instructors or instruction that causes so much unbelief in the modern world; but as they have been very extensively told that it is their right to do so, and made to

believe it, the Church, of course, must meet their factitious wants the best way she can, and educate them up to the highest point possible, and give them all the instruction, not only in the faith, but on its grounds and reasons, they are or can be made capable of receiving. She must do this, not because the people believe or are already enlightened, but because they have learned only just enough to doubt and rebel.

NOTE.—Descartes claimed that his doubt was not real, but feigned in several passages of his writings, as, for instance, in his *Discours sur la Méthode*, P. 4ieme, where he says: "As there are men who are deceived, and make paralogisms even when reasoning upon the simplest matters of geometry, I judged myself as liable to err as they are, and I rejected as false all those reasons I had before held to be demonstrations; and also considering that even the thoughts we have while awake may come to us when asleep, although none of them may be true, I resolved to feign that all things which had entered my mind contained no more truth than illusory dreams. But I immediately observed that while I wished to think that every thing was false, it was necessary for me, who thought this, to be something; and, noting that this truth: I think, therefore I am, was so firm and secure that the most extravagant suppositions could not shake it, I judged that I might, without scruple, receive it as the first truth of philosophy."

In the answer to the objections of Father Mersenne, Descartes admits that his famous enthymem is not an argument, and says: "When we know that we are something that thinks, this first notion is taken from no syllogism; and when any one says: *I think, therefore, I am*, or exist, he does not infer his existence from thought, as by the force of a syllogism, but as a thing known by itself; he sees it by a simple inspection of the mind; for if he deduced it from a syllogism, he would have to know beforehand this major; whatever thinks is, or exists. On the contrary, this proposition is manifested to him by his own sentiment that he cannot think without existing."—ED.

PORTER'S HUMAN INTELLECT.*

[From the Catholic World for 1869.]

ARTICLE I.

This formidable volume is, unless we except Professor Hickok's work on *Rational Psychology*, the most considerable attempt that has been made among us to construct a philosophy of the human understanding. Professor Porter is able, patient, industrious, and learned. He knows the literature of his subject, and has no little facility and fairness in seizing and setting forth the commanding points in the views and theories of others; but, while he shows great familiarity with metaphysical and psychological questions, and some justness and delicacy as an analyzer of facts, he seems to us to lack the true philosophical instinct, and that synthetic grasp of thought which seizes facts in their principles and genetic relations, and reduces them to a dialectic whole, without which one cannot be a philosopher.

The professor's book is a hard book for us to read, and still harder for us to understand. Its mechanical aspect, with three or four different sizes of type on the same page, is repulsive to us, and prejudices us against it. It is not absolutely dull, but it is rather heavy, and it requires resolution to read it. It has nothing attractive or enlivening, and it deals so much with particulars and details that it is difficult for the reader to carry what he reads along in his memory. Even when we have in our minds what the author actually says, it is not easy to understand it, or determine which of several possible meanings he adopts. Not that his language, though seldom exact or precise, and disfigured occasionally by needless barbarisms, and a terminology which we hope is not yet in good usage, is not clear enough for any one accustomed to philosophical studies, nor is it that his sentences are involved and hard to be construed, or that his statements, taken as isolated statements, are not

* *The Human Intellect; with an Introduction upon Psychology and the Soul.* By Noah Porter, D. D., Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics in Yale College. New York: 1868.

intelligible; but it is hard to determine their meaning and value from his point of view, and in relation to his system as a whole. His book is composed of particulars, of minute and not seldom commonplace observations, without any perceptible scientific reduction to the principle which generates, co-ordinates, and explains them.

It is but fair to the professor to say, in the outset, that his book belongs to a class of books which we seldom read and heartily detest. It is not a work of philosophy, or an attempt even to give us a science of things in their principles and causes, their progress and destiny, but merely a *Wissenschaftslehre*, or science of knowing. Its problem is not what is or what exists; but what is knowing, how do we know, and how do we know that we know? With all deference to the Fichteans, we venture to assert that there is and can be no science of knowing separate from the science of things, distinct from and independent of the subject knowing. We know, says all that, we know that we know, says. He who knows, knows that he knows; and if one were to doubt that knowing is knowing, we must let him doubt, for we have only knowing with which to prove that knowing is knowing.

We can by no possible anatomical dissection of the eye, or physiological description of its functions, explain the secret of external vision. We are told that we see not external objects themselves, but their pictures painted by the light on the retina, and it is only by them that we apprehend visible objects. But suppose it so, it brings us no nearer to the secret of vision. How do we see the picture? How by means of the picture apprehend the external object? Yet the man who sees knows he sees, and all that can be said is, that to elicit the visual act there must be the visive subject, the visible object, and the light which mediates between them and illuminates them both. So is it with intellectual vision. We may ascertain some of the conditions under which we know, but the knowing itself is to us an inexplicable mystery. No dissection or possible inspection of the soul can explain it, or throw the least light on it. All that can be said is, that to the fact of knowledge, whatever its degree or its region, there must be the intellective subject, the intelligible object, and the intellectual light which places them in mutual relation and illumines alike both subject and object. Having said this, we have said all that can be said. Hence works intended to con-

struct the science of science, or knowledge, are not only useless, but worse than useless; for, dealing with abstractions which have no existence in nature, and treating them as if real, they mislead and perplex the student, and render obscure and doubtful what without them is clear and certain.

Professor Porter is a psychologist, and places all the activity in the fact of knowledge on the side of the soul, even in the intuition of principles, without which the soul can neither exist, nor think, nor feel. His purpose in his Introduction is to establish the unity and immateriality —spirituality, he says, of the soul against the materialists— and to vindicate psychology not only as a science, but as an inductive science. With regard to the unity and immateriality of the soul, we hold with the professor, though they are not provable or demonstrable by his method; and we recognize great truth and force in his criticisms on materialism, of which we have to deplore in the scientific world, and even in popular literature, the recrudescence. That psychology is, in a secondary sense, a science, we do not deny; but we do deny that it is either the *prima philosophia*, as the professor asserts, or an inductive science, as he endeavors to prove.

All the inductive sciences are secondary sciences, and presuppose a first science, which is strictly the science of the sciences. Induction, the professor himself maintains, has need of certain first principles, or *a priori* assumptions, which precede and validate it. How can psychology be the *prima philosophia*, or first philosophy, when it can be constructed only by borrowing its principles from a higher or prior science? Or how can it be the first philosophy, when that would suppose that the principles which the inductive sciences demand to validate the inductive process are contained in and derived from the soul? Is the professor prepared to maintain that the soul is the first principle of all the sciences? That would imply that she is the first principle of things, of reality itself; for science is of the real, not of the unreal. But this were pure Fichteism, and would put the soul in the place of God. The professor would shrink from this. He, then, must have made the assertion that psychology is the *prima philosophia* somewhat hastily, and without due reflection; unless indeed he distinguishes between the first principles of science and the first principles of things.

The inductive sciences are constructed by induction from

the observation and analysis of facts which the soul has the appropriate organs for observing. But psychology is the science of the soul, its nature, powers or faculties, and operations; and if an inductive science, it must be constructed by induction from psychical facts observed and analyzed in the soul by the soul herself. The theory is very simple. The soul, by the external senses, observes and analyzes the facts of the external world, and constructs by induction the physical sciences; by her internal sense, called consciousness, she observes and analyzes the world within herself, and by way of induction from the facts or phenomena she observes, constructs psychology, or the science of herself. Unhappily for the psychologue, things do not go so simply. To this theory there are two grave objections: First, the soul has no internal sense by which she can observe herself, her acts or states in herself; and second, there are no purely psychical facts to be observed.

The professor finds the soul's faculty of observing the facts of the internal world in consciousness, which he defines to be "the power by which the soul knows its own acts and states." But consciousness is not a power or faculty, but an act of knowing, and is simply the recognition of the soul by the soul herself as the subject acting. We perceive always, and all that is before us within the range of our percipient powers; but we do not always distinguish and note each object perceived, or recognize the fact that it is we who are the subject perceiving. The fact of consciousness is precisely in the simple perception being so intensified and prolonged that the soul not only apprehends the object, but recognizes itself as the subject apprehending it. It is not, as the professor maintains at great length in Part I., a presentative power; for it is always a reflex act, and demands something of memory. But the recognition by the soul in her acts as the subject acting is something very different from the soul observing and analyzing in herself her own powers and faculties.

The soul never knows herself in herself; she only recognizes herself under the relation of subject in her acts. Recognizing herself only as subject, she can never cognize herself as object, and stand, as it were, face to face with herself. She is never her own object in the act of knowing; for she is all on the side of the subject. She cannot be on one side subject, and on the other object. Only God can be his own object; and his contemplating of him-

self as object, theologians show us, is the Eternal Generation of the Son, or the Word. Man, St. Thomas tells us, is not intelligible in himself; for he is not *intelligens* in himself. If the soul could know herself in herself, she could be her own object; if her own object, she would suffice for herself; then she would be real, necessary, self-existent, independent being; that is to say, the soul would be God. We deny not that the soul can know herself as manifested in her acts, but that she can know herself in herself, and be the object of her own thought. We cannot look into our own eyes, yet we can see our face as reflected in the glass. So the soul knows herself, and her powers and faculties; but only as reflected from, or mirrored in the objects in conjunction with which she acts. Hence the powers and faculties are not learned by any observation of the soul herself, but from the object. The soul is a unit, and acts always as a unit; but, though acting always in her unity, she can act in different directions, and in relation to different objects, and it is in this fact that originates the distinction of powers and faculties. The distinction is not in the soul herself, for she is a unit, but in the object, and hence the schoolmen teach us that it is the object that determines the faculty.

It is not the soul in herself that we must study in order to ascertain the faculties, but the soul in her operations, or the objects in relation with which she acts. We know the soul has the power to know, by knowing, to will, by willing, to feel, by feeling. While, then, the soul has power to know herself so far as mirrored by the objects, she has no power to observe and analyze herself in herself, and therefore no power of direct observation and analysis of the facts from which psychology, as an inductive science, must be constructed.

But there are no such facts as is assumed to be observed and analyzed. The author speaks of objects which are purely psychical, which have no existence out of the soul herself; but there are and can be no facts, or acts, produced by the soul's own energy alone. The soul, for the best of all possible reasons, never acts alone, for she does not exist alone. "Thought," says Cousin, "is a fact that is composed of three simultaneous and indissoluble elements, the subject, the object, and the form. The subject is always the soul [*le Moi*,] the object is something not the soul, [*le non-Moi*,] and the form is always the relation of the two."

The object is inseparable from the subject as an element of the thought, but it exists distinct from and independent of the soul, and when it is not thought as well as when it is; otherwise it could not be object, since the soul is all on the side of the subject. The soul acts only in conjunction with the object, because she is not sufficient for herself, and therefore cannot suffice for her own activity. The object, if passive, is as if it were not, and can afford no aid to the fact of thought. It must, therefore, be active, and then the thought will be the joint product of the two activities. It is a grave mistake, then, to suppose that the activity in thought is all on the side of the soul. The soul cannot think without the concurrent activity of that which is not the soul. There is no product possible in any order without two factors placed in relation with each other. God, from the plenitude of his being, contains both factors in his own essence; but in creatures they are distinct from and independent of each other.

We do not forget the *intellectus agens* of St. Thomas, but it is not quite certain what he meant by it. The holy doctor does not assert it as a faculty of the soul, and represent its activity as purely psychical. Or if it be insisted that he does, he at least nowhere asserts, implies, or intimates that it is active without the concurrence of the object; for he even goes so far as to maintain that the lower acts only as put in motion by the higher, and the terrestrial by the celestial. Hence the *præmotio physica* of the Thomists, and the necessity in conversion of prevenient grace—*gratia præveniens*.

But even granting that there is the class of facts alleged, and that we have the power to observe and analyze them, as, in the language of Cousin, "they pass over the field of consciousness," we cannot by induction attain to their principle and causes; for induction itself, without the first principles of all science, not supplied by it, can give us only a classification, generalization, an hypothesis, or an abstract theory, void of all reality. The universal cannot be concluded, by way of induction, from particulars, any more than particulars can be concluded, by way of deduction, from the universal. Till validated in the *prima philosophia*, or referred to the first principles, without which the soul can neither act nor exist, the classifications and generalizations attained to by induction are only facts, only particulars, from which no general conclusion can be drawn. Science is knowledge indeed; but the term is generally used in English to express

the reduction of facts and particulars to their principles and causes. But in all the secondary sciences the principles and causes are themselves only facts, till carried up to the first principles and causes of all the real and all the knowable. Not without reason, then, has theology been called the queen of the sciences, nor without warrant do men, who do not hold that all change is progress, maintain that the displacement, in modern times, of this queen from her throne has had a deleterious effect on science, and tended to dissipate and enfeeble the human mind itself. We have no philosophers now-a-days of the nerve of Plato and Aristotle, the great Christian fathers, or the mediæval doctors, none of whom ever dreamed of separating theology and philosophy. Even the men of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had a grasp of thought, a robust vigor of mind, and a philosophic insight into the truth of things and their higher relations that you look in vain for in the philosophers of the eighteenth century and of our own. But this by the way. When things are at the worst, they sometimes mend.

Psychology, not psychologism, is a science, though not an inductive science, nor a science that can be attained to by the study of the soul and her phenomena in the bosom of consciousness. The psychologists—those, we mean, who adopt the psychological method, a method seldom adopted before the famous *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes—seem incapable of comprehending that only the real is cognizable, and that abstractions are not real but unreal; and therefore that the first principles of science must be real, not abstract, and the first principles of things. Thus Professor Porter appears to see no real connection between them. True, he says, (p. 64) "Knowledge and being are correlatives. There must be being in order that there may be knowledge. There can be no knowledge which is not the knowledge of being. Subjectively viewed, to know implies certainty; objectively, it requires reality. An act of knowing in which there is no certainty in the agent, and no reality in the object, is impossible in conception and in fact." This would seem to assert that only being can be known, or that whatever is known is real being, which is going too far and falling into ontologism. Only being is intelligible *per se;* but existences which are from being and participate of being, though not intelligible in or by themselves, since they do not exist in and by themselves, may yet be really known by the light of being which creates them. We know *by* being, as well as being itself.

But be not alarmed. The professor's being, the only object of knowledge, his reality without which there is no cognizable object, is nothing very formidable; for he tells us, in smaller type, on the same page, that "we must distinguish different kinds of objects and different kinds of reality. They may be *formed by the mind, and exist* [only] *for the mind that forms them*, or they may exist in fact and space for all minds, and yet in each case they are equally objects. Their reality may be mental and internal, or material and external, but in each case it is equally a reality. The thought that darts into the fancy and is gone as soon, the illusion that crosses the brain of the lunatic, the vision that frightens the ghost-seer, the spectrum which the camera paints on the screen, the reddened landscape seen through a colored lens, the yellow objects which the jaundiced eye cannot avoid beholding, *each as really exists* as does the matter of the solid earth, or the eternal forces of the cosmical system." The "eternal forces" of the cosmical system can be only God, who only is eternal. So the illusions of fancy, the hallucinations of the lunatic, and the eternal, self-existent, necessary being whom we call God, and who names himself I AM THAT AM, SUM QUI SUM, are alike being, and equally real!

The learned author tells us elsewhere that we call by the name being beings of very different kinds and sorts, owing to the poverty of our language, which supplies but one name for them. He will permit us to say that we suspect the poverty is not in the language. We have in the language two words which serve us to mark the precise difference between that which is in, from, and by itself alone, and that which exists in, from, and by being. The first is *being*, the other is *existence*. Being is properly applied only to God, who is, not Supreme Being, as is often said, but the one only being, the only one that can say, I AM THAT AM, or QUI EST; and it shows how strictly language represents the real order that in no tongue can we make an assertion without the verb TO BE, that is, only by being, that is, again, only by God himself. Existence explains itself. Existences are not being, but, as the *ex* implies, are *from* being, that is, from him in whom is their being, as St. Paul says, "For in him we live, and move, and are," *vivimus, et movemur, et sumus*. Reality includes being and all that is from and by being, or simply being and existences. Nothing else is real or conceivable; for, apart from God and what he creates, or

besides God and his creatures, there is nothing, and nothing is nothing, and nothing is not intelligible or cognizable.

Dr. Porter understands by reality or being only what is an object of knowledge, or of the mind in knowing, though it may have no existence out of the mind, or, as say the schoolmen, *a parte rei*. Hence, though the soul is certain that the object exists relatively to her act of knowing, she is not certain that it is something existing in nature. How, then, prove that there is any thing to correspond to the mental object, idea, or conception? In his Second Part, which treats of the representative power, he tells us that the objects represented and cognized in the representation are purely psychical, and exist only in the soul and for the soul alone. These, then, do not exist in nature; they are, in the ordinary use of the term, unreal, illusory, and chimerical, as the author himself confesses. If the object of knowledge can be in any instance unreal, chimerical, illusory, or with no existence except in and for the soul itself, why may it not be so in every instance, and all our knowledge be an illusion? How prove that in any fact of knowledge there is cognition of an object that exists distinct from and independent of the subject? Here is the *pons asinorum* of exclusive psychologists. There is no crossing the bridge from the subjective to the objective, for there is no bridge there, and subject and object must both be given simultaneously in one and the same act, or neither is given.

Dr. Porter, indeed, gives the subjective and what he calls the objective, together, in one and the same thought; but he leaves the way open for the question, whether the object does or does not exist distinct from and independent of the subject. This is the difficulty one has with Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Locke makes ideas the immediate object of the cognitive act; for he defines them to be "that with which the mind is immediately conversant." If the soul can elicit the cognitive act with these *ideas*, which it is not pretended are things, how prove that there is any real world beyond them? It has never been done, and never can be done; for we have only the soul, for whose activity the *idea* or concept suffices, with which to do it, and hence the importance to psychologists of the question, How do we know that we know? and which they can answer only by a paralogism, or assuming the reality of knowledge with which to prove knowledge real.

For the philosopher there is no such question, and

nothing detracts so much from the philosophical genius of the illustrious Balmes as his assertion that all philosophy turns on the question of certainty. The philosopher, holding that to know is to know, has, after knowing, or having thought the object, no question of certainty to ask or to answer. The certainty that the object exists in nature is in the fact that the soul thinks it. The object is always a force or activity distinct from and independent of the subject, and since it is an activity it must be either real being or real existence.

The error of the author, as of all psychologers, is not in assuming that the soul cannot think without the concurrence of the object, or that the object is not really object in relation to the soul's cognitive power, but in supposing that the soul can find the object in that which has no real existence. He assumes that abstractions or mental conceptions, which have no real existence aside from the concrete or reality from which the mind forms them, may be real objects of the soul in the fact of knowledge. But no abstractions or conceptions exist *a parte rei*. There are white things and round things, but no such existence as whiteness or roundness. These and other abstractions are formed by the mind operating on the concretes, and taking them under one aspect, or generalizing a quality they have in common with all concretes of their class, and paying no heed to any thing else in the concrete object. But these abstractions or general conceptions are cognizable and apprehended by the mind only in the apprehension of their concretes, white or round things. They are, as abstracted from white things or round things, no more objects of thought or of thought-knowledge than of sensible perception. We speak of abstractions which are simply nullities, not of genera and species, or universals proper, which are not abstractions but real; yet even these do not exist apart from the individual. They and their individuals subsist always together in a synthetic relation, and though distinguishable are never separable. The species is not a mere name, a mere mental conception or generalization; it is real, but exists and is known only as individualized.

The unreal is unintelligible, and, like all negation, is intelligible only in the reality denied. The soul, then, can think or know only the real, only real being, or real existences by the light of real being. If the soul can know only the real, she can know things only in their real order, and

consequently the order of the real and of the knowable is the same, and the principles of the real are the principles of science. The soul is an intelligent existence, and the principles, causes, and conditions of her existence are the principles, causes, and conditions of her intelligence, and therefore of her actual knowledge. We have, then, only to ascertain the principles of the real to determine the principles of science. The principles of the real are given us in the first verse of Genesis: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and in the first article of the Creed, "I believe in one God, maker of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible." Or, as stated in strictly scientific terms, as affirmed in intuition, Being creates existences. The real and necessary being given in the scientific formula or intuition is indeed God; but this is not intuitively known, and can be known only discursively or by contemplation and reflection. We must not, then, in stating the first principles of the real, and of knowledge as given in intuition, use the term God, but being. We know by intuition being, but do not by intuition know that being is God. Hence the mistake of those who say we have intuition of God, or know by intuition that God is. We have intuition of that which is God, but not that what is given is God. Ontology is a most essential part of philosophy; but exclusive ontologists are as much sophists as are exclusive psychologists.

The first principles of reality are being, existence, and the creative act of being, whence the ideal formula or judgment, Being creates existences. This is the *primum* in the real order. All that is real and not necessary and self-sufficing being must be from being; for without real uncreated being there can be nothing, and existences are something only in so far as they participate of being. Things can exist from being, or hold from it, only by virtue of its creative act, which produces them by its own energy from nothing, and sustains them as existent. There is only the creative act by which existences can proceed from being. Emanation, generation, evolution, which have been asserted as the mode of procession of existences, give nothing really or substantially distinguishable from being. Existences, then, can really proceed from being only by the creative act, and, indeed, only by the free creative act of being; for necessary creation is no creation at all, and can be only a development or evolution of being itself. In theological language, then, God and creation include all the real; what is not God is

creature or existence, and what is not creature or existence is God. There is no reality which is neither God nor creature, no *tertium quid* between being and existence, or between existence and nothing. The *primum* of the real is, then, the ideal formula or divine judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, for it affirms in their principle and their real relation all that is and all that exists. This formula is a proper judgment, for it has all the terms and relations of a judgment, subject, predicate, and copula. Being is the subject, existences is the predicate, and the creative act the copula, which at once unites the predicate to the subject and distinguishes it from it. It is divine, because it is *a priori*, the *primum* of the real; and as only the real is intelligible or knowable, it must precede as its principle, type, and condition, every judgment that can be formed by an existence or creature, and therefore can be only the judgment of God affirming his own being and creating the universe and all things, visible and invisible, therein.

Now, as the soul can only know the real, this divine judgment must be not only the *primum* of the real, but of the knowable; and since the soul can know only as she exists, in the real relations in which she stands, and knows only by the aid of the object on which she depends for her existence and activity, it follows that this judgment is the *primum scientificum*, or the principle of all real or possible science.

Is it asked, How is this known or proved, if not by psychological observation and analysis? The answer is, by the analysis of thought, which discloses the divine judgment as its idea, or necessary and apodictic element. This is not psychologism nor the adoption of the psychological method. Psychologism starts from the assumption that thought, as to the activity that produces it, whatever may or may not be its object, is purely psychical, and that the ontological, if obtainable at all, is so by an induction from psychological facts. The first assumption is disproved by the fact just shown, that thought is not produced or producible by the psychical activity alone, but by the joint action of the two factors subject and object, in which both are affirmed. The other assumption is disposed of by the fact that what is found in the analysis of thought is not particular facts or phenomena from which the first principles are concluded by way of induction, which could give us only a generalization or abstraction, but the first principles themselves intuitively given.

Philosophers generally assert that certain conditions precedent, or certain ideas *a priori*, are necessary to every fact of experience or actual cognition. Kant, in his masterly *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, calls them sometimes cognitions, sometimes synthetic judgments *a priori*, but fails to identify them with the divine judgment, and holds them to be necessary forms of the subject. Cousin asserts them and calls them necessary and absolute ideas, but fails to identify them with the real, and even denies that they can be so identified. Reid recognized them, and called them the first principles of human belief, sometimes the principles of common sense, after Father Buffier, which all our actual knowledge presupposes and must take for granted. Professor Porter also recognizes them, holds them to be intuitively given, calls them certain necessary assumptions, first truths or principles without which no science is possible, but fails to identify them with the divine judgment, and seems to regard them as abstract principles or ideas, as if abstractions could subsist without their concretes, or principles ever be abstract. We deny that they are abstract ideas, necessary assumptions, or necessary forms of the understanding or cognitive faculty, and hold them to be the principles of things, alike of the real and the knowable, without which no fact exists and no act of knowledge is possible. They cannot be created by the mind, nor formed by the mind operating on the concrete objects of existence, nor in any manner obtained by our own mental activity; for without them there is no mind, no mental activity, no experience. Dr. Porter, after Reid, Kant, Cousin, and others, has clearly seen this, and conclusively proved it—no philosopher more conclusively—and it is one of the merits of his book. He therefore justly calls them intuitions, or principles intuitively given; yet either we do not understand him, or he regards them as abstract truths or abstract principles. But truths and principles are never abstract, and only the concrete or real can be intuitively given. Those intuitions, then, must be either real being or contingent existences; not the latter, for they all bear the marks of necessity and universality; then they must be the real and necessary being, and therefore the principles of things, and not simply principles of science. Dr. Porter makes them real principles in relation to the mental act; but we do not find that he identifies them with the principles of the real. He doubtless holds that they represent independent truths, and truths

which are the principles of things; but that he holds them, as present to the mind, to be the principles themselves, we do not find.

Dr. Porter's error in his Part IV., in which he discusses and defines intuitions, and which must be interpreted by the foregoing parts of his work, appears to us to be precisely in his taking principle to mean the starting-point of the soul in the fact of knowledge, and distinguishing it from the principle of the real order. He distinguishes between the object *in mente* and the object *in re*, and holds that the former is by no means identical with the latter. He thus supposes a difference between the scientific order and the real, and therefore that the principle of the one is not necessarily the principle of the other. This is to leave the question open, whether there is any real order to respond to the scientific order, and to cast a doubt on the objective validity of all our knowledge. The divine judgment, or ideal formula, we have shown, is alike the *primum reale* and the *primum scientificum*, and therefore asserts that the principles of the two orders are identical, and that the scientific must follow the real, for only the real is knowable. Hence science is and must be objectively certain.

The intuitive affirmation of the formula, Being creates existences, creates, places the soul, and constitutes her intelligent existence. The author rightly says every thought is a judgment. There is no judgment without the copula, and the only real copula is the copula of the divine judgment or intuition, that is, the creative act of being. Being creating the soul is the principle of her existence; and as we have shown that she can act only as she exists, the principle of her existence is the principle of her acts, and therefore of her knowing, or the fact of knowledge. There is, then, no thought or judgment without the creative act for its copula. The two orders, then, are united and made identical in principle by the creative act of being. The creative act unites the acts of the soul, as the soul itself, to being.

The difficulty some minds feel in accepting this conclusion grows out of a misapprehension of the creative act, which they look upon as a past instead of a present act. The author holds that what is past has ceased to exist, and that the objects we recall in memory are "created a second time." He evidently misapprehends the real character of space and time. These are not existences, entities, as say the scholastics, but simple relations, with no existence, no

reality, apart from the *relata*, or the related. Things do not exist in space and time; for space and time simply mark their relation to one another of coexistence and succession. Past and future are relations that subsist in or among creatures, and have their origin in the fact that creatures as second causes and in relation to their own acts are progressive. On the side of God, there is no past, no future; for his act has no progression, and is never *in potentia ad actum*. It is a complete act, and in it all creatures are completed, consummated, in their beginning, and hence the past and the future are as really existent as what we call the present. The Creator is not *a causa transiens*, that creates the effect and leaves it standing alone, but a *causa manens*, ever present in the effect and creating it.

Creation is not in space and time, but originates the relations so-called. The creative act, therefore, can never be a past or a future act, an act that has produced or that will produce the effect, but an act that produces it always here and now. The act of conservation, as theologians teach, is identically the act of creation. God preserves or upholds us in existence by creating us at each instant of our lives. The universe, with all it contains, is a present creation. In relation to our acts as our acts or our progressiveness toward our final cause or last end, the universe *was* created and will remain as long as the creator wills; but in relation to God it is created here and now, and as newly created at this moment as when the sons of the morning sang together over its production, by the divine energy alone, from nothing; and the song ceases not; they are now singing it. There is nothing but this present creative act that stands between existences and nothing. The continuity of our existence is in the fact that God creates and does not cease to create us.

We have only to eliminate from our minds the conceptions that transport the relations of space and time to the Creator, or represent them as relations between Creator and creature, where the only relation is that of cause and effect, and to regard the creative act as having no relations of space and time, to be able to understand how the divine judgment, intuitively affirmed, is at once the principle of the real and of the scientific, and the creative act, the copula of being and existence, is the copula of every judgment or thought, as is proved by the fact already noted, that in no language can an assertion be made without the verb *to be*, that is, without God.

Dr. Porter, engaged in constructing not the science of things, but a science of knowing—a *Wissenschaftslehre*—has apparently been content with the intuitions as principles or laws of science, without seeking to identify them with the real. He is a doctor of divinity, and cannot intend to deny, with Sir William Hamilton and the Positivists, that ontology can be any part of human science. The Positivists, with whom, in this respect, Sir William Hamilton, who has finished the Scottish school, fully agrees, assert that the whole field of science is restricted to positive facts and the induction of their laws, and that their principles and causes, the ontological truths, if such there be, belong to the unknowable, thus reducing, with Sir William Hamilton, science to nescience. But though Dr. Porter probably holds that there is an ontological reality, and knows perfectly well that it cannot be concluded from psychical phenomena, either by way of induction or of deduction, he yet seems unable or unwilling to say that the mind has in intuition direct and immediate apprehension of it. The first and necessary truths, or the necessary assumptions, as he calls them, which the mind is compelled to make in knowing particulars, such as "what is, is," "the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time," "whatever begins to exist must have a cause," &c., are, in his doctrine, abstract ideas, which, though they may represent a reality beyond themselves—and he tries to prove that they do—are yet not that reality itself. These ideas he states, indeed, in an abstract form, in which they are not real; but they are all identified in the ideal formula, or divine judgment, which is not an abstact but a real, concrete judgment. He holds them to be intuitions, indeed; but intuition, in his view, simply stands opposed to discursion, and he makes it an act of the soul immediately affirming the object, not the act of the object immediately affirming itself by its own creative act. Till being, in its creative act, affirms itself, the soul does not exist; and the intuitive act is that which creates it, and creates it intelligent. The intuition cannot, then, be the act of the soul, unless you suppose the soul can act without existing, or know without intelligence. If we make intuition the act of the soul, and suppose the necessary truths intuitively given are abstractions or representative ideas, how can we know that there is any reality represented by them? The old question again: How pass from the subjective to the objective?—from the scientific to the real?

The doctrine of representative ideas comes from the scholastics, and most probably from the misapprehension of their philosophy. Plato maintained that we know by similitude, which similitude he called *idea*. No doubt, Plato often means by *idea* something else; but this is one of the senses in which he uses the term. This idea, with the peripatetics, becomes in sensibles the phantasm, in intelligibles the intelligible *species*. The intelligible *species* was assumed as something mediating between the soul and the intelligible object. But though they asserted it as a medium, they never made it the object cognized. In their language, it was the *objectum quo*, not the *objectum quod;* and St. Thomas teaches expressly that the mind does not terminate in the *species*, but attains the intelligible object itself. In the article entitled *An Old Quarrel*,* we showed that what the scholastics probably had in mind when they spoke of the intelligible *species*, is adequately expressed by what we, after the analogy of external vision, call the light, which illuminates at once the subject and object, and renders the one cognitive and the other cognizable. This light is not furnished by the mind, but by being itself light, and the source of all light, present in every fact of knowledge in the creative act.

The Scottish school has made away with the phantasms, and proved that, in what our author calls sense-perception, we perceive not a phantasm, but the real external object itself; but in the intelligible or supersensible world, this direct apprehension of the object Dr. Porter appears not to admit. He consciously or unconsciously interposes a *mundus logicus* between the mind and the *mundus physicus*. The categories are with him abstract relations, and logic is a mere formal science. This is evident from Part III., in which he treats of what he calls "thought-knowledge." But the categories are not abstract forms of thought, but real relations of things; logic is founded in the principle and constitution of things, not simply in the constitution and laws of the human mind. Its type and origin are in being itself, in the Most Holy Trinity. The creative act is the copula of every strictly logical judgment. The Creator is logic, the λόγος, or, as Plato would say, logic in itself, and therefore all the works of God are strictly logical, and form, *mediante* his creative act, a dialectic whole with himself.

*Ante, p. 295.

Whatever does not conform to the truth and order of things is illogical, a sophism; and every sophism sins against the essence of God, as well as against the constitution of the human mind. Psychologism is a huge sophism; for it assumes that the soul is being, and can exist and act independently when it is only a created, dependent existence; that it is God, when it is only man. Satan was the first psychologist we read of. Ontologism is also a sophism of very much the same sort. Psychologism asserts that man is God; ontologism asserts that God is man. This is all the difference between them, and they terminate at the same point. Existences cannot be logically deduced from being, because being, sufficing for itself, cannot be constrained to create either by extrinsic or by intrinsic necessity. Existences are not necessarily involved in the very conception of being, but are contingent, and dependent on the free-will of the Creator. God cannot be concluded by induction from psychological facts; for the universal cannot be concluded from the particular, nor the necessary from the contingent.

Both the ontological *primum* and the psychological must be given intuitively and in their real synthesis, or no science of either is possible. The mind must take its starting-point and principle of science from neither separately, but from the real synthesis of the two, as in the ideal formula. The attempt to construct an exclusively ontological or an exclusively psychological science is as absurd and as sophistical as the attempt to express a judgment without the copula, or to construct a syllogism without the middle term. The real copula of the judgment, the real *medius terminus* that unites the two extremes of the syllogism, is the creative act of being.

All Gentile philosophy failed, because it failed to recognize the creative act. Outside of Judaism, the tradition of creation was lost in the ancient world. In vain will you seek a recognition of it in Plato or Aristotle, or in any of the old Gentile philosophers. In its place you find only emanation, generation, or formation. The error of the Gentiles reappears in our modern philosophers, who—since Descartes detached philosophy from theology, of which it is simply the rational element—are endeavoring to construct science and the sciences without the creative act, and if they escape pantheism or atheism, it is by the strength of their faith in revelation, not by the force of their logic. Dr. Porter really attempts to construct the philosophy of the

human intellect, unconsciously certainly, on purely atheistic or nihilistic principles; that is, without any principles at all. He, of course, believes in God, believes that God made the world; but most likely he believes he made it as the watchmaker makes a watch, so that when wound up and started it will go of itself—till it runs down. This is a very widespread error, and an error that originates with so-called philosophers, not with the people. Hence we find scientific men in large numbers who look upon the world God has made as a huge machine; and now that it is made, as independent of him, capable of going ahead on its own hook, and even able to bind him by its laws, and deprive him of his freedom of action, as if it were or could be any thing but what he at each moment makes it. He ought, as a doctor of divinity, to understand that there can be no science without the efficacious presence of God, who created the soul, and none without his presence creating it now, and by his light rendering it intelligent. To construct science without God in his creative act as the principle, is to begin in sophism and end in nihilism.

We need hardly say that, in asserting the divine judgment or ideal formula as the principle of all science, and as the necessary and apodictic element of every fact of knowledge, we do not pretend that the mind is able in the first moment of intellectual life to say to itself, or to others, God creates existences. This is the real formula which expresses in principle the entire real order, but it is the formula to which the principles given in intuition are reduced by reflection. There are a large number of minds, and among them our illustrious Yale Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics, who do not recognize the identity of being with God, or are aware that the intuition is of that which is God. A still larger number do not distinguish the so-called necessary ideas from the contingent objects of experience cognizable only by them, and very few, even among professors of philosophy, ever identify these ideas—the necessary, the universal, the eternal, and the immutable—with real being, or reflect that they cannot subsist as abstractions, and that the universal, the eternal, the immutable, the necessary, of which we have intuition in all our mental acts, is and must be real, necessary, universal, eternal, and immutable being, that is to say, God himself. Few reflect far enough to perceive that in intuition the object is real being; and the number of men who distinctly recognize all the

terms of the formula in their real relation is a very small minority, and every day growing smaller.

But the intuition is not, as Dr. Porter supposes, of ideas which lie latent or dormant in the mind till occasion wakes them up and calls them into action; but they are the first principles, or rather the principles from which the mind proceeds in all its intellectual acts. They are intuitively affirmed to the mind in the creative act, and are ever present and operative; but we become aware of them, distinguish them, and what they imply or connote, only by reflection, by contemplating them as they are held up before the mind, or sensibly represented to it, in language. Though the formula is really the *primum philosophicum*, we attain to it, or are masters of what is really presented in intuition, and are able to say, being is God, and God creates existences, only at the end of philosophy, or as its last and highest achievement.

The principles are given in the very constitution of the mind, and are present to it from its birth, or, if you will, from the first instant of its conception; but they are by no means what Descartes and others have called *innate ideas*. Descartes never understood by *idea* the intelligible object itself, but a certain mental representation of it. The idea was held to be rather the image of the thing than the thing itself. It was a *tertium quid* somewhere between real and unreal, and was regarded as the medium through which the mind attained to the object. In this sense we recognize no ideas. In the fact of knowledge, what we know is the object itself, not its mental representation. We take *idea* or the ideal in the objective sense, and understand by it the immediate and the necessary, permanent, immutable object of intuition, and it is identical with what we have called the *primum philosophicum*, or divine judgment, which precedes the mind's own activity. Hence we call that judgment the "ideal formula." With this view of idea or the ideal, analogous, at least, to one of the senses of Plato, from whom we have the word, it is evident that the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas, which was afterward changed to that of innate faculties, cannot find in us an advocate.

The formula is ideal and apodictic, but it is not the entire object of the cognitive act. It is that which precedes and renders possible experience, or what Kant calls synthetic judgments *a posteriori*. We have said the soul can know only as she exists, and that whatever object she depends on

for her existence must she depend on for her acts, and it enters into all her thoughts or facts of knowledge. The soul depends for existence on God, on humanity and nature. In the formula, we have only the ideal principle of man and nature, and therefore the ideal formula, while it furnishes the principle and light which render knowledge possible, does not supersede experience, or actual knowledge acquired by the exercise of the soul and her faculties. Here the soul proceeds by analysis and synthesis, by observation and induction, or deduction, according to the nature of the subject. We do not quarrel with the inductive sciences, nor question their utility; we only maintain that they are not sciences till carried up to the principles of all real science presented to the mind in intuition. Induction is proper in constructing the physical sciences, though frequently improperly applied; but it is inapplicable, as Lord Bacon held, in the construction of philosophy; for in that we must start from the ideal formula, and study things in their principles and in their real synthesis.

We have got through only the author's Introduction, yet that has brought up nearly all the salient points of his entire volume. Here we might stop, and assuredly should stop, if we had no higher object in view than to criticise its author, or simply to refute his psychological method. We believe one of the first steps toward arresting the atheistical or pantheistical tendency of the age, and of bringing the mind back to truth and the logic of things, is to set forth and vindicate sound philosophy, the philosophy which in substance has always been preserved in the Christian church. To use up an author or to denounce a false system is a small affair. The only solid refutation of error is in presenting the truth it impugns. As there are several questions of importance raised by the author on which we have hardly touched, we propose to return to the book and consider them at our earliest convenience.

ARTICLE II.

In returning to consider this elaborate volume more in detail, we would remark that its author has designed it as a text-book for college students in the class of philosophy, and has proceeded, in writing, on the presumption that they for whom he writes have not the slightest knowledge of the subject. Hence his pages are filled with matters which

those who have made some proficiency in the science of the human understanding, and are not wholly ignorant of philosophy, properly so-called, are already masters of, and which they cannot even read without great weariness of the body, and do not deem it worth their while to read at all. They feel that to be able to understand the author, it is enough to consult his principles and method, and his definitions of the several topics he takes up and discusses. They have neither the patience to read carefully through a huge volume which is, nine-tenths of it, filled with what is for them mere baby-talk. But the author does not, in composing his work, begin by stating and defining his theses, and then proceeding to elucidate and prove them; but attempts to begin where he supposes the infant begins, and proceeds as a learner, not as a master. Consequently, we are compelled to read his book from the beginning to the end, or not be sure of his doctrine on any one point.

It is true, the author sometimes attempts definitions, but they are seldom scientific, rarely embrace his whole thesis, and nothing else, and are pretty sure to mislead the unfortunate reviewer who relies on them. He seldom abides by his own definitions. In one place he defines consciousness a power, and in another he makes it an act. Sense-perception is defined to be the power by which the intellect gains the knowledge of material objects; then we are told that the object perceived is not the material existence, but "a joint product of the material agent and the sentient organism," a psychical transcript of the material object; while in another part of his work we find him denying that what the mind perceives is such transcript, and refuting, by plain and solid reasons, those who maintain that it is. A really scientific definition is a definition *per genus et per differentiam;* Dr. Porter sometimes gives the *genus* and forgets the *differentia*, and sometimes gives the *differentia* without giving the *genus*. He also adopts a terminology in many respects not familiar to us, though it may be to others, without the necessary explanation of the terms he uses; and even when the terms he uses are such as we are familiar with, they are used in a sense to which we are not accustomed. We cannot tolerate *subject-object*, for subject and object are distinct, and stand the one over against the other. The subject in thought is never the object, and the object is never the subject. Grammar teaches so much. *Object-object* says no more than simply object. Every object is

object, and no object is more or less than object. The object is always real; for it is causative, since in the act of thought it resists the subject, and becomes a counter-pressure. We dislike *percepts* and *concepts;* for they are intended to imply that they exist, as it were, independent of the subject and the object, and that the product of subject and object may itself be object. We protest earnestly, in the name both of philology and philosophy, against calling existences, which are nothing except by the creative act of God, *beings*, and still more earnestly against so calling the products of second or third causes. This might pass with the Gentiles, who substituted generation for creation, but is inexcusable in a Christian philosopher. We know the schoolmen did so, but they are not to be commended for it. They speak of *ens simpliciter*, *ens secundum quid*, *ens reale*, and *ens possibile*, and even of *ens rationis*, as if being, the creations of being, mental abstractions, and the creations of fancy and imagination could be all of the same genus or placed in the same category! There is a philosophy in language which can never be disregarded without more or less injury to the philosophy of things.

The professor's method and terminology render his work exceedingly difficult to be understood without as much study as would be necessary to construct the philosophy of the human mind without it; and therefore if we should happen at times to miss his meaning, he must blame himself. He is far more intent on explaining the processes of the mind in knowing than on setting forth what it knows. These processes have no interest for us; for they really throw no light on the power or fact of knowledge. We want to know what the author means by philosophy, and what is its value, and we therefore want him to speak as the professor, not as the pupil. We have no disposition to waste our time and weary the flesh, even, in reading the mass of stuff which he writes and which tells us nothing we want to know. But enough of this.

The professor divides, not very scientifically, his work into four parts. Part I. treats of Presentation and Presentative Knowledge; Part II., of Representation and Representative Knowledge; Part III., of Thinking and Thought-Knowledge; and Part IV., of Intuition and Intuitive Knowledge. He says, p. 77, "The leading faculties of the intellect are three: the presentative or observing faculty, the representative or creative faculty, and the thinking or

generalizing faculty. More briefly, the faculty of experience, the faculty of representation, and the faculty of intelligence." But experience is not a faculty; it is the result of the exercise of all our faculties, and a source of intelligence. Intelligence, as a faculty, is the intellect itself; as a fact, it is indistinguishable from experience, which is improperly restricted by some psychologists of the inductive sort to the knowledge of the external world through the senses, but extends to all acquired knowledge, whatever the faculty exercised in acquiring it or the object perceived. The real distinction is not between experience or empirical knowledge and intelligence, but between empirical knowledge or experience and the ideal principles which are given intuitively by the Creator, and neither acquired nor developed by the soul's own action. Distinctions should be real, not arbitrary or abstract.

We are able to know objects of various kinds and sorts, but the knowing is always the same fact, and by the same cognitive faculty, whatever the object known, the order to which it belongs, or the means and conditions of its cognition. The learned professor's division, making four sorts of knowledge, since he makes intuition empirical, or an act of the soul, appears to us, therefore, without any real foundation. All knowledge or actual knowing is presentative, and is in all cases by direct contemplation of the object in the light of ideal intuition. Demonstration only strips the object of its envelopes, removes the *prohibentia*, and presents it to direct contemplation. In the longest chain of reasoning, each link is, in the empirical sense, intuitively apprehended. The apprehension is always immediate, and the several mental processes serve only to bring the subject and object together, face to face. These processes, however named or whatever their character, never extend the matter of knowledge beyond the objects presented.

The presentative faculty the author subdivides into consciousness and sense-perception. But consciousness is not a presentative faculty, nor a faculty, nor a subdivision of a faculty at all. It is simply the recognition of the soul, as reflected from the object, of herself as subject. At most, it simply presents the subject of the thought. Sense-perception presents only material or sensible objects. The professor's doctrine is then that of Locke, who derives all our ideas from sensation and reflection, and confines all our knowledge to sensibles with the soul and her operations.

Reflection only operates on the sense-perceptions without extending the matter of knowledge beyond them. This is pure sensism, which we are somewhat surprised to find held by an eminent professor in Yale College. Does Dr. Porter know his doctrine is sensism, and therefore materialistic? He says, though not truly, we apprehend the soul in consciousness as a spiritual being, but is the soul the only non-sensible he means to assert?

But, as we showed in our former article, the soul recognizes herself only as subject, and therefore only as the correlative object. She knows her own operations only in the same correlation. Take away the object and you lose the subject or fact of consciousness. This, we fear, the professor does. He defines, p. 131, sense-perception to be "an act of objective knowledge, in which the soul knows and only knows;" but adds, "if the soul knows, it knows some *being* as its object. But what being does it affirm? We answer, The being which is the joint product of the material agent and the sentient organism. . . . . In perception proper we do not know the excitant apart, nor do we know the organism apart, only the result of their joint action. This we know as an object, with which the mind is confronted both as a sentient and as a percipient." But as there can be no thought without the conjunction of the intellective subject and the intelligible object, if the mind does not apprehend the material object itself, there can be no such joint product as pretended, and, consequently, no object at all. The object then vanishes, and leaves only the subject, which is, we need not say, pure idealism. As the subject is the correlative of object, and recognizes itself only in thinking the object, if the object vanishes, the subject, too, must vanish, and leave behind it only the *sensation transformée* of Condillac. But as sensation, however transformed, is still sensation, and as sensations are incapable of standing alone, or of subsisting without the subject, the sensations themselves must go, and nihilism alone remains—the result to which all psychologisms and ontologisms are necessarily tending, and in which Sir William Hamilton says all philosophy necessarily ends, if we may trust a passage which we saw quoted from him not long since in *The New Englander*, by a Princeton professor, in a striking article on *The Present State of Philosophy*, in which the writer has well stated the problem presented, but which he neither solves nor attempts to solve; a problem,

the solution of which is in the ideal formula, or the real synthesis of principles of things and of science, of which he seems never to have heard.

The professor draws a proper distinction between sensation as feeling and sensation as perception, but we cannot agree with him that sensation as feeling is an affection of the soul. Those psycho-physiologers make a great mistake who call the body "The House I live in." The union of soul and body is too intimate for that. We are not soul, as distinguished from the body, nor are we body, as distinguished from the soul; but we are the union of the two. A General Council defines the soul to be *forma corporis*, the informing and animating principle of the body. Yet there is a distinction between them. We can predicate of the one things which we cannot of the other. There is, indeed, no sensation without thought, or an act of the soul; but the sensation itself, as distinguished from the perception, is felt, not merely localized, in the body, not in the soul. When we feel the twinges of the gout, we feel them, not in our soul, but in our toe. We must distinguish two classes of affections, frequently confounded; the one sensible, of the body, the other spiritual, of the soul. The sensible affections or emotions, such as joy and grief, sorrow and delight, pain and pleasure, are of the body animated and informed by the soul. They indeed imitate in the sensible order the affections of the soul, but have in themselves no moral character. Hence, the masters of spiritual life make no account of what is called sensible devotion, and see in it nothing meritorious, and no reason why the soul, in its itinerary to God, should seek it. But very different is the other class, often called by the same name, and which may or may not be accompanied by sensible emotion. This difference is at once understood by all who have learned to distinguish between the love of the senses and the love of the soul, the love Plato meant when he represented the soul, in his fine poetical way, as having two wings, intelligence and love, on which it soars to the empyrean. This love, in one degree, is chivalric love, which the knight cherishes for his mistress whom he worships as a distant star; in a higher degree, it is heroic love, a love that braves all dangers for the beloved, whether friend or country; in a still higher degree, and informed by grace, it is charity or saintly love, with which the saint burns and is consumed as he contemplates the Beauty of Holiness, or "the First Good

and the First Fair." This is not sensible love, and its glory is in struggling against the seductions of the senses, or the flesh, and by the grace of God winning the victory over them, and coming off conqueror through him who hath loved us and given his life for us.

The professor has entered largely into the physiology of the senses, and the joint action of the soul in the fact of knowledge, and the process of the mind in forming what he calls *percepts;* but as all he says under these heads, whether true or not true, throws no light on the intellectual act itself, we pass it over, and proceed to his Part II., Representation and Representative Knowledge.

"Representation or the representative power," the author says, p. 248, "may be defined in general [that is, *the genus*] the power to recall, represent, and reknow objects which have been previously known or experienced in the soul. More briefly, it is the power to represent objects previously presented to the mind." Clearly, then, representation adds nothing to the matter previously presented by the presentative power. But the author continues: "It is obvious that, in every act of this power, the objects of the mind's cognition are furnished by the mind itself, being produced or created a second time by the mind's own energy, and presented to the mind's own inspection. It follows that representation, in its very essence, is a creative or self-acting power."

We cannot say that this is obvious to us. The definition of representation given by the author makes it what, in the language of mortals, is called memory; and we have never learned that memory is a creative power, or that in memory the mind creates the objects it remembers. To recall or to reknow is not to create. Even that the soul is self-active—that is, capable of acting from itself alone—is by no means obvious; nay, is impossible, unless we take the soul to be the first cause, instead of merely a second cause; and, even if it were self-active, it would not follow that it creates. God is self-active because self-existent, or being in its plenitude; but he is not necessarily a creator. He has infinite scope for his infinite activity in himself, and he is free to create or not to create as he pleases. That the mind does not in memory create the objects remembered, is evident from this that the facts remembered are, as the author himself admits, facts or objects previously known or experienced. The fact of memory, or the fact remembered, is the

same fact that was known in presentation, accompanied by the recognition of it as an object previously present and known, and not now known for the first time. There is no creation a second time any more than there was the first time, or when the object was presented.

The professor says, p. 251, "The objects of the representative power are . . . . mental objects. They are not *real things*, nor real percepts, but the mind's own creations after real things. They are spiritual or psychical, not material, entities; but, in many cases, they concern material beings, being psychical transcripts of them, believed to be real or possible." Does he mean this as a true description of the facts of memory? Probably not. Then his definition needs amending, for it does not include all that he means by representation. His definition includes only memory; but his description includes, besides memory, reflection, fancy, and imagination, things which have nothing in common except the fact that the mind operates in them all on matters which have been previously presented. Reflection and memory are in no sense creative faculties; fancy and imagination are sometimes so called, but even they do not create their own objects. Reflection is the mind operating on the ideal principles re-presented in language, and, in their light, on the facts of experience in their synthetic relations with them. Memory is simply, as a faculty, the power to retain and to re-present, more or less completely and distinctly, the facts of experience. Its objects are those facts themselves, not a mental representation or transcript of them. The author confounds re-presenting with representation. In the one, the object previously presented is re-presented, or presented anew; in the other, the object itself is not presented for more elaborate consideration, but a certain mental transcript, image, or resemblance of it, which is the product of the mind fancying or imagining, but is never its object in correlation with which it acts. This distinction alone upsets the author's whole theory of science, or *Wissenschaftslehre*, and renders worse than useless more than nine-tenths of his volume. His whole theory is vitiated by confounding representation, in the sense of showing or exhibiting by resemblance or similitude, with the etymological sense, that of re-presenting, and in taking the representation as the object of the soul in the intellectual act, which it never is. Neither reflection nor memory represents, in his sense of the word, the objects previously presented; they only re-present them.

In point of fact, we never know any thing by mental representation; for we either know not at all, or we know the thing itself. Representation only replaces the phantasms and intelligible species of the schoolmen, for ever made away with, we had supposed, by the Scottish school of Reid and Hamilton, and the professor himself has given excellent reasons for not accepting them. Plato, indeed, asserts that we know by similitude, but in a very different sense. The idea is impressed on matter as the seal on wax, and the impression is a perfect fac-simile of the idea; and by knowing the impression, we know the idea impressed. But he never made either the idea or the impress of it on matter the product of the mind itself. He makes either always objective, independent of the mind, and apprehensible by it. In other words, he never held that the mind creates the similitude by which it knows, but, at most, only that by observation the mind finds it. The peripatetics never, again, made their phantasms and intelligible *species* mental creations, or represented them as furnished by the mind from its own stock; but always held them to be independent of the mind, and furnished to it as the means of apprehending the object. If they had referred their production to the mind itself, they would have called the species *intellective*, not *intelligible* species. The soul has, indeed, the faculty of representation; but in representing its correlative object, it is not the representation, but the thing, whatever it may be, that it attempts to represent. The *product* of the mind may be a representation, but the *object* of the mind is not. In all the imitative arts, as poetry, painting, sculpture, the artist seeks to represent, but operates always in view of that reality of which he produces the representation or resemblance.

The author himself distinguishes memory from representation, though very indistinctly. "Representation," p. 303, "recalls, memory recognizes." Here he uses representation in the sense of re-presenting; for what is recalled is not the mental representation or semblance, but the object itself; so, really, there is no representation in the case, and the professor should not have treated memory under the head of representation. "I see a face, and I shut my eyes and picture it to myself." This is not an act of representation, but of memory. There is a re-presenting, but no representation, in memory; for, so far as the fact is not reproduced in memory, there is no memory, but simply fancy or imagination. The objects of reflection are simply the

objects originally presented with only this difference, that, in presentation, the fact of consciousness is ourself as subject knowing, whereas in reflection it is ourself as subject reflecting, and, in memory, ourself as subject remembering.

Fancy and imagination are, in a loose way, called creative faculties; but properly creative they are not. Creation is production of substantial existences or things from nothing; that is, without any materials, by the sole energy of the creator. Fancy and imagination can operate only on and with materials which have been or are presented to the mind. Fancy is mimetic and simply imitates imagination, as throughout the universe the lower imitates the higher, as the universe copies the Creator, or seeks to actualize the type in the divine mind; and hence St. Thomas says, *Deus similitudo est omnium rerum.* God creates all things after the type or ideal in his own mind, and *idea in mente divina nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.* Hence, man is said to be made after the image and likeness of God, *ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*, though he is not the image of God; for that is the Eternal Word, who, St. Paul tells us, is "the brightness of his glory and the express image of his substance," or being. (Heb. i. 3.) Fancy is mimetic, and plays with sensations and sensibles; but though it combines them in its own way, as a winged horse, the objects combined are always objects of experience. Imagination is of a higher order than fancy, and operates on and with objects of experience, sensibles, intelligibles, and the ideal principles intuitively given. It sweeps through the whole range of creation, descends to hell, and rises to heaven; but its objects are always those which have been presented to the mind, which it can only arrange and combine in new forms of its own. But the representations it produces are its products, not its object. In producing them, the mind has a real object as its correlate, as in presentation. Let the professor, then, abandon the absurdity which runs through his book that a mental creation or representation is the object of the soul in producing it. The object of the soul is the object whose activity joined to its own produces it.

Take the artist. The object in his richest and sublimest productions is the beautiful which he sees, which is his soul's vision and his soul's love, and which he seeks to express on canvas, in a statue, a temple, an oration, a poem, or a melody. Tell us not, as so many æsthetic writers do, that the artist projects from his own soul, or creates the

beauty which he struggles to express in his work, and which he can never express to his satisfaction. The ideal infinitely transcends the expression. The soul contemplates the beautiful, but does not create it. The beautiful, as Plato somewhere says, "is the splendor of the Good." It is the splendor of the True and the Good, that is, of God; though Gioberti, in his *Del Bello*, seems to divorce it from the ideal, and, while asserting the reality of the object, would appear to resolve the beautiful into the subjective impression on the sensibility, produced by the apprehension of the object, which supposes that beauty exists only for sensible existences. It is as real as God himself, and as objective as the ideal formula. It is the divine splendor, inseparable from the divine Being. Every thing God has made participates, in a higher or lower degree, of beauty, because it participates of being; but beauty itself in its infinity is only in God himself, which exceeds all the power of men and angels to represent. The artist, by the noetic power of the soul, which, if a true artist, he possesses in a higher degree than ordinary men, beholds, contemplates, and loves it. It is, as we have just said, the vision of his soul and the object of his love. He detects it in creatures, in the region of fancy, in the mind, and in the soul itself, and adores it in the ideal. The power of detecting it in sensibles is fancy; in the ideal, is imagination. In seeking to represent it or express it in his productions, it is the real, the objective, he seeks to express or embody. He may form in his mind a representation of it, but that representation is not the object of the mind in either fancy or imagination, nor is it a pure mental representation, not only because it is formed after the real, but because it is formed only in conjunction with the activity of the real.*

These remarks are sufficient to show that all that Dr. Porter says of the faculty of Representation is, when not confused or false, of no moment. He darkens instead of elucidating

*The artist ought always to be highly moral and devout, but whether so or not depends on the motive with which he acts, or purpose for which he seeks to embody the beauty he sees. The relation of æsthetics to ethics, of art to religion is easily understood. Art is not, as some Germans would persuade us, religion, nor is the culture of art true religious worship. Art may be licentious, and is, when it embodies only the sensual passions and affections of our nature, and the more so in proportion to the exquisite touch and skill in the execution. In no case can the brilliancy and perfection of the execution atone for the moral deformity of the object represented. Art which appeals simply to the senses, and

his subject. We pass on, therefore, to his Part III., on Thinking and Thought-Knowledge.

The mental operations treated by the author under the head of thinking and Thought-knowledge, are those which Locke calls by the general name of reflection, and are conception, abstraction, or generalization, judgment, reasoning, deductive and inductive, and scientific or systematic arrangement. They are not faculties, but operations of the mind. The proper English name for the faculty on which they depend, so far as usage goes, is not thought, nor the power of thought—for every intellectual act, whether representative or presentative, is a thought—but *understanding* or *reason*. The old word was understanding, but it is objectionable, because it includes, according to present usage, only the intellectual activity of the soul, and implies nothing of voluntary activity. Reason is the better term; for it combines both the intellectual and the volitive activity of the soul.

The objection of the professor that "reason is used for the very highest of the rational functions, or else in a very indefinite sense for all that distinguishes man from the brute," does not appear to us to be conclusive. Every intellectual act, the highest as the lowest, is thought, an act of one and the same thinking faculty. The objects and conditions of knowledge may vary, but the faculty of knowledge does not vary with them. Reason is not used in a more indefinite sense when used for all that distinguishes man from the brute, than is thought as used by the professor. Man is well defined to be *animal rationale*, or rational animal; but this does not mean that man is animal *plus* reason, but the animal transformed by reason; and hence there is a specific difference between the sort of intelligence which it seems difficult to deny to animals, and the intelligence of man. All human intelligence is rational, the product of reason. Coleridge and our American tran-

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inspires only sensible devotion, is not necessarily immoral, but is not positively moral or religious. But art which seeks to embody or express the ideal, the splendor of the real, the true, the good, whether as presented in the ideal intuition, or as participated by the creatures of God, can hardly fail to be moral and religious in its effect as well as in its ideal. God is worshipped in spirit and in truth, even worshipped in his works, for he enters into all his works as their cause, and their being is in him. We praise God in his saints, in all his works of nature or grace. The art is not the worship, but it is an adjunct to worship, and hence religion in all ages has called into its service the highest and richest forms of art.

scendentalists, after Kant, attempted to distinguish between understanding [*Verstand*] and reason [*Vernunft*], and to restrict understanding to that portion of our knowledge which is derived through the senses, and reason to an order of knowledge that transcends all understanding, and to which only the gifted few ever attain. But they have not been successful. Knowledge of the highest objects, as of the lowest, is by the same faculty, and we may still use reason in its old sense, as the subjective principle of all the operations the professor calls thinking.

The word *reason* is, indeed, used in an objective as well as in a subjective sense. As subjective, it is a faculty of the soul; the objective reason is the ideal formula, and creates and constitutes the subjective reason. Cousin distinguishes between the two, but as between the personal and the impersonal—a mere modal distinction, not a distinction of substance. He identifies the objective reason with the λόγος or Word of God, while it is really identical with the ideal formula, which embraces both being and existences united and distinguished by the creative act of being, as explained in our former article. This asserts a distinction of subject and of substance between the objective and subjective reason asserted by Cousin. In the objective reason, God, in the subjective, man, is the actor; and there is all the difference of substance between them that there is between God and man, or between real, universal, and necessary being, and finite, contingent existence. They ought not to be both called by the same name, and we ourselves rarely so call them. We ourselves call the objective reason the ideal formula, or, briefly, the ideal; yet good writers and speakers do use the word in both senses. They say, "Man is endowed with reason," or has a "rational nature," in which they employ the term subjectively. They say, also, of such an assertion, "It is unreasonable, or it is contrary to reason;" that is, to the truth, or principle of things, in which they use it objectively, as they do when they speak of the principles affirmed in the ideal formula, and call them the reason, necessary and absolute ideas, or the principles of reason; for nothing necessary or absolute is or can be subjective.

We ourselves use the word in a subjective sense, and understand by it the faculty of reasoning, or the subjective principle of all our mental operations. It is not a simple power, but a complex power, embracing both the percipient

and volitive capacities of the soul. In every rational operation of the soul, there is both perception and volition, and it is this fact that distinguishes reason from the simple power of perception, or intellectual apprehension. We *see* and we *look*, and we *look* that we may *see;* we *hear* and we *listen*, and *listen* that we may *hear*. The *looking* and the *listening* are peculiarly rational acts, in which the soul voluntarily, or by an act of the will, directs her intellectual capacities to a special intellectual purpose or end. This voluntary activity, or direction of the capacity to know, must not be confounded with free will; it is the *voluntarium* of the theologians, distinguished, on the one hand, from spontaneity, and on the other, from the *liberum arbitrium*, or free will, which is the faculty of electing or choosing between right and wrong, and implies, whichever it chooses, the power to choose the contrary. It is the principle of all moral accountability. The *voluntarium* is a simple, voluntary activity, or power of directing our attention to this or that intellectual object, or of using the cognitive power in the service of science. The reason may be defined, then, the soul's faculty of using her intellectual and volitive powers for the explication and verification of the knowledge furnished by presentation.

With these preliminary remarks we proceed to consider some of the mental operations which give us what Professor Porter calls Thought-Knowledge. We do not question the fact of these operations, nor their importance in the development of our rational life; what we deny is, that they are a power or faculty of the mind, and that in performing them they are objects of the mind, or that they add any thing to the matter of our knowledge.

The professor says, p. 383, "The power of thought [reason] as a capacity [faculty] for certain psychological processes, is dependent for its exercise and development on the lower powers of the intellect. These furnish the materials for it to work with and upon. We must apprehend the individual objects by means of the senses and consciousness [pure sensism] before we can *think* these objects." So in consciousness and sense-perception we do not think, and we must apprehend sensibles before we can think them! To intellectually apprehend an object is to think it. Intellectual apprehension and thought are one and the same fact. The professor continues, "We can classify, explain, and methodize only individual things, and these must first

be known by sense and consciousness before they can be united and combined into generals." Here are two errors and one truth. The first error is in regarding consciousness as a cognitive power or faculty, and the second is in confining the individual things to sensibles, or the material world. We know in presentative knowledge not only the sensible but the supersensible, the intelligible, or ideal. The ideal principles cannot be found, obtained, or created by the mind's own activity, and are apprehended by the mind only as they are given intuitively by the act of the Creator; but being given, they are as really apprehended and known by the mind as any sensible object; nay, are what the mind apprehends that is most clear and luminous, so luminous that it is only by their light that even sensibles are mentally apprehensible or perceptible. The one truth is that the objects of the soul in her operations must first be known either by perception or intuition before they can be classified, explained, and methodized. Hence the operations of which the author treats under this head do not extend our knowledge of objects. They are all reflective operations, and reflection can only re-present what has already been presented.

The professor is right in maintaining that only individual objects are apprehensible, if he means that we apprehend things only *in individuo* or *in concreto;* for this is what we have all along been insisting on against him. Things are not apprehensible in general, but in the concrete. Hence Rosmini's mistake in making the first and abiding object of the intellect *ens in genere*, which is a mere possible *ens*, and no real being at all. It is simply a conception or abstraction formed by the mind operating on the intuition of real being, which never is or can be abstracted or generalized. Yet the author has argued under both presentative knowledge and representative knowledge that the mind, sometimes with, and sometimes without, any thing distinct from and independent of itself, creates its own object; and that the object, as well as the act, may be purely psychical. Thus he tells us that in sense-perception we do not perceive the material thing itself, but the joint product of the material agent and the sentient organism; and that in representation the object represented may be unreal, chimerical, and exist only in the soul, and for the soul alone. And he dwells with great unction on the relief and advantage one finds in escaping from the real world to the unreal which the soul creates for herself. True, he

says that whatever the object, real or unreal, abstract or concrete, it is apprehensible only as an individual object; but the unreal, the chimerical, the abstract, is never individual. Why does he call conceptions *concepts*, if not because he holds the conception is both the act and the object of the mind in conceiving? And does he hold the concept to be always individual, never general? Conception, in his system, is always a generalization, or a general notion, formed by the mind, and existing only in the mind. How, then, can it be an object of the mind? He says truly the object is individual, but "the concept (p. 391) is uniformly general." And yet, in the very first paragraph on the next page, he calls it an object of cognition! Further on, he says, "The concept is a purely relative object of knowledge," whatever that may mean; and in the same section, 389, he speaks of it "as a mental product and *mental object*." To our understanding, he thus contradicts himself.

Yet we hold that whatever the mind cognizes at all, it cognizes in the concrete, as an individual object. And therefore we deny that the ideas of the necessary, the universal, of necessary cause, and the like, which the author calls intuitions, and treats as first principles, necessary assumptions, abstract ideas, &c., are abstractions, mental conceptions, or generalizations; for there are no concretes or individual objects from which they can be abstracted or generalized. As we really apprehend them, when affirmed in the ideal formula by the divine act, and as we cannot apprehend what is neither being nor existence, as the author himself says, though continually asserting the contrary; and as every existence is a finite contingent existence, they must be real, necessary, and universal being. They cannot be generalizations of being; for nothing is conceivable more general and universal than being. Being, taken in its proper sense, as the *ens simpliciter* of the schoolmen, is itself that which is most individual and, at the same time, the most general, the most particular and the most universal. These so-called necessary ideas, then, are being; and in apprehending them as intuitively affirmed, we do really apprehend being. Hence, as being, real and necessary being, is God, whom the theologians call *Ens necessarium et reale*, God, in affirming the ideal formula, intuitively affirms himself, and we really apprehend him, not as he is in himself, in his essence, indeed, but as being, the ideal or the intelligible, that is, as facing our intelligence; or, in other words, we apprehend

him as the subject of the judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, or as the subject of the predicate existences, united and distinguished by his creative act, the only real, as the only possible, copula.

The author makes man the analogon of God, and, indeed, God in miniature, or a finite God, and gravely tells us, p. 100, that "we have only to conceive the limitations of our being removed, and we have the conception of God." But as we are not being, but existence, we are finite and limited in our very nature; remove the limitations, and we are not God, but nothing. Eliminate the finite, says Père Gratry, and you have God, in the same way and by the same process that the mathematician has his infinitesimals. But this process of elimination of the finite gives the mathematician only the infinitely less than the finite number or quantity, and it would give the theologian not the infinitely greater but the infinitely less than the finite existence. Besides, the process could at best give us not God in his being, but a mere abstract God, existing only as a mental generalization. The universal cannot be concluded from the particular, nor the necessary from the contingent, because, without the intuition of the universal and the necessary, we have and can have no experience of the particular and the contingent—a fact we commend to the consideration of the inductive theologians.

As the conception is always general, it can never be the object of the mind in the fact of thought. It is a product of the mind operating on the individual object or objects which the mind has thought, and is never the object itself. The same may be said of generalization, abstraction, and every form of reasoning. But if this be so, in what are conceptions, abstractions, &c., known? If they are known at all, they must be objects of knowledge; if not known at all, how can we think or speak of them? They are known in knowing their concretes, as the author himself tells us. As concepts, abstractions, generalizations, or general notions, they do not exist in nature, and cannot be known or thought. But they exist as qualities or properties of things, and are known in knowing the things themselves. Thus we know round things; all round things have the same property of being round; we may, then, consider only this property common to all round things, and form the general conception of roundness; but we do not see or apprehend roundness, and the object of thought is always the round thing.

So of all the so-called universals that are abstractions, conceptions, or generalizations. The object known is the concrete; the abstraction, abstracted from it, being nothing, is not known or even thought.

But Cousin, in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, has very properly distinguished general conceptions or general notions from genera and species. The former are real only in their concretes, and knowable only in them; the latter are real, and actually exist *a parte rei*. Genus has relation to generation, and is as real as the individual, for it generates the individual. Hence, we cannot agree with Leibnitz, when he makes the genus or species consist in resemblance, and declares that resemblance real. The individual does not merely mimic the genus, but is produced by it. The genus is always causative in relation to the species, and the species in relation to the individual. The intelligible is always causative in relation to the sensible, which copies or imitates it. The genus is not the possibility of individuals, nor are they its realization. It is not a property or a quality of men as individuals, for it is, in the order of second causes the cause producing them, and therefore cannot be generalized from them, or be a general notion or conception, like roundness, the generalization or abstract of round. Without the genus there could be no generation, as without a generator there could be no genus. Yet, though genera and species, the only universals, properly so-called, are, as the old realists held, real, existing *a parte rei*, and are distinguishable from the individuals, as the generator from the generated, the species from the specificated; they are not separable, and do not exist apart from them. Adam was an individual, lived, acted, sinned, repented, and died, as an individual man; yet was he the generic, as well as individual, man; for he was the whole human race, and the progenitor of all men that have been born or are to be born.

But while we adopt, in relation to genera and species, the doctrine of the mediæval realists, we hold with regard to other so-called universals with St. Thomas, who says they exist *in mente cum fundamento in re*. The *fundamentum in re* of conceptions, abstractions, and generalizations is precisely the individual objects apprehended by the mind from which reason abstracts or generalizes them. The only point which we now make against the author is that the object of thought or knowledge is not the conception or notion, but the object from which the reason forms it; and that in it

nothing is thought beyond that object. Philosophy has been divested of its scientific character, made infinitely perplexing and most difficult to be understood, as well as utterly worthless, by being regarded as the science, not of things, but of these very conceptions, abstractions, and general notions, which, apart from their individuals or concretes, are pure nullities. We insist on this, because we wish to see philosophy brought back to the real, to objects of experience in their relation to the ideal formula; and our principle quarrel with the professor is, that his philosophy is not real, is not the science of realities, but of conceptions and abstractions.

We can hardly pause on what the professor says of judgment and the proposition. We can only remark in passing that every thought, every perception, even, is a judgment—a judgment that the object thought or perceived is real or really exists. Every affimation is a judgment, and every judgment is an affirmation; for denials are made only by affirming the truth denied. Pure negations are unintelligible, present no counter-action to the mind, and cannot be thought. "The fool hath said in his heart, God is—not." It is only by asserting that God is that we can deny that he is. Every negation is the contradiction of what it affirms. So-called negative judgments are really affirmative. We do not mean that denials cannot be made, for we are constantly making them; but they can be made only by affirming the truth; and the denial that transcends the truth affirmed in the denial is simply verbal, and no real denial at all. Universal negation is simply impossible; and hence when we have shown that any system of philosophy leads logically to nihilism, or even universal scepticism, we have refuted it. Logicians tell us that of contradictories one must be false; but it is equally just to say, that of contradictories one must be true; for truth cannot contradict itself, and only truth can contradict falsehood.

But we pass on to Reasoning, which the professor holds to be mediate judgment, and to which we hold all the reflective operations of reason may be reduced. What a mediate judgment is, we do not know. Reasoning may be necessary as the means and condition of judging in a certain class of cases, but the judgment itself is in all cases direct. The error of the professor here, as throughout the whole of this Part III., and, indeed, of his whole treatise, is that he treats every question from the point of view of con-

ception, or the general notion, instead of the point of view of reality, as he cannot help doing as an inductive psychologist.

Reasoning is a reflective operation. It operates on the matter presented by ideal intuition and experience; it clears up, explains, verifies, and classifies what is intuitively affirmed, together with what experience presents. Its instrument is language. We can think without language, and so far De Bonald was wrong, unless he understood, as the professor does, by thought, an act of reflection; but we cannot reflect or reason without language of some sort to re-present to the mind's contemplation the ideal or intelligible intuition. This re-presentation is not an act of the soul herself, nor the direct and immediate act of the Creator, as is the ideal intuition. It is effected only by language in which the ideal or intelligible is embodied and represented, and of which it is the sensible sign or representation. In other words, the ideal is an object of reflection only as taught through the medium of language; for we must bear in mind that man is not pure spirit or pure intelligence, but spirit united to body, and that he must have some sort of sensible representation in order to reflect. Hence the peripatetic maxim, *nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, which does not mean that only sensibles are cognizable, but that nothing can be reflectively thought, or as the Italians say, re-thought, (*ripensare*,) without sensible representation. That God is, can be proved with certainty by reason; for we have immediate intuition of that which is God in the intuition of real and necessary being; but we cannot reach the conclusion that the intuitively affirmed object really is God without reflecting on the intuition, and this we cannot do unless it is re-presented or held up to our contemplation in language, or without its being sensibly represented by the word God. Language is the necessary instrument of reason; we cannot reason without it, and only rational existences have language properly so-called. No animal deprived of "the discourse of reason" has even articulation.

Those philosophers, or pretended philosophers, who regard language either as a human invention or as the spontaneous production of human nature, have never duly considered its office in the development of thought, and in the rational operations of the soul. Men could not have invented language without reflection, and without language they cannot reflect. It needs language to be able to invent language.

The other theory is no better. The soul does not secrete language as the liver secretes bile, for language has in it more than human nature. The spontaneous productions of nature may be less than nature, but cannot be more. There is a philosophy in language broader and deeper than human thought, a philosophy that embraces elements which are known only by revelation, and which human nature does not contain. All language is modelled after the ideal formula. Its essential elements are subject, predicate, and copula, or the noun, adjective, and verb. The verb and adjective may be, and often are, combined in the same word, but they can be resolved always into the predicate and copula. The copula is always the verb *to be*, or its equivalent in other languages than our own, and this verb is the only verb in any language.

The verb *to be* is precisely the name of God himself, the SUM QUI SUM. We cannot make, then, a single assertion but by the divine Being, and he enters as the copula into every one of our judgments without which no affirmation can be expressed. But God is supernatural, and is the author of nature; the ideal formula which is repeated in every judgment is not contained in human nature, is not in the human mind as in its subject, but is above our nature, and by affirming itself creates our nature, both physical and intellectual. How then could our nature, operating simply as second cause, produce spontaneously language which in its essential nature expresses what is beyond and above itself? Men, especially philosophers, or rather theorizers, have corrupted and still continue to corrupt language, as we can see in the book before us; but we have never yet heard of any one by the spontaneous action of nature secreting or producing a language, or of any one having a language without being taught it. Yet nature is all to-day that it ever was, and as fresh, as vigorous, as prolific. Even the fall has not deprived it of any of its primitive faculties, capacities, properties, or tendencies. If language is a spontaneous production of human nature, we ought to have some instances of children growing up and speaking a rich and philosophical language without having ever learned it. For ourselves, we have a huge distrust of all those theories which assume that nature could and did do in the past what she does not and cannot do in the present. Our *savants* employ themselves in seeking the types of domestic animals in the wild races; why not seek the type of the wild races in the

domestic? Why suppose man could and once did domesticate races which he finds it difficult, if not impossible, to domesticate now? We do not believe much in the modern doctrine of progress, but we believe just as little in the wonderful superiority of nature and men in ante-historical times, which is sometimes assumed, especially by the champions of progress.

Language is neither a human invention nor a natural production, but was created by God himself and infused into man along with the affirmation of the ideal formula, when he made him and placed him in the Garden, and it has been perpetuated by tradition, or by being handed down from father or rather mother to child. It comes to us from the hand of the Creator; he who made man gave him speech. We can explain the origin of language in no other way, as we can explain the origin of man only by saying with the catechism, God made him. As language is the instrument of reason, and re-presents to his contemplation the ideal which the Creator fitted it to symbolize, its corruption or confusion has a most disastrous effect on philosophy. It was confounded at Babel, and men lost the unity of speech, and with it the unity of the ideal, and were dispersed. The Gentiles lost the unity of language, and they lost with it the unity of the ideal, or the copula of the divine judgment, and labored to explain, as our modern *savants* are laboring to explain, the existence and laws of the universe without the creative act of God. Language, corrupted, re-presented to the ancient Gentiles, as it does to our modern physiologists and psychologists, the ideal only in a mutilated form, and hence the fatal error of Gentilism and of modern so-called science, which asserts pantheism. It is necessary, in order to have a true philosophy, to have some means of preserving the purity and infallibility of speech, and at no former period was such means more necessary than it is now.

The instrument of reasoning is language; its form is the syllogism, which is given in the ideal formula. All the matter of knowledge is given in presentation, and the syllogism does not advance it; but it explains, distinguishes, arranges it according to the real relations of the objects known, clears up what is obscure, and verifies what is uncertain, doubtful, by reducing the whole to its principle or principles. The principle and model of the syllogism are in the ideal. Being and existences are the extremes, and

the creative act is the *medius terminus*. The major represents being, the minor existences, and the middle term produces the conclusion. To this regular form of the syllogism every form of argument is reducible. If the major is universal, and the minor is proved, the conclusion is necessary and apodictic.

The modes in which reason operates are two, deduction and induction, or analysis and synthesis. Deduction is simple analysis, or what Kant calls analytic judgment, and simply dissects the subject, analyzes it, and brings out to our distinct view what is in it. It is never illative, but always explicative, and enables us to distinguish the part in the whole, the property in the essence, or the effect in the cause. Dr. Porter entirely mistakes it in supposing it to be an imperfect induction. There is nothing inductive in it. Induction is what Kant calls a synthetic judgment *a posteriori*, and adds an element not contained in the subject analyzed. In synthetic judgments *a posteriori*, the added element is taken from experience; in synthetic judgments *a priori*, the added element is from the ideal formula, intuitively given, or rather, the ideal formula is that into which what Kant calls synthetic judgments *a priori* are resolvable. The syllogism is used in deduction and in induction; yet it is not properly either, but is productive. As being creates existences, so the major through the middle term unites the minor to itself and produces the conclusion. Such men as Sir William Hamilton and J. Stuart Mill, who reject the middle term, and hold the major may be a particular proposition, are misled by their philosophy, which excludes the creative act of God both from the universe and from science. No man who has a false or defective philosophy can understand logic as a science. Pantheism, which excludes the creative act, is the supreme sophism. It is not easy to say what Dr. Porter's views of logic, either as a science or as an art, really are.

The chief complaint against the professor here is, that he makes reasoning turn on the laws of the mind, on conceptions, and general notions, and reflecting, as logic, only the relations and forms of the creations or products of the mind, instead of the relations and forms of things. He studies every thing from the point of view of the mental act, instead of studying them from the point of view of the ideal intuition, which is the point of view of God himself. He there-

fore gives in his science, not things as they are, but as the mind conceives them.

The conceptions and general notions play, no doubt, an important part in the process of reasoning, but they play not the chief part, nor do they impose upon logic the laws it must follow. The categories are not general conceptions or general notions, formed by generalizing individuals or particulars. M. Cousin assumes that he has reduced them to two, substance and cause, or being and phenomenon; but as with him substance is a necessary cause, and as phenomenon is only an appearance or mode of substance, his reduction is really to one, the category of substance, which it is needless to say is pure pantheism. They, however, may be reduced to the three terms of the ideal formula; for whatever is conceivable is being, existence, or the creative act of being. The categories are not, then, merely formal, simply conceived by the mind *cum fundamento in re;* but are the ideal principles of things themselves. Take the categories of space and time, which seem to puzzle the author as they have puzzled many greater and wiser men than he. Space is ideal and actual. Ideal space is the power or ability of God to externize his act, that is, to create or act *ad extra;* and actual space is the relation of coexistence of his externized acts or creatures. Ideal space pertains to being, is being itself; actual space being a real relation between creatures, and, like all relations, really existing in the related, comes under the head of existences, and is joined to being as well as distinguished from it by the creative act. The reason of space and time is the same. Time also is ideal and actual. Actual time is the relation of succession, and ideal time is the ability of God to create existences that, as second causes, are explicated and completed successively, or reach their end progressively. Ideal time is God. Actual time is creature, since all relations really exist in the related. The difficulty which so many eminent men have felt with regard to these two categories, evidently reducible to the terms of the ideal formula, grows out of their attempt to abstract them, the ideal from God, and the actual from the related, whether existences or events. Take away the body and the space remains, says Cousin. Certainly; because the intuition of the ability of God to externize his act—that is, to create—remains. So of time. So of the infinite lines of the geometrician. No actual line is infinite, and the conception of its infinity is based on the intuition of the

infinite power or ability of God, the real ground on which the line, when conceived to extend beyond the actual, is projected.

There are various other points presented by the learned professor in this part and in Part IV. on which we intended to comment, but we have exhausted our space and the patience of our readers. We have said enough, however, to show that he recognizes intuition only as an act of the soul, and therefore, however honorable his intention, since he fails to recognize ideal intuition, which is the act of God, he fails to get beyond experience, to extend science beyond the sensible or material world with the operations of the soul on sensations, and therefore cannot be followed as a safe guide in the philosophy of the human mind. He has learning, industry, and even philosophical instincts, but is ruined by his so-called Baconian method.

CHRISTIANITY AND POSITIVISM.

[From the Catholic World for October, 1871.]

Dr. McCosh had acquired a considerable reputation among Presbyterians in his own country and ours, by several philosophico-theological works he had published, before he was invited to become the president of the New Jersey College at Princeton, one of the most distinguished literary institutions of the Union. It had an able president, also a Scotsman, in Dr. Witherspoon, one of the signers of the Declaration, and a devoted champion of American independence, and, though a Presbyterian, a sturdy defender of civil and religious liberty. Dr. McCosh comes to the presidency of the college with a high literary and philosophical reputation, and comes under many advantages, and its friends expect him to contribute much to raise still higher its character, and place it on a level with Harvard and Yale, perhaps even above them.

There is some ability and considerable knowledge displayed in the volume of lectures before us, though not much originality. The author professes to take the side of Christianity against the false and mischievous theories of such men as Sir William Hamilton, J. Stuart Mill, Huxley, Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and others, whom he classes as belonging to the Positivist school. We have every disposition in the world to think and speak well of the volume, and to give it full credit for every merit it may claim. It is directed against our enemy even more than against his. Positivism is the most open, frank, honest, and respectable antagonist Christianity or Catholicity has had in modern times, and, we may add, the ablest and the most logical, especially as represented by avowed Positivists. In fighting against us, positivism fights against our Presbyterian doctor, so far as he retains any element of Catholic truth, and there is no good reason why his war against it should not tend as far as it goes to the same end as ours. Positivism can be opposed and Christianity defended only on Catholic ground;

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* *Christianity and Positivism.* A Series of Lectures to the Times, on Natural Theology and Apologetics. By James McCosh, D. D., LL. D. New York, 1871.

and so far as Dr. McCosh really does either, he must assume our ground and serve in our ranks, or at any rate be on our side; and it would be churlish in us to reject or underrate his services because in certain other matters he is against us, or is not enrolled in our ranks.

It is certain that in these lectures, which show marks of much hard mental labor, the author has said many good things, and used some good arguments; but having truth only in a mutilated form, and only his private judgment to oppose to the private judgment of Positivists, he has been unable to give a full and conclusive refutation of positivism. As a Protestant trained in Protestant schools, he has no clear, well-defined catholic principles to which he can refer the particular truths he advances, and the special arguments he urges for their unity and support. His book lacks unity, lacks the mental grasp that comprehends in its unity and universality the whole subject, under all its various aspects, or in its principle, on which it depends, and which explains and justifies it. His book is a book of particulars, of details, of general conclusions drawn from particular facts and statements, like all Protestant books. This is not so much the fault of the author perhaps as of his Protestantism, which, since it rejects catholicity and has nothing universal, is essentially illogical, and can deal only in particulars or with individual things. The contents of the book are referred to no general principle, and the particular conclusions drawn are of little value, because isolated, each standing by itself instead of being reduced to its principle and co-ordinated under its law. The author lacks the conception of unity and universality; he has particulars, but no universals—variety, but no identity—multiplicity, but no unity, except in words. This is a great defect, and renders his work inconclusive as an argument, and exceedingly tedious to the reader as well as the reviewer. This defect runs all through the author's philosophy. In his *Intuitions of the Mind*, there is no unity of intuition, but a variety of isolated intuitions—no intuition of principle, of the universal, but simply intellectual apprehension of supersensible particulars, as in *The Human Intellect* of Professor Porter, who is a far abler man than Dr. McCosh.

We are utterly unable to analyze these lectures, reduce their deliverances to a universal principle, which, if accepted, is decisive of the whole controversy they attempt to settle, or if rejected proves the whole worthless. Then we com-

plain of the author for the indignity he offers to Christianity by suffering the Positivists to put it on the defensive, and in attempting to prove it against positivism. Christianity is in possession, and is not called upon to defend her right till strong reasons are adduced for ousting her. Consequently, it is for those who would oust her to prove their case, to make good their cause. The Christian controversialist at this late day does not begin with an apology or defence of Christianity, but attacks those who assail her, and puts them on their defence. It is for the scientists, or Positivists, who oppose the Christian religion, to prove their positivism or science. It is enough for the Christian to show that the positivism or alleged science is not itself proven, or, if proven, that it proves nothing against Christ and his Church. Dr. McCosh seems to have some suspicion of this, and occasionally attempts to put positivism on its defence, but he does it without laying down the principle which justifies it; and in doing it he renders it useless, by immediately running away after some pet speculation of his own, which gives his opponent ample opportunity to resume the offensive.

Dr. McCosh, also, more than half agrees with the Positivists, and concedes that the religious society, as such, has no right to judge of the bearings of the conclusions of the scientists on religion. "All this shows," he says, pp. 5, 6, "that religious men *qua* religious men are not to be allowed to decide for us the truths of science. Conceive an Œcumenical Council at Rome, or an Assembly of Divines at Westminster, or an Episcopal Convocation at Lambeth, or a Congregational Council at Plymouth, or a Methodist Conference in Connecticut taking upon it to decide for or against the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, or the grand doctrine established in our day of the conservation of force and the correlation of all the physical forces, on the ground of their being favorable or unfavorable to religion!" This concedes to the Positivists that science is independent of religion, and that religion is to be accepted or rejected as it does or does not accord with science, and wholly overlooks the fact that religion is the first science, and that nothing can be true, scientifically or otherwise, that is contrary or unfavorable to religion. Religion is the word of God, and every religious man says with the inspired apostle, "Let God be true, and every man a liar."

Dr. McCosh, of course, cannot say this, for, having no

infallible authority to define what is or is not religious truth or the word of God, he is obliged to place religion in the category of opinions which may or may not be true, and therefore to deny it as the law for all intelligences. Supposing God has appointed an authority, infallible through his gracious assistance, to teach all men and nations his religion, or the truth he has revealed, and the law he commands all to obey, this authority must be competent to decide whether any alleged scientific discoveries are or are not favorable to religion, and must necessarily have the right to decide prior to all scientific investigation. If this authority decides that this or that theory is unfavorable to religion, we as religious men must pronounce it false, and refuse to entertain it. Dr. McCosh, as a Presbyterian or Protestant, would have no right to say so, but the Catholic would have the right, and it is his duty to say so; because religion is absolutely true, and the supreme law for reason as well as for conscience, and what is or is not religion, the authority unerringly decides for him. Nothing that is not in accordance with the teachings of religion can be true in science any more than in religion itself, though many things may be true that are not in accordance with the opinions and theories held by religious men.

The moment the Christian allows that the authority is not catholic; that it is limited and covers only one part of truth; and that there is by its side another and an independent authority, another and independent order of truth, he ceases to be able to meet successfully the Positivists; for truth is one, and can never be in opposition to truth—that is, in opposition to itself. Religion, we concede, does not teach the sciences, or the various facts with which they are constructed, but it does judge and pronounce authoritatively on the inferences or conclusions scientific men draw from these facts, or the explanations they give of them, and to decide whether they are or are not consistent with her own teachings. If they are inconsistent with the revealed word, or with what that word implies, she pronounces them false: and, if warranted by the alleged facts, she pronounces the alleged facts themselves to be misinterpreted, misapprehended, misstated, or to be no facts. Her authority is higher than any reasonings of men, than the authority even of the senses, if it comes to that, for nothing is or can be more certain than that religion is true. We cannot as Catholics, as Christians, make the concession to the Positivists the Pres-

byterian doctor does, that their science is an authority independent of religion, and not amenable to it.

Dr. McCosh, we think, is unwise, in a controversy with Positivists, in separating natural theology, as he calls it, from revealed theology. The two are only parts of one whole, and, in point of fact, although distinguishable, have never existed separately at any epoch of history. The existence of God, the immateriality of the soul, and the liberty of man or free-will, are provable with certainty by reason, and are therefore truths of philosophy, but they were not discovered by unassisted reason or the unassisted exercise of our natural powers before they were taught to our first parents by the Creator himself, and have never been held as simple natural truths, unconnected with supernatural instruction or some reminiscences of such instruction. Natural theology, or philosophy, and revealed theology form one indissoluble whole, and Christianity includes both in their unity and catholicity. In defending Christianity against positivism, which denies both, we should defend both as a whole; because the natural is incomplete and unable of itself alone to satisfy the demands of reason, which is never sufficient for itself; and the truths necessary to complete it and to solve the objections to the being and providence of God are not obtainable by reason alone or without the light of revelation. We may assert and prove miracles as a fact, but the objection of Positivists to them cannot be scientifically answered till we have proved that they have their law in the supernatural order. The inferences we draw from miracles will not be appreciated or allowed by men who deny the supernatural and reduce God to nature.

The author in reality has no method, but he begins by attempting to prove the being of God, then the existence of mind in man, and the reality of knowledge, and finally, in the second part, that the life of Christ was the life of a real personage, and proves the reality of his religion. He offers only one argument to prove that God is, and that is the well-known argument from design, which he bases on the principle that every effect has its cause. He does not develop this argument, which has been so fully done by Paley and the *Bridgewater Treatises*, but simply asserts its sufficiency. There are marks of design in adapting one thing to another throughout the universe, which can be only the effect of the action of an intelligent designer. Giving this argument all possible force, it does not carry the

author in his conclusion beyond Plato or Aristotle, neither of whom was properly a theist. Plato and Aristotle both believed in an intelligent mind in the universe, operating on an eternal uncreated matter, forming all things from pre-existing materials, and arranging them in an artistic order. The argument from design can go no further, and this is all that is proved by Paley's illustration of the watch, which would be no illustration at all to a mind that had no intuition or conception of a designer. Neither Plato nor Aristotle had any conception of a creator or supramundane God. Whether the intelligent mind has created all things from nothing, or has only formed and disposed all things from pre-existing matter, as the soul of the world, *anima mundi*, is what can never be determined by any induction from the alleged marks of design discoverable in the universe.

We therefore hold, and have always held, that this famous argument, the only one the Baconian philosophy admits, however valuable it may be in proving or illustrating the attributes or perfections of God, when God is once known to exist, is inconclusive when relied on alone to prove that God is, or is that by which the mind first obtains the idea. It may serve as a corroborative argument, but of itself alone it cannot originate the idea in the mind, or carry one beyond an intelligent soul of the world, or the pantheism of Plato and Aristotle, and of all Gentile philosophy, except the school of Leucippus and Democritus, followed as to physics by Epicurus—unless we must also except the sceptics, Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus. We think, therefore, the author has damaged the cause of Christianity, instead of serving it, by risking it on a single argument, by no means conclusive to his purpose. A weak and inadequate defence is worse than no defence at all.

The principle that every effect has a cause, on which the author bases his argument, is no doubt true; but we must know that the fact is an *effect* before we can infer from it that it has or has had a *cause*. Cause and effect are correlative terms, which connote one another; but this is no proof that this or that fact is an *effect;* and we cannot pronounce it an effect unless we know that it has begun to exist; nor even then, unless we have the intuition of cause; and no intuition even of a particular cause suffices, unless we have intuition of a universal cause. It is not so simple a thing, then, to pronounce a given fact an *effect*, and to conclude that there is between it and something else, the relation of cause

and effect. It is precisely this relation that Hume, Kant, Thomas Brown, Sir William Hamilton, Dr. Mansel, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and all the so-called Positivists deny or relegate to the region of the unknowable. Dr. McCosh does not refute them, by assuming and arguing from the principle; he simply begs the question.

Now, we venture to tell our learned and philosophic author that his whole argument for natural theology falls to the ground before a mind that has no intuition of the relation of cause and effect, that is not previously furnished with the knowledge of design and of a designing cause. Hence, from the alleged marks of design and adaptation of means to ends, it is impossible to infer a designer. When the watch was presented for the first time to the untutored savage, he looked upon it as a living thing, not as a piece of artificial mechanism constructed by a watchmaker. He must know that it is a piece of artificial mechanism before he can conclude man has made it. There falls under our observation no more perfect adaptation of means to ends than the octagonal cell of the bee. Does the bee work by design in constructing it? Does the beaver work by design, by intelligent design, in building its dam and constructing its house? It is generally held that the bee as well as the beaver works by instinct, or by a law of its nature, as does the swallow in building its nest. This proves that a designer cannot be inferred from the simple facts observed in nature, as the Positivists maintain. This is the condemnation of the so-called inductive philosophy. The induction, to be valid, must be by virtue of a principle already held by the mind, intuitively or otherwise, and therefore can never of itself supply or give its principle, or by itself alone obtain its principle. God is not an induction from the facts observed in nature; and the Positivists have shown, demonstrated so much, and have therefore shown that observation and induction alone can give no principle, and, therefore, end in nescience—the termination of the so-called *philosophie positive.*

Dr. McCosh is not wholly insensible to this conclusion, and seeks to escape it by proving that there is a mind in man endowed with the capacity of knowing things as they are. But if the existence of the mind needs to be proved, with what can we prove it? By consciousness, the author answers; but that is a sheer paralogism, for consciousness is

simply an act of the mind, and presupposes it. God can no more be an induction from the facts of consciousness than from the facts of nature. In either case, the God induced is a generalization; in the one case, the generalization of nature, and, in the other, the generalization of consciousness. The former usually goes by the name of atheism, the latter by the name of egoism.

Dr. McCosh very properly rejects Hamilton's and Mansel's doctrine of the pure relativity of all knowledge, and Herbert Spencer's doctrine that all knowledge is restricted to the knowledge of phenomena or appearances, though conceding that appearances are unthinkable without a reality beyond them, but that the reality beyond them, and which appears in them, is itself unknowable; and maintains truly that we know things themselves, both sensibles and supersensibles. We know them, he contends, by intuition, or a direct looking on or beholding them by the simple intellectual force of our minds. Of this we are not so certain, for we do not ourselves know by intuition why salt is bitter and sugar sweet, and we think the doctor knows things themselves only in so far as he excepts their essence or substance, and confounds the thing with its properties, or its accidents, as say the schoolmen, in which case he makes no appreciable advance on Mr. Herbert Spencer. We know the appearances and the sensible properties of bread, but we do not know its essence or substance. Has the Presbyterian doctor, who seems to have a holy horror of Catholicity, invented a philosophy for the express purpose of combating with apparent reason the mystery of transubstantiation, by making it conflict with the positive testimony of the senses and the human intellect?

But let that pass. The intuition the doctor recognizes is empirical intuition, and intuition of particular or individual things, not of principles, causes, relations. And from the knowledge of those individual things, he holds that man rises by generalization and abstraction—that is, induction—from one degree of knowledge to another, till he finally attains to the knowledge of God distinct from the world, and clothes him with infinite perfections. Yet the good doctor claims to be a philosopher, and enjoys a high reputation as such. None of these individual things, nor all of them together, are God, or contain him; how, then, from them, supposing you know them, rise scientifically to him? and what by abstraction and generalization is that to which

the mind attains? Only their generalization or abstraction, which as a creation of the mind is a nullity. He, like Hamilton, in this would make philosophy end in nescience.

We, of course, hold that we apprehend and know things themselves, not phenomena merely, and as they are, not as they are not—that is, in their real relations, not to us only, but in the objective world. But to know things as they are, in their real objective relations, or to know them at all, demands intuition of them, in their contingency or in their character of creatures or effects—that is to say, as existences, not as independent, self-existent beings, which they are not. And this is not possible without the intuition of the necessary, of real being, on which they depend and from which they are derived. When we say a thing is an effect, we say it has been caused, and therefore, in order to say it, we must have intuition of cause; and if we say of a thing that it is a particular cause, we deny that it is a universal cause, which we could not do without the intuition of universal cause. So when we say of a thing it is contingent, we simply deny it to be necessary being, and we could not deny a thing to be necessary being if we had no intuition of necessary being. If the author means by abstracting and generalizing our knowledge of things or individual existences, distinguishing this ideal intuition, or the intuition of real, necessary, and universal being—what philosophers sometimes call necessary ideas—from the intuition of things or contingent existences, along with which it is presented in thought, and as the necessary condition of our apprehending them, and by reflection and contemplation ascertaining that this ideal, necessary and universal, is really God, though not intuitively known to be God, we do not object to the assertion that we rise from our knowledge of things to the knowledge of God himself. What we deny is that God can be concluded from the intuition or apprehension of things. We rise to him from the ideal intuition, or intuition of the real and necessary, which enters the mind with the intuition of the things, and without which we never do or could have intuition of them, any more than they could exist without the creative act of real and necessary being creating them from nothing and sustaining them in existence; but it needs to be disengaged by a mental process from the empirical intuition with which it is presented.

This ideal intuition is not immediate and direct intuition of God, as the pseudo-ontologists contend, and which the

Church has condemned; but is intuition under the form of necessary, universal, eternal, and immutable ideas—of that which the mind, by reasoning, reflection, and contemplation, proves really is God. What misleads the author and so many others who use the argument he uses, is that the intuition of real and necessary being, and the intuition of contingencies, are given both in the same thought, the one along with the other, and most minds fail to distinguish them—which is done, according to St. Thomas, by the *intellectus agens*, in distinction from the passive or receptive intellect—and hence they suppose that they conclude the ideal intuition from the empirical intuition. This is decidedly the case with Dr. McCosh. The learned doctor admits intuitions, but only intuitions of individual existences—what we call empirical intuitions—whether causes or effects, not intuition of the ideal; and hence his argument for the existence of God proves nothing, for the universal is not derivable from the particular, the necessary from the contingent, nor being from existences. Had he recognized that along with, as its necessary condition, the intuition of the particular there always is the intuition of the universal, &c., he would have placed theology against positivism on an impregnable foundation. The necessary ideas, the universal, the eternal, the immutable, the necessary, connoted in all our thoughts, cannot be simply abstractions, for abstractions have no existence *a parte rei*, and are formed by the mind operating on the concrete object of empirical intuition. As these ideas are objects of intuition, they are real; and if real, they are either being or existences. But no existences are or can be necessary, universal, eternal, immutable, for they depend to be on another, as is implied in the very word existence, from *ex-stare*. Then they must be being, and identifiable in the one universal, eternal, real, and necessary being, and distinguishable from existences or things, as the creator from his creatures, the actor from the act.

We have said that the ideal intuition is not intuition of God, but of that which is God; we say now that the ideal intuition is not formally intuition of *ens* or being, as erroneously supposed by some to be maintained by Gioberti and ourselves, but of that which is *ens*. The process of demonstrating that God is consists in identifying, by reflection and reasoning, the necessary ideas or ideal intuition with real, necessary, universal, eternal, and immutable being, and real and necessary being in which they are all identified with

God. This process is demonstration, not intuition. When we say, in the syllogism, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, we have intuition of the necessary, else we could not say it; but we have not intuition of the fact that the necessary is being, far less that it is God. This is known only by reflection and reasoning, disengaging the ideal from the empirical. The idea must be real, or there could be no intuition of it, but if real, it must be being; if being, it must be real and necessary being; and real and necessary being is God. So of all the other necessary ideas. As the intuition is of both the ideal or necessary and the contingent in its principle, and in their real relation, it gives the principles of a complete demonstration of the being of God as Creator, and of the universe as the effect of his creative act, and therefore of the complete refutation of pantheism. The vice of Dr. McCosh's argument is that it proceeds on the denial of ideal intuition, and the assumption that being, God, is obtainable by generalization and abstraction from the individual things given in empirical intuition. It is not obtained by reflection from them, but from the ideal intuition, never separable from the empirical.

This process of proving that God is may be called the ideal process, or the argument from universal and necessary ideas intuitively given. It is not *a priori*, because the ideal is held by intuition; nor is it an argument from innate ideas, as Descartes held; nor—since really objective, and present to the mind—is it an argument from the primitive beliefs or constituent principles of human nature, as Dr. Reid and the Scottish school maintained, and which is only another form of the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas; or an argument drawn from our own *fonds*, as Leibnitz imagined, or from the *a priori* cognitions or necessary forms of the intellect, as Kant held, and which is only the doctrine of the Scottish school of Reid and Stewart differently stated; but from principles or *data* really presented in intuition, and along with the empirical intuition of things. It places, therefore, the being of God on as firm a basis and renders it as certain to the understanding as our own existence, or as any fact whatever of which the human mind has cognizance; indeed, renders it absolutely certain and undeniable. But while we say this, and while we maintain that the ideal intuition is given along with the empirical intuition, with which our author confounds it, and from which philosophy or natural theology disengages it, we by no means believe

that the race is indebted to this ideal or metaphysical process—which is too difficult not only for the Positivists, but for their great opponent, Dr. McCosh—for the origin of their belief in God. All ages and nations, even the most barbarous and savage tribes, have some sort of belief in God, some religious notions which imply his existence; and, hovering above the various Eastern and Western mythologies, we find the belief in one God or the divine unity, though neglected or rejected for the worship of inferior gods or demons, or the elements—that is, the worship of creatures, which is idolatry, since worshipped as God. The ignorant savage, but a grade above the beasts, has never risen to the conception of God or of the Great Spirit from the contemplation of nature, nor has he attained to religious conceptions by a law of his nature or by instinct, as the bee constructs its cell or the beaver its dam.

It is very true, nothing more true than that "the heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of his hands," but to him only who has the idea of God or already believes that he is. Nothing more true than that God can be traced in all his works, or that "the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made," but only by those who have already learned that he is, are intent on answering the question, *Quid est Deus?* not the question, *An sit Deus?* Hence we so far agree with the traditionalists, not indeed that the existence of God cannot be proved by reason prior to faith, but that, as a fact, God revealed himself to man before his expulsion from the Garden; and the belief, clear and distinct or dim and confused, in the divine being, universally diffused among all races and conditions of men, originated in revelation and is due to the tradition, pure or impure, in its integrity or mutilated and corrupted, of the primitive revelation made by God himself to man. In this way the fact of the universality of the belief in some form is a valid argument for the truth of the belief, and we thus obtain an historical argument to corroborate the already conclusive ideal or metaphysical argument, the principles of which we have given.

We bear willing testimony to the good-will and laudable intention of our author, but we cannot regard him as able, with his mutilated theology and his imperfect and rather superficial philosophy—though less superficial than the phi-

losophy generally in vogue among British and American Protestants—to carry on a successful war against the Positivists. We are almost tempted to say to him:

> Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis
> Tempus eget.

He is too near of kin to the Positivists themselves, and adopts too many of their principles and conclusions, to be able to battle effectively against them. No doubt he urges much that is true against them, but his arguments, as far as effective, are inconsistent with his position as a Protestant, and are borrowed from Catholicity, or from what he has retained from Catholic instruction and Catholic tradition, not from his Protestantism. Having no authority but his own private interpretation of the Scriptures to define what is or is not Christianity, he knows not how much or how little he must defend against the Positivists, or how much or how little he is free to concede to them. He practically concedes to them the Creator. He defends God as the efficient cause, indeed, but not as Creator, producing all things by his word from nothing. He would seem to hold it enough to defend him as the organizer and disposer of materials already furnished to his hand. God does not seem to him to be his own *causa materialis*. He works on a pre-existing matter. He constructs, the author concedes, the existing worlds out of "star-dust," or disintegrated stars, without telling us who made the stars that have dissolved and turned to dust, and without bearing in mind, or without knowing, that Christianity teaches us that "in the beginning God *created* the heavens and the earth," and therefore could not have formed them out of "star-dust" or any other material.

The Protestant divine accepts and defends Darwin's theory of the origin of species by "natural selection," though he does not believe that it applies universally, or that man has been developed from the ape or the tadpole. He denies that Huxley's protoplasm can be developed from protein, or life from dead matter; maintains that all life proceeds from a living organism, that the plant can spring only from a seed, and the animal only from a living cell or germ; and yet concedes that some of the lower forms of organic life may spring or may have sprung from spontaneous generation, and even goes so far as to tell us that some of the most eminent of the fathers held or conceded as much. What becomes, then, of the assertion that life cannot be evolved

from dead matter? He would seem to hold or to concede that man lived, for an indefinite time, a purely animal life, before the Almighty breathed into his nostrils and he became a spiritual man, and quotes to prove it St. Paul's assertion that "not first that which is spiritual, but that which is animal; afterwards that which is spiritual" (1 Cor. xv. 46). He seems, in fact, ready to concede any and every thing except the intelligent Mind recognized by Plato and Aristotle, that has arranged all things according to a preconceived plan, and throughout the whole adapted means to ends. He insists on efficient causes and final causes, but hardly on God as the *causa causarum* or as the *causa finalis* of all particular final causes.

Throughout, as we have already remarked, there is a want of unity and universality in his philosophy, as there necessarily must be in his Protestant theology, and a sad lack of logical consistency and order, or co-ordination. His world is a chaos, as is and must be the Protestant world. Herbert Spencer undertakes to explain the universe without God, or, what is the same thing, with an absolutely unknowable God, which is of course an impossibility; but he has a far profounder intellect and a far more logical mind than Dr. McCosh. He is heaven-wide from the truth, yet nearer to it than his Presbyterian critic. His logic is good; his principles being granted, his conclusions, though absurd, cannot be denied. His error lies in his premises, and, if you correct them, your work is done. He will correct all details, and arrive at just conclusions without further assistance. But Dr. McCosh is one who, however much he may talk about them, never reduces his doctrines to their generic principles, or reasons from principles. He is a genuine Protestant, and cannot be refuted in refuting his principles, which vary with the exigencies of his argument, and are really no principles at all, but must be refuted in detail; and when you have convinced him twice three are six, you have still to prove that three times two are also six.

Now, such a man—and he is, perhaps, above the average of Presbyterian divines—is the last man in the world to attempt the refutation of positivism. No Protestant can do it. Indeed, all the avowed Positivists we have known regard Protestant Christianity as too insignificant a matter to be counted. It is too vague and fluctuating, too uncertain and indefinite, too unsubstantial and intangible, too unsystematic and illogical, to command the least respect from

them. They see at a glance that it is too little to be a religion and too much to be no-religion. It cannot, with its half affirmations and its whole denials, stand a moment before an intelligent Positivist who has a scientific cast of mind. The Positivist rejects the Church, of course, but he respects Catholicity as a logical system, consistent with itself, coherent in all its parts, and for him there is no *via media* between it and positivism. If he were not a Positivist, he says openly, he would be a Catholic, by no means a Protestant, which he looks upon as neither one thing nor another; and we respond that, could we cease to be a Catholic, we should be a Positivist, for to a logical mind there is no medium between the church and atheism. The middle systems, as Protestantism, Rationalism, Deism, &c., are divided against themselves, and cannot stand, any more than a house divided against itself. Their denials vitiate their affirmations and their affirmations vitiate their denials. They are all too much or too little.

The Positivists reject for what they call the scientific age both theology and metaphysics. They believe in the progress of the race, and indeed in all races, as does Dr. McCosh. They distinguish in the history of the human race or of human progress three epochs or stages—first, the theological; second, the metaphysical; and third, the scientific. Theology and metaphysics each in its epoch were true and good, and served the progress of man and society. They have now passed away, and the race is now entering the scientific age, which is the final stage, though not to last for ever; for when the field of science is exhausted, and all it yields is harvested, the race will expire, and the world come to an end, as having no more work to do. It will be seen there is here a remarkable difference between the real Positivists, or believers in Auguste Comte, and our author and his Protestant brethren. The Positivists never calumniate the past, but seek to appreciate its services to humanity, to acknowledge the good it did, and to bury it with honor, as the children of the New Dispensation did the Old, when it had lived its day. One of the finest appreciations from the point of view of humanity of the services of the mediæval monks we have ever read is from the pen of M. E. Littré, the chief of the French Positivists, and one of the most learned men of France. It said not all a Catholic would say, but scarcely a word that could grate on a Catholic ear. Dr. McCosh also believes in progress, in the progress of our species, and, for aught we know, in the progress of all

species and genera, and that we outgrow the past; but he takes pleasure only in calumniating it, and like a bad son curses the mother that bore him. Because he has outgrown his nurse, he contends the nurse was of no use in his childhood, was a great injury, and it would have been much better to leave him to himself, to toddle about at will, and toddle into the fire or the cistern, as he saw proper.

Now, we think, if one believes in the progress of the species or the perfectibility of man by development or by natural agencies, the Positivist doctrine is much the most reasonable as well as far the most amiable. Its effect, too, is far better. We owed much to the doctrine, which we borrowed not from Comte, but from Comte's master, Saint-Simon, the influence of which, under the grace of God, disposed us to return to the old church. It softened the animosity, the bitter hatred, toward the past which we had inherited from our Protestant education, and enabled us to study it with calm and gentle feelings, even with gratitude and respect, and disposed us to view it with impartiality and to appreciate it with justice. Studying the past, and especially the old church which we had complacently supposed the race had outgrown as the man has outgrown the bib and tucker of his childhood, in this new and better mood, we soon discovered that there was much more in the past than we had ever dreamed of, and that it was abundantly able to teach us much more than we or any of our Protestant contemporaries supposed; and we were not long in beginning to doubt if we had really outgrown it, nor in becoming convinced that, instead of outgrowing it, we had fallen below it; that the old church, the central institution of the world, was as needful to us now as in the beginning; and that, in comparison with the full noonday light which beamed from her divine countenance, the light in which we had hitherto walked, or stumbled, rather, was but a fading twilight, nay, midnight darkness.

Of course we differ far more from positivism than does Dr. McCosh, but we can as Catholics better discriminate than he what is true and just in it, and better understand and refute its errors or false principles, because we have the whole truth to oppose to it, not merely certain fragments or disfigured aspects of truth. It is only Catholics who can really set right the class of men Dr. McCosh wars against. Protestants cannot do it. When Theodore Parker published his *Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion*, we had not

outgrown the Protestantism in which we had been trained. We set about refuting him, and we saw at once we could not do it on Protestant grounds, and we planted ourselves on Catholic ground, as far as we then knew it, and our refutation was a total failure except so far as we opposed to the *Discourse* the principles of the Catholic Church. Dr. McCosh has tried his hand in the volume before us against Theodore Parker and the Free Religionists, and with no success save so far as he abandons his Protestantism and quietly appropriates the arguments of Catholics, to which he has no more right than he has to his neighbor's horse. It was hardly generous in the learned doctor, while using their arguments—and they were the only arguments that availed him any thing—to turn upon Catholics and twit them of "ignorance and superstition." Was he afraid that people might discover the source whence he drew the small stock of wisdom and truth he displayed?

We might have made Dr. McCosh's lectures the occasion of presenting a formal refutation of positivism, but we had already taken up from time to time the false principles, the errors and untenable theories and hypotheses, which his lectures treat, and refuted them, so far as they are hostile to Christianity, far more effectively, in our judgment, than he has done or could do. He may be more deeply versed in the errors and absurd hypotheses of the false scientists of the day, who are laboring to explain and account for the universe without creation and Providence, than we are; but we have not found in his volume any thing of value which we have not ourselves already said, and said too, perhaps, in a style more easily understood than his, and in better English than he ordinarily uses. Our readers could learn nothing of positivism from him, and just as little of the principles and reasonings that Christianity is able to oppose to it. He writes as a man who measures the known by what he himself knows, and is now and then out in his measurement.

Dr. McCosh, also, adopts rather too depreciatory a tone in speaking of our countrymen, especially considering that he has but just come among us, and knows us at best only imperfectly. We own it was no striking indication of American intelligence and judgment to import him to preside over one of the best Protestant American institutions of learning and science; but men often loom up larger at a distance than they are when seen close by, and there is no country in which bubble reputations from abroad more

speedily collapse than our own. The doctor will find, when he has lived longer among us, and becomes better acquainted with us, that if England is nearer Germany, German speculations are known to Americans and appreciated by them at least as soon as they are by Englishmen or Scotsmen. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, were known to American scholars before there was much knowledge of them in England or Scotland. The English and Scotch are now just becoming acquainted with and are carried away by theories and speculations in philosophy which had been examined here, and exploded more than thirty years ago by Americans. The doctor underrates the scholarship and intelligence even of his American Presbyterian friends, and there are scholars, men of thought, of science, general intelligence, in the country many degrees above Presbyterians, respectable as they are. Presbyterians are not by any means the whole American people, nor the most advanced portion of them. They are really behind the Congregationalists, to say nothing of "the ignorant and superstitious" Catholics, whose scholars are in science and learning, philosophy, theology, especially in the history of the church, it is no boast to say, superior to either, and know and understand better the movements of the age, the intellectual, moral, social, and political theories, crotchets, and tendencies of the present, than any other class of American citizens. It takes more than a Dr. McCosh, although for a time a professor in Belfast, Ireland, to teach them more than they already know.

We pass over the second part of the lectures, devoted to Apologetics, as of no importance. One needs to know what Christianity is, and to have clearly in his mind the entire Christian plan, before one can successfully defend it against the class of persons the author calls Positivists. This is more than the author knows, or as a Protestant can know. His Christianity is an indefinite, vague, variable, and uncertain opinion, and he has no conception at all of the Christian plan, or what St. Paul calls "the new creation." No doubt the miracles are provable by simple historical testimony by and to one who knows nothing of the Christian plan, or of its supernatural character; but to the unbelievers of our time it is necessary to set forth, in its unity and catholicity, the Christian *schema*, if we may be allowed the term, and to show that miracles themselves have their reason or law in the divine plan or decree, and are no more anomalies, in relation to that plan or decree, or

ex parte Dei, than are earthquakes and volcanoes. It is only in this way we can satisfy the demand for order and regularity. The unbeliever may not be able to resist the testimony which proves the miracle a fact, but till we show him that in a miracle the natural laws are not violated, or that nature does not go out of her course, as he imagines, we cannot satisfy him that he can yield to the miracle without surrendering his natural reason, and the law and order of the universe.

Now, this the Protestant cannot do; and though he might adduce the historical evidences of Christianity satisfactory to a simpler age, or to minds, though steeped in error, yet retaining from tradition a full belief in the reality of a supernatural order, he cannot as a Protestant do it to minds that deny that there is or can be any thing above nature, and that refuse utterly to admit the supernatural order, which the miracles manifest, or that reject miracles, not because the testimony is insufficient, but because they cannot be admitted without admitting the reality of the supernatural. The prejudice against the supernatural must be removed as the preliminary work, and this can be done only by presenting Christianity as a whole in its unity and catholicity, and showing that, according to it, the supernatural or Christian order enters into the original decree of God, and is necessary to complete what is initial in the cosmos, or to perfect the natural order and to enable it to fulfil the purpose for which it exists, or realize its destiny or final cause, in which is its beatitude or supreme good. This done, the prejudice against the supernatural is removed, miracles are seen to be in the order, not indeed of nature, as Carlyle pretends, but in the order of the supernatural, and demanding only ordinary historical testimony to be proved, and consequently Hume's famous argument against miracles, refuted by no Protestant that has protested against it, shown to have no force.

Now, this requires a profound knowledge of Christianity, which is not attainable by private judgment from the Scriptures, or outside of the infallible authority of the church with which the revelation of God, the revealed word, is deposited as its guardian and interpreter. M. Migne, indeed, admits some treatises written by Protestants into his collection of works he has published under the title of *Evangelical Demonstration*, which are not without their merit, but are valuable only on certain points, and on those only so far as they rest on Catholic principles and use Catholic arguments.

Christianity being supernatural, a revelation of the supernatural, it, of course, while addressed to natural reason, cannot be determined or defined by natural reason, and can be determined or defined, preserved or presented, in its purity and integrity, only by an authority supernaturally instituted and assisted for that very purpose. Even what the author calls natural theology, since it is only initial, like the cosmos, is incomplete, and, though not above natural reason, needs the supernatural to fulfil it, and therefore the supervision and control of the same supernaturally instituted and assisted authority to preserve it from error, from a false development, or from assuming a false direction, as we see continually occurring with those who have not such an authority for guide and monitor. Hence, even in matters not above the province of natural reason, natural reason is not a sufficient guide, or else whence come those errors of the Positivists in the purely scientific order the learned doctor combats with so many words, if not thoughts—with so many assertions, if not arguments?

Hence, since Protestants have no such authority, and make it their capital point to deny that any body has it, it follows that they are unable to present any authoritative statement, or any statement at all which an unbeliever is bound to respect, or what Christianity really is, or what is the authentic meaning of the term. They can give only their private views or opinions of what is, and these the unbeliever is not bound to place in any respect above his own, especially since they vary with every Protestant sect, and, we may almost say, with every individual Protestant who thinks enough to have an opinion of any sort. Even if they borrow Catholic traditions, Catholic principles, and Catholic doctrines and definitions, these in their hands lose their authoritative character, and become simply opinions resting on private reason. They can present as Christianity nothing authentic to be defended by the Christian, or to be accepted or rejected by the unbeliever. Clearly, then, Protestants are in no condition to manage apologetics with acute, scientific, and logical unbelievers; and if we wanted any proof of it we could find it, and in abundance, in the volume before us.

PROFESSOR BASCOM'S LECTURES.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1873.]

Professor Bascom belongs in the main to the school of philosophy of which the late President Marsh of the Vermont University may be regarded as the American founder, and of which Dr. Mark Hopkins, ex-president of Williams College, Dr. Noah Porter, president of Yale College, and Dr. McCosh, president of Princeton College, are the best known and the most distinguished members. The school, perhaps, owes its origin to the reaction in English philosophy, begun or promoted by Coleridge, against the sensism and materialism of Locke, or rather of Hobbes, the so-called "philosopher of Malmesbury," who is the best representative of the English mind that can be named, and whose philosophy Locke simply borrowed, diluted, and in some respects disguised. In our own youth, Locke was in our American schools *the* philosopher, as much so as Aristotle was for the mediæval scholastics. The present is a reactionary school; and Professor Bascom, while asserting an order of ideas not derived from either sensation or reflection, directs his main efforts to the refutation of sensism and materialism.

The professor's aim is laudable, and we cannot help applauding the sincerity and earnestness with which he pursues it. But the real value of his philosophical labors depends on his success in establishing the reality or objectivity of the order of ideas not derived from the senses or reflection. If he leaves any doubt on this point, his work, as a refutation of the school of Locke, is good for nothing. We of course believe in the reality of the ideal or supersensible as the basis of all science, but the author will permit us to doubt the sufficiency of his proofs of it. He adopts the inductive method, as does the whole school, and, in defiance of my Lord Bacon, holds it to be as applicable to the study of philosophy as to the study of the physical sciences. But

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**Science, Philosophy, and Religion.* Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston. By John Bascom, Professor in Williams College. New York: 1871.

this method is available for the study of the physical sciences only by virtue of certain *a priori* principles, which the mind consciously or unconsciously applies as the principle of its inductions. The inductive method cannot attain to or supply these principles, for it presupposes them, and no induction is possible without them. The author himself labors to prove this with regard to the physical sciences; only what we call principles he calls ideas, general ideas, intuitive ideas, or simply intuitions, makes them the subject-matter of philosophy, which he places in a central position between the sciences and religion, related to each, and distinguishable from both.

This is well enough so far; but, if induction is impossible in the physical sciences without *a priori* principles, or, as the author says, "general ideas," it is manifest that the principles or ideas on which the possibility of the induction depends, are not obtained or obtainable by way of induction, and, consequently, the inductive method is not applicable to the study of philosophy. This indicates the grand defect of all, or nearly all, modern philosophy, especially in the English-speaking world. The inductive method is the proper, because the necessary, method to be adopted in the study of the sciences; but, as it presupposes and demands principles to validate the inductions, it is not applicable to the study of philosophy, which, for our present purpose, may be defined the science of principles, and, therefore, of the principles of science and religion, so far as religion has a rational or scientific basis. The error of modern philosophy, as we often have occasion to repeat, is in placing method before principles, and in seeking to determine the principles by the method, instead of determining the method by the principles. It puts, to use a homely illustration, the cart before the horse. The mind must be in possession of principles, before it is capable of any operation to obtain them, or by which they may be obtained.

Professor Bascom, though he asserts ideas as *a priori* and necessary to experience, nowhere, so far as we have discovered, asserts them as objective, or as principles, whether principles of science or principles of things. This is evident from the fact that he calls them "general ideas," that is abstractions, and, consequently, nullities. There are no abstractions in nature, or in the real order. A *general* idea is an abstract idea, and therefore, like all other abstractions, objectively null. A general idea is a generic idea, an idea

in genere, that is, no determinate, specific, or particular idea, like the *ens in genere* of Rosmini, and therefore must be unreal; for whatever is real is determinate, specific, individual. We recognize and defend the reality of genera and species, but not as separated from the individuals in which they are concreted. Man is distinguishable, but not separable, from men. Humanity is more than the individual, but it is nothing without the individual; and the indeterminate, or general, without the determinate, or specific, is just as little. Ideas may be taken either as the intelligible object itself, or as the mental apprehension of it, either as the ontological reality, or as the psychological fact. If as the psychological fact, it is subjective; and then how prove or ascertain that there is an objective reality that corresponds to it, or that in apprehension any thing objective is apprehended? There is no logic by which the objective can be concluded from the subjective, as the interminable and always unsatisfactory discussions of psychologists on the question of certainty, or the validity of our subjective ideas or concepts, amply prove. There is no bridge over which the mind can pass from the subjective to the objective. But we must let the author speak for himself:—

"The point about which the conflicts in philosophy, and more especially between the philosophical and scientific tendencies, the metaphysical and the physical methods, are becoming increasingly warm, is that of intuitive ideas. Does the mind, as mind, independently bring any thing to the explanation of the world about it; or, are the initiations of thought and the forms of thought alike from without? This is the pregnant question, which, put in a great variety of ways, is seeking an answer. Spencer laboriously handles it through many pages. Mill returns to it again and again. It is the germinant point of the philosophy of the unconditioned, as urged by Hamilton and Mansell. It reappears in every treatise on ethics, and a negative answer is assumed by every disciple of Positive Philosophy, and every physicist who fancies himself solving problems of mind as well as of matter. Nor is this discussion unworthy of the attention that is bestowed upon it. The bias of our philosophy, of our thinking, must be received at this point; and the answer given by us to this question will discover at once our lines and our methods of investigation, and settle the general character of the results to be attained by us. To broach this inquiry clearly, in the outset, therefore, and answer it squarely, is necessary to perspicuity and soundness of method; since some answer to it, explicit or implicit, will be lurking in our entire discussion. No man ever ridiculed metaphysics, and then proceeded to handle any system of thought, to present any con-

ceptions whatever with breadth, who did not plainly involve in the treatment this very point,—the source and authority of our general ideas. Those ideas have been variously designated, each name striving to seize upon something in their connection with the mind, or with other ideas, peculiar to them and fitted to define them. They have been called intuitive ideas—that is, ideas directly seen by the mind; ideas furnished neither by the senses nor by reflection. They have been termed innate ideas, thereby expressing their independence of experience and priority to it; having the same end in view, they have been spoken of as *a-priori* ideas; and, in reference to their power to bring order, cast light into all our conceptions, they have been designated as formative, regulative, rational, general ideas. We need merely to understand exactly what we are seeking for, under these various appellations, to wit: notions, which owe their origin—fitting occasions being given in experience—exclusively to the mind, to its penetrative, explanatory power; its intuitive, rational, comprehensive grasp. The one philosophy claims, that, in the last analysis, the mind furnishes the notions in the light of which it sees and understands the external world; brings with it its own intellectual solvents, reducing matter, otherwise opaque, to a transparent and penetrable form. The other philosophy asserts that all thought, knowledge, are exclusively the product of matter in its action upon mind—the ripple-marks left by the restless ways of physical forces; that our settled convictions are but the worn pathways in which repeated perceptions and sensations have passed along, lining out for us the roads of intellectual travel. Here we take issue, and affirm unhesitatingly, the mind does furnish ideas, and those, too, the essential ones which give order, system, reason, to *all* its actions."—pp. 27–29.

The author makes the question turn on "the source and authority of ideas," which proves that he is a mere psychologist and no philosopher. The question turns on what ideas are, and it is only in determining what they are, or what is the ideal, that we can determine their source and authority. Unhappily, the professor pretermits this the first and most important question of all, and spends his whole strength on the question, what is the origin of indeterminate ideas, or of we know not what? All he tells us is, that they are *general* ideas and have been variously designated. "They have been called intuitive ideas, that is, ideas directly seen by the mind, ideas furnished neither by the senses nor by reflection; they have been termed innate ideas, thereby expressing their independence of experience and priority to it; having the same end in view, they have been spoken of as *a priori* ideas," &c. "We need," he adds, "merely to understand exactly what we are seeking for under these appellations, to wit: notions which owe their origin—fitting occasions being

given by experience—to the mind, to its penetrative, explanatory power; its intuitive, rational, comprehensive grasp." These statements refer to the source of ideas, and simply affirm that they are not derived from sensation or reflection, as held by Locke, but are *notions* furnished by the mind itself. But is there any thing noted in these notions really objective and independent of the human mind or soul itself? This is a question the professor does not answer or even raise; and yet it is the real question in the case.

It is true, he calls the general ideas intuitions, or ideas directly seen by the mind; but he also accepts the assertion, that they are innate and *a priori* ideas, because they are independent of experience and prior to it. But if they are directly *seen* by the mind they are facts of experience, not prior to it, and are *a posteriori*, not *a priori*. Then, being abstractions, the mind cannot directly see or apprehend them, for abstractions are formed by the mind operating on the concrete, as roundness from round, whiteness from white, and have as abstractions no existence *in rerum natura*. The author says the ideas are furnished by the mind, on the occasion presented by experience, but it is not clear what he means by this. If he holds, as it would seem he does, that the mind furnishes them from itself, they are not objective, independent of the mind, but subjective, simply the mind itself, or its inherent law, mode, or affection projected; and the professor simply reproduces the subjectivism of Kant, who makes the categories forms of the understanding, which is easily resolved into the egoism of Fichte.

The professor seems to us to be grappling with a philosophy which he has not mastered. He protests against the sensism and materialism of Locke, which is to his credit; but he would seem to be not aware that, if he adopts Locke's principles and follows his method, he cannot refute either the one or the other. Leibnitz, in his remarks on Locke's essay, and even in his *Nouveaux Essais*, fails to refute Locke's doctrine. He proposes, indeed, an amendment to the peripatetic maxim, so that it should read: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, NISI *intellectus ipse*. This really adds nothing, except the subject, to the sensation and reflection of Locke. Nothing objective we mean; for, what ever the forms, inherent ideas, or innate faculties of the mind, they are subjective, and apprehension of them does not extend our knowledge beyond the sphere of the subject, and it remains true, as Locke held that all our ideas imply-

ing a reality beyond the subject—which is the real doctrine of Locke—are derived from sensation and reflection.

What the professor is required to establish, to effect his purpose, is not the existence of abstract ideas in the mind, but an intelligible world, transcending matter and the senses, independent of the understanding and its faculties, and in which are the principles of all the real and the knowable, whether sensible or non-sensible. This the professor, though he talks largely of ideas, does not succeed in doing, because he makes the intuition our act, and the ideas subjective, furnished by the mind, instead of being furnished to it from a source independent of itself. The professor is a psychologist, and attempts, as does all modern German heterodox philosophy, to explain the fact of human knowledge from the soul itself, as if the soul were an independent existence, and capable of operating from and by itself alone. We need not wonder at the prevalence of atheism, when the official philosophy of the day assumes that, in the fact of knowledge, the soul is independent of God and his creative act. The soul, no matter in what sphere, can no more know than it can exist without the presence of the creative act of God. The creative act of God is a continuous act, and creates us from nothing every moment of our existence; and were God for a single instant to withdraw his creative act, we should drop into nothingness. The creative act is identically the act of conservation. God did not create the world, give it a kick, and say, "There, go ahead, on your own hook," as modern Deists hold. He is immanent in all his works, not immanent indeed, in the pantheistic sense, as the subject acting in their acts, but as the cause creating and sustaining their activity. We are dependent on him for every thought we think, for every act we perform, for every breath we draw.

God has created us substantial and intelligent existences, but capable, in neither respect, of acting or knowing without him; and his creative act is as necessary to enable us to know as to act or to exist: our intelligence is as dependent on him as our existence itself. If the soul were capable of thinking or knowing in and of itself, and without him, it would be an independent being, would be God; and the words of Satan, "Ye shall be as gods," instead of being false, would be true. Nearly all the philosophy that has obtained since Descartes, who was in philosophy what Luther was in theology, assumes that the soul is God, and needs not God in order to be intelligent.

Intuition may be taken in two senses: the one, as the immediate presentation of the object; the other, as its immediate or direct apprehension, in which sense it stands opposed to discursion. The first we call ideal intuition, the second we call empirical intuition, and is impossible without ideal intuition. In both the object is active and presents or affirms itself; but in the ideal intuition the object, that is, the idea, creates the intellect and is simultaneously its immediate object and light. The human soul, being dependent, cannot think in or by itself alone; but, alike in ideal intuition and in empirical, there must be presented the object, or there is no thought. Thought is the product of two activities acting and meeting from opposite directions. But what is not or does not exist, cannot act. The object in every intuition is therefore real; for, if it were not, it could not present itself; and if it did not present itself, there could be no thought, since the soul can act only in conjunction with its object.

In ideal intuition, or intuition of ideas, the principle is the same. The ideas must be active, offer a counterpressure to the mind, and therefore cannot be the mind's own creations or products, or laws even; but must be objective, independent of the subject, and real, or exist *a parte rei*, as say the schoolmen. They are not, then, as Professor Bascom imagines, notions, but principles, alike of science and of things, and given *a priori;* for, without them, as the professor justly maintains, no experience or empirical intuition is possible. The error of the professor is in not establishing the independence and reality of ideas, which follow necessarily from the fact, which he himself asserts, that they are intuitively given, and in making them purely subjective, and therefore scientifically worthless. His error is that of Reid, Kant, and Fichte.

It would carry us beyond the purpose of this article to analyze the ideal intuition and give its formula. That we have done in an *Essay in Refutation of Atheism.* We will only add here, that ideas in our sense are not abstract or general, but real, and, if real, they must be the principles both of the real and the knowable, without which nothing could be known or exist. They bear the characteristics of necessity, universality, and immutability, and therefore must be real and necessary being, or God in the respect that he is intelligible to the human intellect, not God as he is in himself, but as by his creative act he affirms himself to

created intelligences. As he affirms himself to us, he affirms our existence as his creatures in one and the same intuition. That God is or exists, we know with precisely the same certainty that we know we exist ourselves; only we do not know by direct or immediate intuition that the ideal intuitively given is God. We learn that from reflection or reasoning, not from intuition, which, if we are not greatly mistaken, escapes the error censured by the Holy See in the first proposition of the Louvain professors.

We remark, in passing, that we do not take, with these same professors and Father Rothenflue, the *primum ontologicum*, any more than we do with Descartes the *primum psychologicum*, as our *primum philosophicum*. The ideal is real and necessary being, in the respect that being is intelligible to us; but it is intelligible to us only as intuitively given by its creative act, and the intuition being given to us who are placed by it, and therefore contingent existences, it includes both in their synthetic relation. The *principium* of philosophy is then neither alone, but the real synthesis of the *primum ontologicum* and the *primum psychologicum*. But this by the way.

The proof we have given of the objectivity and reality of ideas, which follows necessarily from the fact that ideas are intuitively given, places science beyond the attacks of scepticism, and supplies the defect we have noted in the professor's doctrine of ideas. The ideas, he himself says, are intuitions; but in every intuition the object presents or affirms itself, and therefore must be real and exist *a parte rei*, or independently of the percipient or intuitive subject. As we have said, ideas are furnished *to* the mind, not, as the professor holds, *by* the mind on the occasion of experience. Man, whatever else he may be, is a dependent existence, and as dependent in all his acts or operations as he is in his simple existence itself. He can in no case be his own object; he cannot look into his own eyes and see himself in himself, and he can know or be conscious of his own existence only as he finds it reflected as in a mirror from the object, or that which is not himself. Only God, who is infinite, and being in its plenitude, can be at once subject and object of his own intelligence, or know himself in himself. Man never knows or can know himself in himself, for, if he could, he would be God, or independent being, being in its plenitude. The object, then, must be other than the subject, and always, as Cousin truly says, *le non-moi*, that is, neither the soul nor its product.

Now, as the author holds that ideas, what he calls "general ideas," are *a priori* and necessary conditions of experience, he must concede not only that they are objective, but are the real and necessary principles of all science, and therefore of things, or reality, for what is not, is not intelligible, and can be no principle of science. The author errs through his imperfect analysis of thought, and his overlooking the active part of the object in the fact of intuition. He is led into this error not through any defect of philosophical acumen, but through the fault of modern philosophy itself, which follows the inductive method, and treats the question of method before treating that of principles. Not being able to establish the objective reality of the ideal, he fails utterly in his attempt to refute sensism and materialism, by establishing the reality of an order of supersensible and spiritual truth.

We hold with St. Thomas, that the mind, through the medium of the *species intelligibilis*, attains to the intelligible object or idea, but we do not accept the transcendental doctrine that the soul has a faculty of directly or immediately apprehending the ideal, noetic, intelligible, or spiritual. Man in this life is the union of soul and body; and though the soul, as the church has defined, is *forma corporis*, it never acts without the body. The ideal, indeed, is objectively presented or affirmed to the mind; but it is never an object of empirical intuition or contemplation, unless sensibly represented. This is the objection that both Aristotle and St. Thomas make to Plato's doctrine as to the apprehension of pure ideas. For ourselves, we accept the peripatetic maxim, without the amendment proposed by Leibnitz: *Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, and in what we believe to be the sense in which the peripatetics themselves understood it. If we understand St. Thomas, he holds that the intelligible, or ideal, is presented in the *phantasmata* to the passive intellect, and is disengaged from them, that is, from the sensible representation, by the *intellectus agens*, or active intellect, which we hold to be both true and profound. The objections that have been urged against it grow out of a misapprehension of the real doctrine of the holy doctor, that of supposing the intelligible species is obtained from the phantasms by way of logical inference, which is by no means his or the peripatetic doctrine. The *intellectus agens* abstracts, that is, separates, or disengages the intelligible from the sensible, but does not derive it from the sensible *data*, as do Locke and the sensists. There is separation of

what is presented together, or as a complex whole, but no inference, logical deduction, or induction.

St. Thomas distinguishes, which most modern philosophers forget to do, between the passive intellect and the active intellect. In ideal or primitive intuition the intellect is passive, and it is to the passive intellect that the object is presented. In this object the ideal, or intelligible, is presented, but the active intellect, that is, reflection, seizes it only in the phantasm in which it is presented, and disengages it, yet only by the aid of language, which is the sensible sign or representation of the intelligible. But even with the aid of language, reflection could not disengage or separate it from the phantasms, unless it were actually given or presented in them or along with them. If we understand St. Thomas, who is for us the highest authority, under the Holy See, in philosophy that we recognize, he holds that, in the species both sensible and intelligible, there is represented, or, as we prefer to say, presented, to the intellect an intelligible or ideal element, but not by itself alone, as pure idea, as Plato, according to Aristotle, held, but enveloped, so to say, in the species, from which the active intellect separates or disengages it. But if given or presented in the phantasms or species to the passive intellect, it is intuitively given, and therefore objective and real.

We have dwelt, perhaps, at a disproportionate length on this first point in the professor's philosophy, for all in his theory turns on it. He holds with us that the ideas, not derived either from the senses or from reflection, are the principles of science; but making them either mental abstractions, or the forms or laws of the understanding, he can assert for them no objective validity. He cannot, then, assert them as principles of things, and consequently he cannot assert the reality of science. His principles, if not the principles of things, are unreal, and therefore all this pretended science is an illusion. Starting with them, he can never attain to real science, for having nothing objective in his principles, he can have nothing objective in his conclusions, but must revolve forever in the elaborate subjectivism of Kant, or the egoism of Fichte. He can never get out of the sphere of his own *Ich* or *Ego*, for we repeat there is no bridge over which the understanding can pass from the subjective to the objective, as the vain efforts of psychologists to establish the validity of our knowledge, or to find a test of certainty, sufficiently prove. We have only thought with which to estab-

lish the validity of thought; and thought is worth as much in the field of knowledge, as it is in the effort to establish the certainty of knowledge. The real solution of the problem is in the fact that there is and can be no purely subjective thought, for the soul being finite and dependent, as we have said, cannot be its own object, and in every thought the objective is presented simultaneously with the subjective, and both are given in one and the same complex fact, both rest on the same authority, and are equally certain; and philosophers may talk till doomsday, but this is all there is to be said.

We cannot go through the author's metaphysics,—a word by the by, for which in its ordinary sense we have little or no use. All we will say is, that, adopting the inductive method, he places philosophy in the category of the sciences, and loses it as the science of principles, which it is. He seems to recognize no difference between the laws asserted by the scientists, which are simply generalizations or classifications of observed facts or phenomena, and principles on which the generalizations or classifications, that is, inductions, depend for their scientific value. He does not even profess to give us either the principles of science or of things; he professes only by observation of the facts or phenomena presented by the field of consciousness, to ascertain by way of induction the laws of mind, or as the physicist seeks by observation and induction in the physical world to ascertain the laws of external nature. But what is the scientific or philosophical value of these laws of mind? What do they teach us? What objective or ontological conclusions do they warrant? Does the professor need us to tell him that, as to the science of reality, the proper subject of philosophy, they lack fecundity?

But we pass from the professor's metaphysics to his ethics. Knowing the author's general doctrine, we know beforehand that he must found his ethics on the idea of right in opposition to "the greatest-happiness" principle of Jeremy Bentham. Mr. Lecky, who hardly acknowledges that God is, much less that he is supreme and universal Legislator, does the same. The professor has a most marvellous faculty of using words without saying any thing, and of offering definitions that define nothing. He mixes up the perception of right with an affection of our emotional nature which has nothing to do with the principle of ethics, for emotion belongs to the sensitive nature, not to our

higher or rational nature. Yet he says that, on its perceptive side, our moral life consists in the perception or idea of right. But as ideas are with him, as we have seen, simply subjective facts or phenomena, right must be what each one takes it to be, and must vary as individual minds and emotions vary. The professor takes note of this objection, and attempts to answer it, but it cannot be answered, if only a subjective standard of morals is asserted. What is the objective standard or criterion of right? Is there such a standard or criterion, or is there not? If not, it is idle to talk of right or duty; if there is, what is it? The author has no answer. He can only say right is right. With all our heart; but what, *hic et nunc*, is right? and why is it right?

The author holds that the idea of right is the ethical *principium*, and regards it as absurd to ask, Why we are bound to do right? Yet we may ask, Why is this or that act right? Right is not *ultimate*. Doubtless there is an eternal and immutable right in the sense in which we speak of the eternal law, which St. Augustine defines to be the will or reason of God, which is identical with the divine essense; and we are disposed to agree with Dr. Mark Hopkins, whom the author attempts to refute.

But like all exclusive psychologists, the professor revolves in the sphere of the subject. He seeks the ground of duty or moral obligation in the subject, in the constitution of the human mind, and to maintain what he calls an independent morality, that is, a morality independent of all law except that which is imposed by the essential nature of man himself, that is, by the physical law of man's own constitution. He shows by this that he does not really distinguish moral law from physical law, and consequently has no moral conception. There is no morality where, as the Transcendentalists say, man simply acts out himself, or obeys himself, because the obeyer and the obeyed are identical, and there is no recognition of a sovereign will one is bound to obey. Morality is out of the question, when God as supreme Lawgiver is not recognized, or when his law is recognized as the rule of right, or obligatory on the conscience, only in so far as it is identified with the conscience itself, or with man's own nature.

Dr. Hopkins may not be right in his view of the end, or he may be, for, not having his work before us, we cannot say what the good is that he asserts must be the end of the act, if a rational act; but we agree with him when he asserts

that right is not ultimate, and cannot be the end of the moral or voluntary act. Right is the rule, but not the end. Every rational act is done *propter finem*, and for an end that is good. Hence God, who is infinite reason, acts always for an end, and for an end which is infinitely good. But as he is himself the only infinite, the only real good, he in creating creates all things for himself, the only good for which even he could create. The moral act, the right or just act of man who is created and governed as a free moral agent, is an act done for the same end. God is the supreme good, the *summum bonum* itself, and also *our* supreme good. Perfect charity loves and seeks God for his own sake, as the supreme good itself; but as we cannot habitually do that in this life, it is lawful to love and seek him as *our* supreme good, and therefore to have respect to his retributions, as says the Psalmist, and as the church decided against Quietism and in censuring Fénelon's *Maxims of the Saints*.

The author's objection that this is more illogical than Benthamism, grows out of his not perceiving that the end of the act is our good IN GOD, who is the supreme good, therefore has no relation to the greatest-happiness rule, or utility, which refers to this world and this life only, on which Bentham bases his ethical and legislative codes. Bentham was not wrong in making the good of the actor the end of the act, but in placing that good where it is not, and in giving no certain rule by which it is to be sought and found. The will is ordained to good, and it, by its own nature, cannot act without willing good. Sin is not in willing evil for the reason that it is evil, but in deliberately choosing a less good instead of a greater, a present temporary good instead of a future eternal good, sensible or worldly good instead of spiritual good—a good in the creature, instead of good in God. Yet in seeking our good, if we seek it in God and in obedience to his law, we are sufficiently removed from the sensists who place it in pleasure, or from the Benthamites who place it in happiness, without regard to God, and from the *interêt bien entendu* of the French *philosophes* of the last century.

A right action is an action done from right motives for the right end, and, aside from this, right has no existence. It is the rule, not the end of the act, and depends solely on the law imposed by the end, which is God as final cause. The right is not an uncreated being and independent of God, and which gives the law to God and men, as some of

the heathen maintained, because that would suppose a God above God, or would deny God to be God. As there is no right independent of God as final cause, in which sense he is the supreme good, so there is and can be no independent morality; and Dr. Hopkins is justified in maintaining that right is not ultimate, and that reason demands an end, to wit, good, beyond it. It is not improper to ask, Why are we bound to do right? The answer is, Because God the supreme good, and in whom is *our* good, enjoins it. Is it further asked, Why are we bound to do what God enjoins, or the law of God ordains? The answer is, Because God has made us and made us for himself, and we are therefore his; he owns us and is our sovereign Lord and proprietor, and has the sole right to do with us as he pleases. If God, as our maker, owns us, we as moral agents owe ourselves to him, and are bound in justice to give ourselves to him, for the very definition of justice is, giving to every one his due.

We have neither the patience nor the space to continue our criticisms on the professor's book. It treats a great subject, but with hardly a conception of the real problems it involves. It deserves to be commended as an honorable protest against sensism and materialism, but it refutes neither. No doubt the author makes many just observations, and says much that is true and not unimportant; but he builds without any solid foundation. Philosophy, as the science of principles, and of principles on which are based alike the sciences, ethics, and religion, is unknown and undreamed of by him.

BALMES' PHILOSOPHY.*

The following translation of the great work of James Balmes on Philosophy, was undertaken at my suggestion and recommendation, and thus far I hold myself responsible for it. I have compared a considerable portion of it with the original, and as far as I have compared it, I have found if faithfully executed. The translator appears to me to have rendered the author's thought with exactness and precision, in a style not inferior to his own.

I have not added, as was originally contemplated, any notes to those of the author. To have done so, would have swelled the volumes to an unreasonable size, and upon further consideration they did not seem to me to be necessary. They would, in fact, have been an impertinence on my part, and the reader will rather thank me for not having done it. The work goes forth, therefore, as it came from the hands of its illustrious author, with no addition or abbreviation, or change, except what was demanded by the difference between the Spanish and English idioms.

James Balmes, in whose premature death in 1849, the friends of religion and science have still to deplore a serious loss, was one of the greatest writers and profoundest thinkers of Spain, and indeed of our times. He is well and favorably known to the American public by his excellent work on European Civilization,—a work which has been translated into the principal languages of Europe. In that work he proved himself a man of free and liberal thought, of brilliant genius, and varied and profound learning. But his work on the bases of philosophy is his master-piece, and, taken as a whole, the greatest work that has been published on that important subject in the nineteenth century.

Yet it is rather as a criticism on the various erroneous systems of philosophy in modern times, than as containing a system of philosophy itself, that I have wished it translated and circulated in English. As a refutation of Bacon, Locke, Hume, and Condillac, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Spinoza, it is a master-piece, and leaves little to desire. In

*Introduction to Fundamental Philosophy by James Balmes; translated from the Spanish by Henry F. Brownson. New York, 1856.

determining the fundamental principles of philosophy, and constructing a system in accordance with the real world, the author is not always, in my judgment, successful, and must yield to his Italian contemporary, the unhappy Abbate Gioberti.

When criticizing the errors of others, the distinguished author reasons as an ontologist, but when developing his own system, he is almost a psychologist. His ontology is usually sound, indeed, and his conclusions are for the most part just, but not always logically obtained. He recognizes no philosophical formula which embraces the whole subject-matter of philosophy, and does not appear to be aware that the *primum philosophicum* is and must be a synthesis; and hence he falls into what we may call, not eclecticism, but syncretism. This is owing to the fact that his genius is critical rather than constructive, and more apt to demolish than to build up.

What I regard as the chief error of the illustrious Spaniard, is his not recognizing that conceptions without intuitions are, as Kant justly maintains, empty, purely subjective, the mind itself; and hence, while denying that we have intuition of the infinite, contending that we have a real and validly objective conception of it. Throughout the book the reader will find him maintaining that the human mind may, by discursion, attain to valid conceptions of a reality which transcends intuition. This I regard as an error. Discursion is an act of reflection, and though there is always less there can never be more in reflection than in intuition. If we have no intuition of the infinite, we have and can have no proper conception of it, and what is taken to be a conception of it is simply the human mind itself, and of no objective application or value.

The excellent author is misled on this point by supposing that in intuition of the intelligible the mind is the actor, and not simply the spectator, and that an intuition of the infinite implies an infinite intuition. In both cases he is mistaken. In intuition we are simply spectators, and the object affirms itself to us. In intuition of the infinite, it is not we who perceive and affirm the infinite by our intellectual act, but the infinite that reveals and affirms itself to our intellect. In apprehending the infinite, as thus revealed and affirmed, we of course apprehend it in a finite, not in an infinite manner. That which is intuitively apprehended is infinite, but the subjective apprehension is finite. The

limitation is on the part of the subject, not on the part of the object.

The error arises from failing to distinguish sharply between intuition and reflection. In intuition the principal and primary actor is the intelligible object; in reflection it is the intelligent subject. In the intuitive order the object presents itself as it is, with its own characteristics; in the reflective order it is represented with the limitations and characteristics of the thinking subject. As the subject is limited, its conceptions are limited, and represent the infinite not as infinite, but as the not-finite; and it is in the reflective order, if we operate on our conceptions, instead of our intuitions, only by a discursive process that we can come to the conclusion that the not-finite is the infinite. The author not distinguishing the two orders, and taking conceptions which belong to the reflective order as if they belonged to the intuitive order, supposes that we may have valid conceptions beyond the sphere of intuition. But a little reflection should have taught him that, if he had no intuition, he could have no conception of the infinite.

Following St. Thomas and all philosophers of the first order, the author very properly maintains that it is by the divine intelligibility, or the divine light, that the human mind sees whatever it does see; but he shrinks from saying that we have intuition of God himself. So far as we are to understand intuition of God as intuition, or open vision of him as he is in himself, he is undoubtedly right. But objects are intelligible only in the light of God, and it is only by this light that we apprehend them. Do we ever apprehend objects by the light of God without apprehending the light which renders them apprehensible? In apprehending the object, we apprehend first of all the light which is the medium of its apprehension. The light of God is God, and if we have intuition of the light, we must have intuition of him who is "the true light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world." We cannot see God as he is in himself, not because he is not intelligible in himself, but because of the excess of his light, which dazzles and blinds our eyes through their weakness. So very few of us can look steadily in the face of the sun without being dazzled, yet not therefore is it to be said we cannot and do not see the sun.

The author does not seem to be aware that *substance* as distinguished from being or existence is an abstraction, and

therefore purely subjective, and no object of intuition. Abstract from a thing all its properties or attributes, and you have remaining simply zero. The substance is properly the concrete thing itself, and in the real order is distinguishable simply from its phenomena, or *accidents*,—an abstract term,—not from its so-called attributes or properties. Hence the question, so much disputed, whether we perceive substances themselves, is only the question, whether we see things themselves or only their phenomena. This question the Scottish school of Reid and Sir William Hamilton has settled forever, and if it had not, Balmes has done it, making the correction I have suggested, in a manner that leaves nothing further to be said.

The author's proofs of the fact of creation are strong and well put, but fail to be absolutely conclusive in consequence of his not recognizing intuition of the creative act. They all presuppose this intuition, and are conclusive, because we in reality have it; but by denying that we have it, the author renders them formally inconclusive. We have intuition of God, real and necessary being; we have also intuition of things or existences; and therefore must have intuition of the creative act; for things or existences are only the external terminus of the creative act itself. Hence it is that Gioberti very properly makes the ideal formula, or *primum philosophicum*, the synthetic judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, Real and necessary Being creates existences. This formula or judgment in all its terms is given intuitively and simultaneously, and it is because it is so given we are able at one blow to confound the sceptic, the atheist, and the pantheist. The illustrious Spaniard uses in all his argument this formula, but he does so unconsciously, in contradiction, in fact, to his express statements, because he could not reason a moment, form a single conclusion, without it. His argument in itself is good, but his explication of it is sometimes in fault.

If the learned and excellent author had recognized the fact that we have intuition of the creative act of the first cause, and the further fact that all second causes, in their several spheres and degrees, imitate or copy the first, he would have succeeded better in explaining their operation. He does not seem to perceive clearly that the *nexus* which binds together cause and effect is the act of the cause, which is in its own nature causative of the effect, and by denying all intuition of this *nexus*, he seems to leave us in the posi-

tion where Hume left us, because it is impossible to attain by discursion to any objective reality of which we have no intuition.

These are all or nearly all the criticisms I am disposed to make upon the admirable work of Balmes. They are important, no doubt, but really detract much less from its value than it would seem. It has in spite of these defects, rare and and positive merits. The author has not, indeed, a synthetic genius, but his powers of analysis are unsurpassed, and, as far as my philosophical reading goes, unequalled. He has not given us the last word of philosophy, but he has given us precisely the work most needed in the present anarchical state of philosophical science. Not one of the errors to be detected in his work is peculiar to himself, and the most that the most ill-natured critic can say against him is, that, while he retains and defends all the truth in the prevailing philosophy of the schools, he has not escaped all its errors. Wherever he departs from scholastic tradition he follows truth, and is defective only where that tradition is itself defective. He has advanced far, corrected innumerable errors, poured a flood of light on a great variety of profound, intricate, and important problems, without introducing a new, or adding any thing to confirm an old error. This is high praise, but the philosophic reader will concede that it is well merited.

The work is well adapted to create a taste for solid studies. It is written in a calm, clear, and dignified style, sometimes rising to true eloquence. The author threw his whole mind and soul into his work, and shows himself everywhere animated by a pure and noble spirit, free from all pride of opinion, all love of theorizing, and all dogmatism. He evidently writes solely for the purpose of advancing the cause of truth and virtue, religion and civilization, and the effect of his writings on the heart is no less salutary than their effect on the mind.

I have wished the work to be translated and given to the English and American public, not as a work free from all objections, but as admirably adapted to the present state of the English and American mind, as admirably fitted to correct the more dangerous errors now prevalent amongst us, and to prepare the way for the elaboration of a positive philosophy worthy of the name. We had nothing in English to compare with it, and it is far better adapted to the English and American genius than the misty speculations

we are importing, and attempting to naturalize, from Germany. It will lead no man into any error which he does not already entertain, and few, perhaps none, can read it without positive benefit, at least without getting rid of many errors.

With these remarks I commit these volumes to the public, bespeaking for them a candid consideration. The near relation in which I stand to the translator makes me anxious that his labors should be received with a kindly regard. He who translates well a good book from a foreign language into his own, does a service to his country next to that of writing a good book himself.

ONTOLOGISM AND PSYCHOLOGISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1874.]

We owe these, and we know not how many other text-books, which have been, are, or are intended to be used in our Catholic colleges and seminaries, to the zeal, learning, ability, and industry of members of the Society of Jesus. We have no intention of reviewing them. We have introduced their titles only as a fitting text for some comments on the admonition addressed to us and others from various quarters, not to depart from the traditional and generally approved philosophy taught in our Catholic schools—an admonition that we are quite prepared to heed the moment it is made to appear that there is such a philosophy, and we are told precisely what it is. Have we, in fact, any such philosophy? And if so, what is it? Where are we to find an authoritative statement of it? We confess that we have not been able, with our limited reading and study, to discover a system of philosophy that can be said to be traditional, even in the schools of the Society of Jesus, far less a system distinguished from Catholic theology, that is traditional in Catholic schools generally. The General of the Jesuits, sometimes rather profanely called the black Pope, issued an order, a few years since, forbidding the professors of the Society to teach certain systems of philosophy which were then gaining ground, and commanding them to go back to the Aristotle of Fonseca; but, supposing they are agreed as to what peripateticism as expounded by that eminent Portuguese Jesuit really is, and are now uniformly teaching it, we could hardly say that as yet it is traditional in Catholic schools; for it is only yesterday that a very different system was taught in many, if not in most of them. We have never

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1. * *Institutiones Philosophicæ ad Usum Prælectionum in Collegiis et Seminariis.* Auctore Petro Fournier, S. J. Paris. 1854.
2. *Institutiones Philosophicæ Theoreticæ in Usum Prælectionum.* Auctore Franc. Rothenflue, S. J. Paris. 1846.
3. *Institutiones Philosophiæ Salvatoris Tongiorgi,* S. J. New York. 1867. Compendium.
4. *Elements of Philosophy, comprising Logic and Ontology, or General Metaphysics.* By Rev. W. H. Hill, S. J. Baltimore. 1873.

been able to find that, in philosphy distinct from theology, our Catholic Schools have had, since the Renaissance, a strictly traditional philosophy in which all have been substantially agreed. If there is such a philosophy, we confess ourselves ignorant of it. The only Catholic philosophy we know, we collect from the great theologians of the Church, in whom it appears as the rational element of the science of theology, not as a separate science.

Our friends of the *Catholic World* tell us very truly that the Church has sanctioned the principles and methods of the Scholastic philosophy and theology: but we have always supposed our Holy Father, Pius IX., in the Syllabus, has only done so as against the Traditionalists, who charged the Scholastic philosophy and theology with being rationalistic, and even atheistic, and as against the German professors, at the head of whom stood the unhappy Dr. Döllinger, who maintained that only the historical method is admissible in the construction of theological science. What we understand the Holy See to have censured is the rejection or disparagement of reason by the traditional and historical schools, and what it has sanctioned, indeed enjoined, is the Scholastic use of reason in philosophy and theology. We are not free to deny the Scholastic use of reason, but we are not therefore bound to accept all the Scholastic processes or conclusions. The Holy See is no less studious to maintain reason unimpaired than she is to preserve the faith in its purity and integrity. The central error of the traditionalist as well as that of the historical school of Germany resulting in the so-called Old Catholic heresy, originates in the Jansenistic heresy as to the value of nature and reason. The Jansenists assert the worthlessness of nature, and therefore the impotence of natural reason. In interpreting condemned propositions, it is necessary to understand the precise error condemned, otherwise we may mistake the contradictory truth asserted. What we understand the Holy See as having sanctioned in the Scholastic philosophy is the rational principles and method impugned by Bonnetty and Döllinger and their respective schools.

But suppose that we are free in no sense to differ from the principles and methods of the Scholastic Doctors; can it be pretended that the Holy See has ever defined which of the Scholastic Doctors it is whose principles and method are to be strictly followed? There are notable differences on a great variety of questions among the Scholastics; for instance,

between St. Anselm and St. Thomas; St. Thomas and St. Bonaventura; Abelard and Guillaume de Champeaux; the Thomists and the Scotists; the Realists and the Conceptualists. Which is approved; which condemned? St. Ignatius Loyola made it in his Institutes obligatory on the society he founded to conform to St. Thomas, and we presume the Jesuit professors do conform to the Angelic Doctor's teaching as they understand it, as do also the Thomists; yet there are very great differences between the two schools. Does St. Thomas teach the *scientia media*, or do the Jesuits teach the *præmotia physica?* Does St. Thomas teach the *auxilium quod* or the *auxilium quo?* "You all claim to follow St. Thomas," said to us a member of the Society of Jesus, "but I find no two of you who agree as to what St. Thomas actually taught."

There are certain great truths of natural reason, so closely allied to revealed theology and so essential to the very existence and operation of the human understanding, that they are recognized and asserted by every Catholic theologian or philosopher of any nerve, and cannot be denied without obscuring or impairing the faith itself; but beyond these we have never found any thing corresponding to the traditional or authorized philosophy, which Father Ramière, and the *Catholic World* after him, admonish us to follow. It is all very fine to talk about such a philosophy, but it would seem to be better to settle that there is such a philosophy, and what it is, before insisting on its being observed, or censuring one for not heeding it. If by philosophy be meant an authorized science distinct from the rational element of Catholic theology, it is to us something as yet unknown.

In its crushing criticism of Father Louage's brief Course of Philosophy, in which we come in for our share, the *Catholic World* shows that the improbation of ontologism by the Holy See has not only frightened it from the ontologism favored by the author of the *Problems of the Age*, but driven it into the opposite extreme, that of psychologism. The editor of the *Catholic World* is able and learned; but he seems not to have ever very well understood the difference between the philosophy improbated in the seven propositions of the Louvain Professors, and that which we have, since 1850, more or less distinctly defended in our *Review*, and even in his own pages, to which for several years we contributed, with the exception of the *Problems of the Age*, the more prominent philosophical and theological articles.

This, that is, his failure to understand this difference, is, we presume, the reason why he made no reserve, when he repudiated his own ontologism, in favor of what had been up to that time the philosophical doctrine of his magazine. He would have been very unjust to a former collaborator, if he had appreciated the difference between the two philosophies, since he was not ignorant that ours had been very generally classed with the improbated ontologism, not to have noted that difference. He could hardly be ignorant that he would be understood as declaring against us, as well as against the ontologists, and leaving it to be inferred, though we were not named, that we are defending a philosophy, in his own judgment at least, under ecclesiastical censure. This, we are sure, he would never have done, if he had not supposed that there is no real difference between the philosophy we defend and the improbated ontologism which he very justly repudiated.

But this, after all, is a small matter, and we should let it pass without comment, if, in the too severe criticism on Father Louage, we did not find the *Catholic World* expressly stigmatizing our philosophy as ontologism, and excusing us for holding it on the ground that we are not a priest. It says: "That Dr. Brownson, in his *Review*, should try to show that *his own ontologism* can be philosophically defended and does not fall under ecclesiastical condemnation, we do not wonder. He is not a priest; he does not write for school-boys, but addresses himself to educated men, who can sift his arguments, and dismiss with a benign smile what they think to be unsound; and, after all, he takes great care to screen himself behind a *newly invented* distinction between ideal intuition and perception or cognition, based on the assumption, honestly maintained by him, that 'intuition is the act of the object, not of the subject.'"*

That Dr. Brownson is not a priest, is very true, but we do not know that he has any right on that account to defend a philosophy improbated by the Holy See, or that his errors are to be smiled on any more benignly than if the errors of a priest; nor are we aware that the fact that he is a layman gives even a priest the right to miscall or misrepresent his philosophy. The "benign smile" is very charming on the editor's lips, no doubt, but men have been known to smile benignly, not from superior knowledge. Dr. Brownson

* Catholic World, May, 1874, p. 243.

tries, very likely, and perhaps not unsuccessfully, to show that his *philosophy*—not his *ontologism*, for ontologist he is not, and never has been since he became a Catholic—does not fall under ecclesiastical censure; for he is a Catholic, and hears the Church, but certainly not, as the *Catholic World* insinuates, by "a newly invented distinction between ideal intuition and perception or cognition," for this distinction he made in his *Review* some years before the Holy See had censured the ontologism of the Louvain Professors. This fact should not have escaped the notice of the *Catholic World*. It is very possible that this distinction is brought out more clearly and fully in the recent numbers of the *Review*, especially in the *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, than it had been before, but it was made an essential point in his philosophy clearly enough, we had supposed, for men habituated to the study of questions of the sort, long previously, and expressly as early at least as 1859, in the article on the Primitive Elements of Thought, criticising and refuting the *Ontologie* of the Abbé Hugonin.* In that article we were careful to distinguish between ideal intuition and empirical intuition, which is the same distinction. We defined then, as we define now, ideal intuition as the act of the object, or the presentation of the object by its own act, and empirical intuition as the act of the subject in conjunction with the act of the object, dependent on it, and impossible without it. This was in 1859, and only repeated what we had all along maintained. The censure of the Louvain ontologism by the Holy See was first published, if we recollect aright, in 1861, and we may say that not a single proposition censured had ever been defended by us, and there is not one which we had not, in the light of our own philosophy, opposed and refuted. Let the distinction be tenable or not, the *Catholic World* should not have sneered at it as *newly invented* as a security from ecclesiastical censure. We hope we are too loyal to be guilty of a subterfuge.

The author of the *Problems of the Age*, when he published the chapters of that work in the *Catholic World*, was a decided ontologist, and taught that the existence of God is a truth known by direct intuition. No one knows better than he does that we objected to that doctrine and remonstrated against it in a letter addressed to the Superior of the Paulist Community. In our remonstrance we said, We

*See Vol. I, pp. 408 et seq.

know by intuition that which is God, but not that it is God; that we know only discursively, not intuitively. We were aware at the time of the condemnation of "certain philosophical propositions" he speaks of, and had defended the condemnation some years before in a Letter to the Professor of Philosophy in Mount St. Mary's College, near Emmittsburg, and pointed out the difference between the propositions condemned and our own. It is probable that the editor of the *Catholic World* never grasped this difference, and when, subsequently, he found his ontologism censured, he concluded our philosophy was also prohibited, therefore closed his pages to it, and took up a philosophy which, in our judgment, is as far from the truth, in the opposite extreme, as is the ontologism he has repudiated. It seems never to have occurred to him that he may have from the outset erroneously identified our philosophy with his own ontologism, although we frequently assured him of the fact, as many others would seem to have done, and now, when he sees that he cannot bring it under the ecclesiastical censure his ontologism has incurred, he insinuates that we escape by a subterfuge, instead of frankly admitting that he very possibly had failed rightly to understand us. We do in no sense object to his denunciation of ontologism, but we do very seriously object to his opposing it as a system we entertain, or have ever entertained.

The *Catholic World* is quite right in following Stoeckl and the Jesuit Fathers Ramière, Kleutgen, Liberatore, Tongiorgi, &c., as against ontologism; but, though they defend the philosophy which is just at present dominant in many of our Catholic colleges and seminaries, it by no means follows that it is right in following them in their own philosophy, that their own is free from very grave errors and defects, or that it is the traditional Catholic philosophy from which one cannot dissent without temerity. For ourselves, we find it very conclusive against ontologism, or the false and exaggerated ontology of the Louvain Professors improbated by the Holy See, or as against what the Holy See has defined cannot be safely taught; but when the question is as to what must be taught, or what is the true solution of the great problems with which the real philosopher must grapple, we find them for the most part superficial, vague, uncertain, and far better fitted to perplex than satisfy the student. We hardly begin to follow them before we are enveloped in a dense fog, or plunged

into a wilderness of abstractions, unrealities, or unveracities, to use a Carlylism. We find in them, the moment the question approaches the higher philosophy, that is, the first principles either of the real or the knowable, nothing clear, distinct, or solid. Their philosophy starts from a point below principles, "first or necessary truths," as St. Thomas calls them, which necessarily precede all intellectual operations, and deals at best only with abstract forms or concepts. It is therefore formal, not real, without any solid basis, as unsubstantial "as the baseless fabric of a vision."

These authors are very learned, very respectable, even eminent in their way, but they seem to us never to have caught a glimpse of the higher problems of philosophy, and in their fear of falling into the error of the improbated ontologists, to feel that they are safe only in excluding ontology from philosophy, as Sir William Hamilton, Dean Mansel, and others of the same school, do from theology. They profess to follow St. Thomas, and insist that we shall swear by him, and yet St. Thomas teaches expressly that God, though not self-evident to the human intelligence, is yet demonstrable by natural reason, and the Holy See has defined, that the existence of God can be proved with certainty by reasoning, while it has improbated the proposition that God is known by immediate cognition. Between St. Thomas and the Holy See there is no discrepancy. Hence two points all Catholic philosophers must hold and defend, namely, 1, We cannot know God by immediate cognition or intuition, and 2, We can prove with certainty or demonstrate by reasoning that God is. These two points condemn, the one ontologism and the other so-called Traditionalism. So much is settled. But how demonstrate or prove that God is, if we exclude ontology?

Reasoning or demonstration can proceed only from principles or premises, and the question between us and the philosophers whose works stand at the head of this article turns precisely on these principles or premises, which necessarily precede reasoning or demonstration and from which it proceeds, and therefore are not and cannot be obtained by it. They are not obtained by the operation of reason, for reason cannot operate discursively without them. They must then be given *a priori*, and be the primitive *data* of the mind, the first principles of intelligence. Even the philosophers opposed to us by the *Catholic World* do and must admit so much.

Now what are these primitive *data*, these cognitions *a priori* as Kant calls them? The Scholastics, as far as we are aware, hardly raise the question, at least they do not formally discuss it. St. Thomas seems, as far as he touches them at all, to call them first truths, necessary truths, that is, necessary to the operations of the intellect, dictates of reason, or truths inserted in human nature, &c., leaving the question of their objective reality, or truths, as the question whether they are necessary in their own nature and essence or necessary only in relation to our intellect, unsettled. Indeed, so far as we have seen, he nowhere treats the question as here presented, or tells us clearly, distinctly, decisively, what he understands by them, or how or whence the mind gets possession of them. This—we say it with all reverence for the holy Doctor—strikes us as a grave defect in his philosophy, a defect which seems to us to omit the primary problem of science and to leave it not unsolved, but even unraised. We have, in the *Essay in Refutation of Atheism* and other writings, endeavored to solve the problem in accordance with his recognized principles, and have shown, we think, that there is no discrepancy between his philosophy and that which we in our feeble way have defended, and which the *Catholic World* very unjustly confounds with ontologism.

Ontologism—we use the word as we do all the *isms*, in a bad sense—no Catholic can hold; but ontology, or the science of being, no Catholic philosopher, we think, is at liberty to deny, and none of the *Catholic World's* friends, so far as we have studied them, pretend to deny it. Fathers Ramière, Kleutgen, and the rest, hold that ontology is a legitimate part of philosophy. It is taught as a part of philosophy in every Catholic college or seminary in the land. The ecclesiastical censure, which has so frightened our contemporary, cannot attach to the assertion of ontology, for the exclusion of ontology would be the exclusion of God from the region of science, and either deny his existence or relegate him, with the Cosmists, to the unknowable. For God is being, being itself and in itself; if we have no science of being there is no God, or if we know not that being is, we can neither know nor prove that God is. It is absurd, then, to suppose that the Holy See has improbated ontology or the science of being. But how do we know that being is?

There are and can be only two ways in which it is possible for us to know being, or that being is. These are intuition

and discursion, reasoning, or reflection. But discursion, that is, reasoning, demands premises which it does not and cannot itself supply. From what premises more ultimate or better known to the mind than being can being be logically concluded? If the *data* or premises are not being, or do not contain being, they are nothing, and the logic that can conclude something from nothing, or being from that which is not being, has not yet been discovered. Being must be given in the premises or it cannot be in the conclusion.

The premises without which reason cannot operate can, then, be given only in intuition. But the conclusion that exceeds the premises is invalid, Father Hill to the contrary notwithstanding. In other words, there can be nothing in the conclusion, not contained, either explicitly or implicitly, in the intuitive premises. The syllogism explains, renders explicit or evident, what is implicit, confused, or obscure in the premises, but does not extend knowledge beyond the matter presented and affirmed in them. If being, then, is not contained in the intuition, that is, if we have no intuition of being or of that which is being, no reasoning can conclude it, and the assertion of being is impossible, and the existence of God cannot be proved or demonstrated by reasoning.

But since the existence of God can be certainly proved, it follows necessarily that being is given in intuition, as we say, in the intuition of the ideal, and therefore ontology may be asserted without asserting the ontologism improbated by the Holy See; namely, that "the mind has immediate cognition, at least habitual, of God," and must be so, or we are not able to "prove with certainty the existence of God by reasoning." So far we do not think any Catholic philosopher or theologian can safely dispute us, if he understands both us and himself.

We have said, *explicitly* or *implicitly*. We have never held and do not hold that being is explicitly presented or affirmed in intuition. It is really presented or affirmed to us, but simply as the ideal, or as universal, necessary, immutable, and eternal ideas, or, as some say, universal, necessary, immutable, and eternal truths. These ideas or truths, which are the *a priori* condition of every thought, of every empirical perception or cognition, and which enter into every cognition or mental operation as an essential element and as an undistinguished part of the complex fact, are, in the last analysis, identically being, though it is only by reflection or rea-

soning that we know and verify the identity of the ideal and of being, as it is only by reflection or reasoning that we discover and verify the identity of being—real and necessary being we mean—with God. The process by which this double identity is obtained or proved is given in the *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, and is not necessary to be reproduced here.

The philosophers the *Catholic World* appears to hold that it must, as a Catholic, follow, do not deny the fact of the possession by the mind of these necessary and universal ideas, but they deny them to be identical with real and necessary being, and the *Catholic World* treats the assertion of such identity as the ontologism improbated by the Holy See. Precisely what these philosophers do understand by universal, necessary, eternal, and immutable ideas, "eternal verities," as Leibnitz calls them, the ideal, as we say, we do not know, and have never been able to ascertain. They do not appear willing to say that they are either subjective or objective, but would seem to hold them to be a sort of *tertium quid*, neither the one nor the other. Some of them appear to hold them to be simply representative, not the verities themselves, but representations of them in the mind, which has the disadvantage of leaving the mind, since it has no fac-simile of them in itself, with no possible means of ascertaining whether they represent objective reality or not, or whether there is any objective reality or not to be represented. Father Kleutgen, the ablest and profoundest thinker among them, and who only barely misses what we hold to be the truth, says that they are not God, but are founded on God. But what is founded on God is either God or creature. The first he denies; the last is inadmissible; because there can be no necessary, eternal, universal, and immutable creatures. What is not God, and yet exists, is creature, and what is neither God nor creature is nothing, and is neither knowable nor thinkable.

But these ideas are the primitive *data* given intuitively to the mind, and are therefore objective; and if objective, they are real. If not real, they could not be intuitively given, as we have seen they are. If real, they are either being or existences. Not the last, because existences or creatures are contingent, and exist only by and from being, and are not intelligible in and by themselves or without being, since what is not is not intelligible, is no object *per se* of intuition. Then the first, and the ideal and being are identical, or the ideal

is real being. But the ideas are given as necessary, eternal, universal, and immutable. The ideal is therefore necessary, eternal, universal, and immutable being. Hence we say in the intuition of necessary and eternal ideas, real and necessary being is given as the ideal, and, therefore, that we have actually intuition of real and necessary being, though not explicitly as being. Is this identical with the improbated ontologism?

The ideal must be, 1, real and necessary being, and therefore, as Gioberti says, God as the intelligible or as facing the human intellect; 2, they must be forms of the understanding inherent in it, that is, innate ideas in the Cartesian sense; or, 3, concepts or conceptions, formed by the mind, and existing only *in mente*. The first we ourselves maintain, and so far, dare agree with Gioberti. The second is Cartesianism as modified by Kant, and none of the philosophers whose works are before us will avow it. It is pure subjectivism, and gyrates forever in the circle of the *Ego* or subject. The third and last makes the ideas not primitive *data*, but secondary, and places them in the order of reflection, not in the order of intuition—the common error of our modern philosophers who profess to follow St. Thomas, whom they only caricature. The *Catholic World* seems, latterly, to have adopted this modern conceptualism, which it is not difficult to resolve into nominalism and nihilism.

But conceptions, or concepts, presuppose intuition, and therefore, the ideas in question, for they are formed by the mind operating on the intuitions; and consequently, cannot be the ideas or primitive *data* themselves. These philosophers commit the error of those scientists who undertake to explain the origin of things by development or evolution. They forget that concepts, conceptions, abstractions, &c., are all terms of the reflective order, and therefore are not primitive, or the *a priori* condition of thought. Intuition must precede reflection, or there is nothing for the mind to reflect or operate on. We must think before we can re-think, or revolve in the mind what has been thought. Moreover, concepts, conceptions, abstractions, all imply a mental operation of some sort, the *intellectus agens* of St. Thomas; but we have seen that without the ideal intuitively given, no mental operation or activity is possible. We agree that the ideal, the intelligible, is obtained as a separate or distinct intellectual possession, by abstraction from the *phantasmata* and *species intelligibiles*, in the peripatetic language, in which it is pre-

sented or affirmed to the intellect, the peripatetic rendering of the fact we call intuition; but abstraction could not separate it from the phantasms or species and place the mind in distinct possession of it, if it were not really presented in them. We have never held, but have always denied the Platonic doctrine that in intuition ideas are given as pure ideas, or separately from phantasms or species; for man is neither God nor pure spirit. But though distinguished by reflection, or abstracted by the *intellectus agens* from the sensible phantasms, or intelligible species, they must be really presented, that is, intuitively given, or else they could not be abstracted, divided, or separated from them by reflection; for reflection, though it may contain less, can never contain more than intuition. Perhaps, if the philosophers who profess to follow St. Thomas, and accuse us of defending ontologism, should once break from routine, and read and understand St. Thomas for themselves, they would find less ground for quarrel with us than they imagine, and also that we are far more in accordance with the mind of St. Thomas than they themselves are.

We have said enough to show the injustice of accusing us of ontologism, because we assert the intuition of the ideal and the identity of the ideal—necessary and universal ideas, or universal and necessary truths—with necessary and real being, and on no other point, however much we may differ from the text-books before us, can it be pretended that we agree with the improbated ontologists. The ontologists are censured, among other things, for teaching that the intellect has immediate cognition, at least habitual, of God. We hold nothing of the sort. We simply hold that the mind has direct intuition of the ideal, which we prove by reflection or reasoning, that is, discursively, is, in the last analysis, necessary and real being, and therefore God, who is *Ens necessarium et reale*. But we have never pretended that we know intuitively, or by immediate cognition, either that the ideal is necessary and real being, or that necessary and real being is God.

We, moreover, have never, since we abjured Protestantism and professed to be a Catholic, fallen into the error of the exclusive or improbated ontologists, that of holding that every principle of reason, and all things with which science can deal, are or can be obtained by way of logical deduction from the single intuition of *Ens* or Being, as does Father Rothenflue; for creation is a free act, and God was under

no necessity, extrinsic or intrinsic, to create. We objected in our *Review*, more than twenty years ago, to Father Rothenflue's doctrine, that with it he cannot refute or escape pantheism. Whoever starts with being alone as his *primum*, can escape pantheism only at the expense of his logic, as he who starts with the soul or subject as his *primum*, as does Descartes, inevitably falls, if logical, into egoism, scepticism, nihilism, as has been proved over and over in the *Review*. We do not and have never done either, as our critics cannot be ignorant.

The *Catholic World* objects to Father Louage's definition of philosophy, but refuses to accept ours, that it is the "science of principles," because he says, p. 256, "We *know* that the true definition of philosophy is the science of things through their highest principles." As he *knows* this is the true definition, we have nothing to say. We defined philosophy from our point of view, or the aspect under which we were considering it, without pretending to give a strictly scientific definition, brief, exact, precise, and adequate. We asserted, rather than defined, it to be the science of principles in order to distinguish it from the science of facts, the proper matter of the special sciences. The science of things through their principles does not differ much—only in being less definite—from the science of principles. The difference to our understanding is simply verbal, for according to us we know things only through their principles. In our view, the special sciences collect, describe, and classify the facts, and philosophy applies the principles which coördinate, connect, and explain them, or give them meaning.

The *Catholic World* says Father Louage's definition of *being*, as "that which exists or may exist," is correct, and waves aside our objection, that a possible existence is simply nothing, as unfounded, for, "although what may exist, but does not exist," it says, "is nothing in the real order, yet it is something in the ideal order, as an object of thought." Here our contemporary adopts the primal error, the utter absurdity of the whole school we have ventured to oppose, set forth in its nakedness, without any disguise or concealment. He is a brave man who can boldly assert that nothing is not nothing, but something, or maintain that nothing can be an object of thought, that is, that we can think nothing, as if to think nothing were not simply not to think! If the possible is nothing, it is a contradiction in terms to say it is something; if it is nothing in the real order, it can-

not be something in the ideal order, for we have already proved the identity of the ideal and the real. If the ideal is not real, it is unreal, and the unreal is nothing, and nothing cannot be an object of thought. The trouble with the critic, as with many others, is that he does not admit that nothing is nothing, or that nothing is not something.

The Philosophers the *Catholic World* recommends us and others to follow do not seem to reflect that their doctrine, which divorces the ideal from the real and asserts that the ideal can be thought without the real, renders the refutation of scepticism impossible. The ideal, if unreal, if it does not exist *a parte rei*, is simply nothing distinguishable from the subject. If it can be an object of thought, the subject can be its own object, and does not need any thing but itself in order to think. Then the fact of thought is no evidence that there is any reality, that is to say, any truth, prior to or independent of the subject. How then establish the objective validity of thought, since we have and can have nothing but thought with which to establish the objective validity of thought? This makes the question of certitude the central, we may say, the pivotal question of philosophy, and what is worse, makes it, an unanswerable question. Once concede that we can think without thinking any thing real, how will you prove that we ever think any objective truth, or any thing real? How will you verify human knowledge, if it is conceded that it needs verifying? We have nothing more ultimate or more certain than knowledge with which to verify knowledge or to establish its validity. The arguments drawn by our philosophers from the senses, the *sensus intimus*, consciousness, or any other possible source, to prove certainty or the objective validity of thought, amount to nothing; for they all rest, in the last analysis for their principle on thought, and can give to thought nothing in addition to itself to confirm it. One can only marvel that this is overlooked, and that so much labor and pains are expended by eminent men in attempting to prove what, if it needs proof, is not provable. All these elaborate arguments of philosophers to prove certainty or the objective validity of thought or knowledge are paralogisms, ingenious efforts to prove *idem per idem*.

The philosophy the *Catholic World* opposes to ontologism, whether its learned and accomplished editor means it or not, is pure, unmitigated psychologism, which asserts the

subject as its own object, or at least as furnishing its object from its own resources independently of the real order or objective truth. He asserts that what in the real order has no existence, is simply nothing, may be an object of thought. This real nothing, but ideal something, can be neither subject nor object *in re:* it must then be either, as Kant holds, a form of the understanding, or a mental conception—concept, as is now said—and in either case it is purely psychological and restricted to the sphere of the subject, or the *Ego.* How from purely subjective premises conclude objective truth? We have repeatedly proved that the thing is impossible, that there is no logical passage from the subjective to the objective. The objective cannot be concluded from the subjective, nor the subjective from the objective,—God, by way of induction or deduction, from man, nor man, from God: for there can be, as we have seen, nothing in the conclusion not explicitly or implicitly in the premises.

Psychologism, by asserting that the soul can think without any real object, or with an object furnished by itself, and which is simply nothing in the real order, asserts, contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas, as cited by Balmes, that man is both intelligent and intelligible in himself, suffices for his own intelligence, without any dependence on any objective reality, or any thing not contained in himself. If it were so, man would be God, as implied in the famous *Cogito, ergo* SUM. I think, therefore I AM, the name by which God reveals himself to Moses. It implies that the soul is its own object, and able to think and therefore to act, in itself, without depending on any truth, being, or existence objective to itself, which can be affirmed only of God, who alone suffices for his own intelligence and acts. Psychologism repeats the promise of Satan to our first parents, "Ye shall be gods," and the identity of man and God is rapidly becoming the creed of the nations in this nineteenth century. It is impossible, on purely psychological grounds, by any means known to us, to refute it, or to show its absurdity. Psychologism assumes for the soul what ontologism assumes for being, and both alike, logically carried out, terminate in nihilism. We, therefore, must believe that the *Catholic World* has been misled by the philosophy it finds just now in vogue, and is not aware that it is defending, in principle, the chief errors that have disfigured and vitiated philosophy from Descartes down to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, the effects of which are seen in the pantheistic

and nihilistic tendency of the age. Indeed, its possible existence, which is nothing in the real order, yet is something in the ideal order, bears a closer affinity, perhaps, than it is aware, to Hegel's *reine Seyn*, avowedly equivalent to *das nicht-Seyn* or not-being.

But our highly esteemed contemporary is not, in our judgment, correct in his psychological analysis, when he asserts that a possible existence is an object of thought. As we understand it, the object of the thought is not the possible existence, which is unreal—nothing, but the power or ability of the real and actual to produce it; prescinded from that power or ability, the possible is nothing in any order, and is and can be no object of thought. It is a pure abstraction, and abstractions are intelligible or thinkable, as they exist, only in their concretes, as whiteness only in white things, or roundness only in round things. There are white things, and there are round things, but there is no abstract whiteness or roundness in nature, by participation of which things are white or round as Plato teaches, and consequently none in the intelligence. Abstraction is the work of the reflective understanding in distinction from the intuitive, and reflection can operate only on objects furnished by intuition. What is no object of intuition, can be no object of reflection, and only the real or what really is or exists, can be an object of intuition.

The philosophy our conscientious, we might say, scrupulous contemporary recommends to us and the Catholic student, fails to draw continuously and with precision the line between intuition and reflection, or as an Italian might say, between *pensare* and *ripensare*, between thinking and re-thinking. Reflection is the turning back of the mind on its intuitions, or the objects intuitively presented or affirmed to it; it may analyze, divide, abstract, separate, combine, re-combine, explain, account for, or verify them, but it can add nothing to the matter of the intuition, nor introduce any object of thought not already in the intelligence. In abstractions formed by the mind operating on the concretes given by intuition, the object of the thought is not the abstraction, roundness, for instance, but the round thing intuitively given, and in which the abstract is concrete and real. If this distinction had been properly understood and duly heeded, philosophers would have spared themselves and their readers much wearisome and useless labor, would have greatly simplified their science, and escaped most of the grave errors into which they have fallen.

There is no possible without the real, for the possible is only in the power or ability of the real. Possible in relation to God is what he has in himself the power to do or to produce; in relation to man it is what, with the divine concurrence, man is able to do. As in either case it is nothing actually done, or actually existing, it is and can be cognizable or thinkable only in the power or ability that can do it or cause it to exist. Father Tongiorgi pronounces false and absurd the assertion that possibility originates in the power of God, and maintains that it emerges from the essence of things. He supposes God can do whatever he chooses, or that all things are possible to God that do not contradict the nature or essence of things, *essentia rerum*, while those that do are impossible to him. Be it so. What is this nature or essence of things, which bounds and defines the omnipotence of God? Is it something distinct from God, back of him, and above him? Is there, without God, and independent of him, any nature or essence of things, or an intrinsic possibility? Certainly not, for without him there is absolutely nothing. It is then God, that is, his own necessary, eternal, and immutable being, that constitutes the nature or essence of things. It is in his own being or essence that is grounded intrinsic possibility or impossibility, on which Father Tongiorgi and his school lay so much stress. God can do anything but contradict, that is, annihilate his own necessary and eternal being. He is eternal and necessary being, and therefore cannot cease to be, or not be, or cease to be what he is. But any thing not repugnant to his own being he can do, and hence he is omnipotent, because he is himself his only restriction. The principle of contradiction has its reason and ground in the divine being or essence; it is a valid principle, but its meaning is that nothing that is repugnant to the divine being can be true or possible, because God the only real and necessary being, without whom nothing exists or can exist, cannot annihilate his own being.

Yet this does not negative our definition of the possible, namely, the power or ability of the real and actual. We do not say that possibility originates in the power of God, distinctively taken, for so taken, we might say the power of God is the power to do whatever he chooses that is possible, and every thing is possible to him that does not impugn the principle of contradiction, which is substantially what Father Tongiorgi does say. But this really defines nothing, and

implies that the principle of contradiction is an abstraction, which no principle is or can be. We say simply what the possible is, that is, what in the possible is the real object of thought, or intuition. The limit of the possible is the power of God, and that power is unlimited, except it is not able to destroy itself. For God is, and, we repeat, cannot not be, or be other than he is. Every falsehood denies that being is being, and therefore denies God.

We dwell the longer on this point, that it is only in the real that the possible can be thought, because we wish to get rid of that world of abstractions in which a feeble scholasticism envelops the divine being, and which interposes between the human intellect and its creator. There is nothing between us and God but his creative act, as there is nothing between us and nothing but that same act, which, while it distinguishes us from him, unites us to him. We have no patience with these wire-drawn and manifold distinctions on which our picayunish philosopher so strenuously insists, and which serve only to obscure the truth and bewilder the understanding. We know that theologians distinguish between the *essentia divina* and the divine *esse*, between the divine *esse* and the attributes, and between one attribute and another; but we know that they also tell us that these distinctions are only *quoad nos*, growing out of the inadequacy of our faculties to take in at one view the whole that is knowable of the divine being, but have no existence *in re*. They are distinctions *rationis ratiocinatæ*, not real, but authorized by the real. The divine being is absolutely one and simple, and excludes all plurality and all complexity, and it is as one and simple that we think and speak of God. There is in God a distinction of persons, but absolute unity of being. Hence we have no taste for the philosophy that delights in dissecting the real and necessary being, and gives us its anatomy or skeleton instead of presenting us the living God and the tender and loving Father.

We have the profoundest veneration for the illustrious Society of Jesus, and the highest appreciation of the services rendered to religion, literature, and science, by its learned and devoted members; but we hope we may, without any impeachment of our Catholic faith and loyalty, say that their official philosophy as set forth in the text-books used in their colleges, is not in our judgment, which may indeed be worth nothing, capable of solving satisfactorily the great problems

pressing us on every hand for solution. We do not find them arming the young men they graduate, for the warfare that awaits them as they go forth into the world, or preparing them to defend successfully reason and faith against the false science, crude philosophy, incredulity, indifference, and recrudescent paganism of this proud and arrogant but shallow and narrow-minded nineteenth century. It may be true that their colleges are the best we have, but judging them by the intellectual inefficiency of their graduates, we risk little in expressing the opinion that they are but imperfectly performing the work of the higher education demanded here and now. This is not an age or country to be redeemed by routine, nor by condescension to its intellectual imbecility.

We take a deep interest in the prosperity of the *Catholic World*, whose editor we love and revere, and whom for years we have counted among our warmest and most loyal personal friends; but, to say nothing of his misrepresentation of us, we regret, while we agree heartily with him in his repudiation of ontologism, that he should suffer himself to be seduced into the defence of the conceptualism of the text-books we have cited, and which, *me judice*, is as far from the doctrine of St. Thomas as it is from the truth. We hope he will recover soon from the fright produced by the improbation of the Louvain propositions, and while he takes care to avoid ontologism, that he also take care to avoid psychologism—the more dangerous error of the two.

* FATHER HILL'S PHILOSOPHY.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1875.]

ARTICLE I.

The very great success Father Hill's work has met with indicates less its merits as a text-book of philosophy, than the very deep want which had for some time been felt for some text-book of the sort in English for students in our colleges and higher schools. Yet it would be unjust to deny the work ability, learning, great familiarity with philosophical questions, and no little facility in treating them. From the point of view from which it is written it deserves as high praise as it has received from the Catholic press, and, by a happy inconsequence, the author contrives to get into his work all, or nearly all, the elements that enter into a sound and unobjectionable system of philosophy. Still we cannot call Father Hill a philosopher. He lacks the true philosophical instinct; and we should doubt if he has ever engaged in any original investigations, or made his loans from others his own by digesting and assimilating them to his own mind.

Father Hill professes to follow St. Thomas: he could not follow a higher authority; but we must be permitted to doubt if he always succeeds in grasping the deeper sense of St. Thomas, and still more, his success in translating his sense, enveloped as it is in mediæval scholasticism, into the language of modern thought. He does not seem to us to be able to put himself in the philosophical and scientific position of St. Thomas, and to see and understand the several problems the holy doctor solves from his point of view. One may understand St. Thomas's language and yet not understand his thought, or the real meaning of the solution he gives, in scholastic form, to the problems he treats. It has often struck us that, to understand or to grasp the meaning of St. Thomas, or of any other great mediæval philosopher, it is necessary to arrive at it, in some sense *aliunde*,

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* *Elements of Philosophy. Comprising Logic and Ontology, or General Metaphysics.* By Rev. Walter H. Hill, S. J., Professor of Philosophy in the St. Louis University. Baltimore. 1874

by original and independent investigation for one's self; or that, in order to understand his solution of a problem, we must first solve it for ourselves; and we confess that we distrust all interpreters of the Angelic Doctor, who are able only to cite his words and claim to follow his doctrine, only because they can quote texts from his pages apparently in their favor.

Then we must not forget that philosophy, as far as it goes, is a rational science and depends on reason, which is given to every man, and is common to all men. It does not, like faith, depend on extrinsic authority, distinct from reason, and addressed to it. We have no right, under the name of reason, philosophy, or science, to defend any proposition contrary to, or incompatible with faith or sound doctrine; but, faith saved, no man has the right to cite authority against us, otherwise than as an argument addressed to our reason. That such or such was the teaching of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, or St. Bonaventura, does not conclude us, or shut our mouth, in what is confessedly a question of reason; and we have a right to hold differently if we can show a good reason for doing so. Whether we can cite any great name in our favor or not, we claim no rights of the mind or of reason against the Church; for we hold that man has no rights against God, or against him who is authorized to speak in his name. But all men are equal, and no one can, in his own name, bind another. As between man and man we have rights, and we cannot surrender them. When you oppose to us only the authority of another man or of other men, we give it what it is rationally entitled to, and no more, our own error of judgment excepted. As a fact, we attach great weight to the teaching of St. Thomas, and we must have very strong reasons against it, or we should not dare dissent from a philosophical opinion of St. Thomas or St. Augustine; yet, for sufficient reasons, we have the right to differ from either.

Very nearly the same would we say of the authority of the Society of Jesus, so far as they have agreed, as an educating order, in teaching their classes the same philosophy: for the presumption is that they would not be permitted under the very eye of authority to continue teaching three hundred years a philosophy manifestly unsound. This presumption is somewhat weakened, it is true, by the fact that the Society has never fully agreed as to its philosophy, and has taught at different times different philosophical systems,

though a modified peripateticism has usually predominated in their schools. Still, while we hold ourselves free to differ from their philosophy, if philosophy they have, we hold ourselves bound to justify our difference from it by good and valid reasons. Father Hill's book, we take it for granted, meets with the approval of the Society; as tacitly, if not explicitly, approved and authorized by the Society to be taught, we take it up and study it, with a certain presumption in its favor on that very account; but a presumption which only requires us to give a solid reason for our difference, if we happen to differ from it, for *hic et nunc* his philosophy is in possession, and we must oust it before we can place a different philosophy in possession.

With these preliminary remarks designed chiefly to assert the independence of the cultivators of rational science, not indeed of the Church, but as between one human mind and another or others, and the respect, in determining what is reason, always due to great names and time-honored and generally received opinions, we may proceed to the main purpose of this article, namely: a critical examination of Father Hill's *Elements of Philosophy*, as set forth in the work before us. We intend to be rigid in our criticism, but not hostile or unjust, and shall aim to be as fair and as candid as it is in our nature to be. We do this with the design of putting, if possible, the advocates of the philosophy which Father Hill so favorably presents, on their defence, or to compel them as loyal and earnest lovers of truth to respond to the grave objections which we, and not we only, have urged against it. It may be true that at present they have the field in their possession, and can afford to disdain their opponents, and treat their grave objections with contemptuous silence; but they may not always retain this possession, and it may, before they are aware of it, be wrested from them. We can tell them that there are questions of the deepest philosophical import, which, sooner or later, Father Hill and his friends must meet. The controversy is looming up before us, and cannot be staved off much longer: come it must and will; and, for the sake of all concerned, we wish it to come, as it may and should, in the form of an amicable discussion.

Father Hill does not give, or profess to give, a whole course of philosophy in this small volume, but confines himself to Logic and Ontology, or General Metaphysics. Logic he divides into two parts, Theoretical and Applied. This divi-

sion may pass, but we should prefer the old division of logic into logic as a science, and logic as an art. It is the science of Logic that should be given in the first division, not its theory. Theory is not science, but the mind's view of science. Science gives the reality; theory gives simply the mind's view of it, and may be true or false. There is no objection to calling the second division Applied Logic, for art is, with all deference to our modern German æsthetical writers, who would convert it into a science, only the practical application of science, and fails under the relation of art even, when it fails to apply or to express in its productions objective or scientific truth. Why the author calls the first division of logic the theory rather than the science of logic, we shall find as we proceed; and, if we are not mistaken, we shall find it is because all science in his system is simply theoretical, or a mental conception. But we pass on.

The author proceeds to define his terms. "The first part of logic," he says, "includes three operations of the mind: simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning"—p. 16. "Apprehension, in its widest sense, includes all acts of cognition which precede judgment." Again (*ibid.*): "Simple apprehension, in the more special sense in which the expression is more generally used, is an act of the intellect, by which it takes notice of an object and acquires some knowledge of it, but without any judgment or explicit affirmation; or, in other words, by this act it merely perceives or sees the object, without proceeding to form a judgment." That is, without thinking whether it apprehends it or not, since every thought is a judgment. We doubt if the mind by its own act ever perceives or sees the object, without, by the same act, perceiving, that is, affirming, that it is, and that it perceives it. "The intellect expresses what it . . . apprehends or conceives in the *verbum mentis* or concept, or by these acts it forms its idea of the object." This is not very clear or satisfactory. Does the author make no distinction between perception and conception? Perception is an act of the intellect in the direct or intuitive order; conception is an act of the intellect in the order of reflection, and demands a return of the mind on itself. The *verbum mentis*, that is, a complete thought, is the product of two factors, in the language of the schoolmen, of the *species impressa*, and the *species expressa*. The *species impressa* must be furnished by the object; the *species expressa* is the action

of the intellect and constitutes the *verbum mentis*, because the mind is dependent, and is not able of itself alone to generate the *verbum mentis*, or to think: otherwise it would generate the Word, as in the Blessed Trinity the Father generates the Son or Word. Father Hill overlooks the *præmotio physica* of St. Thomas, or is unaware of its extent. He gives us no hint that the intellect is dependent, and therefore incapable of acting by itself alone, or of initiating its own action. The object must present itself, or be presented to the intellect, before the intellect can act. This presentation of the object to the mind is what we call intuition, the cognition *a priori* of Kant, and, if we mistake not, the *species impressa* of the schoolmen, and proceeds from the object, whether sensible or intelligible. The mind being dependent, not independent and self-sufficing, cannot initiate its own action, any more than it can its own existence; and hence, in order to act, it must be moved by the object. But the object cannot move the mind to act, and thus render the fact of cognition possible unless it is present to the mind; and hence we understand by the *species impressa*, not something detached from the object, but the action of the object itself, or the objective reality, actually present to the mind. This *a priori* and concurrent action of the object in the fact of apprehension or cognition, as necessary to the very existence of that fact, Father Hill's philosophy seems to us to fail wholly to recognize.

No doubt Father Hill asserts, for he is a theologian, the objectivity of our cognition, but he fails to show it; for he says (*ibid.*): "We may regard the idea or concept as the term of these apprehensive acts." That is, the mind in apprehension does not apprehend, or terminate in, the object itself, but in its idea or concept. This shows the character of his philosophy, and proves that, in his view, the mind, contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas, does not grasp the objective reality, but simply infers it. Science, then, is not science of the real, or of things, but of the mind's ideas or concepts, that is, abstractions. How, then, cross the *pons asinorum* of psychologists, and prove that there is any objective reality represented in the idea or concept, or that our science is not purely subjective? True, he says the objects of the ideas or concepts are real; but as he does not place the object in immediate relation to the mind, moving it to act by its own activity, we see not what evidence or proof he has of its reality, or existence *a parte rei*. He

seems to us, if he does not interpose a *mundus logicus* between the mind and the external reality, to make the mind capable of action without any *prœmotio physica*, without any action on the part of the object, and, therefore, capable of knowing by its own action alone: which is really to assume that man is God, and to deny his dependence on any thing but himself alone. This is the fatal objection to psychologism.

But we pass on. "Terms" (p. 20) "considered in relation to their objects, are real and logical: of the first and second intention: absolute and connotative." "The object of the real term actually exists outside of the mind: it is a real, or actual, object, or, at least, really possible." No, reverend father. It is the mind's idea or concept, according to your theory of knowledge, for you fail to place the object and the mind in direct and immediate relation. You overthrow your own doctrine, that the object of the real term actually exists outside of the mind, when you say that it may be not an actually existing but a *possible* object: *really* possible you say, as if there were real and unreal possibles. The possible, considered in itself, is nothing, is unreal, and is real only in the ability of the real. Prescinded from that ability, it is no object of thought or cognition. To include it as an object of a *real* term, is therefore to exclude all distinction between the real and the unreal. The definition, therefore, needs amendment. But the error in the definition is occasioned by the error of the system, which deals with concepts instead of their objects existing *a parte rei*.

The author continues, same page: "The *logical* term has for its object a concept or idea, which, though founded upon real objects, does not itself express any thing really existing out of the mind, v. g., the terms genus, species, and all universals." Here the author proves himself a Conceptualist, if not a Nominalist. He supposes that he follows St. Thomas, who seems to teach that universals exist *in conceptu cum fundamento in re;* but this does not necessarily include genera and species. The schoolmen confound genera and species with universals, which are only abstractions, and we will not say, for we do not know, that St. Thomas distinguishes them; but he nowhere, to our knowledge, expressly teaches that genera and species are simply mental conceptions *cum fundamento in re*. This is a just definition of abstractions, such as whiteness, redness, round-

ness, and the like, which Plato would seem to make ideas, and therefore real; since in his philosophy, as we have learned it, ideas are real, and the only thing that is real, for the mimetic, or sensible, is with him purely phenomenal, therefore unreal, as it is with the Cosmists.

Genera and species Cousin has well shown in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, or Introduction to the unpublished works of Abelard, the least known of all his philosophical works, are not mere words, as Roscelline maintained, nor conceptions or abstractions, as Abelard taught, nor separate entities, as they said then, as Guillaume de Champeaux was said, probably falsely said, to hold; but real, distinct, though not separable from individuals: which we hold to be the true doctrine, and substantially that of Guillaume de Champeaux and the old Realists. How will Father Hill, if he makes genera and species concepts or conceptions, that is, abstractions, therefore productions of the mind and subjective, explain the fact of generation, that like produces like? Generation is not creation: it is only explication, and simply unfolds or develops a reality preëxisting in the genitors. If you deny the reality of the genus or species, how can you explain that vegetables do not generate animals, and the seed of the oak does not spring up a pine? As generation is real, genera and species must also be real, since from the unreal no real effects are obtainable. How, if you deny the reality of genera and species, will you explain original sin, that all men died in Adam? They could not have died in Adam unless they were in him; but they certainly were not in him as individuals, for none of them were born or even conceived, when Adam prevaricated. We think Father Hill would find on his philosophy some difficulty in explaining the mystery of Redemption or the Atonement: "As in Adam all die, so in Christ all are made alive." On what principle could Christ by his obedience and passion redeem all men and atone for the sins of the world, except on that of being the head of every man? Nay, how could he, in becoming incarnate, assume universal human nature, the nature common to all men? Surely he did not become incarnate in every human nature individually. He took upon him not all men in their individuality, but the race in its generic existence, and thus became in the teleological order, or regeneration by grace, the head of every man, as Adam was the head of every man in the order of natural generation, or the initial order. If human nature does not

really exist as one nature in all men, we cannot understand how the assumption of human nature *in individuo* in the womb of the Virgin could be the assumption of the nature of all men. The Word would in such case have needed to assume the human nature individually of every man. In such case he would have needed to be crucified for each man in particular, for whom he tasted death. To our understanding, both nominalism and conceptualism are incompatible with the principles that underlie the great mysteries of our religion, and strip our faith of all dialectic character. We have noticed also that those theologians who deny the reality of genera and species and make them mere words or mental conceptions, hardly recognize original sin—save in words. Nature, they tell us, received no wound from it, and the loss incurred was simply the loss of things that were extrinsic to it, and had no dialectic relation to it.

We are not quite satisfied with the author's definition of *logical* terms, which makes logic a *formal*, not a real, science. We do not accept the categories of Aristotle if taken as the categories not of reality, but of a *mundus logicus*, or a world intermediate between the subject and the object. Regarded as a science, logic, like all science, is real, not formal, and deals with real principles or things, not with mere forms or concepts. The principles of the science of logic, like the principles of all science, are real, and are the principles of things, because all science, if science, is the science of the real, not of the unreal. Logic as a science is a real science. Indeed, the universe is constructed on the principles of the most rigid logic; and, in a far deeper and truer sense than either Schelling or Hegel dreamed of, reality and logic are identical. The universe in all its parts, natural and supernatural, initial and teleological, is supremely logical, is the expression, through the creative act, of the supreme logic itself,—the work of the Logos "who was in the beginning, who was with God, and who was God, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made that was made." God the Creator, St. Thomas tells us, *est similitudo rerum omnium*. Logic is not, then, merely formal, but a real science, identical with the principles of things. It deals not with concepts, possibilities, or abstract forms, but with the immutable principles of the universe. What is logical is true, objectively as well as subjectively; what is not logical or is sophistical, though conforming in its construction to the artificial rules of logic, is false.

Logic is not simply the first or introductory part of philosophy; it is rather the whole science of philosophy. One needs to know the whole science in order to define the terms the logician uses. Father Hill had constructed his system of philosophy before he made out his definitions, and every one of them is dictated by his system, and they have just the value of that system; neither more nor less. His definitions reveal his system, and as soon as we read them we know what that system is. Were we writing a text-book of philosophy for learners, we should not begin with a long string of definitions, which can be understood and appreciated only after the whole field of the science has been mastered; nor should we treat logic before treating the other parts of philosophy. If we retained the ordinary divisions, we should treat psychology first, ontology next, and logic last. We, however, think, as psychology and ontology are not separable in real life, as the soul is nothing separated from real and necessary being, they should be taught together, as far as possible, in their real synthesis, as we have done in our *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*. We should begin with what Cousin calls "a fact of consciousness," what we call thought, and then proceed to the analysis of thought; from that, following the real order, we would proceed to the analysis, successively, of each of the elements of which analysis shows thought to be indissolubly composed. This would complete our work so far as concerns philosophy as distinguished from the sciences.

We may say here that we understand by philosophy the science of principles, real principles, in the Greek, not the Latin, sense, and hold it coincident with what, in modern times, is called Natural Theology, or theology based on principles evident to natural reason, and therefore distinguishable from Revealed Theology, based on principles known only by supernatural revelation. It is for us all included in that one term,—thought, which is a fact composed simultaneously and indissolubly of three elements, subject, object, and their relation. These three terms comprise all reality, and consequently all the knowable, whether intelligible or sensible, necessary or contingent, universal or particular.

We have no need, indeed no place, for the long string of technical terms which Father Hill defines in the sense of the system he defends. Indeed, philosophy has been made too technical, artificial, and complex. Locke had a just

thought in proposing to express philosophy in the language of common-sense; and we see no reason why it should not be expressed in simple terms, in their natural sense. The obscurity complained of in metaphysical writers grows out of the forgetfulness that there are no abstractions in nature, that nothing is nothing, that what is or exists not is unintelligible, and that possibles are intelligible only in the ability of the actual. Nothing that is or exists not is intelligible or an object of thought. Only real being is intelligible in and by itself.

We do not ourselves accept Father Hill's use of the word *idea*. He uses it in a subjective sense, as the synonyme of concept, or conception; we use it, as does Plato, in an objective sense, to express the *a priori* and apodictic element of every thought, without which no thought is possible, as we have explained, in the analysis of the object, in our above-cited essay. The idea is necessary, immutable, universal, eternal, and is the form in which the ontological, real, and necessary being affirms itself in immediate intuition, by its own persistent creative act and intrinsic light. We fear this is unintelligible to Father Hill, for, though we think it implied, if not expressly taught, in the Thomist philosophy, it is not recognized in Father Hill's *Elements*. In a word, Father Hill's system, though containing much that is true and important, if we do not misapprehend it, interposes between the intellect and the intelligible, or the mind and the truth, a *mundus logicus*, and nowhere admits that the mind and the real object existing *a parte rei* are ever brought into immediate relation; and that the fact of thought or cognition is the resultant of the intershock of the two factors, or their concurrent action, as we endeavored to show in the *Review* for July, 1846, when trying to explain, to some extent, the act of faith, by showing that all that is required to elicit it is that the creditive subject and the credible object be placed in immediate relation. The so-called motives of credibility, we maintained, do not motive the assent; they only remove the *prohibentia* or obstacles, which prevent the creditive subject and credible object from coming together with nothing interposed between them. We maintained that this is also the case in regard to the assent of science or knowledge. This last we had maintained in the Boston *Observer* as early as 1833 or 1834. The assent, we argued, is always direct and immediate, by virtue of the force of the two factors, without any extrinsic reason.

Demonstration does not motive the assent; it only strips the matter of its envelopes, and shows it—*demonstrare*—to the mind as it is, or brings it and the mind into actual relation, with nothing between to separate them. The assent is direct and immediate. So we held and wrote when still a very young man; and on this point we have never changed, nor seen any reason to change, our view. This is all in the face and eyes of the modern peripatetics, and, if true, upsets a very important principle of the Aristotelian or scholastic logic.

Now, we may misapprehend Father Hill's system, but, as we apprehend it, the mind and object never come into immediate relation. The assent which we call the assent of science or knowledge, as distinguished from the assent of faith, is not by the direct concurrent action of the subject and object. What is immediately assented to by the mind is not the object itself as existing *a parte rei*, but a certain concept or idea of it is formed by the mind. It is not the thing itself that is immediately apprehended by the mind, but its representative; and it is by reasoning, by induction, that any thing responding to it, exterior to, or independent of, the mind, is asserted. Father Hill and all the philosophers of his class leave that *pons asinorum*, or asses' bridge, from the subjective to the objective, to be crossed.

We certainly do not and could not think so meanly of Father Hill as to suppose that he does not recognize the distinction between intuition as an act of the mind, and reflection, which is more or less discursive; but what he does not seem to us to recognize is the fact of the intuitive affirmation or presentation of principles to the mind prior to its own action, and the necessary condition of all its empirical activity, whether perceptive or reflective. A writer in the *Catholic World*, in an elaborate article on *Ontologism and Psychologism*, which, we understand from a friend, was intended to be a reply to us, and to demolish the philosophy defended by the *Review*, evidently sees no necessity to the explanation of the fact of knowledge to assert any thing of the sort, and simply says he cannot say we are right, and does not like to say we are wrong, and fall under the censure of ontologism by the Holy See: all of which shows us very clearly that he is unaware of the problem which we have attempted to solve. Perhaps, if he will read Kant's *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, on the question, How synthetic judgments *a priori* are formed? he will discover the importance

and necessity of the problem, though Kant certainly will not give him the true solution. The Scholastics, if aware of the problem, do not give it prominence, and by no means solve it. St. Thomas begins, not with the intuitive reason, but with the reflective. Father Hill, and Father Hewit of the *Catholic World*, seem, if we may speak as we think, to forget that the human mind is dependent, and to regard it only as limited. They would seem to hold that, within its assigned limits, it acts as an independent and self-determining being, fully sufficing for its own activity. We have not so learned our theology. The mind can no more act of itself, originate its own activity, determine its own action, than it can create itself. If it could, it would be, *pro tanto*, independent of its Creator. God is the adequate object of his own intellect. He must, then, know all things in himself. But how can he know all things in himself unless they all exist in him as their cause, and he has willed, ordained them? We know no *scientia media* that conflicts with this fundamental truth of all sound theology.*

The principles of logic are the principles of things, and those principles must be given *a priori*, for they are at once the principles of all mental existence and all mental action. It is they that render objects intelligible, and the subject, that is, the soul, intellective or cognitive. The soul can as little know without them, as it can act without existing. These principles cannot be obtained by intuition regarded as the act of the soul, because without them the soul can neither exist nor act, and act neither intuitively nor reflectively. We reject, of course, the doctrine that God is known by direct or immediate intuition, because those who maintain it, mean by intuition an act of the soul; and it is in this sense that the Holy See has censured it. Man has, we hold, no power to place himself in immediate intellectual relation to God or to apprehend him, by his own act. No man hath seen God at any time, or can see him and live. Our friend of the *Catholic World*, whom we sincerely love and honor, can say no more on this point than we can and do. But it

* We do not forget that man is a free moral agent. How the liberty of man can be reconciled with the absolute sovereignty of God, is no doubt a difficult question; but if we are forbidden to explain the divine Sovereignty so as to restrict human liberty, we are equally forbidden to explain human liberty so as to restrict the divine Sovereignty. God governs the universe absolutely, but he governs men as free moral agents.

is not of intuition as an act of the mind, empirical intuition as we call it, that we speak; but of what we call ideal intuition, and which we maintain is the act of the object, that is, of real and necessary being, *Ens necessarium et reale.*

The *Catholic World* objects to this that it is a novelty, and rests on no authority. But we were not aware that we needed in an admitted rational science any authority but that of reason itself. In philosophy, we had supposed we were free to follow reason so long as we did not misapprehend its dictates, or run athwart, in any respect, the word of God, or the teachings of the Church. The Church has supreme authority in science as in faith; but in science her authority is negative, and she intervenes only to condemn what is false and repugnant to faith and morals. We as a Catholic cannot be required to do more than give a solid and valid reason for the view in question. We are not obliged to give any other authority. We may be censured for our bad reason, but not because we do not or cannot cite St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Suarez, or Padre Curci in our support. The doctrine must, if not condemned by the Holy See, be received or rejected on its merits.

But if the doctrine is novel, which we do not concede, the problem it is brought forward to solve is as old as philosophy itself. The *Catholic World*, as well as Father Hill, has heard, we presume, of what the Greeks call principles, and the Latins primordial or first principles, called by some "first truths," "necessary truths;" by others, "necessary ideas," "absolute ideas," "necessary and immutable ideas;" by St. Augustine, "the principles of things;" by St. Thomas, if we recollect aright, "first or necessary truths." All agree in this, that it is only by virtue of possessing them that the mind is cognitive or the soul is capable of any act or fact of knowledge or experience. So far we are no innovator, and differ not from the general current of the philosophy of the schools.

But whence do these truths, ideas, or principles come to the mind, or how does the mind come into possession of them, and what are they? Aristotle teaches us that they are not derived from experience, but are above it and precede it; St. Thomas says they are inserted in human nature, by which we suppose he means that they are inherent in the human reason,—constitutive of it; Descartes treats them as innate, —born in and with us; Old Ralph Cudworth holds them to be the mind itself protended, though we do not exactly know

what that means; Leibnitz holds them to be eternal verities, that is, the principles alike of science and things, and would seem to teach that the mind actually perceives or apprehends them; Ward of the *Dublin Review*, and his friend Dr. M'Cosh, make them empirical intuitions, as also does Dr. Porter, President of Yale College; Locke endeavors to make out that they are obtained by reflection, that is, reasoning, operating on sensible *data*; Hume says no man can disbelieve them, but no one can prove them—from sensible experience; Dr. Thomas Reid makes them "the constituent principles of belief," "the constituent principles of human nature," "the principles of common-sense, and needing no proof;" Kant makes them the forms of the understanding, supplied by the understanding itself, on the occasion of experience; Cousin makes them constituent elements of the objective reason, which he makes the word of God, but which Fénelon identifies with God himself, or the divine Being or Intelligence; Gioberti holds that they are presented objectively and *a priori* to the mind by the immediate act of the object, which is for him the ideal, or *ens necessarium et reale*, affirming itself in the creative act, and reducible to the ideal formula, L'ENTE CREA L'ESISTENZE.

These remarks show, 1. That the problem is an old one; and 2. That there is no such thing as absolute agreement among philosophers, heathen or Christian, Catholic or Protestant, as to its solution. Among all the solutions given, we prefer that given by Gioberti, that is, as we understand it, though not as understood by the *Catholic World;* for it supposes that what we call ideal intuition, proceeds from the action of the object, is a novelty, recently invented by us to escape ecclesiastical censure, and evidently supposes that Gioberti understands by ideal intuition an act of the soul. Yet we cannot see how one can have read Gioberti and not have perceived that the ideal in his doctrine is objective and placed in the mind by the action of the object, that is, by the ideal itself. He calls these ideas, which are for him the ideal formula, a judgment, with the three terms of a perfect judgment, subject, predicate, and copula, and maintains that it is a divine judgment, not a human judgment, and that we are spectators of it, not actors in it. We do not cite Gioberti as authority for holding the doctrine, but as the author who first formally stated and defined it. We hold the doctrine for reasons independent of Gioberti, and of every

other philosopher, ancient or modern; for reasons which we have heretofore given and regard as conclusive.

The fact is, since the pretended reform of philosophy, continuing the work of Luther and Calvin, by that philosopherling, René Descartes, the question of method has taken precedence of the question of principles, and philosophy has become little else than methodology. The question of principles has been displaced and almost lost sight of. Reid, founder of the Scottish school, made an energetic protest in favor of them; Kant, following Reid, undertook, by a masterly analysis of the pure reason,—*die reine Vernunft*,—to find a scientific basis for them in human nature, but simply, as himself avows, ended in demolishing science to clear the site for faith. Leibnitz and Pierre Leroux recognized them, but failed to vindicate them, for they both held the doctrine, censured by the Holy See in the Louvain professors, that the soul, by its own action, intuitively perceives or apprehends the ideal, as we ourselves did with them before our conversion, but never since. But what is impossible to intuition as an act of the subject may be very possible to intuition as the act of the object presenting or affirming itself, and thus constituting or creating the intellect, or the soul as a cognitive existence.

Certain it is the soul cannot operate without those *a priori* ideas or principles; and therefore equally certain is it that it cannot obtain them by its own act or power. They must, then, be given by the action of the object, as we, after Gioberti, have maintained, as no human knowledge, or intellectual act, is possible without them. They must be so given, that is, by the action of the object; else no human cognition in any order, sensible or intelligible, can be asserted, and all science is a vain illusion. The giving of these principles, or *a priori* ideas, by the direct action of the object is what we call intuition, and *ideal* intuition, as distinguished from perception or empirical intuition. It is this ideal intuition that renders the soul intelligent.

Those who have done us the honor to read our *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, will observe that in our analysis of the object,—one of the three necessary and inseparable elements of thought,—we find that it is itself composed, as object, of three inseparable elements, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation; and in our analysis of the ideal, we find it also composed, as the ideal element of thought, of three inseparable elements,—the necessary, the contingent,

and their relation or nexus. These ideas, the philosophers recognize, are all marked by the characters of necessity, universality, immutability, and eternity. But abstractions are nothing, and there can be no abstract necessary, universal, immutable, eternal, &c.; and hence these ideas can be intuitively affirmed only as concreted, and they can be concrete only in real, necessary, universal, immutable, eternal, independent, self-existent, and self-sufficing being,—*Ens necessarium et reale.*

Hence the ideal object of thought includes as its primary term real and necessary being—though not the empirical object; and what we maintain is, that the principles or ideas in question are this real and necessary being presenting and affirming itself, creating by so doing the human intellect, and remaining as its immediate object and light, by which the empirical is illuminated, and the fact of human knowledge is possible, and man exists as an intelligent soul. We do not say that the human mind has immediate cognition of real and necessary being, for that we deny; but we do say that real and necessary being, by its objective act, creating and constituting the human intellect, affirms itself to it as the ideal, or as real and necessary ideas, and remains ever actively present with it, its immediate object and light, in accordance with what St. John says of the Logos: "He was the true light that enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world."

Perhaps our learned friend of the *Catholic World*, when he gets over his fright at the censure of the seven propositions of the Louvain professors, which has never affected us since we became a Catholic, and becomes able to look more calmly at the question, will perceive that we depart far less from the Angel of the Schools than he has supposed. St. Thomas recognizes these *a priori* ideas, and holds them to be first truths, the necessary principles of all science, at least of all reasoning and demonstration. He does not pretend that they are empirically obtained,—he was incapable of such absurdity as that,—but holds them to be inserted in human nature, or the natural gifts of reason. But what does he mean by their insertion in human nature? We do not know; but, whatever he meant, he must have meant that they were given to man in his creation by his Creator: and so far there is no difference between his doctrine and that which we defend. But in what sense does he hold them to be inserted in our rational nature,—in the sense of

innate ideas, as subsequently maintained by Descartes? If so, we are not alone in differing from him. Does he hold them to be created and inserted *tanquam aliquid creatum*, and therefore contingent as all creatures are? But how can the contingent, how can creatures, have the marks of necessity, universality, immutability, &c.? We can very well understand that the faculty of the soul, which apprehends necessary ideas when intuitively presented or affirmed, is created, but not that necessary and universal ideas themselves can be creatures. Perhaps the *Catholic World* can and will aid us to understand how of contradictories both may be true.

We make no apology for replying at greater length than we intended to the *Catholic World* in a review of Father Hill's book, for it and Father Hill defend substantially the same philosophy, and we are introducing no foreign or irrelevant questions. Both Father Hill and the *Catholic World* seem to us in their philosophy to aim at making the act of cognition in some sense independent of all direct concurrence of the Creator; at least to separate as far as possible the Creator from the intellectual life and activity of the creature. They seem to us to forget that the creative act and the act of conservation are identically one and the same divine act, and, therefore, that God creates us at each successive moment from nothing,—at this moment as much as at the first moment of our existence. He did not, as the Deists hold, create the world, infuse into it its laws, give it a jog, and say to it, "There, go ahead on your own hook." There is nothing under us, or between us and nothing, but his creative act, which at once unites us to him, and distinguishes us from him. What then he did for us when he first called us from nothing, and, by his direct action, gave us life, activity, and reason, he does for us in the same way and in the same sense, at each moment, by his creative presence. It is in him we live, and move, and have our being, as St. Paul assures us; and we can no more think or know without his efficacious presence and divine concurrence, as theology teaches us, than we can exist. Why, then, should we hesitate to acknowledge our dependence on God, and that it is by his immediate presence, and affirmation of himself as the ideal to the soul, that we are able to think and know? Why should we fancy that we can think and know without his permanent presence and direct action giving the soul its ideal object and light?

No doubt it is necessary to guard against pantheism, and nothing is more common than for the human mind in seeking to avoid an error on one side to fall into an error on the opposite side; but we submit that, to escape pantheism, it is not necessary to assert that man is disconnected with his Creator, or can act in any sphere or degree independently of God. Modern philosophy, so far as we know it, either absorbs man in God, and allows him no substantial existence except in the one only substance which some call God, and others nature; or it disconnects man with God, and holds that he lives, and moves, and has his being, even if originally a creature, within the sphere determined by his nature, independent of God—as if there were no God at all. He has no need of God, and God cannot, indeed not without violating the inviolable laws of nature, interfere with him. The former is pantheism; the latter we call deism, and is defended by all rationalists, who reject pantheism, and assert, in some sense, the fact of creation, as did the old English Deists. Of course, no Catholic philosopher wittingly adopts or favors this view, so nearly akin to the Epicurean doctrine, that the gods do not trouble themselves with the affairs of men; but to us it seems that Father Hill, and Father Hewit of the *Catholic World*, who reject it with horror, as theologians, do yet, in their fear of pantheism, imply it as philosophers, or by no means guard against it. They seem afraid that they would lose the substantiality of man, and the distinction of the human intellect from the divine intelligence, if they admitted, what we hold to be indubitable, that it is only through the divine *concursus*, or the direct action of the Creator as the ideal object and light in the fact of knowledge or every human intellectual act, as the *a priori* element, that we know at all, or are intellectual existences. The tendency even among philosophers is to hold that the light of reason is not the light of God, or the divine Being illumining the soul and rendering visible to the mind's eye the several objects of cognition, but a created light and shining, as it were, of itself. Yet Fénelon regards the light of reason as the divine Being himself. There is no pantheism in this. For though in the fact of human knowledge it is by the divine Being and his uncreated light we know, it is still our human activity that is the knower. It is the soul that thinks, knows, reasons, by the affirmation or presentation of his divine Being, by himself intuitively to the soul as its immediate object and light;

as in faith it is by the revelation and grace of God the soul believes or elicits the act of faith. The analogy in the two cases is complete; and pantheism is no more implied in the one than in the other. St. Thomas holds that grace is *aliquid creatum;* but Peter Lombard, *Magister Sententiarum*, and many other eminent theologians, do not, and hold that grace is the Holy Ghost himself acting directly on the soul: and we are, with all submission, unable to conceive what sort of a created entity or existence grace can be regarded, as distinct from the direct action of the Holy Ghost on and within the soul.

Father Kleutgen, whom we venerate as the ablest of all the living philosophers of the Society of Jesus, as reported and approved by Dr. Ward in his criticism of J. Stuart Mill's Moral Philosophy, denies that the ideal, necessary, and eternal truths or ideas are God or the divine Being himself, but says they "are founded on God." We take this from Dr. Ward, for our eyes have troubled us so much since we have had Father Kleutgen's Philosophy in our possession, that we have not been able to examine it for ourselves. Besides, we have been expecting a friend, every way competent, to review for us both Father Kleutgen's philosophical works and also those of Professor Stoeckel. But what meaning does the venerable philosopher attach to the expression, "are founded on God"? Does he mean that they are creatures? But, if creatures, how can they be necessary and eternal? If they are not creatures, then they are either God or nothing: for God and creatures include all that is or exists. What is and is not creature is God; and what exists and is not God is creature. There is no *tertium quid*, which is neither God nor creature, possible.

This brings us back to our standing charge against the modern peripatetics, or pretended followers of St. Thomas, who interpose a *mundus logicus* between the mind and objective reality, which, while they admit it is nothing in the real order, they contend is nevertheless something in the order of thought, thus plainly implying that we can think without thinking any thing real. This denies that science is real, and assumes that knowledge may be unreal, that is, no knowledge at all—that we may see what is not, in spite of the couplet,

> Sharp optics has he, I ween,
> Who sees what is not to be seen.

But we have exhausted our space, and must leave our examination of Father Hill's *Elements of Philosophy*

unfinished. We hope to be able to resume and complete it in our *Review* for next July. In the meantime we wish to assure Father Hill that, if he thinks we have in any respect misapprehended him or done his system injustice, or if he wishes to controvert our philosophy and defend his own, the *Review* is as open to him as it is to ourselves. The questions at issue are very important, and we are quite willing to give his side a hearing in the *Review*. We hope this offer will be received in the same spirit in which it is tendered, and be taken as the tender of a courtesy, not as a challenge to discuss the respective merits of the two philosophies. We should not like to engage in a set-to with so young and vigorous an athlete.

ARTICLE II.

An anonymous writer in the *Boston Pilot* assails with great bitterness and some personal abuse, both of which are very unphilosophical, and neither of which is of any logical value, our criticism, in our number for April last, of Professor Hill's much-praised *Elements of Philosophy*. The anonymous writer we find partially upheld, much to our surprise, by our friend of *The Louisville Catholic Advocate*, for whose able and independent editor we have a very high esteem. The anonymous writer in the *Boston Pilot* attacks us with great vehemence, and writes with an imposing self-assurance, which may lead some readers to imagine that he really understands something of the subject on which he writes. We shall not attempt to prove the contrary, for we cannot so far derogate from the dignity of a quarterly review as to reply to an anonymous scribbler in a weekly newspaper, and especially a newspaper of such a character as the *Boston Pilot*.

There is one charge the writer makes, since it is repeated by our friend of the *Catholic Advocate*, and maintained, we are informed, by Father Hill himself, if, indeed, it did not originate with him, that we feel bound to notice.* It is that we do not know Latin, or at least are too ignorant of Latin to understand the technicalities of St. Thomas and the scholastic philosophy. We have never pretended to be

* Father Hill assures the Editor that this is a mistake so far as relates to him, for he never said any thing of the kind.—Ed.

a classical scholar, nor a thorough Latinist. Yet we do claim to have enough acquaintance with the Latin of the mediæval scholastics, to read and understand them, as well as some understanding of their technicalities both in philosophy and theology. But suppose we have not. Does not Father Hill write his philosophy in English for students whose mother-tongue is English, and will it be alleged that we are too ignorant of Latin to understand English? Is it necessary to charge us with ignorance of Latin in order to prove that we misunderstand or cannot understand Father Hill's English? This would only confirm the criticism made in our first notice of his work, that his English is unintelligible to a reader who is ignorant of the scholastic philosophy and of the Latin. Indeed it is a grave objection to the work, as an English work, that it is not intelligible to a simple English reader who knows no language but his own. The attempt to make out that our criticisms must be unfounded because we are ignorant of Latin, only justifies our criticism.

We regard Father Hill as a man of passable ability, and as possessing considerable philosophical erudition, but he is bound by obedience to maintain a prescribed system of philosophy, and he is not free to exercise any philosophical insight or originality of his own if he possesses any. At best he can only tell us what others have said, only gyrate in the circle prescribed by the general of his order. We admit the right of the Church to condemn us if in philosophy or any of the sciences we emit a false or an erroneous proposition; but we have yet to learn that we are bound as a Catholic to accept, with the reverence and submission due to a dogma of faith, every philosophic proposition to be found in Suarez, or even St. Thomas. Philosophy is a rational science, and is not, like faith, to be taught by authority; and we tell the philosophers of the illustrious Society of Jesus, that their recent attempts to make philosophy an authoritative as distinguished from a rational science, are ill-advised, and destructive of human reason itself. Their general commands them to return to Aristotle and Fonseca, that is, to the dominant philosophy of the early part of the seventeenth century. Do you know the history of philosophy since?

Starting in the seventeenth century with the philosophy to which your professors are commanded by your general to return, philosophy soon with Descartes lost its objectivity,

and became purely subjective; and in the following century with the Abbé Condillac and others it lost the subject, and resulted, as with Hegel, in pure nihilism. What better result can be expected from persisting in teaching in our schools the same philosophy? It must from the first have contained the germs, if we may say so, of the nihilism in which we have seen it result: and what is to hinder it from terminating in the same result again, if insisted on? You cannot, do what you will, reason as illogically as you please, prevent society in the long run from drawing from the premises you give it, their strictly logical consequences, unless those consequences should happen to be favorable to truth and holiness.

We do not pretend that Father Hill does not assert the reality both of the object and the subject; but, if we understand it, his system recognizes or admits no principle or premises from which that reality follows as an inevitable consequence. We have wholly mistaken the professor, if he anywhere asserts the identity of the principles of science and the principles of things: that is, that only the real is an object of science, and the unreal, which is nothing, is unintelligible, unthinkable. The system he defends, holds that the unreal, that is, the possible, the abstract, separate from the concrete or the power of the real, is not a pure nullity, but is intelligible,—an object of thought. Thus the author writes: "*Terms*, considered in respect to their objects, are *real* and logical: of the first and second intention: absolute and connotative (relative). The object of the real term actually exists outside of the mind; it is a real or actual object, or *at least really possible*." The *really* possible is simply a contradiction in terms. The two terms cannot go together, are as incompatible, the one with the other, as square circle, burning cold, or wet drought. It has been clearly proved in the *Review* that the possible is nothing in itself, therefore always unreal, consequently never in itself the object of a real term. If we make it, with the professor, an object of thought, we assume that the unreal is thinkable, that is, that we can know without knowing any thing. Then the principles of science and the principles of things are not identical. How, then, know that there is any object actually existing out of the mind, or that there are things at all? Say we not, then, truly that, though the professor asserts an objective world, he is unable, by the system of philosophy he is obliged as a Jesuit to defend, to prove it.

By denying the identity of the principles of science and the principles of things, that philosophy concedes that science may be unreal, and, therefore, no evidence or proof of the reality of its object.

Father Hill asserts ontology as one of the parts of philosophy. The assertion we accept, but we find in his philosophy no principle recognized that warrants it. We do not find in his *Elements* any solution, nor, indeed, any consideration of the problem: How pass from the psychological to the ontological, from the subjective to the objective, the real *pons asinorum* of modern philosophers? The professor does not seem to be aware that there is and can be no passage for the human mind from the one to the other. Suppose the mind has, as Father Martin, Father Rothenflue, and the Louvain professors teach, immediate perception of *ens* or being, and that *ens* or being is God, you cannot conclude from the perception or intuition of God, if we have it, the existence of the soul; for that would imply that creation of contingent existences is necessary: which is a contradiction in terms, since it makes contingent existence necessary and not contingent, and asserts pure pantheism. If you conclude the ontological from the psychological, God from the soul, you make God the necessary product of the soul, or assert the Egoism of Fichte. But waiving this, if the soul can think, that is, know, in any instance, without thinking or knowing any object really, actually existing out or independent of itself, as it must if it can know possibles or abstractions, by what possible process can it prove that there is any thing actually existing outside of itself?

We are assumed to be ignorant of Latin, are assumed, as a matter of course, not to be able to understand Father Hill writing in English! We are told that we charge him ignorantly and falsely when we call him a conceptualist. We are told that we seem not to know the scholastic distinction between the first and the second intention, or at least to pay no attention to it. We paid no attention to it, we own, because the distinction had no bearing on the points we were discussing, and could not relieve Father Hill's philosophy of the objections we felt it our duty to urge against it. The distinction asserted by the author, expressed in plain English, we take it, is the distinction between intuition and reflection, or between thinking and rethinking: the *pensare* and the *ripensare* of the Italians. Thus the author

writes, p. 20: "A term of the first intention expresses the object seen by the *first and direct* act of the mind, in which the object is affirmed with its real predicates; a term of the second intention stands for *another* concept, which the mind forms by a second and reflex act, in which second act logical or universal predicates are attributed: v. g., the terms *genus*, *species*, universals, are terms of the second intention, because their objects are not real, but logical only;" that is, formed by the reflex act of the mind, that is abstractions, creatures of reflection, therefore unreal, simple nullities. Does not this bear out our charge, that Father Hill in his philosophy is "a conceptualist, if not a nominalist"? We are examining, not his intentions, but the philosophical principles asserted or implied in his definitions.

Now, what was the question debated between the mediæval realists on the one side, and the conceptualists and nominalists on the other? The question was confined to universals including genera and species. The realists, represented by Guillaume de Champeaux, maintained that they are real; the conceptualists, represented by the Bas-Breton, Abelard, maintained against him that they are not indeed mere words as asserted by the nominalists, represented by Rosceline, another Bas-Breton, but conceptions formed by the mind, and without any actual existence out of it: the precise doctrine of Father Hill. St. Thomas teaches that universals exist *in conceptu*, or *in mente, cum fundamento in re;* which is true of abstractions, such as whiteness, redness, roundness, hardness, &c., but it is not of *genera* and *species*, which are terms not of the second, but of the first intention, to adopt the terminology of Professor Hill. As to the objective reality of genera and species, it makes no difference whether you call them mental conceptions with Abelard, or empty words with Rosceline; for, if you deny their objective reality, you can assert only a verbal or a subjective difference between an oak and a pine, a man and a horse. We do not doubt the intentions of the author or the justness of his views, when he forgets his system and follows his common-sense.

But the first intention being only an act, a direct and immediate act, if you will, of the mind, gives only a concept; and the author concedes it, when he says the mind in its reflex act, or act of the second intention, forms *another* concept: which plainly implies that the object affirmed in the first intention is a concept. It will be no answer to this to

say that, though the object of the term is a concept, the object of the mental act is a real object existing out of the mind and independent of it; for, if the term stands for a concept, and not for the real object, it is inappropriate and false. Moreover, if the term expresses a concept only, and not the real object, we have our old difficulty, How know that there is a real object out of the mind, of which the term expresses the concept, and which responds to it? The direct act of the mind is never, taken by itself, any thing but a concept, and every concept is subjective. How pass from it to the objective, or prove that in the concept, or idea, any object but the idea or concept, which is in the mind, is apprehended? The idea or concept, if we understand the author, stands in his terminology for the *species impressa* and the *species expressa* of the schoolmen; but he derives the *species* from the direct act of the subject, while St. Thomas and all the mediæval scholastics we are acquainted with, derive it from the object. They teach, as does Plato, that we know only *per ideam*, *per imaginem*, or, as St. Thomas says, *per similitudinem*, which is the representation—presentation, as we prefer to say, for representation is a term of the second intention—of the object to the mind, not formed by its own act, direct or indirect, simply because without it the mind cannot act at all, does not even actually exist, and is only *in potentia ad actum*.

We objected to Father Hill that he makes the mind an independent intelligence, apprehending by its own inherent activity alone, without the concurrent activity of the object. This we are told is a misrepresentation—that he holds that the mind knows only by the concurrent activity of subject and object. Yet the anonymous critic who accuses us of misrepresentation, says that the idea, or concept, according to Father Hill, is that in which or by which the mind knows or apprehends the object: which, as we understand it, is, so far, the doctrine of St. Thomas, and our own; but Father Hill makes the idea, or concept, the product of the direct act of the mind, and therefore purely subjective; not as we, following St. Thomas and the mediæval philosophers, do,—the active affirmation to the mind by the object of itself. The mediæval peripatetics make the object supply their phantasms and species, the idea or similitude by which or in which the mind apprehends it; and we can see no essential difference between holding the soul to be an independent intelligence apprehending the object by its own inherent

activity alone, and holding that the concept, idea, image, or similitude, in which or by which the object is affirmed or apprehended, is supplied by the mind or soul itself. The professor's philosophy is in substance only the Kantian subjectivism; the germ of which may be found in Leibnitz, who, in his *Remarks on Locke's 'Essay on the Human Understanding,'* says that he holds that "the principal part of our ideas come from our own resources (*nos fonds*);" still more decidedly, perhaps, in his amendment of the peripatetic maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, NISI IPSE INTELLECTUS. To us it seems little less than absurd to say the mind apprehends or knows by the concurrent activity of the subject and the object, and then to maintain that the subject supplies by its own direct act the concept, idea, image, or similitude, by which or in which the object is affirmed.

Moreover, the professor, as we have seen, in defining what he calls a *real* term, says its object is "a real or actual object, or, *at least, really possible.*" The possible is no object "actually existing outside of the mind," indeed, has no actual existence at all. What has no actual existence cannot act. If, then, it can be apprehended by the mind, as the professor and his school maintain, the subject can know by itself alone without the concurrent activity of the object, and is therefore an independent intelligence: as we represented him and his school as holding. Of course, we never pretended and do not pretend that he or his school expressly maintain this, or would not disavow it; but we maintain that it follows as a necessary consequence from the principles or premises, as we here show, which they do expressly assert or maintain. Father Rothenflue has given an admirable refutation of pantheism; and yet his philosophy in its principles, as that of Victor Cousin, is undeniably pantheistic. We must judge all systems, not by the intentions, or even formal assertions, of their authors, but by the principles which they maintain. It is not every philosopher who foresees all the logical consequences that follow from the principles he assumes; and especially is this true of authors who take their principles or premises from a school or a great and renowned metaphysician, without original investigation, or attempting to verify them for themselves.

We may be permitted to remark that there is, and necessarily must be, a great difference between theology and philosophy. The theologian proceeds from principles divinely

revealed, and therefore certain. He cannot err as to his principles or premises, and, if he is able to reason logically, his conclusions will be true and certain. Hence St. Thomas calls theology *scientia divina*. Theologians may, indeed, err in their deductions, and in respect to the use they make of elements borrowed from natural reason; but, as their principles are taken from divine revelation, and have the authority of the word of God, they are included in the depositum of faith, watched over and protected by the infallible authority of the Church. He who proceeds from them as his premises, and can reason logically, may arrive at authoritative conclusions. Hence the authority in theology of the great doctors of the Church, and of the traditional teaching of Catholic schools; and yet neither this tradition of the schools, nor the *dicta* of the doctors are infallible, and are authoritative only as witnesses to the teaching of the Church. One may even in theology differ, for good and solid reasons, from an opinion of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Basil, St. Gregory the Great, St Thomas, or St. Liguori, but it would be *temerarium* to do so without such reasons. Father Ballerini differs on the question of Probabilism from St. Liguori, and, in our judgment, which is worth perhaps nothing, very justly; for we have no Gunter's rule by which to determine the different degrees of probability, or what degree of probability binds the conscience, or what degree leaves it free. An uncertain law does not bind the conscience; and whether the law is more or less probable can make no difference, for whether more or less probable, it is still uncertain. If it is probable that the law does not forbid this or that act, then the confessor cannot pronounce us guilty of sin if we perform it. The question between probabilism and probabiliorism, or æqui-probabilism, is, it seems to us, of little practical importance, because in practice one must be either a probabilist or a tutiorist.

If we may say so much in regard to theologians and theological schools, we may say even more of philosophers and philosophical schools; for the principles of philosophy are not drawn from divine revelation, but from natural reason, of which no man or set of men enjoy the monoply. Great names in philosophy, as Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Suarez, Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Hume, Reid, Berkeley, Leibnitz, Gerdil, Kant, Fichte, Cousin, Vico, Rosmini, Galluppi, Gioberti, may be consulted and should be, not as absolute authorities, but for their tes-

timony as to what may be presumed to be the principles and dictates of reason. Their opinions enlighten our reason, but do not supersede or conclude it. Great respect is certainly due to the teachings or the traditional philosophy of our Catholic schools, as it may be supposed that the professors in these schools would not be permitted to go on for centuries, under the very eye of the Church, in teaching an unsound or false system of philosophy or of science; yet this argument is by no means conclusive, and has less weight than at first sight it would seem to have. Professors, however learned and honest, are no more infallible in questions of human reason, than they are in questions of faith. The geocentric theory was for centuries taught in Catholic schools by Catholic professors, who, when the heliocentric theory was broached, denounced it as heretical and false. Yet in later times Catholic professors have very generally rejected the geocentric theory, and it has long since ceased to be the received doctrine of Catholic schools. The infallibility of the Church is not pledged to our Catholic schools, and, in matters of human science, their doctrines, like those of non-Catholic schools, must stand or fall on their merits or demerits. If their doctrines impugn or tend directly to impair faith, the Church reprobates them; but so long as they remain within the circle of pure human science, she, as a rule, leaves them free, and intervenes not in the quarrels of professors.

For four hundred years, or since the so-called Renaissance, Catholic schools, in spite of the protest of a Savonarola and others, have cast the minds of the young generations committed to their charge in a classic, that is, a pagan mould; and under their influence modern society, even in so-called Catholic countries, has lapsed into paganism. Who dares throw the responsibility of the heathenism, evidently revived and fostered by the schools, on the Church? The basis of the education given in our schools is heathen, not Christian. Cite, then, not as authority against us in philosophy or human science, the traditional teaching of Catholic or of any other schools, in which the professors, generally speaking, only follow routine, and repeat the lessons of their predecessors, often with entire innocence of any investigation or understanding of the reasons of what they repeat. The master says it, and that suffices.

Whether we agree with the schools or not is not the question, but is what we defend true, founded on the constituent

principles of natural reason? The critic in the *Boston Pilot*, though he accuses us of ignorance of Latin, whence it is inferred we are incapable of understanding a work on philosophy written in English, never, so far as we have observed, even attempts to prove that our own philosophy is unsound, but bends all his rare powers to convicting us of misunderstanding and misrepresenting Professor Hill, and in proving that, on the points we objected to, he and his school hold with us. If so, as the professor writes in English, it is a little singular that we never discovered it. But we must say this in our excuse, that, though we find no difficulty in understanding the author when he explains his meaning in Latin, which we are said to be ignorant of, we have no little difficulty in getting at his meaning when he expresses it in English,—a language of which we have been thought to know something. Indeed, Father Hill's English is far less intelligible to us than any scholastic Latin we have ever encountered; and his terminology would be absolutely unintelligible to us but for the little acquaintance we have with the Latin scholastics. We hope the professor will not take it ill, if, while we do not doubt his proficiency either as an English or as a Latin scholar, we do not find him very happy in his rendering of the Latin, in which he studied his philosophy, into English. When we translate the scholastic technical terms into English, and conform them to the genius of our mother-tongue, we suspect he and his defenders fail to recognize them. The author's terminology is un-English, "done out of Latin," if you will, but "into no language." Take what he calls terms of the first and second intention: they have in English, either etymologically or by good usage, no such meaning as he gives them, but really a very different meaning, and one that has no analogy to it. We define, sometimes restrict or enlarge, the meaning of a term to make it conform to its etymology, but never use a term in a sense authorized neither by etymology nor good usage, and we try always, in our use of a term, to retain some trace, at least, of its primary sense and original figure or symbolism.

But to return to our proper subject. We charged the professor and his school with maintaining that the soul is an independent intelligence, which, though pronounced false, we have seen to be true; for they hold that possibles, as such, that is, as having no actual existence, are thinkable or intelligible. We also objected that the system the professor

defends, makes the act of knowledge independent of the divine creative act, or as we said, the divine concurrence—as theologians say, the divine *concursus*. This, we are told, is a gross and unpardonable misrepresentation, for neither Professor Hill, nor any philosopher of his school, ever dreamed of denying the divine concurrence. Perhaps not, in their sense; but we doubt if one among them even admits it in the sense in which the objection assumes that they deny it. As the point, in our estimation at least, is very important, we must be allowed to dwell on it for a moment. Every Catholic theologian, of course, teaches that God is universal Creator, and efficaciously present at all times and places in all his works; that all his creatures are absolutely dependent on him for life, breath, and all things; and that, without his creative act, they never would and never could have existed. This is all very well, so far; but, if we mistake not, the school to which, we take it, the professor belongs, holds that the divine concurrence in the fact of intelligence is solely as *causa eminens*. It holds that the light of reason is a created light, not the divine light itself "that enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Then, as we understand the school, though the idea is not formed without an object real or possible outside of the mind, it is the mind by its own activity alone that forms it: and hence the professor calls it a *concept*. The object is passive, and its existence is affirmed by the subject, and intuition is the act of the subject, and stands opposed to discursion or ratiocination. The judgment, the object is, or exists, is affirmed by the mind, not by the object affirming or presenting itself to the mind, and, by so doing, creating and constituting the mind, or the soul intelligent.

The school, as we have learned it, holds that the mind cognizes creatures, contingent existences, by its own activity, and in themselves as if they were intelligible in themselves. The professor evidently so holds; and, though he doubtless holds that the contingent cannot exist without the creative act of the necessary, he holds that the contingent can be known without intuition of the necessary. Here we touch what we consider the fundamental error of the philosophy contained in the text-books at present used in all our colleges. We hold it indubitable that what is not is not intelligible, is and can be no object of thought or knowledge. Hence we maintain that being, real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, is alone intelligible *per se*, as it alone

exists *per se*. Contingents, creatures, exist only by being, not in, by, or from themselves, and therefore are not cognizable in or by themselves, but are intelligible or cognizable only in and by being. To maintain the contrary is to maintain that what is not,—that is, what is nothing, a simple nullity, —is intelligible, since, without real and necessary being, contingents are nothing. As only what is or exists is intelligible or cognizable, things are and can be known, if known at all, only as they are, not as they are not. Hence we maintain that the principles of science and the principles of things are identical. Nothing can be true in the order of science that is not true in the order of being. This the philosophy the professor defends, and which our colleges teach to our ingenuous youth, denies. It makes the principles of science and the principles of things different, and therefore holds that the unreal, the non-existent, can be an object of science: as any one may see who will read a chapter or two in the Metaphysics of Suarez, one of the most eminent philosophers and theologians of the illustrious Society of Jesus.

Here we may see wherefore the peripateticism of the seventeenth century ended, as we have said, in the nihilism of the Hegelians. Noble and powerful minds expounded, developed, and defended it, but nothing could save it, for it denied or failed to assert the identity, we say not of science and things, but that the *principles* of science and the *principles* of things are identical, that science must follow the order of being, for only that which is only the real, is intelligible, thinkable, or knowable. By admitting, as the professor does, that the unreal is knowable, it made philosophy in principle an unreal science, and therefore no science at all, but nescience or nihilism. That the germ of nihilism, concealed from the first in the system, has not been so fatally developed in Catholic schools as in others, is owing to Catholic theology, which has restrained them, and held them practically within the bounds of the real. But whenever and wherever the restraints of that theology have been thrown off or loosened, and the system has had its free and natural development, it has invariably developed in the direction, first, of egoism, as with Descartes, Kant, and Fichte; and then of downright nihilism, as in Hegel, Sir William Hamilton, and J. Stuart Mill, however these pseudo-philosophers may have differed on minor points among themselves. The only scientific remedy is not, after the

heterodox, in conforming our theology to our philosophy, but in showing the conformity of all true philosophy with Catholic theology: and it is for attempting to do this, which necessitates a more or less severe criticism on the system in which is concealed the germ of the evil, that we are denounced as a rash innovator, or as an Ishmaelite. We hope we shall be forgiven, if we say to our critics,

> There are more things in heaven and earth, *gentlemen*,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

Our sole aim in our philosophical essays is to show that between true philosophy and Catholic theology there is no discrepancy; it is only a false or defective philosophy with no scientific value, that ever comes in conflict with the principles of Catholic theology. Yet we find ourselves opposed by men who do not blush to deny, as philosophers, principles which they do and must assert as theologians. We cannot sympathize, and never could, with this sort of dualism; and therefore we are counted eccentric, one who is always running to one extreme or another, never contented to walk in a beaten path, or to keep the middle way; that is, who is never contented to be a routinist.

Now, as the principles of science and the principles of things are identical, it follows necessarily that we do and can know only the real: things only as they are, only in the order and the relation in which they actually exist. They actually exist only in and by real and necessary being, through its creative act. Then it is only by and in real and necessary being,—*ens necessarium et reale*, and through its creative act, not in or by themselves, that they are or can be known, are or can be objects of science. But as things exist only in and by being, *mediante* its creative act, they can be known or be intelligible only in the intuition of being, *mediante* the same act: otherwise the principles of science and the principles of things would not be identical, and we should be obliged either to deny all knowledge, or to hold that we can know without knowing any thing, as we charge that Professor Hill's system requires us to do. As things exist, not by their own act, but by the creative act of being, so, the principles of science and the principles of things being identical, they cannot be known by their act, but only, as they exist, *mediante* the creative act of being. The creative act is as necessary to the fact of science as it is to the fact of existence,

—the existence of things, we mean. There is and can be no fact of science or knowledge without the presentation or affirmation of being, by its own act, as the object and light of the created intelligence; and this presentation or affirmation, called self-evidence, which is wholly independent of our intelligence, which does and must precede our activity, or what we call empirical intuition, or direct and immediate perception or apprehension, creates and constitutes the human intellect. As the fact of science is impossible without it, since without it there is and can be no intelligent or knowing subject, there is and can be no fact of science or knowledge but *mediante* the creative activity of the object, or the direct and immediate creative act of real and necessary being affirming itself.

Now, we feel quite sure that the writer in the *Pilot*, who seems disposed to make out that we misrepresent Father Hill, and that on the points on which we object to his philosophy he holds with us,—we feel quite sure, we say, that he will not even pretend that Father Hill or his school holds and teaches the doctrine we here set forth. It is the doctrine which, as we understand it, stands opposed to the whole modern peripatetic school, as defended by Curci, Liberatore, Tongiorgi, San Severino, Kleutgen, Dr. Ward, and others, and of which we have discovered no trace in the professor's *Elements*, his Logic, or his Ontology. His definitions not only do not include, but exclude it, if we understand them and ourselves.

The school the professor represents, and ably represents, we are well aware, teaches that the object in the fact of thought is *ens*, that is, *some ens*, but it may be either *ens reale*, or *ens possibile;* but Professor Koop has, in our own pages, proved that the possible is nothing in itself, and is cognizable or thinkable only in the power or ability of the real. Father Hill, and his defender in the *Boston Pilot*, would do well to read Professor Koop's discussion of possibilities and the *mundus logicus*,—a priest who cannot be accused of being too ignorant of Latin either to understand a work written in English, or to be familiar with the technicalities of St. Thomas and other scholastics. *Ens possibile* is not a real entity, but an abstraction like the *ens in genere*, and therefore created by the human mind, and, consequently, not its object. Moreover, the *ens* the school asserts, as the object of intuition, or "a term of the first intention," does not, by its own activity, present or

affirm itself, but is simply apprehended by the direct act of the subject. The intuition that affirms the object is the act of the subject, not the act of the object or *ens* affirming itself, and is, therefore, no surety that it is not, as some of our German philosophers say, "subject-object," or that it is "object-object." Kant, who shows, in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, that it is impossible by the most rigid analysis of reason to refute the scepticism of Hume, makes, as do we, the fact of thought the product of subject and object; and yet he includes the object in the subject, making it not object-object, but a form of the intellect, therefore subjective, or subject-object, as, without knowing it, does Father Hill himself in his definition of what he calls a real term. His "really possible," if it means any thing, means the subject-object, or object-subject of the German school founded by the Königsberg philosopher.

Father Rothenflue, indeed, teaches that the *ens*, which is the direct and immediate object of the mind, is *ens reale*, and so do Pères Fournier and Martin, all Jesuit Fathers; but their philosophy is not approved by the Society, and its professors are forbidden by its general to teach it. But Father Rothenflue did not teach the philosophy which we oppose to Father Hill's school. He makes *ens* the object, and holds it to be intuitively apprehended; but the intuition he asserts is the act of the mind by its own force apprehending *ens*, not, as we do, the act of *ens* presenting or affirming itself immediately, and by its immediate creative act rendering the subject intelligent, and capable of apprehending it, and, by its underived light, all things dependent on its creative act that fall within the range of our natural faculties when fully formed and duly exerted.

There are several points here which we do not accept, or which are not in accordance with the philosophy we defend. *Ens necessarium et reale*, real and necessary being, is God indeed, though we do not know it by immediate intuition. Being in the intuitive act does not affirm itself as God, but as idea; yet it is so, for the ideal is real, and the *ens* intuitively affirmed, though idea, is really God as the intelligible, or as facing our intelligence, as we have shown in our *Refutation of Atheism*. But to maintain that we have direct and immediate intuition of God, understanding by intuition the act of the mind, that is, direct perception, or, as we call it, empirical intuition, as distinguished from ideal intuition, which is the creative act of *ens*, or the object, is

to fall into one of the errors of the Louvain professors, and of the Sulpician, M. Branchereau, reprobated by the Holy See. We have intuition of *ens* only *mediante* its creative act, as it in that act affirms, evidences itself.

Father Rothenflue makes *ens* the principle of science and of things, which necessarily implies pantheism, as it would make both science and things identical with real and necessary being or God. We maintain that the principle of science and of things is God and *his creative act.* All things, the universe and all its contents, are said to be in God eternally, but they are so only in the sense that their types or exemplary ideas are in him, eternal in his essence; but these ideas, or types, are indistinguishable from the divine essence itself, and the assertion, that they are eternal in him, only means that he has eternally the power to create things, existences, the universe, the heavens and the earth, and all things therein. They are identical with his creative power, and their assertion is simply the assertion that his creative power is an intelligent not a blind force. We cannot, by any possible logic, from the judgment, God is, conclude, therefore, things or creatures are, for God is a free creator, and obliged, neither by extrinsic force nor internal necessity, to create or exercise his power *ad extra.* These ideas or types belong, if you will, to the divine Intelligence, but they are no element in the created existence. There is a world of speculation and endless distinctions on this point among schoolmen, all of which proceed on the assumption that possibles are not nothing in themselves, but in some sense real; and which serve only to confuse the mind, to obscure the simple truth, and to render metaphysics an unintelligible and even a repulsive science. Rational science, that is, philosophy, treats of being only as the intelligible; it does not penetrate its essence, and undertake to tell us what it is in itself. For the same reason that things, creatures, contingent existences, are not deducible from the judgment, being or God is, science cannot be logically developed or derived from the intuition of being alone. From the intuition of being you can only conclude, being is, for being is eternal, self-sufficing, and needs only itself in order to be. The intuition of being of itself alone is not and cannot therefore be the principle of science. Hence the condemnation of ontologism, which is very generally supposed to be the philosophy we defend, but is not, and never has been.

The intuition or affirmation, in order to present the principles either of science or things, must be of both *ens* and its creative act. The principle of philosophy or rational science, Professor Rossi, of Genoa, says truly, in his profound and remarkable work, *Principii di Filosofia Soprannaturale*, is *l'ente crea l'esistente*, for things proceed from being and exist only by its creative act, and, as the same professor also says, "are not intelligible in themselves, for they have not their reason or cause in themselves, and the intelligibleness of a thing is in its reason or cause." This follows from the doctrine that the principles of science and the principles of things are identical, for only the real is knowable: as we have shown over and over again, Professor Hill and his school to the contrary notwithstanding.

Science, or knowledge, is either intuitive or discursive, direct or reflex; in the professor's terminology, either of "the first intention," or of "the second intention." The professor, of course, understands that in what he calls "the second intention," or discursive knowledge, first principles are necessary; and, if we understand him, the principle here, that is, the principle of demonstration, is the principle of contradiction, which is the common doctrine of his school. We will not stop now to examine this principle, if principle it be, for it is of the second intention, of reflection, reasoning, or ratiocination, and presupposes "the first intention," or direct and immediate knowledge, apprehension, or perception, which we call empirical intuition, in order to distinguish it from ideal intuition, which is the act of the object, not of the subject. Now in this intuitive order, or this direct order of knowledge or science, we find in the professor's system no recognition of principles, nor of any necessity of principles. He asserts, indeed, the necessity of an object real or possible, but would seem to hold that the mind, in and of itself, by its own native intelligence, is able to apprehend and know the object. Yet it is precisely here that our quarrel with his system begins, or that lies the question between his philosophy and that which we have the honor to defend. We maintain that first or *a priori* principles, principles neither furnished by the subject from its own forms or resources, nor obtained or obtainable by its own act,—since without them it cannot act at all,—are necessary, and the principal matter of the higher philosophy. The professor, as well as his zealous defender in the *Boston Pilot*, seems to be either ignorant of the

question, or to ignore it. He appears never to have understood the difficulties in the way of human knowledge suggested by Hume in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, and which Kant shows unanswerably, in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, no analysis of reason can solve. He seems to proceed as if the subject is itself alone competent to apprehend the real or possible object, and that in the fact of direct knowledge or perception it needs nothing, no principle or principles not inherent in itself. He demands nothing from the activity of the object, and assumes that its own subjective activity alone suffices. Hence we charged his system with maintaining that man, a dependent existence, is an independent intelligence: which is simply absurd.

We think we have here stated the question so clearly and distinctly, that even our modern peripatetics, however wedded to routine, or blinded by prejudice, cannot misapprehend it. The question, then, turns on the necessity to the fact of knowledge, intuitive or discursive, of *a priori* principles, or, as Kant calls them, cognitions or synthetic judgments *a priori*,—judgments which precede experience, and which are not and cannot be furnished or obtained by the action of the subject, because, as we hold, the subject cannot act without them. They are given by the object in affirming itself by its own activity, in which the subject has no more lot or part than it has in the divine creative act which calls it from nothing into existence. The object is *ens necessarium et reale*, real and necessary being; and it is its creative act that gives the mind, as we have so often explained, the principles of science, which are at the same time the principles of all the knowable and of all the real. These principles constitute what Gioberti names "the ideal formula," and "l'Ente crea l'esistenze," as he tells us; Professor Rossi says: "La formula razionale—l'Ente crea l'esistente—è il principio primo e supremo della filosofia."* These principles, we have time and again proved, are: Real and necessary Being creates existences; and we need not here argue the question anew. In spite of the sneer of the writer in the *Boston Pilot*, we think it sufficient to refer to our *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, already published.

But we are gravely told that this formula, *Ens creat existentias*, is ontologism, and ontologism is condemned by the Holy See. We are so told, we presume, because it is easier

* *Principii di Filosofia Soprann.* Vol. iv. p. 17, note.

to attack our philosophy than it is to defend Father Hill's system. That ontologism, as held a few years since by the Louvain professors and several eminent fathers of the Society of Jesus, has been pronounced by the Holy See, a doctrine that cannot be "safely taught," is well known; but that the formula we defend falls under that or any other censure pronounced by the Holy See, is, so far as we are informed, a very great mistake. It may, for aught we know, have been censured by the general of the Jesuits, but not, so far as known to us, by the Successor of Peter and Vicar of Christ. Then, to accuse the formula of the error of the ontologists betrays great hardihood or gross ignorance. We have shown the broad difference between it and ontologism, in criticizing Father Rothenflue's system. Ontologism teaches that being simply is the principle both of science and of things, that all science is deducible from the empirical intuition of being, and that, given being, all existences and all science are given; while the philosophy we defend teaches that science and existences are derived from being, real and necessary being, indeed, but *mediante* the creative act of being,—*Ens creat existentias*. He who can see no essential difference between this formula and ontologism, has no reason to applaud himself for his intellectual acumen or powers of discrimination.

The formula we are told again, and with equal gravity, is pantheistic. Pantheism denies the creative act, and makes the universe and its contents, or existences, emanations, modes, affections, or phenomena of being, or the one only substance, Power, or Something which it calls God, but which the cosmists say may just as well be called nature. Now, what are we to think of the philosopher who can discern no difference between this really atheistic doctrine, and the formula which asserts the creative act as the copula or nexus between being and existences, and therefore asserts that there is and can be neither human science nor contingent existences, but *mediante* the creative act of being? Why, such a philosopher would be apt to find pantheism in the first verse of *Genesis:* "In principio, Deus creavit cœlum et terram." But we are told once more, and with a triumphant air not a little provoking, that the human mind is not equal to the intuition of the formula. Well, who says it is? Have we not objected to Father Rothenflue that he makes real and necessary being perceptible by the direct and immediate act of the subject? Do you not know, Mr. Objector, that we

maintain that the intuition which presents or affirms the formula, is the act of being itself, not of the human mind, that it precedes it, and that without it there is and can be no act of human intelligence? Do, pray, read our *Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, instead of dismissing it with a supercilious sneer. You may possibly learn from it what is the philosophy we hold, and be able to object to it with some pertineney.

Still it is insisted that, although the formula is presented or affirmed by being itself, yet it, when so presented or affirmed, must be received, and therefore apprehended by the subject, otherwise the affirmation would be as if it were not. So the objection, though removed a step, is not solved. As the being affirmed is really the divine Being, or God himself, it follows that, if the subject really apprehends the formula, it really sees God, while the Scriptures declare that "no man can see God and live." This states the objection in its most formidable shape. The objection has two parts: 1. The objective intuition does not supersede the necessity of the subjective intuition. 2. The subjective intuition, apprehension, or reception of the objective intuition implies that the subject really sees God.

1. In answer to the first part we remark that we have, as every theologian knows, a nearly parallel difficulty with regard to grace. Grace is not efficient unless we will to comply with it, and we cannot will to comply with grace without the aid of grace. The difficulty is solved by the fact that when what is termed *gratia præveniens* strikes and excites the will, it becomes itself, if not resisted, immediately *gratia adjuvans*, and assists the will to comply with grace, and when complied with, it becomes, *ipso facto*, *gratia efficax:* that is, the three graces are simply three offices of one and the same grace. Being does not by its objective act merely affirm the formula, but it by its creative act gives the subject the power or ability to receive or apprehend it: —"There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." It is as true in the natural order as in the supernatural, what our Lord says, "Without me ye can do nothing." It is the creative act of God, without which we are nothing, and can do nothing: which is the copula that binds the subjective or human judgment to the objective or divine judgment, *l'Ente crea l'esistenze.*

2. The word *see*, in the second part, is ambiguous. The

Scriptures cannot mean that a man cannot know God and live, for they everywhere teach that we do know and ought to know God; and the condemnation of the heathen, according to St. Paul, was, that, when they knew God, they did not worship him as God. He declares them without excuse; "For the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and Godhead, have been, from the creation of the world, *clearly seen*, being understood by the things that are made." (Rom. i. 20.) When, then, the Scriptures say no man can *see* God, we must understand, not that no man can know God, or the things of God, but that no man in this life can see God with his bodily eyes.

Moreover, those who see so many horrible errors in the formula, would do well to pay a little attention to what its assertors mean by it. When we assert that Being, that is, God, if you will, is affirmed intuitively to us, we do not mean that we see Being by our organs of sense, or that we see or know what Being is in itself, or in its essence,—which is the intuitive vision of the blessed, and possible only by the *lumen gloriæ*, or the *ens supernaturale*,—we call the formula ideal, and understand by the *idea*, not *ens*, or God in himself, but as the intelligible, or as he faces the human intellect. That we have intuition of the idea is undeniable; but the modern peripatetics appear never to dream of its identity with real and necessary being, but relegate it to "the second intention." and lodge it in the *mundus logicus*, a sort of intermediary world between the real and the unreal, being and not-being. Yet such an intermediary world, or *mundus logicus*, as distinguishable from the *mundus physicus*, or real world, is what Father Hill's friends, the schoolmen, technically call *ens rationis*, that is, fiction, nothing at all. This is what we maintained in our former article on Professor Hill's philosophy, and in addition proved the reality of the ideal, or what philosophers term "absolute ideas," "necessary ideas," as the universal, the necessary, the immutable, the eternal, &c., without which there is and can be no logical conclusion, no fact of experience or cognition. These can be real only inasmuch as they are being, real and necessary being, as we have proved over and over, till our patience is nearly exhausted. We certainly have, in all our mental operations, intuition of them, and consequently intuition of real and necessary being; and as all intuition is, *mediante* the creative act of being, we have, in the intuition of the

ideal, intuition of the formula, as the *principium* both of science and of reality.

Professor Hill cannot, with Herbert Spencer, relegate God to the dark regions of the unknowable. He holds, as we do, that God is knowable and known, but his existence he ranges as a term of "the second intention," that is, a conclusion drawn from the terms of the first intention. God, he holds, is not affirmed in direct apprehension, that is, as we understand it, is not an affirmation of direct knowledge or intuition, but is an affirmation of reflex knowledge. If this means that the intuition does not expressly affirm that this is God, we accept it in the sense already explained; but if it means that the intuition does not directly affirm that which is God, to wit, the ideal, or *ens necessarium et reale*, we cannot, for reasons already given, accept it.

We do not question the sincerity and reality of Father Hill's theism, any more than we do the sincerity and reality of his Catholic faith; but the God his system asserts is, to our understanding, only a generalization, an abstraction, and therefore no God, nor real being at all; for, if we understand his definition, all terms of the second intention are concepts of the reflex order, and are generalizations, or abstractions formed by the mind operating on concretes expressed by terms of the first intention, or as, in our ignorance of the Latin technicalities of the schoolmen, we say, given in intuition.

Professor Hill's system rejects the doctrine, that we have direct intuition of real and necessary being even as the ideal, and his ontology is derived from the apprehension or direct knowledge of contingent existences. It is from the intuition of contingents that he concludes the necessary, and from the intuition of creatures that he concludes the necessity and the fact of the creator: as from effects we conclude the cause. We need not develop the argument, for every body knows it, and wonders at its inefficiency in convincing the atheist. The existence of an effect supposes a cause; of creature, supposes a creator; of the contingent, supposes the necessary. Of this there is and can be no doubt. No atheist even disputes it. But this is not the question. The real question is, Are contingent existences intelligible or cognizable in themselves or by themselves alone?

If contingents can be known in or by themselves alone, we wish the professor would tell us how from intuition of them he can conclude the necessary, or why the necessary is

requisite to explain their existence. If the effect, in and by itself, is intelligible, intuition or knowledge of it can furnish no indication that it cannot exist in and of itself—can suggest neither the fact nor the necessity of cause or reason of its existence beyond itself. It is because effects are unintelligible in and by themselves, that we conclude they are caused; it is because they are inconceivable without something that has caused them, that we infer from them a creator. Besides, cause and effect, necessary and contingent, creator and creature, are correlative terms, and correlative terms connote each other; so that the one is never known or intelligible without intuition of the other. The one does not simply imply, it connotes the other, so that both are cognized in one and the same cognition.

St. Thomas says, indeed, that God is not demonstrable from first principles, or by an argument from cause to effect, but from the effect to the cause; and the five different arguments he gives, or different methods of demonstrating that God is, all conclude the cause from the effect: which is unobjectionable, if the mind is understood to be simultaneously in possession of the idea of cause affirmed in the intuition of the creative act of being as expressed in the ideal formula. But, suppose the mind destitute of the intuition of the creative act, or of the idea of cause, the effect could not furnish any data from which to conclude it, because without it nothing can be pronounced an *effect*, since effect is the correlative of cause, and is intelligible only in its relation to cause, that is, in its relation as an effect, the only sense in which it implies or connotes the cause. St. Thomas always assumes that the mind is in possession of the idea of cause, which he holds to be a first principle without which no demonstration is possible. We think Professor Hill by a more careful examination will be satisfied that the principle of demonstration is not the principle of contradiction, which is passive and negative, but the principle of causality, which is intuitively supplied by the creative act of being, and of which it is the type.

But we repeat that what is not is not intelligible. What is not is nothing; and nothing, with all deference to the able and learned editor-in-chief of *The Catholic World*, cannot be even an object of thought, therefore is not intelligible, for intelligibleness is in being, not in not-being. Hence we maintain that science is of the real, not of the unreal; that the principles of science and the principles of

things or reality are identical. Therefore, as we have already said and shown, things must be known, if known at all, as they really exist, and in their real relations. Creatures, contingent existences, do not exist in themselves. "Le realtà contingenti non sono per sè intelligibili, ma soltanto in virtù dell' idea eterna," says Professor Rossi, C. M., who adds in a note: "Se il contingente non ha in sè la ragione della sua esistenza non è per sè intelligibile; perchè l'intelligibilità d'una cosa giace nella sua ragione."* The induction or demonstration of the divine Being from contingent existences, if we deny the ideal formula, concludes nothing, and the God demonstrated is only a generalization, and no real or concrete being. Concede the formula, or the affirmation, by the object or idea, of the formula, *Ens creat existentias*, the demonstration is complete. But Professor Hill's system denies this intuition, which St. Thomas does not, though he may not distinctly assert it; and in so far nullifies his only demonstration of the divine Being.

Professor Hill, if he understands himself, must accept the doctrine of the Genovese philosopher and theologian, that contingents are not intelligible *per se*, for he says, p. 149: "Error is refuted and truth demonstrated only by principles that are known *per se*, i. e., are self-evident, necessary, and immutable." Principles which are self-evident are principles which evidence, that is, affirm themselves: precisely what we ourselves assert of the ideal formula. Now, how can that which does not exist *per se*, has not the principle of its existence in itself, be self-evident, or evidence itself *per se?* Contingents have not the principle of their existence in themselves, do not exist *per se*. How, then, can they be intelligible *per se*, or be known except by virtue of the self-evident, necessary, and immutable principles, that is, principles which evidence or affirm themselves; that is, again, which are given intuitively by *ens*, the light and object of the intellect? These principles are evidently not in contingent existence, for they are necessary and immutable; yet without them truth cannot be demonstrated: then it is impossible to demonstrate the divine Being without the intuition of principles not contained in contingents, not furnished by them, and without which they themselves are unintelligible?

Thus far we have made but little progress in the critical

Principii di Filosofia Soprannaturale. Vol. IV., p. 35

examination of Professor Hill's *Elements of Philosophy*, for, contrary to our wont, we have suffered ourselves to be put in great measure on our defence, and have, to no little extent, been engaged in explaining and vindicating the philosophy we oppose to the school he defends. We own that in this we have been diverted from our original design, and have, in consequence, been obliged to go over much ground which we had previously traversed, and to repeat explanations and proofs of which we were already weary. Nobody, till instructed by experience, can conceive how hard it is to get the mind of a thorough-bred schoolman, accustomed to the subtile distinctions, sub-distinctions, and abstractions of the schools, out of its grooves, and to induce him to look at things in the simple light of common-sense. Why, we had to labor for hours with a professor of philosophy to a post-graduate class in a renowned college, to get him to admit the truism, "Nothing is nothing," and did not succeed even at last. The most we could get from him was, "That depends on the sense in which you use the word nothing." He seemed very much inclined to maintain that nothing is something! He was disposed to refine on the word, and could not see that the assertion, nothing is nothing, is the English equivalent of the Latin assertion, "Nihil est nihil." We spent half a day in the vain effort to prove that the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, is not pantheistic; another half day, also in vain, in trying to prove to him that there is an essential difference between the synthetic philosophy we hold and the ontologism reprobated by the Holy See. When once routine philosophers get the idea in their heads that one not of their class holds such or such a doctrine, although his system in no sense favors it, it is next to impossible, if a doctrine not generally received in the schools, to get it out, and to convince him of his error and the injustice he does to his neighbor. It is this dullness of apprehension, on the part of philosophers, in respect of systems not strictly accordant with their own, their nearly total incapacity to do justice to doctrines which differ from those in which they have been trained, that forces us to repeat our views and explanations to satiety. We cannot divest ourselves of the hope, proved vain by bitter experience, that at last we may hit upon some form of statement that will prove successful. The schoolmen, professors, and teachers of ancient Greece were called sophists, a word originally of noble import, and

naming a most honorable and useful class, for *sophist* meant a *sage;* but Socrates and Plato found them the bitterest enemies of real science, and the greatest obstacles to scientific progress. The class, though the term has become a term of contempt, remains, and retains all its old instincts and pettifogging spirit. We sometimes in our moments of impatience, wish that a new Socrates or Plato might arise, to cover, by keen wit and polished irony, our modern sophists with ridicule. But this is only momentary, when we have under our eyes some newspaper article on *Brownson's Philosophy.* But enough, and too much, of this.

APPENDIX.

THE ECLECTIC PHILOSOPHY.

FROM THE

BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW

For January, 1839.

THE ECLECTIC PHILOSOPHY.*

M. Cousin, the principal founder of the Eclectic Philosophy in France, is thought by many in this country to be merely a philosophical dreamer, a fanciful framer of hypotheses, a bold generalizer, without solid judgment, or true science. An impression to this effect was conveyed some months since, in an article in one of our most respectable periodicals, by the teacher of philosophy in the oldest and best endowed University in the country,—an article, by the way, which nothing but the youth and inexperience of its author could induce us to pardon. But nothing is more unjust than this impression. M. Cousin is the furthest in the world from being a mere theorizer, or from founding his philosophy, as some allege, on mere *a priori* reasoning. They who censure him for his "eloquent generalizations" give us ample proof, that they are ignorant of both the method and the spirit of his philosophy. Would they but attain to a tolerable acquaintance with his writings, they would at once perceive that he is most remarkable for those very qualities which they most strenuously deny him; and we cannot refrain from reminding them, that they have no moral right to condemn a man of whom they know comparatively nothing, or to sit in judgment on a system of philosophy which they will not take the pains to comprehend. Understand, and then judge, is an old maxim, and a good one, and sorry are we to find occasion to repeat it.

There is manifested, in a quarter from which we ought to be able to look for better things, a singular pertinacity in confounding M. Cousin with certain persons among ourselves, who, for some reason not known to us, have received the appellation of Transcendentalists. This is altogether unpardonable. If they who persist in doing this know no better, they are deplorably ignorant; if they do know better, we leave it to their own consciences to settle their claims to morality. We assure our readers that M. Cousin has very little in common with those they are in the habit of calling Transcendentalists. He professes no philosophy which transcends experience, unless by experience be understood merely that of the senses; he differs entirely as to his method from the New German philosophy represented by Schelling and Hegel, and on many essential points in the application and results of his method from Kant, the father of the Transcendental Philosophy, with whom we perceive there is a

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* *Cours de Philosophie professé à la Faculté des Lettres* pendant l'année 1818, par M. V. Cousin, sur le fondement des idées absolues du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien; publié avec son autorisation et d'après les meilleures rédactions de ce Cours, par M. Adolphe Garnier, maître de conférences à l'Ecole Normale. Paris. 1836.

strong disposition to class him. He cannot be classed with Kant, nor with any of the Germans. He has all that Germany can give that is worth having, and much which Germany cannot give. Profited much he undoubtedly has by his study of Kant, and by his acquaintance with Schelling and Hegel; but he is the disciple of none of them. He has some things in common with the Scotch school; but he leaves that school at an immeasurable distance behind him.

Nor is it just to assert, as some do, that he is merely reproducing the old Alexandrian philosophy or Neoplatonism. The Alexandrians called themselves Eclectics, and Electicism was no doubt in their intention; but they failed utterly in their attempt to realize it. "Their school had the decided and brilliant character of an exclusive school," and ended in exclusive mysticism,—a tendency to which no man, however lynx-eyed he may be, can discover in Cousin. The slightest acquaintance with his writings is sufficient to convince any man, at all familiar with the Alexandrian philosophy, that Cousin has done quite another thing than to reproduce it. He has given us a faithful account of it; he has criticised it with great judgment, pointed out its vices, and shown us why it failed to realize the Eclecticism to which it aspired. Indeed, he is so far from being a Neoplatonist that he is not even a Platonist;—at least he is no more a follower of Plato than he is of Aristotle. He reverences Plato and Aristotle as philosophers by way of eminence; the first as having given birth to philosophic ideas, and the latter as having reduced them to order, and given them their language, which is still the language of philosophy; but properly speaking he is the disciple of neither. He has translated Plato and enabled us to comprehend him; he is devoting much attention to Aristotle, and doing what he can to raise up the Stagyrite from the neglect into which he has fallen, since the ruin of the Scholastic Philosophy. If he himself is remarkable for one thing more than another, it is for the freedom and independence with which he seeks and accepts truth wherever he can find it.

We say again that M. Cousin is not a Transcendentalist, as the term appears to be understood in this community. It is not easy to determine what people mean by the term Transcendentalist; but we suppose they mean to designate by it, when they use it as a term of reproach, a man who, in philosophizing, disregards experience and builds on principles obtained not by experience, but by reasoning *a priori*. In this sense, Cousin is no Transcendentalist. Nor indeed was Kant. Kant's method was as truly experimental as Bacon's or Locke's. He starts with the proposition that "all our knowledge begins with experience." (*Dass alle unsere Erkenntniss mit der Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein Zweifel.*) But experience is possible only on certain conditions. If the human mind be in its origin a mere blank sheet, as Locke represents it, incapable of furnishing from its own resources any element of experience, we must admit with Hume that no experience is possible, and that every sane philosopher must needs be a sceptic. If we admit the possi-

bility of experience, we must admit certain *a priori* conditions of experience; that is, we must admit in the mind, prior to experience, certain inherent qualities, properties, laws, elements, by virtue of which experience is rendered possible. What are these *a priori* conditions, qualities, properties, elements, ideas, forms, categories, or whatever else they may be termed, and without which no experience can take place? This is the problem Kant proposes to solve, and the solution of this problem is what he calls the Transcendental Philosophy: and his attempt at its solution, he calls the Critic of Pure Reason, that is, of the reason considered as abstracted from all the elements it receives from experience. Kant saw very clearly the conclusion to which Hume had been conducted by assuming Locke's point of departure,—a conclusion wholly repugnant to the common sense of mankind, and to every man's practical convictions,—and he felt that before proceeding further in the attempt to create a philosophy, it was necessary to make an analysis of the pure reason, that is, to ascertain the possibility of experience, and the conditions without which it cannot take place. This he contends had not been done, nor even seriously attempted.

Now, although these *a priori* conditions of experience, these elements which the reason itself furnishes, precede experience, since they are essential to experience,—it is experience that develops them, and it is by experience that we ascertain them, separate them from the empirical elements with which they are always connected in the consciousness, and become able to see them by themselves and in themselves. From the fact that they are said to precede in the understanding the fact of experience, we must not infer that we can seize them by *a priori* reasoning. Kant's philosophy, it is admitted, professes to give an account of what is in the reason prior to experience; but it does not profess to give this account before experience has developed the reason, much less without the aid of experience. He seeks by experience, by experiment, by a careful analysis of the facts of consciousness, as they actually present themselves to the eye of the psychological observer, to distinguish the rational elements of those facts, from the empirical elements which they also contain, to trace the non-empirical elements to their source, and to give us their real character. His method, therefore is, as we have said, as truly the experimental method as that of Bacon or Locke.

Moreover, Kant's problem was not essentially different from the problem Locke himself undertook, in his own estimation, to solve. Locke saw that before proceeding to discuss the objects of knowledge it was necessary to ascertain the nature and character of that with which we know, namely, the human understanding. "For I thought," says he, "that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted." But Locke surveyed the understanding, the instrument with which we know what we do know, not in its character of pure under-

standing, or pure reason, but in its mixed character, in its manifestations, as developed by experience, or as it develops itself by the aid of experience. Abstract from the understanding all the elements, facts, or ideas, furnished it by experience, and according to Locke nothing remains to be surveyed, but a mere *tabula rasa*, a mere blank sheet. Kant, however, proceeded on the ground that after we have abstracted from the understanding every thing furnished it by experience, there remains the pure reason itself with certain laws or categories of its own, which it is necessary to ascertain and describe. Locke undertook as well as Kant to give us a critic of the pure understanding; but he immediately came to the conclusion that the pure understanding, that is, the understanding considered in itself, and apart from every thing derived from experience, is a mere nullity, and not worth troubling one's self about. He, therefore, confined himself to the understanding in action, as made up by experience. Kant resumes the original problem of Locke, comes to the conclusion that the pure understanding is not a nullity, but a something, of considerable value, well deserving to be known, abounding in wealth which may be considered as the inalienable patrimony of the race, and of which it behooves every philosopher to draw up an inventory. Here is all the difference there is, as to their problems, between these two distinguished philosophers. Their method, and even their object, was virtually the same. Locke applied the experimental method to the survey of the understanding, without abstracting the elements furnished it by experience; Kant applied the experimental method to the pure understanding, seeking not to construct a philosophy on *a priori* reasoning, but merely to ascertain the *a priori conditions* of knowledge. Both were, in fact, engaged in the same work, as it presented itself from their respective points of observation, and both pursued the same method, observation and induction, in accomplishing it. Kant's philosophy is in many respects incomplete, unsatisfactory; but not because he leaves the path of experience and rushes off into speculation; not because he leaves observation for ratiocination; but because he fails in the application of his method to the phenomena of consciousness, and in the proper classification of the phenomena which a profound psychology detects.

The mistake on this point, in relation to both Kant and Cousin, probably arises from supposing all experience is necessarily the experience of the senses. Cousin and Kant, while they admit, and give a large place to empiricism, or the experience of the senses, facts of consciousness introduced, generated, by means of sensation, contend for an experience which transcends sensible experience, and which, though taking place only on occasion of sensible experience, is not generated by it.

"Is there not," says Cousin, in commenting on a disciple of Hegel, "is there not another experience than that of the senses? Above the senses there is in us understanding, reason, intellect, which, on occasion of sensible impressions, the wants and affections which they excite, enters

into exercise and discloses to us what the senses cannot attain to; sometimes truths of a very common order, at other times truths of the most elevated order,—the most general; for example, the *principles* on which turns the whole metaphysics of Aristotle. Aristotle says positively, that he admits the immediate intuition of first principles. There is here no longer a question of the senses. It is the reason which reveals principles to us spontaneously. But know we not also that reason and its fruitful action by means of which we know? And how know that? Is it not by consciousness and reflection? And do not consciousness and reflection constitute an experience as real as that of the senses? Is not this rational experience which is wholly internal, certain, regular, and fruitful in great results? Will it be said, that the knowledge we owe to this internal experience, to consciousness and reflection, contracts a personal and subjective character? I reply that this personal and subjective character is only the covering, not the ground, of consciousness; that the true ground of consciousness is the reason and intelligence attaining to a knowledge of themselves. Will it be denied, that there is in human thought an eternal ground, which manifests itself by its subjective side even, as power manifests itself by the act, and the universal by the particular? Will it be pretended that the reason, by virtue of the fact that it manifests itself and acts in us, and we have the consciousness of it, ceases to be reason, that is, the essence of things, if, as it is alleged, the essence of things is in thought? Let us leave mere words to the schools, and not waste ourselves in vain formulas. All that we know of any subject whatever, an essence or a thought, we know only by virtue of the fact that we think. All ends in thought in its personal and impersonal character combined; and in this is the firm foundation of our sublimest conceptions and our humblest notions. To study in ourselves this interior development of the intelligence, and verify its laws by mingling as little as possible of our own personality, is to derive truth from its most immediate and surest source.

"This rational experience, combined with sensible experience, furnishes the philosopher all the materials of science.

"To experience also we refer the attentive investigation of common notions, generally diffused, borne witness to in the languages of men, manifested in their actions, and which compose what is called common sense, that is, the universal experience of mankind. Each of our fellow men is ourself. The artisan and the shepherd are also men; human nature in all its integrity, the human soul with all its faculties is in them; reason and thought manifest themselves in them, and manifesting themselves in them with order, and according to their own laws, do manifest in them both the nature and the laws of the essence of things. To study our like is to study ourselves; and the experience of common sense is always the necessary control, and frequently even the light and the guide, of our internal experience.

"By the side of the experience of common sense, is the experience of genius. Humanity, in acting, in speaking, manifests a system which she herself knows not; but some few men, who have more leisure and reflection than the mass, seek this system, and the essays they make to discover it, transmitted from age to age, form a second experience more precious yet than the first. This experience is called the History of Philosophy.

"These four great species of experiences compose an experimental method, all the parts of which mutually support and enlighten one another. *This method is for me the true one.* Aristotle has suspected it with his *Four Elements*, and has observed it on some points with admirable fidelity and depth. But he no where treats specially of method; he

has not perfectly determined it. It is modern philosophy that has for the first time treated of method in itself, and it is to its adoption of the experimental method that it owes its progress." *

Surely here is proof enough that Cousin does by no means contemn experience; and we commend this extract to all those who call him a mere specialist, remarkable only for his eloquent generalizations; who class him as to his method with the new German school, and range those who in this country profess to be his friends with a few speculatists, half mystics and half sceptics, christened Transcendentalists. We commend it especially to the author of the article before alluded to, and trust that he will learn from it to discover a difference where he has heretofore seen only an identity.

Cousin's method, we have now determined, is the experimental method. His method is the method of modern philosophy itself, the only method philosophy has been permitted to follow since Bacon and Descartes.

This method consists of two fundamental movements, analysis and synthesis, or as they are more commonly named, observation and induction. All true science results from a careful and profound analysis of facts, and the induction from facts properly analyzed, of their principles, their fundamental laws. If the analysis be incomplete, the facts be not properly observed, rightly classed, the induction will be faulty and without scientific value. Every thing, therefore, depends on the first movement. Observation must be complete, analysis must exhaust the subject, before we have any right to proceed to our inductions.

The defects of most systems of philosophy, the more frequent errors of philosophers, arise from incomplete analysis, and from proceeding to the induction of principles, of laws, before the facts themselves have been duly observed and experimented upon. They catch a glimpse of a fact, here and a fact there, and forthwith proceed to construct a system. As wise were he who with half a dozen bricks should attempt to reconstruct the walls of Babylon.

The instrument of philosophy is the human intelligence; its field is the human consciousness, that world which each man carries in himself,—a world diminutive indeed in the estimation of the unreflecting, but in reality far transcending the bounds of all outward nature.

The first step in philosophizing is to turn the mind in upon itself, upon this interior world of consciousness, and observe, examine with care, patience, and fidelity, its various and fleeting phenomena. The first object is to ascertain what is there. We must not begin by seeking what ought or ought not to be there, what can or cannot be there, how what is there did or did not come there, could or could come there, but simply

* De la Métaphysique d'Aristote. Par Victor Cousin. Paris: 1835. pp. 84–89.

what *is* there. We must seek for facts, not theories, for realities, not hypotheses, to know what is, not to uphold or overturn a belief.

The error of Locke and his school, under the head of method, was in proceeding to discuss the origin of our ideas before determining what are our ideas. He begins by an assumption, an hypothesis. He assumes in the outset that there can be no ideas in the consciousness, which have not either been generated by sensation or manufactured by reflection out of materials furnished by sensation. How does he know this? How knows he but when he comes to inquire he shall strike upon an idea, a fact of consciousness, which no metaphysical alchemy can transmute into a sensation, and which no Vulcan can forge out of materials furnished by the senses? If he should chance to strike upon such an idea, what shall he do with it? Nay, is he not in great danger of overlooking all such ideas, if such ideas there be, or of falsifying them in his account of them? Would he not have acted altogether more wisely, if he had first ascertained what is in the consciousness, before undertaking to tell how what he guesses to be there came there?

The true philosophical method is to begin with the facts of consciousness and ascertain what they are. The study of the facts of consciousness, the analysis and classification of the interior phenomena, give us psychology, as the analysis and classification of the facts or phenomena of the human body give us physiology; or as the analysis and classification of the facts or phenomena of external nature give us physics or the natural sciences.

The only difference there is between metaphysical science and natural science is in their subject-matter, and the instruments by means of which we make our experiments. In the natural sciences we make experiments, or observe, by means of the external senses; in psychology, since the interior phenomena escape the cognizance of the outward senses, we observe or make experiments by means of that inward sense, or interior light, called consciousness.

That there is an internal order of facts as real and as open to our inspection as the facts of the outward world, no man can doubt. We may doubt as to the origin or the validity of our ideas; we may doubt whether we have the means to determine their origin or their validity; but we can never doubt our competency to determine what are our ideas. For instance, we may dispute how we came by the idea of God, and whether there be or be not in the world of reality any thing to respond to our idea: but the fact that we entertain the idea, in case we do entertain it, is a matter that admits of no discussion, and one on which we feel as certain as we do in reference to any fact observed by the outward senses.

There is then an internal order of facts to be observed, and we are capable of observing them. We know as well what is passing in us as we do what is passing without and around us. We know the facts of our consciousness, which we observe by means of an inward sense, as

well as we do the facts of outward nature, observed by means of our five senses. We know that we think, believe, disbelieve, what we think, believe, or disbelieve; that we entertain certain notions and reject certain other notions; as well as we know that we see that lamp on our table, and feel in our fingers the pen with which we are writing.

Be there no mistake on this point. We say nothing now of the genesis of our ideas, or of their ontological value. The idea, so far as we are for the present concerned, may or may not have a sensible or a rational origin, may or may not have a value beyond the sphere of the individual consciousness; it may or may not be responded to in the world of reality. All these questions, very important and very proper in their place, we waive now. All we pretend at this moment is, that there are phenomena of consciousness, and that we can observe them as steadily and as certainly as we can the phenomena of the external world.

When we have examined, carefully ascertained, what are the facts of consciousness, we may then proceed to the question of the origin of our ideas. If we find, among our ideas, ideas which are unquestionably facts of consciousness, certain ideas which could not have been generated by the senses, we have a right to infer that we have another source of ideas than the senses. If we can trace these ideas to the reason, which is not a creature of sensible experience, for without reason sensible experience would be impossible, then we may say, that the reason is a source of ideas, and that we have rational ideas as well as sensible ideas.

Now Cousin admits, contends, that there is an order of facts in the consciousness which owe their origin to sensation; but he also contends that there are facts in the consciousness, which have another origin than that of the senses. He recognises in the consciousness three orders of phenomena, which he refers to three fundamental faculties; 1st. Sensibility; 2d. Activity, or will; 3d. Reason, or understanding. To illustrate these, take the example of a man who studies a book of mathematics.

"Assuredly if this man had no eyes he could not see the book, neither the pages nor the letters; he could not comprehend what he could not read. On the other hand, if he would not give his attention, constrain his eyes to read, and his mind to reflect on what he reads, he would be equally far from comprehending the book. But when his eyes are open, when his mind is attentive, is all done? No. He must also comprehend, seize or think he seizes the truth. To seize, to recognise the truth, is a fact which may indeed require various circumstances and conditions; but in itself it is simple, indecomposable, which cannot be reduced to a mere volition, nor to sensation; and must by this consideration have a separate place in a legitimate classification of the facts which fall under the eye of consciousness.

"I speak of consciousness: but consciousness itself, the perception of consciousness, this fundamental and permanent fact, which nearly all systems commit the error of pretending to explain by a single term, which sensism explains by sensation become exclusive, without inquiring what renders it exclusive, which M. de Biran explains by the will producing a sensation,—this fact, can it take place without the intervention of something else which is neither sensation nor volition, but which perceives them both? To be conscious is to perceive, to rec-

ognise, to know. The word itself (*scientia-cum*) says as much. Not merely do I feel, but I know that I feel; not merely do I will, but I know that I will; and this knowing what I feel, and what I will, is precisely what is meant by consciousness. Either is it necessary then to prove that sensation and volition are endowed with the faculty of perceiving, of knowing themselves, or it is necessary to admit a third term, without which the two others would be as if they were not. Consciousness is a triple phenomenon, in which to feel, to will, and to know, serve as the mutual conditions of one another, and in their connection, simultaneousness, and difference, compose the whole intellectual life. Take away *feeling* and there is no longer either occasion or object for the will, and the will ceases to be exerted. Take away the *will* and there is no longer any real activity, me, or personality, percipient agent, or perceptible object. Take away the power of *knowing*, and there can be no perception whatever, no light to disclose what is,—feeling, willing, and their relation;—consciousness loses its torch and ceases to be.

"To know is therefore unquestionably a fact, distinct, *sui generis*. To what faculty refer it. Call it understanding, spirit, intellect, reason, no matter which, provided it is understood to be an elementary faculty. It is usually termed the reason."*

That the sensibility alone cannot be the source of the facts of consciousness, these remarks of M. Cousin sufficiently demonstrate to all familiar enough with psychological matters, to comprehend them. Aristotle, who, strange enough, has been sometimes considered as favoring sensism, states the same thing. He says the senses cannot give us wisdom, that is, knowledge of causes, principles. "Although the senses are the true means of knowing individual things, they do not tell us the *why* of any thing. For example, they do not teach us *why* fire is hot, they merely tell us that it *is* hot."†

Locke, although his philosophy run into complete sensism, thought he had contended for another source of ideas than that of sensation. According to him, all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. He divides our ideas into two classes, simple and complex, or primary and secondary. Primary ideas come directly from sensation; secondary ideas are produced by the action of the mind or reflection on the primary ideas. Now this indeed makes all ideas in the last analysis come from sensation, for the secondary ideas are merely modifications of the primary. But Locke did not so intend it. He thought he had escaped the sensism of Hobbes, and obtained a rational origin as well as a sensible origin of ideas.

Locke's error consisted merely in his exposition. His account of the matter was erroneous. His mistake doubtless arose from confounding the occasion with the origin of our ideas; and from regarding what is unquestionably the origin of a *part* of any given fact of consciousness, as the origin of the *whole* of it. He understood perfectly well, that before sensible experience there are no facts of consciousness. The sen-

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*Ouvrage Posthume de M. Maine de Biran, publié par M. Cousin. Préface de l'Éditeur, pp. xxix–xxxi.

†L. i. c. i., De la Métaphysique d'Aristote, p. 124.

sibility has always been acted upon before we have an idea. Hence no innate ideas. So far Locke was right. The organs of sensation are affected; a sensation is produced; there is a fact of consciousness,—an idea. Now as sensation chronologically precedes the idea, he concludes that it is its cause, and does not inquire, whether analysis might not detect in the idea an element or elements which sensation could not furnish, but which must have been furnished by the mind itself. Here is the source of his mistake and that of the sensists generally.

Undoubtedly there can be no idea, no fact of consciousness, in which there is not an element derived from sensation. But is the sensible element the *whole* of the fact? Have we any purely simple ideas? Are not all ideas, is not every fact of consciousness, complex? And into every fact of consciousness does there not enter an element which can by no means have a sensible origin? Now these are the questions the sensists should ask. But instead of these questions, they ask, have we any ideas or facts of consciousness that are wholly of a rational origin, in which the senses have no share? Unable to find any fact of consciousness in which sensibility does not intervene, they rashly conclude that all phenomena, and the whole of every phenomenon of consciousness, are derived from sensation.

Every man, we presume it will be admitted, has the idea, conception, or notion of *cause*. The idea of power, of causative force, is unquestionably a fact of human consciousness. We speak of causes, and all our reasonings, and all our actions imply the idea.

Now what is our idea or notion of cause? What do we mean by the term? Invariable antecedence, as Thomas Brown asserts, and as Locke himself also virtually asserts? Interrogate consciousness. The universal belief of mankind is, that cause is a something, a power, force, or agency which produces or creates effects. We will to raise our arm; a muscular contraction succeeds; our arm rises. Does the voluntary effort merely precede the muscular contraction and the rising of the arm, or does it produce them? It produces them, is the universal answer of consciousness.

The idea of cause, as a fact of consciousness, is the idea of a causative, productive, or creative force, power, or agency. What is the origin of this idea? It has been demonstrated over and ever again, that the senses can attain only to phenomena; that they do not and cannot give us information of causes. A piece of wax is placed close to the fire; forthwith it is changed from a solid to a fluid. Here is what all our senses take cognizance of; and of course all that we can attain to by sensation. Nevertheless, we all say and believe that the fire melts the wax, causes, produces the change we observe in its state or condition. An angry fellow has struck us a severe blow on the head; a contusion follows, and we suffer acute pain. Our senses have noted the phenomena; the raising of his hand; its motion towards our head; its contact with our head; the contusion, the pain which have followed; and this is all they have

noted; but this is not all that we believe. We connect these several phenomena together in the relation of cause and effect, and pronounce the blow struck, not merely the antecedent, but the cause of what we suffer. We have then the conception of something which the senses do not perceive. They note the simple phenomena only; but we believe an agency, a causative force, which escapes the senses, has been at work in them; and so does every body. Now this belief is not and cannot be the product of sensation. It may spring up only on the occasion of sensation, of observing the sensible phenomena; but it contains in itself an element not derivable from sensation, and which necessarily transcends sensible experience.

Whence does it originate? We observe the sensible phenomena, and from the *data* they furnish us we infer it, it may be said. But what is that which infers? And how can we draw out of sensible phenomena that which is not contained in them? Would the mind unconscious of the idea, and unable to furnish it from its own resources, ever dream of inferring it from *data* which do neither contain it, nor in any way indicate it? If the understanding were previously furnished with the idea, we could easily conceive of its applying it to the relation of the phenomena in question; but we confess that we cannot conceive how an understanding made up of purely sensible elements, as it must be if sensism be true, can infer a non-sensible idea from merely sensible phenomena. The logic by which it can be done we have not yet learned.

Chronologically we admit sensation precedes the idea of cause; we even admit that without sensation, without sensible experience of some individual case of causation, we should never have had the idea of cause. Never till we have witnessed the phenomena do we conceive of their relation, or of any relation of cause and effect. But as soon as we witness the phenomena, we find and apply the idea. The experience to which we are indebted for the first development of the idea is probably internal experience. We obtain the idea of cause by detecting ourselves in the act of causing. We will, and perceive that our will produces effects; and from this act of willing which is performed in ourselves, in the bosom of our consciousness, the idea of cause is probably first suggested to us.

But if this be a true account of the historical origin of the idea of cause, it proves that it comes not from sensation, nor from reflection operating on sensible materials. There are in the case of voluntary causation, the me, or personality, willing or making a voluntary effort, and the motion of a part of the body in obedience to the will. We will to raise our arm. Here we must note, 1st, the volition; 2d, the muscular contraction; 3d, the rising of the arm. Now the senses take cognizance of the rising of the arm, and, if you please, of the muscular contraction; but not of the volition, much less of the fact that the volition is the cause of the phenomena succeeding it. The sensation, we are conscious of in this case, is the result of the muscular effort, not of the voluntary

effort. How then by sensation alone are we to connect our volition, or more properly ourselves, with the muscular contraction, and the rising of our arm, as their cause? We are conscious of the fact. We want no reasoning to prove to us that the connexion implied does really exist. We cannot for one moment doubt that we are the cause of the phenomena in question. Whence comes this feeling of certainty, this conviction, this conception of ourselves as a cause? It cannot come from sensation.

Grant that we are a cause, that we do and can produce effects, grant us sensibility, and nothing more; we ask, how are we to know that we are a cause? We are indeed conscious of causing, producing, and we need no argument to prove to us that we are a cause; but we are conscious only by virtue of the fact that we are intelligent as well as causative. Activity of itself does not necessarily imply intelligence. We can easily conceive of a causative force which shall cause, but be unconscious of causing. Beyond the me as a causative force, as we have seen in the extract from Cousin's preface to Maine de Biran, there must be intelligence or reason, in order to render us conscious of our own acts. Were we unconscious beings, we could obtain no idea of cause from the fact that we ourselves cause or produce; for we should take no cognizance, have no conception of our own acts. Mere activity, or power of causing, which is the characteristic element of the me, or personality, of that which we mean when we say *I*, or *me*, does not then alone of itself suggest the idea of cause. It can suggest it only to an intelligent me, or personality. As we said of sensation, so may we say of the activity. Were we not endowed with the power of causing, producing effects, and did we never exert this power, we probably should never be conscious of the idea of cause; we should never obtain the notion or conception of a causative force; nevertheless, the idea itself, as a fact of consciousness, contains an element which it is as impossible to derive from activity as from sensation.

It may be said that we *feel* ourselves produce: and as the phenomena of feeling are ranged under the head of sensibility, it may be thought that the idea of cause, as obtained from the exertion of the will, is after all obtained from sensation. But we do not, in fact, feel ourselves produce. The feeling, we are conscious of in every creative act we attribute to ourselves, is, as we have said, of the muscular effort, not of the voluntary effort. Moreover, feeling cannot go beyond itself. Grant merely that we are conscious, capable merely of feeling, and of perceiving or knowing that we feel, and all we can know is simply our own feelings. The cause, or causes of what we feel must be beyond the range of our conceptions. A blow is struck on our head. We feel the pain it produces. But all we know is simply the pain we feel. In this case, all the multiplied causes around us, and ever acting on us, the external world with all its endless variety, would be reduced to mere sensations, to mere modifications of our sensibility. They could never be regarded

by us as out of us, existing independently of us, and causing in us the sensations we are conscious of receiving, and which we are in the habit of ascribing to their action upon our organs of sense.

But even grant that sensibility may attain to causes, we must still demand intelligence as the ground, the indispensable condition of sensibility. In the first place, mere sensation can of itself shape itself into no proposition. There must be the me, the personality, the invariable something we call *ourself*, to receive the sensations, and to give unity to the impressions received through the organs of sense. In the second place, and this is the point now under consideration, we must not only have the capacity of receiving sensations, but of knowing them. It is not enough that we feel, but we must know that we feel. Take away the intelligence, the faculty of knowing, which can no more be confounded with the sensibility, or capacity of receiving sensations, than the capacity of receiving sensations can be confounded with the activity, or power of producing effects, and sensibility itself becomes impossible. Intelligence is always at the bottom of sensation. What were pain if unknown? joy or grief unperceived by the joying or grieving subject? Simple organic impressions, or affections, of which the recipient of them would have no consciousness. Pleasure and pain, joy and grief, if we are unconscious of them, are for us as though they were not. Nay, they are not for us at all. They can exist for us only on the condition that we know as well as feel. We must not only feel them, but know that we feel them. Though both sensibility and activity combine to suggest to us the idea of cause, and are indispensable conditions of its suggestions, neither of them nor both of them can therefore suggest it, without the intervention of another element, diverse from them both, and to which they both must look for their light.

This will appear still more conclusive, if we remark that we not only have the idea of cause, such as we have described it, that we not only believe ourselves the cause of our own acts, and that certain bodies are the cause of the motions we observe in certain other bodies; but we also have the idea of the principle of causality; we believe that every phenomenon whatever that begins to exist must have a cause. We believe that nothing begins to exist without a cause. Now this belief may or may not be well-founded. This principle, may or may not be true. Whether it be or be not, is not now the question. What we allege is, that we do entertain the principle. It is not in our power to reject it. All languages imply it; all reasoning involves it; the whole juridical action of society is based upon it; and it lies at the bottom of that curiosity which leads us to seek a cause for every phenomenon we observe.

Whence the introduction of this principle into the consciousness? What is its origin? It cannot come from sensation, even admitting sensation is of itself competent to suggest the idea of cause; for sensation at best can suggest only the notion of individual causes, and only of the

particular causes of which it has had experience. Suppose the senses really do inform us that the fire melts the wax, give us the idea we have that it is the fire which produces the change we observe in the wax, when brought into contact with it; still, we ask, how is it possible for them to generalize this notion, which is the notion of a concrete, individual cause, into an abstract and universal principle? How from the particular cause, the fact that fire melts wax, go to the universal and necessary principle, that no phenomenon can begin to exist without a cause? Any induction broader than the premises, all logicians will assure us, is illegitimate. The conclusion must be contained in the premises, or it will be without validity. But the general, the universal, the abstract is not contained in the particular, the concrete, and consequently cannot be inferred from it. From the fact that the fire melts wax, no man would ever dream of inferring that no phenomena can begin to exist but by virtue of a cause.

Inferences from sensibility cannot go beyond the experience of sensibility. Reduce man to simple sensation, leave him only his senses, and whatever power to attain to causes you may claim for the senses, he can obtain a notion of no cause which has not passed under the observation of his senses. Now nobody can pretend that the senses have taken cognizance of all that is; consequently nobody can pretend that the principle, nothing can begin to exist without a cause, is a fact of sensible experience. In order that it should be a fact of sensible experience, we must with our senses have observed all things which exist, all possibilities of existence, and all conditions of existence. We have not done this. The principle of which we speak is not then a fact of sensible experience. Yet it is unquestionably a fact of consciousness. There are facts of consciousness then which cannot be traced to a sensible origin.

Nor can the principle, no phenomenon can begin to exist but by virtue of a cause, be derived from the notion of our own causality. The cause which we ourselves are is always conceived as voluntary and personal. The idea of cause which we obtain from the consciousness of the fact, that we create or produce, is the idea of ourselves as causes. It is by no means the conception of cause in general, of any cause, in fact, existing out of the bosom of our own consciousness. Now, how can we pass from this purely individual and personal cause, to general and impersonal causes,—to causes which we are not, and which stretch over the whole domain of all actual existence and of all possible existence. From the fact, that we know ourselves to be the cause of our own volitions, by what means are we led to believe that the fire melts the wax, and especially to adopt the principle that every phenomenon, which begins to exist, exists by virtue of some cause?

The idea of cause obtained from the consciousness of our own causative force is merely the idea of ourselves as causes, not the idea of causes out of us, of cause in general. It is of ourselves as causes, and

only of ourselves, that we conceive. Now let us transfer this conception of cause to the external world, as we must, if from this conception we are to derive, consciously or unconsciously, all our notions of causality, and the causes, we may fancy we see at work in that external world, must be regarded by us as ourselves,—will be merely ourselves projected. We are in this case the cause at work there. We create or produce all the phenomena we are accustomed to represent to ourselves and to others, as existing out of us. The sun, moon, and stars, with their light and glory; the earth with its variety; the ocean with its majesty; men and women with their infinitely varied actions and sentiments, with their love which charms and blesses us, their hatred and opposition which grieve and overwhelm us; yea, God himself with the solemn awe of his being, the unsearchable riches of his grace, and the unfathomable depth of his wisdom;—what are all these but ourselves taken as the object of our thoughts and emotions? We are therefore the only existence; we are the universal Creator. We make God, Man, and Nature. We are all, and in all, and there is only we. To this conclusion we must come, if we have only the conception of our own causality, out of which to form the notion of cause in general. But this conclusion is rejected by common sense, and nobody can entertain it even for a moment, unless system-mad indeed,—and system-madness cannot have affected the race. But even if this idea could be entertained, it would not relieve us; because it is not the idea of cause which actually exists in the consciousness. It is not the notion of cause which mankind entertain. Now we are not inquiring what is the true idea of cause, what idea of cause men ought to have, but the idea they really do have, together with its real origin.

The remarks we have thus far made will show, if we have made ourselves understood, that we have the idea of cause; that we conceive of cause always as something which creates, or produces effects; and that this idea, whether it be true or false, cannot be derived from the experience of the senses, nor from the experience of the activity; but must be derived from the intelligence, the reason, or whatever that is in us, by virtue of which we are knowing, as well as feeling and acting beings. It must therefore be an intuition of the reason. It is the reason that sees the relation of cause and effect in the phenomena presented by experience; and the reason that furnishes us the principle, that nothing can begin to exist but by virtue of a cause. If we are correct in this, it must be admitted, that there are facts in the consciousness which have not an empirical origin, but a rational origin.

This conclusion may be established by analyzing several other facts of consciousness. Now it is unquestionably a fact, that we entertain the notion of space. We do never conceive of a body as existing, without conceiving of it as existing somewhere. No doubt this conception of the *where* springs up only on the occasion of the presentation of some body occupying space; but does the idea of body not only suggest but

originate it? Space is never conceived as a part of body, and we always distinguish it from the body which fills it. Give the body or take it away, the idea of space, once suggested, remains unaffected. Has it a sensible origin? Through which of our senses do we receive it? Can we see it, feel it, hear it, taste it, smell it, touch it? Locke indeed pretends to derive the idea of space from the senses of touch and sight; but as he himself contends the senses of sight and touch can take cognizance of only bodies, from which he carefully distinguishes space, and from which every body distinguishes it, it is evident that it must come from some other source. That it springs up in the consciousness along with the conception of body, we readily admit. But it cannot be derived from our conception of body, because without the conception of space we can form no conception of body. Body, in our conception of it, is always extended; but how conceive of extension without space? Nor does the idea of space come from the activity, that is, it is not a creation of our will. Supposing that we could create the idea by an effort of the will, we should still need to have the conception before we could will to create it. To will, always implies a conception of something as the object of the voluntary effort to be put forth. We see more or less clearly what it is that we would create. We do not will we know not what. So then if we could produce the conception by an effort of the will, its origin would not be accounted for. Before we will to have the idea of space, we must have conceived of space. There remains therefore only the reason to be regarded as the source of the conception. The idea of space is an intuition of the reason. The reason furnishes the idea of space on the occasion of the experience of a body occupying space. It is not the senses, nor the activity, that tell us that body must be somewhere, but the reason. Where does the reason obtain this information, but from its own resources?

The idea of the infinite is another fact of consciousness, which cannot be introduced into the consciousness by sensation. If we had no experience of finite things, we should doubtless never have been conscious of a conception of the infinite. But the conception of the infinite is not derived from the experience of the finite. Sensible experience,—which is all the experience which now concerns us,—can give us nothing beyond its own objects, and these objects are all finite, individual, concrete. Multiply these objects into one another as we will, and the product can be at most only the indefinite, never the infinite; the undefined, not the undefinable. Induction can draw from particulars only the particular; for it can draw from them only what is in them. Suppose then the finite is given by sensible experience,—a fact we by no means admit, except for the argument's sake,—we cannot conclude from that to the infinite, unless the infinite be in the finite. But the finite with the infinite in it is not the finite but the infinite. Either then we have not the idea of the infinite, or all our ideas are not derived from the experience of the senses. But we have the idea, as we may all satisfy ourselves by

interrogating our own consciousness. Therefore we have another than an empirical source of ideas. Comes this idea of the infinite from the will? Certainly not; for we must conceive an object before we can will to create it. There remains, then, only the reason as its source. The reason furnishes the idea. It is an intuition of the reason furnished in point of fact, though obscurely perceived, contemporaneously with the idea of the finite.

We pretend not, in these examples we have adduced, that our demonstration is complete, that our reasoning leaves nothing to be desired. We are indicating a method, rather than constructing a philosophy; and the space to which we have felt ourselves restricted has not permitted us to say all that we could say, much less what probably would be necessary to satisfy our readers. More than all this, we shall have to return upon all the ideas of which we have spoken, in our future numbers, as we proceed in our exposition of the Eclectic Philosophy. All we have thus far attempted is simply to show that Cousin's method is really the experimental method, and to point out what is the order in which the several metaphysical questions should be taken up; and that by taking them up in their proper order, and applying the experimental method faithfully to the study of the facts of consciousness, we shall be led to the conclusion, that there are facts of consciousness which have a rational origin, and not, as some pretend, that all our ideas have an exclusively empirical origin.

We have asked two questions:—First, What are the facts of consciousness with their actual characters? Second, What is their origin? We have found that though sensibility and activity concur in the generation of the facts of consciousness, yet that without intelligence, or reason, there is no fact of consciousness, and that the ideas of space, the infinite, of cause, and especially the principle that no phenomenon can begin to exist but by virtue of a cause, are pure intuitions of the reason. So much we think we have done; at least pointed out the way by which our readers may easily do so much for themselves. But admitting that we have done all this, we have not touched the main metaphysical question. The great problem remains as yet unsolved. Suppose it granted that we have the idea of cause, the idea of the infinite, the idea of space; suppose these ideas to be facts of consciousness, to possess the characters under which we have spoken of them; and to have the origin we have assigned them; it is still necessary to ask, what is their validity? Is there really any cause to respond to our notion of cause? Is the infinite a reality? This is the ontological question.

Now we all are conscious of entertaining the idea or notion of a God: most men, if not all men, believe in a God. The idea of God is then, we will suppose, a fact of consciousness. Psychologically, then, it is true that there is a God. But this is not enough. Is it ontologically true that there is a God? That is, is there out of us, independent of us, really existing a being which answers to our idea of God? We believe,

all men believe, there is an external world. Is this belief well founded? The belief is a fact of consciousness; but is it a chimera, a mere illusion, having nothing in the world of reality to respond to it? Here, it is evident, is a momentous question. It is a question of no less magnitude than what is the validity of human beliefs. It is the question which under some form or other has ever tormented the souls of philosophers; and indeed, not of philosophers only, it torments the souls of all men. Can we answer this question? Vain are all our pretensions to philosophy, if we cannot. We want no philosophy to teach us that we believe in our own existence, in Nature, in God,—to tell us what are the facts of our consciousness, nor even what is their origin. These are matters we know already, or can easily dispense with knowing. But what is their validity? Are we cheated, duped? or is there that immense world of being around, beyond, and above us, which is revealed to us by the light of the reason shining in us? We have the idea of God. Is there a God who exists out of us, independent of us, who is not our conception, but the object of our conception? We have the conception of a life beyond this life, an immortal life, for which we hope, in which we believe, and to which when overburdened with the sorrows of this, we sometimes look forward with inexpressible ongings. Is there such a life? We have the conception of Duty; we feel that some things we ought to do, and some things we ought not to do; that we are under a Law from which we cannot withdraw ourselves. Are we deceived? These and such like questions every reflecting man is ever asking himself. The soul grapples with these mighty questions, and experiences her bitterest grief when she feels herself unable to answer them. Can they be answered? This, we say again, is the true metaphysical question; in comparison with this all other questions are insignificant, and have no importance, save as the answer to them paves the way for an answer to this.

END OF VOLUMME II.

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